Game Theory Research Articles

Optimizing Serverless Performance Through Game Theory and Efficient Resource Scheduling

Optimizing Serverless Performance Through Game Theory and Efficient Resource Scheduling

Lane-Changing Decision Model of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles in Merging Area Based on Game Theory

Lane-Changing Decision Model of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles in Merging Area Based on Game Theory

Designing a smart grid energy management with game theory and reinforcement learning using Parrondo's paradox

Designing a smart grid energy management with game theory and reinforcement learning using Parrondo's paradox

Spatial evolutionary public goods game theory applied to optimal resource allocation and defense strategies in herbaceous plants.

Spatial evolutionary public goods game theory applied to optimal resource allocation and defense strategies in herbaceous plants.

A data trading scheme based on blockchain and game theory in federated learning

A data trading scheme based on blockchain and game theory in federated learning

Corrigendum to “Designing a smart grid energy management with game theory and reinforcement learning using Parrondo's paradox” [Energy Rep. 13 (2025) 914–928

Corrigendum to “Designing a smart grid energy management with game theory and reinforcement learning using Parrondo's paradox” [Energy Rep. 13 (2025) 914–928

Technology diffusion considering technological progress and multiple policy combinations based on evolutionary game theory

Technology diffusion considering technological progress and multiple policy combinations based on evolutionary game theory

Leveraging evolutionary game theory for cleaner production: Strategic insights for sustainable energy markets, electric vehicles, and carbon trading

Leveraging evolutionary game theory for cleaner production: Strategic insights for sustainable energy markets, electric vehicles, and carbon trading

Power asymmetry destabilizes reciprocal cooperation in social dilemmas.

Power asymmetry destabilizes reciprocal cooperation in social dilemmas.

An SDG composite index based on Hierarchical DEA and Cooperative Game Theory

An SDG composite index based on Hierarchical DEA and Cooperative Game Theory

Exploring cooperation evolution in biological and social systems through donation and moral sentiment.

Exploring cooperation evolution in biological and social systems through donation and moral sentiment.

Web server-based deep learning-driven predictive models for respiratory toxicity of environmental chemicals: Mechanistic insights and interpretability.

Web server-based deep learning-driven predictive models for respiratory toxicity of environmental chemicals: Mechanistic insights and interpretability.

Resurgence of Malthusianism Through Billionaire Bullies: Population and Sustainable Development in an Emergent Era of a Global Multi-polar Leadership 1

As the world surges ahead toward an era of an apparent different situation of world politics under Donald Trump, there appear to be juxtaposing hopes and fears about what to expect as Trump 2.0 unfolds. The latest American presidential election of 2024 was fought on the basis of “politics, morality, ethics and righteousness,” with both Republicans and Democrats claiming to be the custodians of this fervor. Although the former won convincingly, the election stands out as a battle of the “Billionaire Bullies.” While “Billionaires Bullies” Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and Vivek Ramaswamy waxed lyrical about having to fight the USA’s “deep state” to change the course of American and world politics, their opponents in the Democratic Party claimed to be fighting against “ultra-conservatism” and lost. As politicians, they were the fronts for the “leftist Billionaire Bullies” that touted restrictive ideas about population and development that had hidden within them the Malthusian notion of population control and development. Malthus wrote extensively about how and when war and violence arise as tools for (re)stabilization. His ideas are resurfacing without mention of his name, albeit in the context of game theory. In a sense, the Republican victory constitutes an undeclared American acknowledgment of the “deep state” and their tiredness of war and a leadership style that survived under the rhetoric as saviors of democratic freedoms but thwarted by Republicans as a guise toward authoritarian rule. The next American presidential election in 2028 could reverse this war of perceptions.

Applying cooperative game theory to develop water management strategies for the restoration of Hour Al-Azim wetland

Applying cooperative game theory to develop water management strategies for the restoration of Hour Al-Azim wetland

Risk evaluation of metro tunnel shield construction based on game variable weight extension cloud theory

To address the issues of fuzziness and randomness in risk evaluation for subway shield construction, this study proposes a risk assessment model integrating variable weight theory and an extension cloud model to enable a more scientific and effective evaluation. Firstly, the WBS-RBS (Work Breakdown Structure-Risk Breakdown Structure) method was employed to establish a risk evaluation index system for metro tunnel construction, with risk levels classified into Grades I-V. Secondly, the ordinal relationship method (G1) and entropy weight method were applied to calculate the fixed weights of the evaluation indexes. The comprehensive fixed weights are determined based on the game theory, considering the dynamic changes of the evaluation indexes, and the optimal dynamic, comprehensive weights are calculated based on this combined with the variable weight theory. Finally, comprehensive affiliation degrees were obtained through the extension cloud model, and the comprehensive evaluation grade was determined according to the principle of maximum affiliation. The model was applied to the submarine tunnel section of Qingdao Metro Line 8. The results indicate that the risk level of the project is Grade III, which aligns with the actual construction conditions. This consistency validates the rationality and feasibility of the proposed method, offering a novel approach to guide safety management and risk decision-making in metro tunnel construction projects.

The Taiwan Game. Navigating U.S.-China Tensions from Game Theory Perspective

Taiwan is a potential flashpoint for conflict between the U.S. and China. Although it has been de facto independent of China for more than seventy years, China’s leaders regard Taiwan as an inseparable part of the PRC. While China claims to strive for peaceful “reunification,” it has never renounced the use of force against Taiwan. Despite a 45-year policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding Taiwan’s defense, the U.S. has declared its support for the use of military force to defend Taiwan. China’s threats and U.S. support have created a security dilemma, in which adversaries build up their respective offensive or defensive capabilities in response to each other’s actions. This article employs game theory to assess whether the United States and China are more likely to use force or seek accommodation in determining Taiwan’s future. The paper seeks to answer the following questions: What risks would China’s leaders be willing to take to secure the benefits of seizing Taiwan? What costs would they be willing to bear? Is the United States prepared to use military force to defend Taiwan? To demonstrate the usefulness of game theory, the paper begins with an explanation of the history of classical game theory. It then provides an overview of cross-strait relations and the role of the United States as Taiwan’s security guarantor. The payoff structure of this analysis reflects the dynamics of a Chicken Game with asymmetric stakes: China’s pursuit of peaceful unification represents a strategic imperative tied to national identity, while the United States prioritizes regional stability and ally credibility. These differing levels of urgency and risk tolerance shape their strategic decisions.

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Aquatic Product Traceability System from a Multi-Actor Perspective

This study employs an evolutionary game theory framework to analyze the interactive learning, imitation, and strategic evolution among multiple actors within China’s aquatic product traceability system. It focuses on four types of strategic interactions: between fishers and the government, fishers and consumers, fishers who adopt the traceability system and those who do not, and between consumers who purchase traceable aquatic products and those who do not. The evolutionarily stable strategies and equilibrium outcomes in each game depend on the net benefits obtained and the various costs borne by each party. Among these factors, transaction costs within the traceability system play a particularly critical role in shaping stakeholder behavior. The lower the transaction costs, the more likely stakeholders are to adopt strategies that support or enhance the functioning of the system. Therefore, reducing the operational and transaction costs of the traceability system should be a key policy focus for the government. This includes efforts in policy and regulatory development, platform and infrastructure construction, and the improvement of information exchange mechanisms to foster sustainable development in aquaculture.

Navigating Water Sustainability: Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cross-Sectoral Collaborative Governance in China

Globally, governments are stepping up their efforts to address water pollution, with an increasing number of countries adopting diverse policies aimed at water sustainability. Effective collaborative governance across various government departments is essential for achieving water sustainability. However, the diverse interests of different departments often lead to interdepartmental conflicts. This study employs a mixed-method approach that integrates qualitative insights with evolutionary game theory to analyze these conflicts. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with 31 Chinese local officials and a systematic review of 179 policy documents and academic studies, the research constructs an evolutionary game model between the Department of Ecology and Environment (DEE) and the Department of Water Resources (DWR) — the two primary government agencies responsible for water sustainability in China. By mathematically analyzing replication dynamics, evolutionary strategies, and the stability of the game system, the study demonstrates that governance effectiveness is maximized when DEEs actively implement water sustainability projects and DWRs provide robust support. The findings highlight how empirical evidence on departmental motivations, constraints, and strategic behaviors can inform the selection of game parameters and model structure. Further results suggest that adjusting incentives, sharing investment costs, and introducing constraint mechanisms can guide both departments toward an ideal equilibrium for collaborative governance. This study expands the theoretical and methodological framework of water governance and offers actionable insights for institutional reform and policy design in water sustainability.

Research on Optimization Strategies of Supply Chain Pricing and Returns Management under O2O Model

With the rapid development of information technology and the continuous innovation of e-commerce model, the level of supply chain management has become a key element of the core competitiveness of enterprises. Under the O2O e-commerce model, the lack of coordinated pricing mechanism in the supply chain and the imperfection of returns management have seriously restricted the improvement of the overall efficiency of the supply chain. Based on Stackelberg game theory, this paper constructs a two-level supply chain model consisting of a single supplier and an e-commerce retailer, and through comparative analysis, it is found that the cooperative pricing strategy can significantly enhance the overall benefit of the supply chain, and the coordinated pricing mechanism based on the revenue-sharing contract can effectively promote the long-term and stable cooperation among supply chain members. Regarding the returns management problem, the study systematically classifies the types of product returns, then designs a standardized returns strategy scheme, and confirms the relative advantage of the exchange mode by comparing the impact of four typical returns modes on the supply chain profit. On this basis, this study proposes specific measures to optimize the supply chain returns management. The research results provide theoretical basis and practical guidance for O2O e-commerce enterprises to improve their supply chain management level.

An Analysis of the Double Game Theory in the Negotiation of Structural Obstacles between the United States and Japan

The U.S.-Japan Structural Barriers Talks took place in 1989 and were initiated by then-U.S. President George W. Bush on the issue of the trade imbalance between Japan and the United States. After the subsequent negotiations between the U.S. and Japanese governments, the two sides signed the U.S.-Japan Agreement on Structural Barriers (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement") on issues such as forms of savings and investment, land policy, and corporate behavior. The Agreement is an in-depth economic and trade cooperation between the United States and Japan, and is also a microcosm of US-Japan relations in the 80s. Relying on Milner's dual game model, this paper explores the negotiation game between the two sides at the domestic and foreign levels, and studies the situation background, negotiation attitude, negotiation process and focus of the two sides at the international level, as well as the differences in the preferences and systems of the two actors at the domestic level.