French Voter Research Articles

Blaming the Polish Plumber, Blaming the French Voter: Bogeys and Attributions of Belief in Liberal Politics

Abstract The liberal imaginary generates phantom actors, both virtuous and dangerous, as substitutes for the real people excluded from the political arena. A special case is the bogey, a negative phantom openly acknowledged as false but attributed to popular belief and used to blame public opinion for bad political outcomes. I demonstrate that the “Polish plumber,” fear of whom supposedly caused the French public to reject the European Constitution in a 2005 referendum, circulated intensively in elite discourse with minimal popular uptake. Nonetheless, when phantoms and bogeys occupy the arena, excluded persons may be forced to engage with them in order to achieve visibility of their own.

Party, Ideology, and Vote Intentions: Dynamics from the 2002 French Electoral Panel

The debate over the relative importance of ideology versus party for vote choice in France is enduring. Resolution of the debate would have much value, for the light shed on sources of stability and change in multiparty electoral systems generally. The main reason the debate continues is that previous studies examining that question have been plagued by difficulties pertaining to variable measurement, model specification, election type, and research design. We address these problems and provide new evidence from the 2002 French Electoral Panel. Most notably, these data allow stronger causal inference because party identification and ideological identification are both measured in the first wave of the survey, that is, before the declaration of vote actually occurs. We estimate a multi-equation model of first-round legislative vote intention—as measured in the second wave of the panel—using two-stage least squares, ordered logit, as well as binomial and multinomial logit techniques. The results indicate that ideological identification systematically outweighs party identification in shaping the French voter’s choice.

The French voter: before and after the 2002 elections

Preface Introduction: French Election Theories and the 2002 Results M.S.Lewis-Beck France's 2002 Presidential Elections: Old and New Territorial Fractures A.Laurent Do Issues Matter? Law and Order in the 2002 French Presidential Election N.Mayer & V.Tiberj Ideology and Party Identification: A Normalization of French Voting Anchors? J.Evans Old Wine in New Bottles? New Wine in Old Bottles? Class, Religion and Vote in the French Electorate B.Cautres Strategic Voting in the 2002 French Presidential Elections A.Blais Institutions and Voters: Structuring Electoral Choice R.Elgie Could There Possibly Have Been Economic Voting? G.Whitten Dual Governance and Economic Voting: France and the United States M.S.Lewis-Beck & R.Nadeau Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Electoral Dilemmas and Turnout in the 2002 French Legislative Elections T.Gschwend & D.Leuffen Forecasting the 2002 Elections: Lessons From a Political Economy Model B.Jerome & V.Jerome-Speziari Vote Functions in France and the 2002 Election Forecast E.Dubois & C.Fauvelle-Aymar National Economic Voting in France: Objective vs. Subjective Measures E.Belanger & M.S.Lewis-Beck

The French Electoral Panel 2002

The 2002 elections in France have been a unique occasion to study the French voter in a dynamic perspective. With two elections (presidential and legislative) in a few weeks sequence of time, the analysis of the dynamics of political choice and voting was requiring a special design. Two research teams (the CEVIPOF in Paris and the CIDSP in Grenoble) and a private political expertise agency (the CECOP) have joined their efforts to conduce the biggest electoral study ever done in France, the Panel électroal français 2002 (the “PEF 2002”). With a support from the Ministère de l'Intérieur and the Fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques, the PEF 2002 is a three waves panel study of the French voter in the context of the 2002 campaigns and elections. The overall sample of the French electorate is more than 10 000 individuals from which 1822 have been interviewed two times and 1413 three times. The paper presents an overview of this unique study.

Party, Ideology, Institutions and the 1995 French Presidential Election

In French election studies, a central debate concerns the French voter's ‘standing decision’ – is it party or ideology? The debate has been ongoing because of data and measurement issues and, we add, because of an inadequate understanding of the role electoral institutions play. The 1995 French National Election Study allows a fresh attack on these questions. It contains promising party and ideology measures, on a very large national sample. Both party identification and left–right ideological identification are shown to be widely held, with the latter more so. Their relative structural effects are found to depend heavily on the dynamics of the dual ballot. Party is more important for electoral choice on the first ballot, while ideology is more important on the second. This finding, demonstrated in fully specified logistic regression models of the presidential vote, seems also to inhere in the logic of French electoral institutions. The two-ballot rules, coupled with the pervasiveness of ideological and party identification in the public mind, go far towards revealing and explaining an underlying stability of the French political system.

French electoral institutions and the economic vote

The economic vote exists in France, as in other Western democracies. Little is known, however, about how this economic vote is conditioned by their electoral institutions, which have unusual and considerable variation. Here we examine large survey data sets of French elections—legislative, presidential, and European—in order to test various institutional hypotheses. We find that economic voting is strongest in a presidential election under unified government. It is weakened when the election takes place under cohabitation, or is of the second order. Further, it is neither strengthed nor weakened on the second ballot. Electoral institutions clearly affect the magnitude and target of the economic vote. The French voter, in considering the economy, appears more sophisticated than naive.

Voter Choice in the 1995 French Presidential Election

This study estimates a model of voter choice for the first and second ballots of the 1995 French Presidential election. Its objective is to characterize the relative importance of traditional bases of French voter choice such as social class relative to campaign issues and voter evaluations of the economy. The study also seeks to identify candidate-specific bases of voter choice. Multinomial logit analysis of voter choice among the four leading candidates reveals a stronger role for campaign issues than previous studies suggest. Voter-candidate ideological proximity is the strongest predictor of first and second ballot choice, followed by voter perceptions of candidate ability to address unemployment and political corruption. Demographic variables have limited explanatory power in both the first and second ballot models. The parameter estimates demonstrate considerable differences in the bases of voter choice across candidates, with the bases of voter choice for National Front leader Jean-Marie le Pen most distinct from those of the remaining candidates.

The French voter decides

The French voter decides

Anchoring the French Voter: Ideology versus Party

In their pivotal 1986 volume, Converse and Pierce rekindle the debate over whether left-right ideological attachment or party identification serves as the psychological anchor of the French electorate. They argue that, much like Americans, French voters use partisanship to orient themselves to the political landscape. Our study, which employs the data used by Converse and Pierce, draws a different conclusion. We find that ideology, in terms of both scope and strength, clearly exceeds party in its importance for vote choice.

Deja Vu All Over Again: "A Comment on the Comment of Converse and Pierce

What is standing decision rule that guides French voter? Party or ideology? Converse and Pierce (1993), commenting on their 1986 volume, say that the tilt of our diverse tests actually favored party. Our tests point in opposite direction, favoring ideology (Fleury and Lewis-Beck 1993). This disagreement is but a part of a larger debate in literature on explanations of French electoral behavior. We hope, by reviewing key aspects of disagreement, light will be cast on broader concerns. We begin with modeling issue, then take up matter of data and measures. We conclude with analysis of a newer, and perhaps better, data set from 1988 elections. In that analysis, we offer a straightforward examination of basic question: Are there more ideological identifiers or party identifiers in French electorate? As shall be seen, there are many more ideological identifiers.

Comment on Fleury and Lewis-Beck: "Anchoring the French Voter: Ideology versus Party"

hen asked to review an earlier draft of this article, our comments roughly equalled the manuscript text in length, since there seemed to be a remarkable number of misrepresentations of our French work, along with a variety of errors of other kinds. This is a cleaner version of the argument, although at least two key misinterpretations remain. In a sense this is not surprising, since correction at these two points would leave a very unpersuasive article. On the other hand, given that the extensive bodies of evidence within our volume Political Representation in France (henceforth, PRiF) that sharply contradict judgments by Fleury and Lewis-Beck (henceforth, F&L-B) have now been specifically pointed out to them, it is depressing that they continue to keep such evidence from the reader. Indeed, while they are certainly entitled to dispute this counterevidence, it is hard to have an intelligent discussion unless they are willing to reveal why they contest it. We hope that the general reader interested in these issues will at least consult our many relevant discussions in PRiF rather than count on the impressions of our positions left by this article.

French electoral theory: The national front test

The National Front (FN) has become a serious force in the French electoral arena. What has brought voters to this extreme-right alternative? We first try to cast the explanation in terms of traditional variables orienting the French voter—class, religion, region, ideology. Analysis of these cleavages has virtually no utility along the lines of class or religion. However, there is some relationship to region and, with respect to the ideological variable, FN supporters sharply distinguish themselves from other right wing partisans (RPR and UDF). Their far-right ideology has an issue base, resting broadly on the ‘materialist’ values of law and order, and economic wellbeing. In particular, it is the issues of crime, immigration, and unemployment (taken together in a pattern of statistical interaction), that manage largely to account for National Front support. These issues, as they persist, transform the meaning of right, or at least extreme-right, ideological identification. The French electorate continues to be anchored by left-right ideology, but its content is undergoing change.

The Responsible Party Model

Any French political scientist who has the ambition to write The French Voter to match the American study will now have to take into account Converse and Pierce's monument, Political Representation in France. Not only does it tell us a great deal about the subject treated, it also in the first five hundred or so pages deals at the highest intellectual level with both the common and the original traits of voting behavior, of parliamentary behavior, and of demonstrating behavior in France. It is a rare achievement of professional skill and political culture. The least inspiring part of the book was added to the initial project and deals with the unexpected events of May 1968. The variations in the number and origins of the demonstrators and of the strikers comes as no surprise, nor does the idea that they included many people who had never demonstrated or gone on strike before. The paradox of the June electoral tidal wave in favour of the government is classically explained by the excesses of a movement which was far from unpopular at the beginning. The responsiveness of the political elites once everything had returned to normal is also well known. Two interesting points, nevertheless, are worth noting. The first is that 40% of the electorate thought that the risks of a civil war were high, as against 31% only 10 years earlier, during the Algiers crisis, when a military rebellion put an end to the Fourth Republic. The second point is that the striking difference between the election results in March 1967 and those in June 1968 was due to the 16%7 of voters who changed their votes, of whom 7 out of 10 went from left to right. The finest part of this impressive book is the first half, devoted to the French parties and voters. It leaves no stone unturned and provides some convincing answers to many questions we have long asked ourselves. The unequal visibility of the parties in the French system is nicely matched with the expectations of the voters, who want an ideal system of some three or four parties. Such a system would force the parties to ally for the presidential contest and for the general election,

Public opinion quarterly: Michael S. Lewis-Beck, ‘Economics and the French Voter: A Microanalysis’, 47:3, Fall 1983, pp. 347–60

Public opinion quarterly: Michael S. Lewis-Beck, ‘Economics and the French Voter: A Microanalysis’, 47:3, Fall 1983, pp. 347–60

Economics and the French Voter: A Microanalysis

Economics and the French Voter: A Microanalysis

De Gaulle and the French Voter

Gaullism has dominated the French National Assembly since 1962. The election of March 1967, while not as favourable to President de Gaulle’s followers as they might have hoped, nevertheless returned a slight majority. According to some of the more optimistic commentators, this triumph was particularly significant since voters were called upon to support the Union for the New Republic-Democratic Union of Labour (UNR-UDT) and its allies at a time when no political crisis was looming over the horizon. Unable to depend so much upon the personality of de Gaulle, the Gaullists had to run on their own merits to a greater extent than in the past. Furthermore, the apparently growing polarisation between the opposition and the government majority increased the likelihood that many voters were casting their ballots either for or against the government. The confirmation of the latter in power for a second successive term therefore was interpreted as a good omen for the future1.Finally, it was suggested that 1967 saw the ‘Action Committee for the Fifth Republic’ expand its hitherto somewhat sectional base into a more diffuse support throughout the nation. This change was seen as evidence of greater local implantation.