Functionalist Psychology Research Articles

Why and how do suppliers develop environmental management capabilities in response to buyer-led development initiatives?

PurposeAlthough buying firms increasingly adopt supplier development to help suppliers enhance their ability to deal with environmental issues, little is known about the mechanisms by which buyer-led environmental supplier development (ESD) affects the environmental management capabilities (EMC) of suppliers. Focusing on the supplier perspective and specifically on the role of psychological mechanisms at the supplier level, the authors adopt the stimulus–organism–response framework from functionalist psychology to investigate the mediating role of environment-related supplier perceived relationship value in the association between ESD, in the form of environmental requirements and audits (indirect development – ID) vs. direct development projects (direct development – DD), and supplier EMC.Design/methodology/approachThe authors used structural equation modeling and regression analysis to test the hypotheses using survey data from 221 supplying organizations in China.FindingsResults reveal that each of the three considered dimensions of the environment-related supplier perceived relationship value (i.e. economic, strategic and co-creation) helps enhance EMC. However, while DD influences positively all three dimensions, ID has a positive effect on only the economic and strategic dimensions. Moreover, the mediation analysis suggests that, while DD affects EMC both directly and via the three dimensions of environment-related supplier perceived relationship value (partial mediation), ID affects EMC only through its impact on environment-related supplier perceived relationship economic and strategic value (full mediation).Originality/valueThe study sheds light on the psychological mechanisms that drive suppliers’ involvement in green supplier development activities. By doing so, it contributes to the understanding of ESD practices and processes and their effectiveness.

Pragmatism, Peirce, and the Pandemic

Pragmatism, Peirce, and the Pandemic

From Something Old to Something New: Functionalist Lessons for the Cognitive Science of Scientific Creativity.

An intuitive view is that creativity involves bringing together what is already known and familiar in a way that produces something new. In cognitive science, this intuition is typically formalized in terms of computational processes that combine or associate internally represented information. From this computationalist perspective, it is hard to imagine how non-representational approaches in embodied cognitive science could shed light on creativity, especially when it comes to abstract conceptual reasoning of the kind scientists so often engage in. The present article offers an entry point to addressing this challenge. The scientific project of embodied cognitive science is a continuation of work in the functionalist tradition in psychology developed over a century ago by William James and John Dewey, among others. The focus here is on how functionalist views on the nature of mind, thought, and experience offer an alternative starting point for cognitive science in general, and for the cognitive science of scientific creativity in particular. The result may seem paradoxical. On the one hand, the article claims that the functionalist conceptual framework motivates rejecting mainstream cognitive views of creativity as the combination or association of ideas. On the other hand, however, the strategy adopted here—namely, revisiting ideas from functionalist psychology to inform current scientific theorizing—can itself be described as a process of arriving at new, creative ideas from combinations of old ones. As is shown here, a proper understanding of cognition in light of the functionalist tradition resolves the seeming tension between these two claims.

Necessity Is Unnecessary: A Response to Bradley

NoûsVolume 48, Issue 3 p. 558-564 ARTICLE Necessity Is Unnecessary: A Response to Bradley† Robert D. Rupert, Robert D. Rupert University of Colorado at Boulder and University of EdinburghSearch for more papers by this author Robert D. Rupert, Robert D. Rupert University of Colorado at Boulder and University of EdinburghSearch for more papers by this author First published: 10 December 2013 https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12058Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume48, Issue3September 2014Pages 558-564 RelatedInformation

Translation of article critical to formation of functionalist psychology now online.

Translation of article critical to formation of functionalist psychology now online.

Darwinian theory, functionalism, and the first American psychological revolution.

American functionalist psychology constituted an effort to model scientific psychology on the successes of English evolutionary theory. In part it was a response to the stagnation of Wundt's psychological research program, which had been grounded in German experimental physiology. In part it was an attempt to make psychology more appealing within the highly pragmatic American context and to facilitate the application of psychology to domains outside of the scientific laboratory. Applications of psychology that emerged from the functionalist ethos included child and developmental psychology, clinical psychology, psychological testing, and industrial/vocational psychology. Functionalism was also the ground within which behaviorism rooted and grew into the dominant form of psychology through the middle of the 20th century.

Can Behaviors Be Adaptations?

Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths (Sterelny 1992, Sterelny and Griffiths 1999) have argued that sociobiology is unworkable because it requires that human behaviors can be adaptations; however, behaviors produced by a functionalist psychology do not meet Lewontin's quasi-independence criterion and therefore cannot be adaptations. Consequently, an evolutionary psychology—which regards psychological mechanisms as adaptations—should replace sociobiology. I address two interpretations of their argument. I argue that the strong interpretation fails because functionalist psychology need not prevent behaviors from evolving independently, and it relies on too strong an interpretation of the quasi-independence criterion. The weaker interpretation does not undermine sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology would be vulnerable to the same criticism. Finally, I offer reasons to think that both mental mechanisms and behaviors can be adaptations.

The self-consciousness argument: Why Tooley's criticisms fail

Ontological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties canbe defined wholly in terms of the general pattern of interaction ofontologically prior realizations. Ideological (or nonreductive)functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can only bedefined nonreductively, in terms of the general pattern of theirinteraction with one another. My Self-consciousness Argumentestablishes: (1) ontological functionalism is mistaken because itsproposed definitions wrongly admit realizations (vs. mentalproperties) into the contents of self-consciousness; (2)ideological (nonreductive) functionalism is the only viable alternativefor functionalists. Michael Tooley's critique misses the target:he offers no criticism of (1) – except for an incidental, andincorrect, attack on certain self-intimation principles – and,since he himself proposes a certain form of nonreductive definition, hetacitly accepts (2). Finally, as with all other nonreductivedefinitions, Tooley's proposal can be shown to undermine functionalism'sultimate goal: its celebrated materialist solution to theMind-Body Problem. The explanation of these points will require adiscussion of: Frege-Russell disagreements regarding intensionalcontexts; the relationship between self-consciousness and thetraditional doctrine of acquaintance; the role of self-intimationprinciples in functionalist psychology; and the Kripke-Lewiscontroversy over the nature of theoretical terms.

The Methodology of Social Judgement Theory

Social Judgement Theory (SJT) evolved from Egon Brunswik's Probabilistic Functionalist psychology coupled with multiple correlation and regression-based statistical analysis. Through its representational device, the Lens Model, SJT has become a widely used, systems-oriented perspective for analysing human judgement in specific ecological circumstances. Judgements are assumed to result from the integration of different cues or sources of perceptual information from the environment. Special advantages accrue to the SJT approach when criterion values (or correct values) for judgement are also available, as this permits the comparison of judgement processes to environmental processes and leads naturally to the generation of cognitive feedback as an aid to facilitate learning. In contrast to more prescriptive approaches to decision analysis, the SJT approach analyses judgements by decomposing the judgement process after judgements have been rendered. This a posteriori decomposition is accomplished by first usi...

Is There a Functionalist Psychology?

Is There a Functionalist Psychology?

The Place of Process-Product Research in Developing the Agenda for Research on Teacher Thinking

Process-product research on teaching, an adaptation of the criteria-of-effectiveness paradigm, has its roots in functionalist psychology. Functionalism is a pragmatic and eclectic approach to psychology that is concerned with the fitting of persons to environments. Functionalists have always accepted cognitive behavior as a legitimate object of study. Thus, a perspective from functionalist psychology may be useful for designing studies of teachers' thinking. From this perspective, the majority of contemporary studies of teachers' thinking are found wanting because there has been no concern for criteria of effectiveness. Recommendations for the improvement of research on teachers' thinking are offered.