Gas Hub Research Articles

Dynamic speculation and efficiency in European natural gas markets during the COVID-19 and Russia-Ukraine crises

Efficiency and dynamic speculation literature focused on financial and crude oil markets whereas empirical studies on natural gas markets are limited. This study examines market efficiency and dynamic speculation in major European natural gas hubs (the Zeebrugge (ZEE) hub of Belgium, Title Transfer Facility (TTF) hub of the Netherlands, and National Balancing Point (NBP) hub of the UK) during the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia-Ukraine conflict. Using the Asymmetric multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis (A-MFDFA) and the power law exponent (PLE) approach, we show that European natural gas markets exhibit an asymmetric multifractal behavior and long-memory effects, with variations observed during crises. The ZEE hub in Belgium and the NBP hub in the UK demonstrate a higher multifractality under different trends during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, respectively. Notably, the TTF hub in the Netherlands emerges as the most efficient market during all subperiods. Moreover, our results, using the PLE approach, suggest that European gas market inefficiencies during crises can be attributed to speculative strategies that create self-perpetuating dynamics and diminish market transparency, leading to heightened risk and volatility in gas prices. Our findings underscore the need for regulatory intervention to mitigate excessive speculation and enhance transparency in gas markets. Diversifying gas supplies and fortifying European gas hubs emerge as pivotal strategies to bolster resilience and stability during crises.

GIS-Based Analytical Hierarchy Process Modelling and Mapping of Erosion Vulnerability in the Coastal Areas of Rivers State, Nigeria

The problem of coastal erosion in rivers State Nigeria is a significant issue that has far-reaching consequences for the environment and local communities. Despite the efforts of previous research there remains a lack of comprehensive understanding of the factors contributing to erosion vulnerability and their relative importance, hindering effective decision-making and management practices aimed at mitigating the effects of coastal erosion in Rivers State. Therefore, this study aimed at a GIS-based analytical hierarchy process modeling and mapping of coastal erosion vulnerability in Rivers State, Nigeria. The objectives are to establish and classify the geophysical factors according to the levels of coastal erosion risk, calculate the reliability index of the classified geophysical factors, determine the coastal vulnerable areas across Rivers State using analytical hierarchical process and to produce a coastal vulnerability index map defining the extent of erosion vulnerability in Rivers State. The methodology comprises of the acquisition of primary and secondary data, image pre-processing, image classification, DEM processing, classification and standardization of factors, development of pairwise comparism, and weighted linear combination analysis. The study revealed three distinct coastal erosion vulnerability zones: high, moderate, and low vulnerability. The high vulnerability zone encompassed a total expanse of 545.29 square kilometers, constituting 6.38% of the study area. In contrast, the moderate and low vulnerability zones covered 1941.33 square kilometers and 6052.51 square kilometers, respectively, making up 22.73% and 70.89% of the total area. Bonny (139.28 sq km) was ranked as the most vulnerable due to its role as an oil and gas hub. Degema (111.28 sq km) ranked second and requires urgent erosion control. Okrika and Andoni (71.73 sq km and 62.20 sq km) were third and fourth respectively. It is recommended that an advocate for the systematic approach to coastal vulnerability zoning be introduced in the study. The categorization of areas into high, moderate, and low vulnerability zones provides a standardized framework for assessing coastal regions' susceptibility to erosion. This approach can be applied to other regions to facilitate consistent vulnerability assessments.

PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-IRANIAN ENERGY COOPERATION

Due to the withdrawal of the United States under Republican President D. Trump in 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis, non-Western vector of foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) (China, India, Russia, Turkey and other states) has strengthened. It became particularly apparent with the coming to power of a conservative president close to the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ebrahim (Ibrahim) Raisi. Seeking to escape the foreign policy isolation and financial and economic sanctions pressure created by the United States and its allies, Tehran is increasingly participating in the activities of major international entities such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Iran became a full member of the Organization on July 4, 2023), the Eurasian Economic Union (Interim Free Trade Agreement is in force) and BRICS (a member of the organization since January 1, 2024).Thus, Iran declares itself as a successfully developing regional center of power. The article pays special attention to the development of energy (with Russia, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan), transport and logistics projects (with Azerbaijan, a railway through Iran to Nakhichevan) with neighboring countries. Under President Raisi new gas and oil fields were discovered. In the future they will ensure greater production and exports. With Russia, Iran in the medium term plans to realize swap gas supplies to Iran through the territory of Turkmenistan, as well as to create a gas hub on the coast of Makran to export its own and Russian energy carriers to the countries of South and Southeast Asia. The government of I. Raisi pays special attention to the development of the Macran Free Economic Zone (FEZ) and the FEZ of Kish Island. At the same time, this is a significant territory not only in geo-economic, transportation and logistics, but also in military terms: the seaports of Chahbehar and Jask are geostrategic at the crossroads of energy communications of the Middle East and South (and further Southeast) Asia.

Lived environmentalisms: Everyday encounters and difference in Australia's north

AbstractThis paper focuses on everyday encounters between environmentalists and Indigenous activists during a dispute around a proposed gas hub development in the Kimberley, NW Australia, to explore the possibilities of practising environmentalism differently. It makes visible the complexity, contestations and dilemmas of putting environmentalism into practice in particular places and calls for the specificness of how environmentalisms are negotiated and developed through encounters to be more carefully attended to. It draws on 32 face‐to‐face in‐depth interviews conducted with activists from national Australian environmental organisations working in the Kimberley, Kimberley‐based environmental groups, Kimberley Indigenous organisations, participant observations at protest camp site visits and analysis of campaign literature. Closely interrogating lived environmentalisms—how environmentalists put into practice their values in everyday encounters—reveals not only evidence of white environmentalists expanding their conceptions of the environment beyond dualisms and engaging with multispecies justice, but also a hesitancy and complexity in supporting Indigenous self‐determination and a limited capacity to challenge colonial‐capitalist frameworks.

Reinforced Soil Wall Construction with High Stiffness Geocomposite Reinforcement and Betoflor Segmental Block, Pengerang, Johor Darul Ta’zim

Pengerang is a municipality in Kota Tinggi district in Johor at the southern tip of the Peninsular Malaysia. It is home for the mega oil and gas hub Pengerang Integrated Petroleum Complex (PIPC) in Southern Johor state, which is one of the region’s largest hubs for oil and gas, petrochemical industries, oil storage and trading activities. The area is experiencing significant development, both residential and commercial in nature. In this development plan, the retaining wall system plays a crucial role in providing a larger development area, enhancing the aesthetic view, and achieving a higher elevation platform. The focus of this paper is on an internally stabilized reinforced soil wall system which involves reinforcing the soil with high stiffness geocomposite reinforcement and utilizing modular segmental blocks as facing elements. This combination creates a 1 vertical: 0.14 horizontal gradient (82°) wall that is implemented for a mixed development at Pengerang. The single-tier reinforced soil wall reaches a height of 13 m. In addition, the maximum 14 m high wall was designed as a two-tier wall and the maximum 19 m high wall was designed as a three-tier wall. The design of the reinforced soil wall includes the evaluation of various potential internal and external failure modes. This paper also discusses the construction sequences employed for the reinforced soil wall. Ultimately, the combination of the high stiffness geocomposite reinforcement with modular segmental blocks has proven successful, resulting in a constructed wall that satisfied the client requirements

A cooperative transactive multi-carrier energy control mechanism with P2P energy + reserve trading using Nash bargaining game theory under renewables uncertainty

Transactive Energy Control (TEC) as a market-based control is a critical notion for scheduling Multi-Carrier Energy Systems (MCESs) in local networks and forming an Energy Hub (EH). Nevertheless, implementing TEC for scheduling and controlling MCESs is extremely difficult due to the lack of a cooperative TEC model that accounts for network constraints and the uncertainty of Renewable Energy Sources (RESs). This paper defines and formulates Prosumer-Based Multi-Carrier Energy Systems (PB-MCESs), which include electricity, heat, cooling, and gas hubs to enable internal coordination of resources and flexibility extraction for PB-MCESs. Subsequently, Nash Bargaining Game Theory is employed to construct a cooperative TEC that prioritizes P2P energy trade. In addition to P2P energy trading, PB-MCESs can trade their reserve in a P2P fashion to mitigate their uncertainty. PB-MCESs estimate the level of uncertainty using stochastic programming and allot a reserve capacity based on this estimation in order to manage their uncertainty via P2P reserve trading and internal reserves. PB-MCES can also control their risk by altering their risk-taking factor in accordance with the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVAR) index. Implementations have demonstrated that the proposed cooperative TEC decreases total costs by 17.14% and that the proposed P2P reserve trading reduces total costs by 16.32%.

THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE CREATION OF GAS EXCHANGES AND THE FACTORS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The purpose of this paper is to identify the prerequisites for the creation of gas exchanges in the European gas market in the process of European integration and to identify the impact of strengthening market mechanisms on Ukraine's attractiveness to the EU in this context. In line with this goal, the author has found that the creation of gas exchanges was a direct consequence of European policy documents aimed at liberalizing and building a single internal natural gas market. This is evidenced by the emergence of gas exchanges in European countries over the past twenty years with the introduction of three energy packages. It is argued that gas exchanges and hubs are essential elements of a liberalized gas market, as they ensure its functioning on a competitive basis in accordance with the functions and principles of their activities. The Directives do not directly prescribe the requirements for the establishment of gas exchanges. However, the principles of liberalisation, third-party access, promotion of competition in the energy market and attraction of many sellers and buyers are implemented with the functioning of the gas exchange institute. The author discusses the impact of strengthening market mechanisms on Ukraine's attractiveness to the EU. The measures taken by Ukraine to implement the requirements of the Third Energy Package, together with the potential creation of a gas hub, will contribute to its attractiveness as a reliable partner and a full-fledged player in the gas market, capable of contributing to the achievement of energy security for European countries.

IMPACT OF THE SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION IN UKRAINE ON RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY IN 2022

The article is devoted to the consideration of the changes that have taken place in relations between Russia and Turkey in 2022 in connection with the conduct of a special military operation in Ukraine. It is concluded that the relationship did not take on a negative character, on the contrary, Russia and Turkey have new areas for cooperation. However, the conflict of interest persists in almost all areas of relations between countries. At the same time, not all areas of cooperation can be developed in full (primarily because of the threat of sanctions against Turkish individuals and companies interacting with Russia). Currently, Russia is doubling its trade turnover with Turkey, is implementing the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant and is also planning the creation of an «international gas hub» in Turkey. From our point of view, the main threat to Russian interests comes from too close cooperation with Turkey in the economy. The implementation of the gas hub project will be able to partially compensate for the loss of Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2, but it is fraught with becoming dependent on Turkish policy on other issues, in particular, in the Middle East and the South Caucasus.

Энергобезопасность Испании в контексте алжиро-марокканского конфликта

The energy crisis experienced by the European Union and representing a serious non-military threat to its security has not bypassed Spain. This is a country with a high degree of dependence on hydrocarbon imports. However, the energy crisis there has a number of specific features. It began in autumn 2021, when Algeria – the main supplier of gas to Spain – severed diplomatic relations with Morocco and closed the gas pipeline GME passing through its territory. In March 2022, yielding to the pressure of Rabat, Madrid changed its position on Western Sahara, de facto recognizing its belonging to Morocco. Since the start of the special military operation in Ukraine and before the acceptance of the Moroccan autonomy plan, everything indicated that Spain could play a key role in meeting the EU new energy security needs through its privileged relationship with Algeria. Having temporarily normalized its relations with Morocco, Spain missed the opportunity to become a European gas hub, ceding this role to Italy. Currently, the very structure of the Spanish energy sector is changing, and the country is going to close all operating nuclear power plants. Madrid is betting on diversifying energy supplies, the Algerian gas is being replaced by the American LNG. Russian gas supplies to Spain, previously not so significant, continue to decrease. The country is set to make a serious contribution to the energy transition since it has numerous renewable energy sources, technologies, production capacities and developed infrastructure. Events in Ukraine have accelerated the already existing energy crisis. As energy prices increased, Spain put forward the initiative for the European Union to approve emergency measures to deal with it. The solution, according to Madrid, is the acceleration of the energy transition. Brussels has actually allowed Spain to set top prices for gas that is used to generate electricity, thus lowering the bills for customers. Within the EU framework Madrid has achieved recognition of the special energy status of the Iberian Peninsula, and together with France and Portugal intends to build a new gas pipeline that will supply Europe with green hydrogen and, in the transition period, with natural gas. In general, Spain, although not without difficulties, is rather successfully coping with the current energy crisis.

INSTITUTIONAL PRECONDITIONS AND GENESIS OF NATURAL GAS EXCHANGE TRADING

Natural gas is one of the world's leading sources of primary energy, and gas exchanges are key players in the natural gas market, which ensure its functioning on a liberal basis. Given the current liberalization trends, exchange trading in natural gas is gaining momentum and importance in this market. The main objective of the study was to determine the institutional preconditions and the main stages of the genesis of the exchange segment of natural gas trade. The study showed that gas exchanges and gas hubs are the key institutions of natural gas exchange trading, as they ensure openness and transparency of the market. As a result of the study, the author identified the following institutional prerequisites for the creation of gas exchanges: the need to form a competitive gas market and ensure its availability to third parties, ensuring transparent pricing and setting the market price for gas, simplification of trade procedures and standardization of products, protection of the execution of agreements and limitation of risks, which is manifested in the security and reliability of supplies and increasing the energy security of the state. Identifying the stages of the evolution of natural gas exchange trading, the author distinguished gas trading on mixed commodity exchanges, gas trading on universal and specialized energy exchanges, which began to emerge slowly in the 1990s, and gas market liberalization, accompanied by a boom in the creation of gas exchanges and gas hubs. The recession of 2008-2009, the shale gas revolution, the process of decarbonization of the economy and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia have been the main catalysts for the modern transformation of the natural gas market in recent decades. The author concludes that the latter will significantly affect the natural gas market in the coming years, which will lead to a revision of European policy in this area and the struggle for energy security. This paper is an original scientific study of the evolution of natural gas exchange trading and makes a certain contribution to the study of the peculiarities of the gas market functioning.

Poland as a gas hub – opportunities for cooperation with selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe

The aim of the article is to analyse the possibility of establishing a regional gas transmission and trade center in Poland, the so-called gas hub. The gas hub is described in many strategic documents adopted by the Polish authorities in recent years. For its creation, several key elements must be met. First of all, a strong, competitive, and diversified (energy sector, heating sector, industry, individual customers) natural gas market should be established in Poland. The natural gas distribution and transmission network should be able to balance supply and demand. Domestic production of natural gas should be supplemented by stable and diversified supplies. The domestic gas markets in the region should be integrated and the connection between the systems (interconnectors) should enable the gas transmission in both directions (import/export). The purpose of this article is to verify the possibility of establishing a regional natural gas transmission and trade center in Poland and to define the potential for cooperation with selected countries of our region. Keywords: natural gas, gas hub, gas infrastructure, regional cooperation Streszczenie: Celem artykułu jest analiza możliwości utworzenia w Polsce regionalnego centrum przesyłu i handlu gazem ziemnym, tak zwanego hubu gazowego. Aby koncepcja, która opisana jest w szeregu strategicznych dokumentów przyjmowanych przez polskie władze w ostatnich latach, mogła zostać zrealizowana, musi wystąpić kilka kluczowych elementów. Przede wszystkim powinien powstać w Polsce silny, konkurencyjny, zróżnicowany (energetyka zawodowa, sektor ciepłownictwa, przemysł, klienci indywidualni) rynek handlu gazem ziemnym. Sieć dystrybucji i przesyłu surowca powinna móc równoważyć popyt z podażą surowca. Krajowe wydobycie gazu ziemnego powinno być uzupełnione przez stabilne i zdywersyfikowane dostawy. Krajowe rynki gazu w regionie powinny być zintegrowane, a połączenia między systemami (interkonektory) powinny umożliwić przesył surowca w obie strony (import/export).

Germany’s stance on the Nord Stream 2 project: Internal and external determinants

In recent years, Germany’s energy policy has been pursuing several long-term goals: not only to ensure energy security, but also to achieve energy transition and to become a major gas hub in the European Union. In that context, cooperation with Russia as a key exporter of natural gas to Germany was of particular importance. At the same time, relations between the two states showed contradictory dynamics. This became especially evident during the political struggle over the project of the new Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. The author traces the evolution of the arguments of the key participants in the discussions sparked by the project in Germany before Russia began its special military operation in Ukraine and after it. The first section examines the positions of the main interest groups, leading political parties and regional authorities. The author shows that representatives from the business community and political forces related to them (SPD, CSU, part of the CDU and FDP) were generally inclined to support the project, albeit under certain conditions. The latter particularly included Russia’s guarantees for preserving gas transit through Ukraine. The human rights (legalist) group and eco-activists, affiliated with the Greens, partly the CDU and the FDP, took a much more critical stand regarding Nord Stream 2. Moreover, the federal government’s policy was greatly affected by a number of external factors. Germany made significant diplomatic efforts not only to coordinate its position with other EU countries, but also to overcome the resistance to the project from the United States and Ukraine. Nevertheless, the German government eventually managed through various compromises to advance the Nord Stream 2 project. The situation has changed dramatically after Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic. The German government halted the process of certification of Nord Stream 2. All major German political parties supported this decision.

As North African energy links are redrawn, Italy becomes Europe’s southern gas hub

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is accelerating a reshaping of the political and economic landscape of the central and western Mediterranean, above all regarding the energy sector and, specifically, gas supply. In this context, Italy is reasserting its influence, especially in the central Mediterranean as it replaces its Russiansourced gas with greater amounts of Algeria, Egyptian and now Israeli gas.

An analysis on Turkey’s natural gas hub development through a game-theoretic model application

ABSTRACT Turkey’s natural gas hub development has been under the spotlight recently as its long-term gas supply contracts expire between 2021 and 2026. This study is an effort to investigate end-user prices and shippers’ behaviors in the natural gas hub development process through four noncooperative game models representing different maturity levels of the Turkish gas market. These models, comprising mixed complementarity problems, are solved by GAMS software using the Turkish gas market’s data. Our findings suggest that although increasing hub maturity yields decreasing end-user prices owing to the availability of more supply options and enhanced competition, a shift from long-term contracts to spot trading may result in an increase in the end-user prices due to strategic withholding by importers. Our models are pioneering as they are the first to depict the Turkish gas market with regard to shippers’ behaviors.

FORMATION OF NEW LOGISTIC NODES OF GAS TRADE IN THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

The countries of South-Eastern Europe had close economic ties with Russia and were guided by the purchase of Russian natural gas. In the recent years, both geopolitically and the market events, as well as the energy security concerns, have transformed the region of South-Eastern Europe into a significant element of the energy strategy of the European Union. The emergence of new gas suppliers in this region is due to both the requirements of the European Union for the diversification of energy supply sources and the active formation of new gas corridors in Eastern Europe, in particular, the launch of a large gas terminal in Poland. The creation of a new gas infrastructure exacerbates competition between suppliers and requires market participants to develop optimal gas supply options for consumers adapted to new conditions. The article examines the features of the formation of promising gas hubs in the countries of South-Eastern Europe. The specifics of the development of the gas market in Bulgaria and Greece are shown. Attention is focused on strengthening Turkey's position as an important gas corridor. The results of the study allow us to conclude that the energy infrastructure in this region is still underdeveloped. The region does not offer an efficient market mechanism for the sale and purchase of natural gas, as well as a spot pricing mechanism. At the same time, amid heightened competition on the European gas market, South-Eastern Europe is beginning to play an increasingly significant role in maintaining Russia's position as the largest gas supplier.

Может ли Турция стать газовым хабом?

Since 1990s, Turkey has been committed to become an energy hub or center, which is, so far, one of the main pillars of contemporary national energy policy. Official documents do not directly mention the creation of a “gas hub” in Turkey as a main task, however all existing strategic plans focus on the development of Turkish gas market through creation of a predictable market and diversification of energy sources and suppliers. The latest requires the development of gas storage infrastructure, gas pipeline network, LNG and floating storage and regasification units (FSRU), and reorganization of energy enterprises. Approaches of various actors of Turkish energy policy regarding the ways of creating a gas hub still differ from each other: when liberals support the policy of reducing the share and role of state-owned companies in the market, others give priority to creating the necessary legislation and administrative conditions to ensure the transparent operation of state-owned companies while maintaining their vertically integrated structure. This study aims to identify the beneficial and unfavorable conditions in Turkey to achieve the mentioned goal. It is made up of four sections: the first section briefly examines the concept and criteria of a “gas hub”, the next one outlines the goals set in Turkey’s energy strategy and the last two sections put the strong and weak sides of the gas infrastructure and the market. Given the current state of the gas infrastructure and gas market, and also domestic and foreign political circumstances, it is still difficult to characterize Turkey as an “energy trading center/gas hub”, simultaneously, it is impossible to ignore its great potential and based on the criteria of the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), it can be concluded that Turkey belongs to the category of “emerging gas hubs”.

On ensuring stable natural gas supplies in China and Japan

China and Japan are the two largest importers of natural gas in the world. Both countries have accelerated the reform of domestic natural gas markets and the establishment of domestic natural gas trading centers (natural gas hubs) in order to achieve carbon neutrality goals and ensure the security of domestic natural gas supplies. The conclusion of short- and medium-term contracts for the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) affected the execution of long-term contracts, the prices of which were tied to JCC. As a result, Chinese and Japanese natural gas buyers began to demand that international natural gas sellers, including Russia, use hub market prices. The article analyzes measures to ensure the security of natural gas supplies and reforms of domestic natural gas markets in China and Japan. The interrelations, advantages and disadvantages of long-term, short-term and spot contracts are highlighted. Based on the analysis of the court decision in the case of GNA v. Atlantic LNG, the conclusions of international arbitration practice on price revision clauses are summarized. The following conclusions are drawn： 1. Arbitration proceedings on the revision of prices contributes to the transition from a formula for calculating prices linked to the oil price index to a pricing mechanism based on various indices of natural gas hubs.2. When concluding a new long-term contract, it is proposed to comprehensively use the price index of the emerging shopping center, the spot price and the price formula calculated by JCC.3. A long-term contract still plays an integral role in ensuring safe natural gas supplies in extreme events (for example: a similar COVID-19 epidemic).

A Retrospective Evaluation of the GDF/Suez Merger: Effects on the Belgian Gas Hub

We present an ex-post analysis of the effects of GDF’s acquisition of Suez in 2006, which created one of the world’s largest energy companies. We perform a series of econometric analyses on the market for trading at the Zeebrugge gas hub in Belgium. Removing barriers to entry and facilitating access to the hub through ownership unbundling were an important part of the objectives of the remedies imposed by the European Commission. Our analyses show a robust price decline after the merger. Additional evidence on traded volumes and number of hub participants is in line with an increased liquidity at the hub after the merger. This suggests the remedies were effective in limiting the potential anti-competitive effects of the merger. Moreover, it suggests that ownership unbundling has generated improved access to the hub. Therefore, remedies may have done more than simply mitigate the potential anti-competitive effects of the merger; they may have effectively created competition.

The V4’s Gas Market transition towards the EU’s Energy Security

Current development of the European gas market uncovers several new opportunities and challenges for energy security that developed from big changes in production, transit and supply ways of natural gas to Europe. New European gas market model builds on the principles of diversification, the security of supply, interconnectivity and liberalization. Realization of the EU Third Energy Package related to a progressive shift from long-term oil-linked gas supply contracts and development of alternative gas supply sources and lines, as well as the rivalry between already established gas transit lines and the new supply lines present new challenges and require transition for the V4 countries. In this article I studied what are the new changes and challenges of the transition of V4 countries towards the EU’s energy security? To adjust to transition V4 countries should build the new infrastructure on the short-term pricing market and the ways how it will be funded. If V4 countries want to trade gas with the neighbours and transport most of the Russian gas to Europe, they need to invest into reforms of pipelines’ networks or to find other alternatives of diversification in the next decades. Returns on investment on a liberalized market with a multitude of competitors will be manageable but require serious reforms. The V4 countries will have to enter into the spot markets to efficiently trade gas. Available gas hubs in Europe are much smaller, less liquid, and mostly supplied by the same companies as the long-term traded gas hubs. This kind of markets is easy to manipulate. Therefore, it is important for the V4 countries to plan how to coordinate their national energy policies and name EU’s energy targets for the future.

An Evaluation of Turkey's Natural Gas Hub Development Process

Since Turkey is a natural bridge located between the gas reserves and consumption regions, it has a big potential to create a successful natural gas hub. Although initial steps have been taken to path the way to facilitate the gas trade and create a gas hub in Turkey, there is still a long way. In this study, we derived requirements from the literature to create a working gas hub, analyzed the Turkish natural gas market’s current structure in light of the derived requirements by benchmarking with developed European gas hubs, and made several policy suggestions to form a new market structure for the sake of creation of a successful gas hub. The most important result that we have obtained via this study is that Turkey is on a critical path before the expiration of long-term supply contracts and should draw a strategic path as soon as possible.