Despite a long history of cooperation, Russia's energy policy towards the European Union has recently been the subject of great consternation amongst scholars and policymakers due to the gas disputes of 2006 and 2009. In addition to European efforts aimed at liberalizing its internal energy market, the looming expiry of the latest Russia-Ukraine gas transit agreement has raised concerns about Russia's potential use of the 'energy weapon,' or more simply its ability to compel European policymakers to acquiesce to various Russian demands through the threat of shutting off gas exports to Europe. Ultimately, I find that this scenario is highly unlikely in the near future, as Russia's foreign energy policy towards the European Union is characterized by a diverse range of interests that largely revolve around achieving security of demand. As such, both the Russian state and Gazprom are significantly limited in their ability to exercise influence over the European Union through natural gas exports, as attempting to do so would jeopardize their domestic political and commercial interests. Moreover, market liberalization in both EU and Russian natural gas markets have weakened the overtly geopolitical aspects of Russia’s energy policy towards the European Union.
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