French Nuclear Forces Research Articles

ENHANCING EUROPEAN SECURITY: MODERN CHALLENGES POSED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The proposal of Europeanising French deterrence was revived by French President Emmanuel Macron, who declared in February 2020 that French nuclear forces reinforce European security simply by existing and suggested a strategic dialogue with all EU partners regarding the role of French nuclear weapons in European security. Macron further reasoned that this issue is increasingly urgent nowadays as the EU must jointly realise that, because of the lack of a legal structure, they may easily find themselves vulnerable to the resumption of a traditional, even nuclear, arms race on their land. The prospects of global control of weapons and disarmament efforts are very blurry in the times of rising political tensions, revived nuclear arms races, and weakening trust in multilateralism. Nevertheless, this all leads to the necessity to support active actions towards nuclear risk reductions, whichhave recently appeared in some of the multilateral forums. The elimination of nuclear risk is nothing but an intermediate measure to reduce nuclear proliferation dangers until they are liquidated. It is essential to review the risks of accidents involving nuclear weapons and their influence on European security, along with focusing on the role of European nuclear weapon states (NWS), their place in global security and possible scenarios for their future: the authors considered the possible prospects of the EU as another entity with nuclear weapons, as well as the likelihood of the EU as another regional nuclear-free zone and discussed whether the real change is possible.

Unfit for purpose: reassessing the development and deployment of French nuclear weapons (1956–1974)

ABSTRACT This article presents the first reassessment of the strategic rationality and credibility of French nuclear weapons policy before 1974. Building on untapped primary material from across the world as well as technical analysis, it shows that early Cold War French nuclear weapon procurement and deployment are incompatible with a precise grand design and the requirements of strategic rationality. The first generation of French nuclear forces also lacked technical credibility, despite reliance on outside help. Several French officials knew about it, as did their allies and adversaries. These findings de-exceptionalise French nuclear history and challenge conventional wisdom about Cold War nuclear history.

STRATEGIC STABILITY IN EUROPE

This article offers a survey of risks that might arise for strategic stability (defined as a situation with a low probability of major-power war) with the reduction of US and Russian nuclear arsenals to “low numbers” (defined as 1,000 or fewer nuclear weapons on each side). These risks might include US anti-cities targeting strategies that are harmful to the credibility of extended deterrence; renewed European anxiety about a US-Russian condominium; greater vulnerability to Russian noncompliance with agreed obligations; incentives to adopt destabilizing “launch-on-warning” strategies; a potential stimulus to nuclear proliferation; perceptions of a US disengagement from extended deterrence; increased likelihood of non-nuclear arms competitions and conflicts; and controversial pressures on the UK and French nuclear forces. Observers in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states who consider such risks significant have cited four possible measures that might help to contain them: sustained basing of US nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe; maintaining a balanced US strategic nuclear force posture; high-readiness means to reconstitute US nuclear forces; and enhanced US and allied non-nuclear military capabilities. These concrete measures might complement the consultations with the NATO allies that the United States would in all likelihood seek with respect to such important adjustments in its deterrence and defense posture.

EU Defence Integration and Nuclear Weapons: A Common Deterrent for Europe?

Nuclear weapons remain the unquestioned core of the defence postures of both France and the United Kingdom. At the same time, the European Union is progressively enhancing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), notably through the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Yet, despite evident progress in the CFSP, whose ultimate purpose is to lead to a ‘common defence policy’, EU member-states still deal with nuclear issues on a predominantly national basis. What is the alleged purpose of European nuclear forces? How is the raison d’être of the French and British nuclear deterrents conceptualized against the background of progressing European (defence) integration? This article examines the construction of the rationale of the French and British nuclear forces and their compatibility with the emerging European defence policy, particularly with regard to a hypothetical integration of both arsenals into a common deterrent. Could and should a ‘European nuclear deterrent’ be envisaged as the final stage in the framing of a European defence?

French nuclear forces, 2008

French nuclear forces, 2008

French nuclear forces, 2008

(2008). French nuclear forces, 2008. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 52-57.

THE LAST TO DISARM?

France still sees its nuclear arsenal as essential both as insurance against future major risks and as support for an independent foreign policy. There is a wide consensus in the country to maintain a nuclear deterrent, both among political parties and the general public. A modernization program is under way that will ensure the continued efficacy of the French nuclear force well into the 2030s, and France has adopted a fairly restrictive interpretation of its disarmament commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This suggests that the likeliest future direction of France's nuclear policy is conservatism. However, other scenarios remain possible, especially in the domain of transatlantic and/or European cooperation.

French nuclear forces, 2005

French nuclear forces, 2005

French nuclear forces, 2005

French nuclear forces, 2005

French Nuclear Forces, 2001

"French Nuclear Forces, 2001." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 57(4), pp. 70–71KEYWORDS: Nuclear-Notebook

French Nuclear Forces, 2001

French Nuclear Forces, 2001

French and British Nuclear Forces, 2000

French and British Nuclear Forces, 2000

French and British Nuclear Forces, 2000

French and British Nuclear Forces, 2000

French and British Nuclear Forces, 1999

French and British Nuclear Forces, 1999

French and British nuclear forces, 1999

French and British nuclear forces, 1999

British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces

British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces

British and French nuclear forces after the cold war

British and French nuclear forces after the cold war

The British and French nuclear forces

The British and French nuclear forces

The French nuclear force

The French nuclear force

Arms Control and the Liberals' Dilemma

ARMS CONTROL AND THE LIBERALS' DILEMMA D. Geoffrey Peck D'uring the closing weeks of the 1984 Presidential campaign as Americans argued among themselves about the prospects for a successful strategic defense and its implications for arms control with the Soviets, there emerged a historic and progressive change in Soviet and American approaches to negotiations. This change, the "umbrella" concept, has defined the present negotiations as a "complex of questions concerning space, nuclear arms both strategic and intermediate-range, with all questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."1 Despite the formal, procedural nature of this adjustment, the umbrella holds the potential to break down two of the most intractable and decisive issues of arms control: the relationship between the nuclear balance in Europe and the bilateral "strategic" balance, and the relationship between offense and defense in deterrence. Meanwhile, as the negotiating environment has improved, the political environment in the United States has turned bitter. The liberal arms control community has become obstructionist and cynical. This once creative political force, now self-absorbed in discussions of the personalities within the Reagan administration, seems to be more interested in an arms control failure, and has grown indifferent to noteworthy progress and changes in the political and diplomatic landscape. From the perspective of a proponent of arms control and a liberal, this reaction is tragic. 1. Joint communique from Geneva 8 January 1985 announcing agreement to reconvene arms control negotiations. David Geoffrey Peck is a Ph.D. candidate at SAIS. 91 92 SAIS REVIEW For despite the new opportunities presented by the umbrella concept, staggering complexities and uncertainties remain that may prove unsurmountable. Political and intellectual contributions from liberals would be useful, yet liberals face an ironic dilemma: whether to support the arms control process and the administration, or oppose them both. The toughest issues in arms control continue to be the oldest. The traditional contest between the United States and the Soviet Union over influence and presence in Europe remains a fundamental political conflict with profound implications. The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties (salt I and II) were based explicitly on the principle of parity in strategic nuclear forces, but divergent definitions of this concept reflected the political conflict and dogged salt through the 1970s. For the Americans parity has meant an "essential equivalence" in strategic systems. Strategic systems, according to the American view, are those capable of striking one superpower from the other's bases.2 This definition is both logical in its simplicity and self-serving in its exclusion of all U.S. systems based in nato countries. For the Soviets parity has meant "equal security," a vague and similarly self-serving concept that implied that any fair balance of U.S. and Soviet forces would provide the Soviets with a numerical advantage.3 This advantage, the Soviets have argued, would be to compensate for Soviet disadvantages caused by British and French nuclear forces, and the vulnerable sea lines of communication of its strategic missile submarines . Strategic systems are defined broadly by the Soviets to include U.S. systems assigned to nato capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union. These forward-based systems (fbs) consist of U.S. planes capable of delivering conventional or nuclear weapons. For the Soviets they are strategic because they may deliver nuclear weapons to Soviet targets. For the United States they are irrelevant to the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance because they are committed to defending nato, and because they have conventional missions to offset Warsaw pact superiority on the ground.4 At stake in this dispute is the credibility of the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe with nuclear weapons if necessary, the foundation of nato, and the U.S. presence in Europe. The Soviet definition of parity, if ratified by treaty, would tend to undermine the credibility of that commmitment. American forces and influence may then be seen by Europeans as a provocation rather than a keeper of peace. The American definition represents an attempt to buttress this fragile credibility, 2.For a thoughtful discussion of these definitions, see Thomas Wolfe, The SALT Experience, Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Co. (1979): 30. 3.Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits, New York: Alfred A. Knopf...