Reviewed by: Political Spectrum: The Tumultuous Liberation of Wireless Technology, from Herbert Hoover to the Smartphone by Thomas Winslow Hazlett Jon Agar (bio) Political Spectrum: The Tumultuous Liberation of Wireless Technology, from Herbert Hoover to the Smartphone. By Thomas Winslow Hazlett. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017. Pp. 416. Hardcover $35. The radio spectrum is an extraordinarily interesting subject for the historian of science and technology. On the one hand it is natural: radio waves have been filling the universe since the big bang. On the other hand it is artificial: the deliberate transmission and reception of radio waves for communication dates from Marconi in the late nineteenth century, and since then technologies to exploit the resource have become central to the modern world. As circuits became tunable and new applications proliferated, there has been increasing demand to use radio waves free from the interference of other users. From early in the twentieth century the response has been the parallel growth of a bureaucracy, at national and international levels, that has assigned frequencies and constructed the radio spectrum as a space to be sub-divided, occupied, and protected from trespass. [End Page 806] Hazlett, a professor of economics, believes that this bureaucratic management of the radio spectrum has been deeply inefficient. Political Spectrum is a messy, frustrating, occasionally entertaining, and insightful polemic. Readers will not find a balanced, straightforward account of the development of frequency assignment policies, nor an even-handed assessment of policy choices. What they will find is a story of free-market heroes and bureaucratic villains, and a plan for the future. Specifically, Hazlett calls for the auctioning of overlay rights, in other words allowing secondary licensees to make use of frequencies being left unused (or underused) by legacy licensees and granting them further rights, say to bargain with incumbents. Public agencies would be particular targets of this measure. Even public bodies that might be considered to have an overriding reason to be granted clear spectrum, such as first responders and the military, should, says Hazlett, be forced to purchase commercial wireless services and be subject to these processes of market liberalization. If such a policy was adopted, then the unleashing of market forces would produce a paradise of efficient and high quality wireless services. The problem is that Political Spectrum is poorly structured, jumping from period to period, appealing to personal anecdote when document-based reasoning is necessary, and reading evidence only in ways that support the overall argument. The actions of the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), later the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), are cases in point. This organization is the chief bureaucratic villain in Hazlett's eyes, and it can do no right. See, for example, the FRC's rejection of a plan to extend the range of AM frequencies in 1927 due to "the manifest inconvenience to the listening public which would result" (p. 48); Hazlett lambasts this action because it would force consumers to buy new receiver sets. Yet in the 1940s when the FCC did consider moving FM frequencies, which would have required early adopters to junk their receivers, Hazlett again criticizes it (p. 67). Damned if it does, damned if it doesn't, the government cannot get a break from Hazlett. Nevertheless, there are some useful contributions in Political Spectrum for the historian. Perhaps most interesting is the reassessment of the contribution of the economist Ronald Coase. An Englishman who moved to the United States in 1951, Coase brought fresh thinking to the "political economy of radio and television." Specifically, in the late 1950s, while at Stanford's Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, he built on the earlier arguments of Leo Herzel. Coase cogently argued that administrative control of the radio spectrum might be replaced by a "pricing mechanism." Coase submitted his paper to the Journal of Law and Economics, only to be told by the editors that he had made basic theoretical errors. Coase responded, saying that "even if my argument was an error, it was a very interesting error," and remarkably the editors conceded. Hazlett credits Coase as the discoverer of a "deeper truth" (p. 75), and as a prophet: [End Page 807] "Coase did not...