For some time now, sociologists have largely evaded metatheoretical questions, no more so than those pertaining to the relationship between fact and value and the role of values within the social sciences. This is not because such issues have faded in importance. On the contrary, the central questions of social theory remain as relevant today as they were during the earliest days of the discipline. Luckily, some members of the guild continue to pursue them. Philip S. Gorski’s exploration of terrain “beyond the fact/value distinction” makes an important contribution. His essay challenges the orthodox claim of fact/value dualism and utilizes neoAristotelian ethical naturalism (hence forward “Aristotelian naturalism”) to defend the idea that the social sciences can contribute to knowledge of the good life and the good society. As a fellow traveler also seeking a space for moral inquiry within the discipline, I am encouraged by this effort. However, I question whether the neo-Aristotelian notion of human flourishing provides an optimal starting point. Aristotelian naturalism depends upon antecedent notions of human functioning, which veer closely towards foundationalism. As a result, it seems to favor the viewpoint of the scientific observer and therefore remains somewhat distant from the moral dilemmas of social and political life. My commentary aims to extend the current dialogue by considering some weaknesses of the Aristotelian position and proposing an alternative based within the pragmatist tradition. To justify my observations, I outline the philosophical underpinnings of this approach in more detail. Next, I point to some weakness of Aristotelian naturalism with respect to the translation of scientific knowledge to moral questions. I consider how insights from the ethical theory of John Dewey might serve as a corrective by clarifying how abstract notions of “human flourishing,” rather than ends in themselves, serve as standards that orient ongoing moral inquiries and deliberations. I conclude by contemplating what this might mean for scientific practice and the future of social theory.