Freedom Of Navigation Operations Research Articles

Muddied waters: Freedom-of-navigation operations as signals in the South China Sea

Freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs) led by the United States have become a prominent policy tool in the South China Sea. These operations, however, have caused much confusion and consternation in the region despite the limited legal purpose that they officially serve. Why? This article departs from existing research by examining FONOPs as a form of signalling. Utilising an original dataset on US FONOPs in the South China Sea, we explain why and how FONOPs are ambiguous signals. Because of the nature of FONOPs using warships, the complexities in the maritime environment, and the irregularity of FONOPs, serious sender–receiver gaps emerge in the South China Sea regarding whether FONOPs signal resolve, coercive intent, and/or intentions to check certain states’ broader ambitions. Our analysis reveals that some signalling interpretations of FONOPs in the region are more plausible than others, thus helping to reduce the signalling ambiguity of these operations.

Legal Issues and Countermeasures of Sino-US Maritime Conflicts Triggered by Freedom of Navigation Operations

Legal Issues and Countermeasures of Sino-US Maritime Conflicts Triggered by Freedom of Navigation Operations

UNLEASHING SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT: MULTIPLEX ANALYSIS OF DIPLOMATIC CHAOS

The South China Sea, one of the busiest trade routes around the world consisting of an area of 3.5 million square kilometers, is subject to several overlapping territorial disputes involving China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei as its stakeholders. The South China Sea connects Asia to Europe and Africa. Political rivals have tried amicable settlement of the contemporary disputes but instead, the tensions have increased over the course of recent years. Multiple Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Treaties of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) have been signed by the contending states but all have proven to be in vain. Mechanisms like Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) are used for chest thumping and hard power display. Numerous other factors are there that eventuate in weakening of diplomatic ties between the contending states. One of such factors is involved is the presence of alien powers like the United States for maintenance of a World Order favouring her on interests under the guise of providing security to the region. Adopting multiplex methodology, this research paper adopts an approach aiming at giving a synopsis of the inherent disputes between the stakeholders, the reasons for failure of efforts for amicable settlement, the role of the stakeholders with special reference to the major contending forces i.e., United States and China, the subsequent implications arising therefrom and some possible solutions to the issue. Keywords: SCS, FONOS, CBM, Multiplex methodology.

Freedom of Navigation Operations as a Tool of the U.S.’ South China Sea Policy

The article analyzes U.S. policy on the conflict in the South China Sea. It focuses on particularities of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) conducted by the U.S. Navy in the contested waters. Political and legal basis of FONOPs, specifics of their undertaking in the South China Sea in recent years, including the first steps of the new presidential administration of Joe Biden, are analyzed in detail. It has been proven that in addition to directly challenging illegal Chinese claims, these operations in a way became a tool for containing China in the SCS and projecting American military power in the region.

The Territorialization of Airspace in the East and South China Seas: Unraveling the Security Dilemma

executive summary: This article examines the perspectives and policies of both China and the U.S. regarding airspace claims in the East and South China Seas and offers a policy prescription to address the underlying political issues driving both nations toward a collision. main argumentThe U.S. and China are moving further into a downward spiral based on misperceptions regarding each other's airspace policies in the East and South China Seas. Weary of U.S. surveillance flights close to its borders, China has responded to such activities by increasingly challenging the right to conduct such flights. The desire to push U.S. military flights farther away has prompted China to establish an East China Sea air defense identification zone and erect similar restrictions, albeit on a smaller scale, in the South China Sea. The U.S., meanwhile, has interpreted these actions as incrementally destabilizing the rules-based international order as well as posing a direct threat to its long-held freedom of navigation interests. The Treaty on Open Skies provides a model to ease the political differences between the two countries by accounting for the core concerns driving U.S. and Chinese policies. policy implications • Far from making the country more secure, China's policy of contesting freedom of navigation outside its twelve nautical mile territorial sea demarcation invites the U.S. and other regional powers to oppose China through military operations to ensure access to the international commons around its mainland. • Absent other measures that take Beijing's perspective into account, continued U.S. freedom of navigation operations and surveillance flights in close proximity to China meant to keep air and sea space free and open will induce aggressive counterreactions that produce the opposite of the intended outcome. • A bilateral framework based on the Treaty on Open Skies model that addresses the concerns of both states, while preserving their underlying interests, would add balance to the confrontational policies adopted by both states heretofore.

INTERVENSI NEGARA KETIGA DAN PERAN INDONESIA BERSAMA ASEAN PADA PENYELESAIAN ISU LAUT CINA SELATAN (LCS)

This paper discusses the development of the issue of the South China Sea (SCS), which until now it is still unclear the direction of its resolution, and over time finally got intervention from a third country, such as the United States (US) through Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS). This is certainly received strong opposition from China that the US action has violated the SCS boundary which is claimed as China's sovereign territory. Indonesia as an ASEAN member country together with other ASEAN countries that claim SCS (Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam) is also working to resolve the SCS problem which is still in the process of discussion and signing of the draft SCS Code of Conduct (CoC) with China.

Политика США в Южно-Китайском море во время президентства Д.Трампа

This article analyzes the U.S. policy in the South China Sea (SCS) under the administration of Donald Trump and examines American strategic interests, objectives, and tasks in the SCS. The U.S. policy in the SCS is addressed the context of the Indo-Pacific Strategy that has become the main doctrinal basis of the Trump administration’s policy for the Asia-Pacific. A new level of the U.S. confrontation with China is noted that in recent years has become a serious challenge for American military dominance in the South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific. The author argues that in the recent years the United States has significantly increased the scale and intensity of its naval maneuvers in the SCS. It was under the Donald Trump administration that the United States increasingly engaged its allies, including non-regional ones, in joint operations in the SCS. Special attention is paid to the impact of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP), conducted by the United States Navy in the contested maritime areas. FONOP have a dual character. On the one hand, they are framed as peacekeeping operations aimed solely at protecting freedom of navigation. On the other hand, these naval raids are the U.S. key tool to contain China's military ambitions and lead to aggravating tensions in the region.

How Strategic Norm-Shaping Undergirds America’s Command of the Commons

The United States government established a Freedom of Navigation program in 1979 with the mandate to conduct diplomatic and military activities to protest other states’ excessive maritime claims and encourage those states to harmonize their claims with U.S. interpretations of international law. Despite the prominence of this program in U.S. maritime strategy, there have been no systematic studies of the patterns in U.S. Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPs). This paper presents a dataset of all U.S. FONOPs conducted since 1991, which shows that the United States does not conduct FONOPs vis-a-vis all excessive maritime claims everywhere in the world every year. The frequency of such operations varies across time and space. This paper thus develops a theoretical explanation for how the United States decides to conduct FONOPs when and where it does. This paper hypothesizes that the United States uses FONOPs as part of a strategic effort to shape international maritime norms in ways that sustain its command of the sea by legitimating its naval access to key straits and littorals. The paper then outlines a research design for testing this theory and implements the first stage of that empirical strategy. Using statistical data, process tracing, and discourse analysis, this initial plausibility probe demonstrates that a theory of strategic norm-shaping is a strong candidate for explaining patterns in U.S. FONOPs.

Europe and China’s sea disputes: between normative politics, power balancing and acquiescence

ABSTRACTChina’s disputes with its South East Asian neighbours and Japan in the South and East China Seas have emerged as important tests of the implications of China’s rise, posing dilemmas not just for regional states but also for other global actors, including European states and the European Union (EU). European responses to these disputes have pulled in three directions: a normative approach emphasising the resolution of disputes within the framework of international law; a power balancing approach, led by France and the United Kingdom, involving support for freedom of navigation operations and strengthened bilateral and EU ties with other Asian states; and de facto acquiescence to Chinese advances in the region. In terms of understanding EU foreign policy, this case suggests a sequence: a normative approach as the initial default EU policy; a turn to power balancing when the effectiveness of that policy is called into question, but also the possibility of acquiescence and consequent divisions amongst EU member states. Europe faces dilemmas in balancing support for the United States, Japan and the South-East Asian states with its strategic partnership with China, but in practice European policy is much closer to that of the former group than that of Beijing.

Multilateral defense cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region: Tentative steps toward a regional NATO?

ABSTRACTSome U.S. military leaders have asserted that the United States, Japan, Australia, and India and the Republic of Korea are developing multilateral defense cooperation to deter aggression and uphold norms much like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has in Europe. Frequent military exercises and China’s threats to freedom of navigation (FoN) and North Korea’s nuclear missiles comprise the motive force for such cooperation. However, cooperation thus far has been trilateral and minimal, given divergent national interests and dispersed geopolitical locations. Cooperation among Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States is increasing given the threat, but ROK’s public opinion is divided about Japan. Australia, Japan, and India have increased cooperation with the United States but are reluctant to conduct FoN operations with the United States to challenge China’s expansionism in the South China Sea. If China becomes more aggressive and blocks FoN or seizes territory, development toward an Asian NATO is possible.

The Philippine Law of the Sea Action against China: Relearning the Limits of International Adjudication

1. China has been blamed – and rightly so – for advancing overbroad claims in the South China Sea (SCS), and for unilaterally attempting to enforce those claims through threats and aggressive actions. The United States has properly responded to China’s assertions by exercising its maritime rights through freedom of navigation operations, by assisting States whose claims are threatened by China’s conduct, and by working to create and strengthen alliances to deter China from continuing its policy of using strength to implement its claims to sovereignty and historical rights through unilateral actions. Such measures are essential to convince China to return to its long-held and sound policy of avoiding sovereignty disputes and supporting cooperative development. 2. It is equally imperative, however, for the US to acknowledge the ineffective foreign policy that continues to exacerbate the ongoing, dangerous confrontation with China over its SCS claims. The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea among conflicting SCS claimants provides for the negotiation, rather than unilateral implementation, of conflicting claims1; and the Philippine government in particular agreed to resolve its disputes with China through negotiations. The Philippine government gave up on diplomacy, however, and sued China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in January 2013, contending that bilateral negotiations had led nowhere; that multilateral efforts were bogged down; and that China had repeatedly used its superior power to maintain its claims. The LOS tribunal appointed to hear the case has decided it has jurisdiction over several of the Philippine claims and it has reserved judgment on all the other claims until the merits have been determined. An LOS tribunal decision adverse to China is anticipated on July 12, 2016.

Meeting China Halfway - How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry

Meeting China Halfway--How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry. By Lyle J. Goldstein. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015. Hardcover: 389pp. Meeting China Halfway is a must read for anyone concerned about the current trajectory of US-China relations. It has much to say about how America and China might build greater strategic trust, and thus avoid the risks of a Thucydides trap. It puts forward constructive policy proposals about how these major powers might move from an escalation spiral in their relationship to a spiral. Recognizing that Chinese and American interests coincide over many global problems, successive chapters address major global issues, such as the environment, the Middle East, Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, and how a spiral might proceed. For each issue it identifies a mutually reciprocal progression of steps that would promote cooperation and trust. Such a spiral would start with small steps and move on to more difficult initiatives. Associate Professor Lyle Goldstein was the founding director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College, and has considerable expertise on China, with the language ability to analyse Chinese language sources, including military publications, not otherwise available to Western experts. Goldstein's basic concern in Meeting China Halfway is the increasing levels of distrust between Beijing and Washington. This is aggravated by the lack of appreciation on the American side of China's history, especially US imperialism, and the wide extent of anti-American sentiment in China. Goldstein notes that Most Chinese foreign policy and defense specialists are convinced that Washington seeks to contain and even derail China's rise (p. 355). With this background, it is not surprising that China responds robustly to US initiatives, especially those of a military nature, in the South China Sea. As Goldstein reminds us, there are hawks in both Beijing and Washington. In his view, Most troubling of all, the military establishments in both the United States and China each appears to hold that they must earnestly prepare for rivalry and even direct conflict (pp. 330-31). Given developments over the past year, with China's artificial island-building in the South China Sea and the US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), if anything these sentiments have increased since the book was published. This review focuses primarily on the chapter which addresses US-China relations in the South China Sea. title of this chapter is The New 'Fulda Gap' using the metaphor for US-China rivalry first introduced by Robert Kaplan in a 2009 Foreign Affairs article on the Indian Ocean. Given the depth of anti-American sentiment in China, Goldstein believes that it is Washington's responsibility to initiate the first steps of each spiral. With the South China Sea, the first step would be for Washington to invite China's participation in the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) series of naval exercises. Subsequent steps by Washington might include promotion of regional coast guard cooperation, public recognition of China as a claimant in the South China Sea, and the scaling back of military activities in the region. last step involves terminating US military cooperation with Vietnam, believing that recent overtures toward military cooperation between Hanoi and Washington have violated reasonable principles of geopolitical moderation (p. 290). Similarly, Goldstein is opposed to the US encouraging India's entry into the South China Sea. reciprocal steps by Beijing might include proposals for combined counter-piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits (unlikely to be well received by the littoral states), clarification of the nine-dash line, joint resource development on the principle of equality and ending its own initiatives for regional military cooperation. …

China, the US, and the Law of the Sea

The South China Sea, a major transit area of international maritime traffic, is the scene of territorial and maritime claims expressed by the riparian states, including China but also Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, and now represents one of the main stumbling blocks in the US-China bilateral relationship. Between October 2015 and mid-May 2016, a series of initiatives taken unilaterally by China on one side and the US on the other have greatly exacerbated the latent confrontation of the two powers in this maritime space.Chinese initiatives have essentially consisted of fitting out the Paracel Islands and some recently reclaimed reefs of the Spratly archipelago with transport infrastructure. To this end, the Chinese Ministry of Transport has installed three lighthouses on the Spratly Islands: two on Cuarteron and South Johnson reefs on 9 October 2015(1)and a third on Subi Reef on 6 April 2016.(2)On 2 January 2016, the spokeswoman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hua Chunying, confirmed completion of construction of an aerodrome on Fiery Cross Reef, which US satellite photos already showed in 2014.(3) This confirmation was followed on 6 January by the organisation of two civilian flight tests - one operated by China Southern Airlines and the other by Hainan Airlines - between the airport of Haikou, the provincial capital of Hainan, and the new Fiery Cross airfield.(4) Both tests may indicate future exploitation of this line on the heels of what the Chinese authorities already planned to do in the Paracel Islands.(5) Finally, other actions such as the deployment of aircraft missile launchers on Woody Island on February 2016 (6) and anti-ship missiles in March(7) seem to confirm the militarisation of the Paracels while leaving some doubt as to the establishment of a similar process in the Spratlys, which could lead, according to some observers, to the delimitation of an air defence identification zone in the South China Sea. (8)These initiatives, which will probably be followed by others in the coming weeks and months, are the undisputed testimony of an increasingly firm will from China to increase its presence in the South China Sea in order to more effectively monitor this space and impose itself as the dominant power. China thus materialises a historically self-proclaimed sovereignty.At the same time, Washington has allowed the US Navy to conduct three Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP). Three guided missile destroyers, the USS Lassen, on 27 October 2015, the USS Curtis Wilbur, on 30 January 2016, and the USS William P. Lawrence, on 10 May 2016, have respectively sailed within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, Triton Island, and Fiery Cross Reef, all claimed and occupied by China. (9)The fact that the two countries answer each other through these actions is obvious. The deployment of missile launchers on Woody Island is clearly a response to the passage of the USS Curtis Wilbur near Triton Island, all the more so given that China undertook this deployment during the US-ASEAN special leaders' summit in Sunnylands, California, in the course of which Barack Obama reiterated that the US would continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows. The summit's joint statement, without clearly mentioning Chinese initiatives in the South China Sea, included calls for respecting freedom of and overflight in the maritime areas as well as non-militarization and self-restraint in the conduct of activities.(10)In fact, a major concern in Washington is that this assertion of Chinese presence in the South China Sea will eventually threaten freedom of navigation and in the process, American strategic and economic interests. This concern is partly fuelled by China's official position regarding certain articles and clauses of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) relating to the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea or in the conduct of activities by foreign military ships and aircraft in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the coastal state. …

Walking the Talk in the South China Sea

Walking the Talk in the South China Sea Thomas B. Fargo (bio) For most of the first decade of the 21st century, the South China Sea was a region of relative calm. Civilian commerce and military transits and training were conducted with only routine concern for the security environment. After the Hainan Island EP-3 collision incident in 2001, peaceful development of the region’s resources moved forward until China re-promulgated a vague historical claim to much of the South China Sea in 2009—the so-called nine-dash line—which stoked tensions with its neighbors over competing sovereignty claims. Also worrying have been Beijing’s confrontational tactics: harassment at sea, the construction and garrisoning of artificial islands, and the absolute rejection of mediation or legal adjudication. These activities have tested, and frequently overstepped, the boundaries of international law. This essay examines the core U.S. interests in the South China Sea and argues that the United States should ensure that freedom of navigation operations are one component of a consistent and comprehensive strategy of regional engagement. This strategy needs to make full use of well-honed diplomatic, military, and economic tools to impart a shared vision of a peaceful maritime arena. Core U.S. Interests and Freedom of Navigation The escalation of tensions in the South China Sea has tested the littoral states’ preferred strategic orientation: good relations with China, the United States, and their neighbors. More than ever, they fear that China’s pretensions are a preview of the day when Beijing will make all the rules and call all the shots in littoral Asia. In a number of respects, it is unfortunate that the U.S. pivot or rebalance to Asia was framed as such, implying that the United States had abandoned the region during the war on terrorism. As one of our good friends in the region once said to me, the rebalance is really a “reaffirmation” of U.S. policy and presence over the past three administrations. The facts are the United States has remained committed [End Page 59] to Southeast Asia and engaged there because the challenge to peace in the South China Sea is also a challenge to three key U.S. interests. The first and foremost reason the United States will remain invested in the peace and stability of Pacific Asia is economic. In 2014, U.S. exports to Asia had a total value of $650.5 billion, while imports from Asia were worth $1.06 trillion, accounting for a respective 27.7% and 37.2% of total U.S. exports and imports.1 Further, investment by American entrepreneurs in Asian economies gives the United States a stake in the regular and uninterrupted conduct of intrastate and intraregional trade and in predictable and inclusive growth. A second national interest is the security of allies and friends. The pursuit of peace beyond U.S. shores is, in turn, the most effective guarantee that the continental homeland will never itself become a battlefield. Third, both of these core interests—prosperity and security—are underpinned by the traditional rights of states to sail unimpeded on the high seas and, without impairing the peace or security of coastal states, travel through territorial waters without prior permission. From its earliest days, the law of the sea has protected trading nations’ access to foreign ports. In the modern global economy, all nations are traders and enjoy in common the benefits of open access. Further, maritime power, which is reliant on mobility at sea, plays a unique and irreplaceable role in U.S. power-projection strategies, being both flexible and visible. U.S. fleets make neighbors of our distant allies, assuring them of the United States’ commitment to their security.2 The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program was established in response to the gradual erosion of traditional rights at sea. Rather than an attempt by the United States to claim special privileges, it was created in reaction to new claims to territorial zones that threatened to enclose the littoral space within a jumble of overlapping jurisdictions.3 Announced in 1979 by President Jimmy Carter and endorsed by President Ronald Reagan in the 1983 U.S. Oceans Policy...