General Philosophy Of Science Research Articles

Interview: Paul Hoyningen-Huene

Paul Hoyningen-Huene was born in Pfronten/Allgäu, West Germany, in 1946. He studied Physics and Philosophy in Munich (1966-1971), Mathematical Physics in London (1971-72) and Theoretical Physics in Zurich (1975). The theoretical physicist and philosopher taught in Switzerland (1976-1998) and was a visiting scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with Thomas S. Kuhn (1984-85). Afterward, he published Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science (1993), an original neo-Kantian interpretation of Thomas Kuhn’s ideas. His numerous articles focus on Logic, the Philosophy of Biology, the Philosophy of Physical Sciences and the General Philosophy of Science. Throughout his career, Hoyningen-Huene also wrote about Paul Feyerabend’s thesis concerning the rationality of scientific development and theory comparison, Scientific Realism, Reductionism, Ethics of Science and Historiography of Science. The German thinker founded the Center for Philosophy and Ethics of Science at the Leibniz Universität Hannover (Germany) and intended to summarize his main ideas on the nature of scientific knowledge in the book Systematicity: The Nature of Science (2013).

PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY: DYNAMICS OF SCIENCE DEVELOPMENT

The article reveals subject discussions on the development of philosophy and methodology of science. The peculiarities of philosophical and methodological disciplines, which give the opportunity to study the theory of knowledge and its structure, are determined. Emphasis is placed on the need to understand metaphysical, epistemological and ethical issues related to the practice and goals of modern science. Emphasis is placed on interpretation, which states that knowledge about the universe comes through scientific research. The process of development of science, which takes place gradually and dates back to antiquity, is singled out. Reflections on human knowledge through the figures of world-famous philosophers are presented and an explanation of the goals and methods of science is offered. The main focus is on the study of empiricists who have taken as their starting point the central task of understanding the great advantages of the natural sciences. In fact, they suggested that the search for the theory of the scientific method was carried out by Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, et al. − can be done more thoroughly with the help of mathematical logic. Methods and results of the work of philosophy and methodology of science require constant replenishment of reliable knowledge about the world and man, but taking into account productive work on yourself. The focus is on the fact that some philosophers continue to work on issues that do not break the relationship with the natural sciences. Thus, exploring, for example, the nature of space and time or the fundamental features of life. The general philosophy of science, on the other hand, seeks to shed light on the general features of the sciences, continuing the research begun in antiquity using Aristotle's discourses on logic and method. It is noted that methodology is a rational-reflective mental activity aimed at studying ways to transform human reality-methods − rational actions that must be taken to solve a problem or achieve a goal. The application of methods is carried out in any field of scientific and cognitive activities. Methodology of science carries out research, search, development and systematization of methods used in this activity to obtain scientific knowledge and general principles that guide it. The main imperative of philosophical science is the need to teach people to think empirically, creatively, exploratoryly and independently.

On Laws of Politics and How to Establish Them

ABSTRACTAlfred Cuzán proposed five “laws of politics” that allegedly govern elections in democracies. Drawing from insights in the general philosophy of science and the philosophy of the social sciences, I argue that—although his empirical evidence is impressive—he failed to develop a convincing argument for calling the five theses “laws.” This article discusses other examples that often are claimed to be “laws of politics” and describes the global picture supporting this analysis.

Feng Shui and the Demarcation Project

The vast majority of well-informed philosophers of science and scientists who are clearly (uncontroversially) scientists are able to extensionally differentiate between almost all scientific and non-scientific practices, disciplines, theories, attitudes, modes of procedure, etc., and do so or would do so in much the same way. This legitimately leads to the conclusion that the main problem of scientific demarcation has already, in a sense, been solved, although an explicative integrated account of that solution has not yet been given. Doing so is the goal of the project proposed in Fernandez-Beanato (Journal for General Philosophy of Science 51(3):375–391, 2020b). To advance toward the solution of the scientific demarcation problem, this article executes part of that project: a first step for scientific demarcation is the composition of a broad “list” (set) of accepted characteristics, conditions, or properties of science, or indicators of scientificity (most of them, by themselves, unnecessary and insufficient) which might be collectively used to establish a demarcation between those theories, cognitive fields, practices, etc. which are scientific and those which are not. This article deals with feng shui as a clear case of a non-science. It defines feng shui and then lists properties of science that feng shui possesses and properties of science that it lacks. This article then shows that the proposed demarcatory list demarcates feng shui as non-scientific, in agreement with the current philosophical and scientific consensus.

Philosophy of sustainability experimentation _ experimental legacy, normativity and transfer of evidence

The recent proliferation of types and accounts of experimentation in sustainability science still lacks philosophical reflection. The present paper introduces this burgeoning topic to the philosophy of science by identifying key notions and dynamics in sustainability experimentation, by discussing taxonomies of sustainability experimentation and by focusing on barriers to the transfer of evidence. It integrates three topics: the philosophy of experimentation; the sustainability science literature on experimentation; and discussions on values in science coming from the general philosophy of science, the social sciences, and sustainability science. The aim is to improve understanding of how sustainability experimentation has evolved, from a broader picture of the history and philosophy of science, with a specific focus on understanding evidence production and how evidence traveling in and from sustainability experiments can be improved, particularly in the context of complex and pervasive normative commitments of the research. By engaging in these topics, this research is one of the first philosophical accounts of sustainability experimentation, contributing both to the knowledge on specific philosophies of science and to the further development of an evidence-based sustainability science through a better understanding of the barriers to more relevant and usable knowledge.

Thinking about laws in political science (and beyond)

AbstractThere are several theses in political science that are usually explicitly called ‘laws’. Other theses are generally thought of as laws, but often without being explicitly labelled as such. Still other claims are well‐supported and arguably interesting, while no one would be tempted to call them laws. This situation raises philosophical questions: which theses deserve to be called laws and which not? And how should we decide about this? In this paper we develop and motivate a strategy for thinking about laws in political science which integrates two core concepts: spatio‐temporal stability and social mechanisms. The proposed strategy is a set of guidelines that political scientists can use to reflect on and argue about specific cases within their discipline, not a clear‐cut demarcation criterion. We defend and motivate this strategy and apply it to two cases (one with respect to state repression, one about parliamentary elections). After we have developed and motivated our strategy for political science, we show that our proposal is relevant for other disciplines in the social sciences. We explain how our views fit into critical realism and embed them in the debate on laws in general philosophy of science and in the philosophy of the social sciences.

A PLURALIST INTERPRETATION OF THOMAS KUHN’S PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION

espanolEs habitual encontrar en la bibliografia filosofica en torno a la figura de Thomas Kuhn la atribucion a este autor de una concepcion filosofica renida con el realismo (cientifico), y en especial una posicion de tipo idealista que hunde sus raices en la distincion kantiana entre “mundo-en-si mismo” y “mundo de las apariencias”. En este articulo defiendo que la concepcion filosofica de Kuhn admite una interpretacion pluralista que encaja mejor con su filosofia de la ciencia general. Ademas, esta interpretacion pluralista de la posicion filosofica de Kuhn tambien permite ofrecer una explicacion alternativa del fenomeno de la inconmensurabilidad, cuya caracteristica central estaria representada por la disparidad taxonomica y ontologica que existe entre especialidades cientificas rivales o sucesivas. EnglishIt is commonplace in philosophical literature to attribute to Thomas Kuhn a philosophical view at odds with (scientific) realism, especially an idealist position rooted in the Kantian distinction between “world-in-itself” and “world of appearances”. In this paper I will argue that Kuhn’s philosophical view is amenable to a pluralist interpretation that fits better into his general philosophy of science. In addition, this pluralist approach to Kuhn’s philosophical position also provides an alternative view on incommensurability, whose central feature is represented by the taxonomical and ontological disparity that exists between rival or successive scientific specialties.

Teorías de alcance intermedio, práctica científica y metateoría estructuralista

The present work is immersed in the context of the contemporary philosophy of science, especially of the semanticist philosophy of the structuralist metatheory. Objectively, the work aims to reestablish the dialogue between the general philosophy of science and the special philosophy developed by scientists concerned with the fundamentals of their discipline, in this case, with sociologists. After presenting the Mertonian notion of middle range theory, the conception of theory that offers ME and, from that conception, a way of conceiving both global intertheoretical relations and intertheoretical change will be presented. Finally, the analysis of the use of the notion of middle range theory in scientific practice will be made, analyzing the specific case of sociological research about organizations.

Pluralism and anarchism in quantum physics: Paul Feyerabend's writings on quantum physics in relation to his general philosophy of science

This paper aims to show that the development of Feyerabend's philosophical ideas in the 1950s and 1960s largely took place in the context of debates on quantum mechanics.In particular, he developed his influential arguments for pluralism in science in discussions with the quantum physicist David Bohm, who had developed an alternative approach to quantum physics which (in Feyerabend's perception) was met with a dogmatic dismissal by some of the leading quantum physicists. I argue that Feyerabend's arguments for theoretical pluralism and for challenging established theories were connected to his objections to the dogmatism and conservatism he observed in quantum physics.However, as Feyerabend gained insight into the physical details and historical complexities which led to the development of quantum mechanics, he gradually became more modest in his criticisms. His writings on quantum mechanics especially engaged with Niels Bohr; initially, he was critical of Bohr's work in quantum mechanics, but in the late 1960s, he completely withdrew his criticism and even praised Bohr as a model scientist. He became convinced that however puzzling quantum mechanics seemed, it was methodologically unobjectionable – and this was crucial for his move towards ‘anarchism’ in philosophy of science.

“So … who is your audience?”

To whom, if anyone, are the writings of philosophers of science relevant? There are three potential groups of people: Philosophers, Scientists, and Interested Citizens, within and beyond the academy. I argue that our discipline is potentially relevant to all three, but I particularly press the claims of the Interested Citizens. My essay is in dialogue with a characteristically insightful lecture given thirty years ago by Arthur Fine. Addressing the Philosophy of Science Association as its president, Fine argued that general philosophy of science was dead, and that all the action lay in the philosophy of the special sciences. I try to identify what was correct about Fine’s diagnosis, while supplementing his message by describing fruitful projects that have since emerged. I also hope to share his subversive spirit.

Evolutionary Philosophy of Science: A New Image of Science and Stance towards General Philosophy of Science

An important question facing contemporary philosophy of science is whether the natural sciences in terms of their historical records exhibit distinguishing developmental patterns or structures. At least two philosophical stances are possible in answering this question. The first pertains to the plurality of the individual sciences. From this stance, the various sciences are analyzed individually and compared with one another in order to derive potential commonalities, if any, among them. The second stance involves a general philosophy of science in which a thorough theory of the natural sciences is developed. The latter stance strives to account for more than possible commonalities among the sciences but also to provide a broad-spectrum philosophical framework to account for, or to explicate, the nature of science itself and its progress. In this paper, the second stance is taken in which an evolutionary philosophy of science is proposed. To that end, Thomas Kuhn’s evolutionary philosophy of science is initially discussed and critiqued. An evolutionary philosophy of science is then proposed based on a revision of Kuhn’s evolutionary philosophy of science in terms of George Gaylord Simpson’s various tempos and modes for biological evolution. Next, two historical case studies from the biological sciences are reconstructed to illustrate the robustness of the proposed evolutionary philosophy of science for explicating the progress of the natural sciences. A concluding section discusses the proposed evolutionary philosophy of science with respect to providing a broad-spectrum framework or general philosophy of science for understanding the nature and progress of the natural sciences.

Thought Experiments, Formalization, and Disagreement

In the last decade, philosophers have offered a number of proposals concerning the logical form of hypothetical cases, or thought experiments, as these are used for purposes of testing philosophical claims. In this paper, I discuss what the desiderata for a formal proposal are. Employing a comparison with general philosophy of science, I suggest that one important desideratum is to highlight recurrent patterns of disagreement surrounding cases. I advocate a proposal in propositional modal logic which, I argue, better meets this desideratum than competing proposals. I also sketch how this proposal may be extended into more fine grained analyses, employing counterfactual conditionals yet avoiding certain problems due to so-called "deviant realizations".

Scientific Realism and Quantum Mechanics: Revisiting a Controversial Relation

ABSTRACTThe article examines the controversial relation of scientific realism with quantum mechanics. To this end, two distinct discussions are invoked: the discussion about ‘realism’ in the context of quantum mechanics and the discussion about ‘scientific realism’ in the context of the general philosophy of science. The aim is to distinguish them in order, first, to argue that the former—revolving around ‘local realism’ and the theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker—unjustifiably identifies realism with features of a particular worldview, and thereby fosters the impression that the failure of ‘local realism’ in quantum experiments constitutes a failure of scientific realism too; and, second, in light of the latter discussion, to claim that scientific realism and quantum mechanics can be compatible—there is ground for dealing with quantum measurement simply as a physical mind-independent interaction. Therefore, a realist approach to the theory is possible despite its notorious measurement problem, even if the issue of its interpretation is still disputed.

Talking about something real: the concept of truth in multimodal non-fiction books for young people

Within social semiotics we discuss how different semiotic resources alone or in multimodal texts are used to communicate truth. This is one of the parts of the multimodal theory that are least developed and discussed. The discussion on truth within social semiotics is mainly focused on the relationship between a corresponding type of truth that is common in natural science and a more everyday perception of truth. This can give an incomplete and stereotypical image of how truth is portrayed. This essay attempts to nuance the picture by suggesting that our theoretical conceptions of how we portray truth visually can be nuanced and developed by combining the theory of multimodality with categories of truth taken from the general philosophy of science. This approach will be illustrated by examples from Norwegian non-fiction books aimed at young people.

Dynamics of scientific change and cognitive science. An epistemological update / Dinámica de cambio y ciencias cognitivas. Una puesta al día epistemológica

I explore two proposals on the dynamics of scientific change in the general philosophy of science and I evaluate the extent to which they can be applied in the cognitive sciences. I do this by paying special attention to the youth and diversity which characterize this field of scientific research. Firstly, I distinguish two kinds of uses of Kuhn’s work: direct but loose applications of Kuhnean concepts to the history of cognitive science, on the one hand, and indirect applications of certain aspects of Kuhnean ideas, on the other hand. Secondly, I criticize their pertinence on the basis of the secondary role which theories play in the field. Finally, I defend the fertility of the concept of ‘research tradition’ proposed by Laudan, by focusing on the previously highlighted set of idiosyncratic characteristics of the cognitive sciences.

A systematic companion to “neoclassical” philosophy of science

After the demise of logical empiricism in the late fifties of the past century, philosophy of science entered a sort of Kuhnian revolutionary phase. Both its central problems and the methods used to address them underwent a profound change; under the pressure of the ‘‘new’’ philosophy of science—and of the various historical, sociological, cultural, or feminist approaches—the way of doing philosophy championed by Carnap and Popper was progressively abandoned by many scholars interested in the study of science. Today, it is unclear whether this revolutionary phase is coming to an end, and if a new paradigm is in sight. That this may be the case is suggested by the appearance of some advanced introductions to the philosophy of science, which aim at replacing classical work like those by Carnap (1966) and Hempel (1966) as manuals for the present generation of scholars. These new contributions provide the (advanced) student, and the expert as well, with a firm grip of what, following Kuipers (2001), we may call the ‘‘neoclassical’’ approach to the philosophy of science: briefly, updating and revitalizing the traditional analytic account to tackle the hot problems of postpositivist philosophy of science. With this book, Gerhard Schurz provides probably the most complete advanced introduction to neoclassical philosophy of science appeared so far. Philosophy of science: An unified approach is an impressive overview of the main issues in general philosophy of science, organized by topics and written in a extremely rigorous and systematic style. To be sure, Schurz’s book is a deliberately biased one: To dispel any doubt, right at the beginning he declares himself ‘‘a follower of logically and empirically oriented philosophers of science such as Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach, and Stegmuller in the German speaking area’’ (xvii). Thus, it is easy

Realism, functions, and the a priori: Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of science

This paper presents the main ideas of Cassirer's general philosophy of science, focusing on the two aspects of his thought that—in addition to being the most central ideas in his philosophy of science—have received the most attention from contemporary philosophers of science: his theory of the a priori aspects of physical theory, and his relation to scientific realism.

Where is philosophy of medicine headed? A report of the International Advanced Seminar in the Philosophy of Medicine (IASPM).

A major part of philosophy of medicine, although not all of it, is a branch of philosophy of science. This part is not only currently emerging. Many important contributions belong to this field, like Boorse’s ‘Health as a theoretical concept’ [1], which is probably the most cited article in the philosophy of medicine. Some contributions, although relevant for philosophy of science, are entrenched in bioethics, medical humanities, and historical and social studies of science. Other contributions come from fields such as philosophy of biology, general philosophy of science, philosophy of neuroscience and philosophy of cognitive science, and can rightly be considered pieces of philosophy of medicine. This is so either because they thoroughly scrutinize examples of diseases or because they investigate scientific methods not necessarily specific to, but mostly used in, medical science. Certainly, questions about biological functions, causality, evidence, mechanisms and decision making are not only relevant to the study of medicine, but their specificity to this field makes them important for philosophy of medicine as well. The result is institutional dispersion. Despite the existence of a bunch of periodicals, there is no prominent journal in the philosophy of medicine as a branch of philosophy of science. Academic positions in this field often demand competence in bioethics and although no master’s programme in the world is yet dedicated to this specialty alone, some are emerging. Philosophers in this field, in early career or not, do not have many opportunities to gather for international events: the International Philosophy of Medicine Roundtable organizes the only one specific to the field. Yet philosophers of medicine significantly contribute papers and symposia to events such as the European Advanced Seminar in the Philosophy of the Life Science; the International Society for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology; the Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science; the Philosophy of Science Association; and the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice meetings. Some sessions in the meetings of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Healthcare have been dedicated to philosophy of medicine as a part of philosophy of science. Recently, a significant introduction to philosophy of medicine has been published: the Philosophy of Medicine: Handbook of Philosophy of Science [2]. Apart from dedicated journals such as Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy and Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy – which has significantly drifted towards bioethics for some years – some others have contributed special issues dedicated to philosophy of medicine, as the Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, and more accept from time to time a paper very relevant for the philosophy of medicine, such as Biology and Philosophy; Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Part C; and History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences. To contribute to a consolidation of the field, the International Advanced Seminar in the Philosophy of Medicine (IASPM) was created. The IASPM is a biannual event, the first session of which has been held in Paris from 20 June to 22 June 2013. It is sponsored by a consortium of five research centres: the Center for the Humanities and Health at King’s College (London, UK); the Institut fur Geschichte, Theorie und Ethik der Medizin at Johannes Gutenberg (Mainz, Germany); the European School of Molecular Medicine (Milan, Italy); the IHPST at Pantheon-Sorbonne (Paris, France); and the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at Pittsburgh (USA). The Paris session gathered 22 advanced students or junior scholars in the philosophy of medicine: 11 were selected from each partner university and 11 others were selected by standard open call for contributions and peer review. Four senior philosophers gave talks and three others coordinated workshop sessions along with three PhD students. Sixty registered participants attended the event. The topic of the conference was ‘Unity and autonomy in the philosophy of medicine’. It was purposely not very specific, so that bs_bs_banner

Perspectives on Structuralism

This issue of Erkenntnis collects papers presented at the international conference Perspectives on Structuralism held in February 2012 at the Center for Advanced Studies of LMU Munich. The editors gratefully acknowledge the generous support from the Center for Advanced Studies. Moreover, we are most grateful to a number of referees on whose judgment our editing decisions have been based. The Munich conference on the structuralist approach was motivated, first, by novel developments concerning the structuralist meta-theory and, second, by the relevance of ongoing research for current issues in general philosophy of science. The range of topics addressed is broad—including theoretical terms and concepts, causation, explanation, social processes, the syntactic approach to scientific theories, quantitative science studies, and the dynamics of science. Below, we give a brief introduction to the basic concepts of the structuralist approach, addressed to the uninitiated reader. We take this special issue to evidence that structuralist insights and methods remain applicable well beyond the reconstruction of an empirical theory’s mathematical structure.

The extended cognition thesis: Its significance for the philosophy of (cognitive) science

While the extended cognition (EC) thesis has gained more followers in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind and knowledge, our main goal is to discuss a different area of significance of the EC thesis: its relation to philosophy of science. In this introduction, we outline two major areas: (I) The role of the thesis for issues in the philosophy of cognitive science, such as: How do notions of EC figure in theories or research programs in cognitive science? Which versions of the EC thesis appear, and with which arguments to support them? (II) The potentials and limits of the EC thesis for topics in general philosophy of science, such as: Can naturalism perhaps be further advanced by means of the more recent EC thesis? Can we understand “big science” or laboratory research better by invoking some version of EC? And can the EC thesis help in overcoming the notorious cognitive/social divide in science studies?