French Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

Polynesia against Paris: Indigenous Anti-Nuclear Literature and the French Colonial Origins of Oceanian Reintegration

Abstract: This essay examines Francophone and Anglophone Indigenous Oceanian literature and art to argue that through the predominantly Polynesian response to French nuclear testing in Te Ao Mā’ohi (French Polynesia), French colonialism has inadvertently generated one key cultural movement toward post-colonial Oceanian reintegration—one that extends well beyond the Francophone Pacific. The essay first examines the prose fiction of Chantal Spitz, Rai a Mai [aka Michou Chaze], and Déwé Gorodé to understand Te Ao Mā’ohi’s (French Polynesia's) and Kanaky’s (New Caledonia's) shared experiences of French colonialism. It then contrasts the same authors’ treatment of French nuclear weapons testing, which was the central crisis in Mā’ohi literature but which was marginal to early Kanak prose fiction. The essay then brings this Francophone literature in direct conversation with the hitherto unexamined specifically anti-French dimension of better-known Anglophone Oceanian works from authors Witi Ihimaera (Maori) and Albert Wendt (Samoan) and visual artists Ralph Hotere (Maori) and Hiko‘ula Hanapi (Hawaiian). The essay then demonstrates how this mutual Francophone-Anglophone Polynesian response to French colonialism created a Polynesia-centric anti-French-colonial process of Oceanian reintegration, and how that engine of Pacific reintegration later encompassed Kanaky and generated new cultural and activist connections between the Francophone and Anglophone Pacific.

French nuclear weapons, 2023

ABSTRACT The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research associate Matt Korda, and research associate Eliana Johns. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue’s column reviews the status of France’s nuclear arsenal and finds that the stockpile of approximately 290 warheads has remained stable in recent years, but that significant modernizations are underway regarding ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, aircraft, and the nuclear industrial complex. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-risk/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-notebook/.

ENHANCING EUROPEAN SECURITY: MODERN CHALLENGES POSED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The proposal of Europeanising French deterrence was revived by French President Emmanuel Macron, who declared in February 2020 that French nuclear forces reinforce European security simply by existing and suggested a strategic dialogue with all EU partners regarding the role of French nuclear weapons in European security. Macron further reasoned that this issue is increasingly urgent nowadays as the EU must jointly realise that, because of the lack of a legal structure, they may easily find themselves vulnerable to the resumption of a traditional, even nuclear, arms race on their land. The prospects of global control of weapons and disarmament efforts are very blurry in the times of rising political tensions, revived nuclear arms races, and weakening trust in multilateralism. Nevertheless, this all leads to the necessity to support active actions towards nuclear risk reductions, whichhave recently appeared in some of the multilateral forums. The elimination of nuclear risk is nothing but an intermediate measure to reduce nuclear proliferation dangers until they are liquidated. It is essential to review the risks of accidents involving nuclear weapons and their influence on European security, along with focusing on the role of European nuclear weapon states (NWS), their place in global security and possible scenarios for their future: the authors considered the possible prospects of the EU as another entity with nuclear weapons, as well as the likelihood of the EU as another regional nuclear-free zone and discussed whether the real change is possible.

Unfit for purpose: reassessing the development and deployment of French nuclear weapons (1956–1974)

ABSTRACT This article presents the first reassessment of the strategic rationality and credibility of French nuclear weapons policy before 1974. Building on untapped primary material from across the world as well as technical analysis, it shows that early Cold War French nuclear weapon procurement and deployment are incompatible with a precise grand design and the requirements of strategic rationality. The first generation of French nuclear forces also lacked technical credibility, despite reliance on outside help. Several French officials knew about it, as did their allies and adversaries. These findings de-exceptionalise French nuclear history and challenge conventional wisdom about Cold War nuclear history.

Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of the European Union

ABSTRACT For the European Union, nuclear weapons are a taboo. But the more the EU takes steps towards defense integration, the closer the moment comes that the role of the French nuclear weapons has to be discussed. This article hopes to clarify that debate. The first part of this article outlines the debate between those who regard nuclear weapons as powerful and legitimate defense instruments and those who perceive them as too powerful and therefore illegitimate. It is argued that power and deterrence are concepts that are constructed and given meaning by people. The second part applies this debate to the future role of the non-American nuclear weapons in the EU: is there a chance that the French nuclear weapons will be further Europeanized, or will the EU in contrast turn itself into another nuclear weapon free zone (similar to Latin America, the Pacific, and Africa), or will not much change ? It is argued that the outcome of this political debate to a large extent will be determined by the outcome of the aforementioned general debate about power and legitimacy of nuclear weapons.

Figuring it out the hard way: America, France, and the challenges of allied pursuit of nuclear weapons, 1958–63

ABSTRACT The US nuclear-policy community did not always accept today’s conventional wisdom that a state’s first nuclear test is a critical milestone; that even a small, rudimentary nuclear arsenal is a major concern; and that preventing states, even allies, from acquiring nuclear weapons should be a core US foreign-policy goal. Between 1958 and 1963, Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy experimented with three different responses to the French nuclear-weapons program: (1) offering to share US-owned nuclear weapons liberally; (2) leaving France to pursue nuclear weapons unaided; and (3) offering to sell France advanced submarines and missiles. Each of these approaches was the product of evolving beliefs about when a state “went nuclear,” the potency of small arsenals, and whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons among allies undermined or advanced US interests. Understanding how Washington shifted its stance during this period sheds important light on the origins and nature of US nonproliferation policy today.

Bombs and Border Crossings: Peace Activist Networks and the Post-colonial State in Africa, 1959–62

This article explores the engagement between European, African and US peace activists as a case-study of the transnational dimensions of decolonization. Its focus is the protest against the first French nuclear weapons test in the Sahara, and European activists’ involvement in subsequent international conferences in Ghana that sought to contest ‘nuclear imperialism’. The article assesses the limits of transnationalism when addressing interconnected histories of European, African and US anti-nuclear weapons campaigns and argues that, rather than facilitating the formation of new transnational communities, anti-nuclear peace movements in Africa coalesced around pre-existing anti-colonial activist networks. Furthermore, this study of interactions between Western and African activists suggests that there is a need for greater reflection on the sometimes contradictory ways in which campaign groups have interacted with the nation-state and negotiated transnational connections in ‘global’ political spaces.

ASSESSING RUSSIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD PHASED, DEEP NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, another issue enters the agenda—that of the impact of possible deep reductions on the shape of the global nuclear balance. As the gap between the US/Russian arsenals and the arsenals of “second-tier” nuclear weapon states narrows, the familiar shape of the global balance, which remains, to a large extent, bipolar, is likely to change. The article explores the Russian approach to the relationship between further US-Russian reductions and the prospect of “nuclear multipolarity,” and assesses the relative weight of this issue in Russian arms control policy as well as the views on the two specific regional balances—the one in Europe (including UK and French nuclear weapons) and in Asia (the possible dynamic of the Russian-Chinese nuclear balance).

French Nuclear Weapons, Euro-Deterrence, and NATO

French Nuclear Weapons, Euro-Deterrence, and NATO

NATO as a Framework for Nuclear Nonproliferation

The following analysis focuses on how the nuclear powers of the west were able to prevent the spread of nuclear weapon possession among their allies within the wider framing of the east-west conflict and by multilateralizing the issue - or the eventual solution - through NATO. Although the article looks into history, away from the grey of today's nonproliferation problems into the clear-cut past of the east -west conflict with its undisputed definition of friends and foes, some of its findings also point to current problems bedevilling NATO policies in this field.In the 1960s, the key challenge to a successful nonproliferation strategy within the western alliance was the question of West German possession of nuclear weapons. East and West Germany provided welcome manpower in the unfolding Cold War within their respective pacts, but the legacies of Hitler's Reich meant that they both remained on constant probation. For West Germany, this meant reliance upon American, British, and (later) French nuclear weapons. However, such dependence, combined with the likely use of nuclear weapons in a future war, brought about profound feelings of vulnerability and exposure in West Germany. This in turn encouraged various West German schemes designed to gain access to nuclear weaponry and nuclear planning so as to have a more central role in, and control over, the deterrence game.In the light of this very real interest, and considering the growing political influence of Bonn within the west, West Germany's financial strength as well as its undisputed technological capability to provide both up-to-date delivery vehicles and enriched nuclear material for warheads, a whole raft of questions arise: why did West Germany never acquire nuclear weapons? What made it possible for this nuclear abstention to be maintained throughout the various stages ofthe east-west conflict until 1989-90 and beyond? And what were the ingredients that made for the sustainability of this arrangement? While the core deal for a non-nuclear West Germany was struck between Washington and Bonn, it was enacted through the nonproliferation treaty and NATO. The framing for the continuation of West Germany's (non)nuclear status proved to be key for the limitation ofthe spread of nuclear weapons within the western alliance - and maintaining it became an ongoing task and even a raison d'etre for NATO itself.While many of these questions may remind the reader of today's dilemmas, the following is a historiographical analysis. As such, it will lead the reader through various - albeit selective - historical stages: the 1950s with the watershed year of 1957; the realization of a meaningful treaty on nonproliferation, including the signature of West Germany, in November 1969; the nuclear threats and dilemmas of 1977-78 leading up to NATO's dual-track decision; and a brief outlook on 1989-90 and Germany's position and choices regarding nuclear weapons today. Finally, the article will try to square some aspects of this particular nuclear history with the stillpreliminary thoughts on sustainable developed by an interdisciplinary research group convened by James Der Derian and Costas Constantinou, which focuses on the virtues and limitations of traditional diplomacy and the necessary wider - regional, economical, ecological, ideological, religious, etc. - framing for long-lasting arrangements.1THE SILENT OPTION: BONN'S NUCLEAR POLICIES IN THE 1950SThroughout the early and mid-1950s both the military and political leadership in West Germany paid little if any attention to nuclear weapons. In the Himmeroder Denkschrift - the founding document of what was to become the Bundeswehr - nuclear weapons were hardly mentioned at all and certainly not as a desirable option for the West Germans. Instead, West German generals busied themselves with rethinking their plans for large tank battles, developed in rather less fortunate times. Meanwhile, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer even seemed to hope that the Soviet Union would develop its own nuclear weaponry as quickly as possible, as this would virtually rule out the possibility of war. …

Residual radionuclide concentrations and estimated radiation doses at the former French nuclear weapons test sites in Algeria

In order to assess the level of residual radioactivity and evaluate the radiological conditions at the former French nuclear testing sites of Reggane and Taourirt Tan Afella in the south of Algeria, the International Atomic Energy Agency, at the request of the government of Algeria, conducted a field mission to the sites in 1999. At these locations, France conducted a number of nuclear tests in the early 1960s. At the ground zero locality of the ‘‘Gerboise Blanche’’ atmospheric test (Reggane) and in the vicinity of a tunnel where radioactive lava was ejected during a poorly contained explosion (Taourirt Tan Afella), non-negligible levels of radioactive material could still be measured. Using the information collected and using realistic potential exposure scenarios, radiation doses to potential occupants and visitors to the sites were estimated.

Nuclear Weapons in Britain's Policy towards France, 1960–1974

This article will attempt to draw attention to the Anglo–French nuclear weapons negotiations that ran alongside the British applications to join the EEC during the years 1960–1974. It suggests that the prospect of an entente nucléaire was an issue that played a unique role in the UK's negotiating strategy. It will argue that three successive Prime Minister's—Macmillan, Wilson and Heath—attempted to forge an agreement in the hope of overcoming French objections to Britain's entry, albeit for different reasons. All three were hampered by the “special nuclear relationship” with the Americans and this eventually precluded a mutually beneficial resolution.

1960 : le projet de constitution d'une force de frappe océanique stratégique (FOST) comme réponse à la menace soviétique

This paper is an attempt to understand which nuclear threat in 1960 the political and military french leaders could scientifically and technically hope within few years after the begenning of the 5th Republic in their relationships with U.S.S.R. 1960 is at the same time a capital year for the french policy of defense and the context of international relations. Respect to the national scientific and technical performances in 1960 from one hand and to the geographical characteristic of U.S.S.R. on ther other, this essay first reminds some aspects of a nuclear war, then describes the main lines of the french program of nuclear submarine, and ends with the soviet areas threatened. By the end, almost 20 millions of soviet citizens and 40% of the economic capacity would be destroyed. This paper is an intellectual essay and use books, statements and others free archives. The secret about the targets of the french nuclear weapons was a part of this «dissuasion» but necessarily this threat existed so that Soviet leaders used to deal with.

Outlook for inertial confinement fusion

During the next ten years the National Ignition Facility (NIF) will be completed and substantial fusion gains are likely to be achieved with the NIF megajoule class solid state laser. A facility very similar to NIF is being constructed by the French nuclear weapons program. Technological advances promise to make ICF increasingly attractive as a practical energy source. These advances include very high gain targets (e.g., the fast ignitor), petawatt lasers, diode pumped solid state lasers, and advanced heavy ion accelerators. Beyond the next ten years an experimental inertial fusion (IF) reactor will be needed to take the major step from NIF to a practical fusion power plant. A key question: how is this IF experimental reactor to be funded? A 100 MWe scale IF reactor could produce several kilograms per year of low cost tritium for DOE Defense Programs. Tritium produced by competing fission reactor and accelerator/spallation options is estimated to cost more than one hundred million dollars per kilogram, much more than the cost of tritium produced by a fusion reactor. Tritium production provides a defense funded option for IF`s next step beyond NIF.

The Marlboro Man on coral beaches.

148 Fox Valley Road, Wahroonga, 2076, Australia Harley J Stanton Testing of French nuclear weapons has re cently led to increasing resentment against the use of tranquil Pacific islands for the det onation of nuclear weapons. Chapman has pointed out the much greater threat to the Pacific that comes from the cancer colonisation of tobacco in the region.1 Tobacco use in the Pacific has risen alarmingly. The photograph on the cover of this issue of Tobacco Control was taken in the Pacific island

British, French, and Chinese nuclear weapons

The lesser nuclear-weapons states British nuclear weapons - history and production, forces and capabilities French nuclear weapons - history and production, forces and capabilities Chinese nuclear weapons - history and production, forces and capabilities.

The place of British and French nuclear weapons in arms control

The title of this article carries an implicit presumption that British and French nuclear weapons ought to have a place in arms control. Due to the way in which arms control negotiations have evolved-especially with the distinctly artificial separation of 'strategic' weapons from 'intermediate' weapons at Geneva-it is not obvious where that place should be. This is a proper subject for debate. But what the British and French governments cannot any longer do without laying themselves open to charges of gross inconsistency and obstructionism is to argue that American and Soviet nuclear weapons should be constrained through arms control while British and French weapons of the same general kind are not. To begin at the conclusion, Britain and France have no grounds, either in equity or in politics, for standing aside from taking proportional reductions if there are reductions in the nuclear weapons of the superpowers. This raises difficult questions for nuclear forces which their owners state (and believe) are 'minimum deterrent forces'. This article will present the argument that these forces seem to be developing to a point well beyond that which was previously regarded as the minimum deterrent level, and that it is not clear why it should be necessary, greatly to alter the retributive capacity of 'minimum deterrent forces' simply because the potential opponent increases his forces. There is a very respectable argument in deterrence theology for taking whatever steps are necessary to ensure the survivability of these minimum deterrent forces or 'weapons of last resort' in the face of a changing threat, but unacceptable damage remains unacceptable damage, in the absence of effective defences. If this calculus was initially based on the capacity to inflict a certain degree of pain on an opponent in retaliation, why should it now be necessary to increase the destructive potential of the deterrent force? In terms of practical politics, the subject of the planned expansion of the British and French forces could be introduced alongside the bilateral US-Soviet strategic arms negotiations, either by offering force increases lower than those planned if the Soviet Union reduces its forces threatening Britain and France, or, if the new weapons are already deployed here, reducing them back to consistency with earlier definitions of what constituted a minimum. If the time were ever to arrive when both superpowers had reduced so dramatically that reductions below the minimum were demanded of Britain and France, it would be a much safer world and they might be able to afford to do so. It is well known why the essential purpose of British and French nuclear forces differs from the superpowrers' strategic or intermediate nuclear forces; yet they share many of the latter's characteristics. They are basically ballistic missiles carried in nuclear-powered submarines-and these are systems genlerally acknowledged in SALT and START to be 'strategic' regardless of missile range and so 'central' systems for the superpowers. Whatever differences one can point to in technrical

La France, l'arme nucléaire et la défense de l'Europe

France, nuclear weapons and the defence of Europe, by Jean Klein Although French nuclear weapons have now obtained national consensus and their contribution to the Alliance's world dissuasion recognized by the declaration at Ottawa in 1974, opinions differ as to the function which could be assigned to them within the European defence context. In 1976, declarations by the highest political and military authorities have been interpreted as a criticism of the doctrine in the White Paper of 1972, insofar as they considered extending nuclear guarantee to France's neighbours. Since then controversies have been appeased and it would appear that the main points fixed in the 60s have been maintained. It is precisely the specific outlines of French military policy which have impeded the development of European and Atlantic cooperation on matters of defence and it is most unlikely that any appreciable change of situation will take place in the future. Indeed, the evolution of the Soviet-American strategic dialogue and changes in the international environment do confirm the justification of choice in favour of an independent force of dissuasion which must not be mortgaged if the chances of a European defence of Europe are to be maintained.

International Law and the French Nuclear Weapons Tests

International Law and the French Nuclear Weapons Tests

Fall-out over Australia from Nuclear Weapons tested by France during July 1966

FRENCH nuclear weapons testing, at a site in the Tuamotu Archipelago in the South Pacific Ocean, started in July 1966 with low-yield explosions in the atmosphere at 1534 G.M.T. on July 2, and 1505 G.M.T. on July 19. A third test on July 21 was described as a safety experiment and did not involve a nuclear reaction, while the fourth test in the series did not occur until September 11. Before these tests, fall-out over Australia comprised only very low concentrations of aged debris from the stratosphere arising from high yield atmospheric tests carried out before the partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Because of this situation, there could be unambiguous detection of fresh fission products arriving from the first two French tests of July 2 and 19. Preliminary results obtained from the Australian fall-out monitoring network are briefly reported and discussed here for the period July 1 to September 15. Fall-out over Australia from the first two explosions was virtually complete by September 15, while debris from the fourth test had not reached Australia.