Abstract Established in 1980, the Spanish Constitutional Court displayed a pacifying function and remained in a discreet position, relatively immune to external polarization, during its first years of existence. Already in the first decade, certain signs of polarization began to appear. However, the last fifteen years have witnessed an increasing polarization around the Court. This is mainly due to exogenous causes, which have produced a change in the very self-understanding of the Court. The article begins with some conceptual clarifications, in order to highlight the inherent balance of Constitutional Justice. The author then devotes an epigraph to examine the practices that have contributed to polarization from the outside (distribution of appointments by quotas, transfer of social polarization, excessive recusals, political criticism and direct legislative disturbance of its peaceful functioning). Thirdly, he refers to the judicial practices that, as a consequence of the external intervention, seem to have fed back the polarization (leaks, delays, public exposure of the judges and overreaching of jurisdiction). The author concludes with some more general reflections on the relationship between the external and internal causes of polarization around the Court.