Beyond Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are free to create a debt adjustment mechanism for their own public debt (as opposed to the debt of their instrumentalities and municipalities). This wiggle-room, however, is subject to the federal Constitution and any relevant state constitutional or statutory constraints. This note seeks to discuss and analyze the federal and state legal framework in which a debt restructuring for Puerto Rico's general obligation bonds would operate and draw a general road-map the Commonwealth could potentially follow if it ever needed to resort to a binding debt adjustment mechanism. To be effective, this mechanism must be capable of cramming down the terms of a negotiated restructuring on a minority of dissenters. It would also have to be carefully structured, with a keen eye on the Commonwealth's constitutional debt priority provisions perceived by some to grant Commonwealth GO bondholders an absolute right of repayment, and possible federal and state constitutional contractual impairment challenges.