Franklin D. Roosevelt Research Articles

Presidential Control over Administration: A New Historical Analysis of Public Finance Policymaking, 1929-2018 by Patrick O’Brien

Americans hold presidents responsible for economic growth and stability, but because each president must rely on entrenched experts and administrative norms, their ability to shift policy is often curtailed. In this book, author Patrick O’Brien tries to understand that tension by exploring how efforts to imbue the presidency with greater capacity to live up to those expectations have fluctuated over time, too often limiting presidents whose ambitions for economic reform outsized their managerial abilities. The book succeeds in meeting this overarching objective. It is clear that despite similar formal powers, not all presidents have left the same legacy on public finance—namely, none as influential as Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) or Ronald Reagan. Yet, presidential success does not boil down to popularity or congressional support. Roosevelt brought about a New Deal finance apparatus; Reagan bequeathed his name on a second one that supplanted it. Both did so because they repudiated an older order whose legitimacy was tarnished. Other presidents, even if fortunate to have the political capital and unified government, were constrained by an administrative apparatus still beholden to a previous era.

Franklin Roosevelt and the Cuban Left: Contradictions of the Colonised Mind?

In any study of modern Cuban history, 1933 is seen as a turning point, either a “prelude to revolution” (for some) or because it divided the overtly neo-colonial First Republic (1902-33) from the Second (1934-58), changing the scope and nature of US involvement in Cuba, with the Platt Amendment replaced by a more complex economic and political dependency. However, it was also when, under Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), a different United States seemed to exist in the eyes of those Cubans who wanted greater Cuban independence within a good relationship with a United States, now seemingly driven by the new “Good Neighbour” policy. This chapter goes beyond that perspective to examine the reformist Cuban Left’s revealingly ambiguous reactions to the other strand of FDR’s new approach, namely his New Deal, reactions which brought out the complexities and contradictions of the reformist Left's attitudes to the United States and to their own group identities within the Cuban spectrum. Those responses and contradictions tell us much about the strength and depth of residual colonised attitudes in Cuban society and politics that even included the Left and the rhetorically nationalist forces, suggesting that an intellectual and cultural dependence on the United States might still go deeper than the discourse might imply.

1933–1938: The New Deal and the Great Depression

In December 1938, US president Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) contemplated recent setbacks that challenged the viability of his program of economic recovery, popularly called the “New Deal.” Various achievements and defeats in the first three years of his administration energized his supporters and galvanized a diverse opposition of conservatives, populists, and extremists—who believed FDR had gone too far or not far enough. Critics accused him of overreach of powers beyond his constitutional authority, of inconsistency, of inciting class warfare, and of creating conditions that actually retarded recovery. Would the record of the New Deal sustain the level of popular support that he won in the election of 1936? Had his policies and programs promoted economic recovery? What lessons should he learn from his defeats? What changes should he make in his programs and politics as he entered the election year? Should he double down on his progressive agenda or change course? Excerpt UVA-F-1951 Jun. 30, 2020 1933–1938: The New Deal and the Great Depression In late 1938, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) contemplated recent political setbacks that appeared to doom his political program, popularly called the “New Deal.” A program of unprecedented breadth and impact, the New Deal stood out as the most aggressive civic reaction to an economic crisis in history. And it proved to be among the most polarizing. Various achievements and defeats in the first five years of FDR's administration energized his supporters and galvanized a diverse opposition of conservatives, populists, socialists, communists, isolationists, and extremists—all of whom believed FDR had gone too far or not far enough. Critics accused him of overreach of powers beyond his constitutional authority, of inconsistency, of class warfare, and of creating conditions that actually retarded recovery. Nevertheless, voters had returned FDR to a second term in office with a thumping majority of 60.8% in 1936 (see Exhibit1). On the basis of that momentum, FDR had sought to sustain his reform policies of “bold, persistent experimentation,” only to confront rising resistance and political humiliation in the midterm elections of 1938. By year-end, FDR saw that the New Deal had lost its momentum and that rising international tensions would command more of the nation's attention and resources. In his draft State of the Union Address for January 4, 1939, he planned to “advise the congress of disturbance abroad and of the need of putting our own house in order in the face of storm signals from across the seas” and to relegate “our nation's program of social and economic reform [to]…a part of defense”—thus marking a major shift in priorities and policies. . . .

1930–1933: The Great Depression and the End of “Orthodoxy” (a)

In February 1933, President Herbert Hoover reviewed the past four years of his administration. He had met a stock market crash and a recession that worsened into the Depression with actions out of the playbook of Republican “orthodoxy”: balanced budgets, tax reduction, protectionism, and community relief based on volunteerism. Yet as the Depression deepened, Hoover pivoted toward policies that pushed the limits of his own philosophy: debt financing of fiscal deficits, government investment in private enterprises, social relief, debt moratoriums, and public works spending to promote employment. None of these actions had halted the worsening economic news. In November 1932, New York governor Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated Hoover in the presidential election.Now, in the interregnum before the transfer of office on March 4, 1933, economic conditions turned suddenly worse. Consumers and business leaders deferred spending until the new administration outlined its policies. Hoover sought Roosevelt's support for policies and actions to address the crisis. What should Hoover do or say to elicit that support? The answers lay in careful diagnosis of the problems and prioritization of remedies. Opinion was divided on the question of whether demand shocks or supply shocks had caused the Great Depression—each would dictate different policy actions. What was the appropriate diagnosis? What should be the remedies?The A case presents the dominant narrative; a suggested B case provides correspondence between Hoover and Roosevelt. This case set has been taught successfully in both in-person and online classes at Darden. Excerpt UVA-F-1904 Rev. Jul. 1, 2020 1930–1933: The Great Depression and the End of “Orthodoxy” (A) In February 1933, President Herbert Hoover reviewed the past four years of his administration. The stock market had crashed seven months after his inauguration. The Great Depression had arrived eight months after that. Hoover had responded energetically to the deepening crisis with actions out of the playbook of Republican “orthodoxy”: balanced budgets, tax reduction, protectionism, and community relief based on volunteerism. As the Depression deepened, he had resorted to policies that pushed the limits of his own philosophy: fiscal deficits, debt financing, government investment in private enterprises, debt moratoriums, and public works spending to promote employment. None of these actions had halted the worsening economic news. In 1930, a landslide of public anger delivered a Democratic Party majority to the House of Representatives. Then in November 1932, New York governor Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) defeated Hoover in the presidential election. Now, in the interregnum before the transfer of office on March 4, 1933, Hoover sought FDR's alignment on policies and actions to address the crisis. In February 1933, banking panics were spreading across the country. A “run” against the US dollar was growing, as foreign holders of the currency sought to exchange it for other currencies or to convert it to gold at the US Treasury. Unemployment was rising. Hoover had met with FDR on November 11, 1932, and on January 30, 1933, and had received only vague indications that the president-elect understood the issues. Subsequently, FDR and his advisers seemed to evade any commitments to future policies. What should Hoover do or say to tackle the problems in the time he had remaining in office? And as the transfer of power approached, wha

Taking on the Dark Side: Public Power & the Regulation of Private Utilities [History

Decades before the New York Power Authority (NYPA) delivered its first power in 1958, the company helped shape the future of American energy generation and distribution as far west as Washington State and to the southern reaches of the Tennessee Valley. NYPA's significance today remains much greater than the low-cost electricity that it generates from its St. Lawrence and Niagara hydropower plants (and 14 smaller facilities, some driven by natural gas and oil). The exquisite hydro plant in Figure 1 symbolizes the contribution of regulation and public power to the electric power industry. In Figure 2, the seeming insignificance of the dam, dividing sky from water, is symbolic of how regulation and public power helped balance the creative tension between public interest and private profit. Indeed, when New York Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) created the NYPA in the spring of 1931, he aimed to make it a yardstick to measure the early investor-owned utilities (IOUs) mostly controlled by J.P. Morgan's "holding companies," which dominated the nation's power providers.

Keynes on the Sequencing of Economic Policy: Recovery and Reform in 1933

On 31 December 1933, The New York Times published an open letter from John Maynard Keynes to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR). In it Keynes encouraged FDR to expand public works through government borrowing. He also criticised FDR’s exchange rate policy, and argued that there was a need for lower long-term interest rates. But perhaps the most interesting feature of this letter is that Keynes made comments on the sequencing and speed of economic policies. He argued that ‘recovery’ policies should precede ‘reform’ measures. In this paper, I analyse this particular aspect of the open letter, and I argue that for Keynes exchange rate stability was a key component of what he considered to be the appropriate order of policy. I also provide a comparison between Keynes’s views on sequencing and those developed in the 1980s and 1990s.

Eleanor Roosevelt’s Remarkable Transition From the White House Into Widowhood, 1945–1946

Eleanor Roosevelt experienced demanding challenges following the unexpected death of her husband, Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), the president of the United States, on April 12, 1945. That she was no longer first lady led to a series of secondary losses: the loss of status, the loss of staff, the loss of financial security, and, within a week, the loss of her primary residence, The White House. Her transition into “Widow Roosevelt” was complicated by her discovery that FDR had died in the presence of Lucy Mercer Rutherfurd, with whom he had had an affair during World War I. As a condition for staying married and having a political career, he agreed never to see Lucy again. The circumstances of FDR’s betrayal and death were kept secret for nearly two decades. A week after FDR’s death, Eleanor answered a question about her future by a New York Times reporter, with a tense, “The story is over.” However, Harry Truman, FDR’s successor, had other ideas and appointed her as a delegate to the United Nations. Over the next 17 years, Eleanor evolved into “First Lady of the World” and had a significant role in world affairs and American politics.

Democracy's Muse: How Thomas Jefferson Became an FDR Liberal, A Reagan Republican, and a Tea Party Fanatic, All the While Being Dead. By AndrewBurstein. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015.

Democracy's Muse: How Thomas Jefferson Became an FDR Liberal, A Reagan Republican, and a Tea Party Fanatic, All the While Being Dead. By Andrew Burstein. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015. This case study on the politics of memory from Andrew Burstein fits in with works by Merrill Peterson (e.g., Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography [New York: Oxford University Press, 1975]), Francis Cogliano ('Thomas Jefferson: Reputation and Legacy [Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2006]), Peter Onuf (Jefferson Legacies [Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1993]), and others on Jefferson's malleable legacy, with special focus on books about Jefferson that were written in the twentieth century. Jefferson's prolific and inspirational writing set him apart from the other Founders, and politicians and theologians easily wrench his quotations out of context. According to Burstein, he is the whose political sentiments reverberate the loudest, making him the supremely articulate superego of the nation (ix--x). While Burstein shares other historians' skepticism of Founder Fundamentalism, Jefferson has proven a durable symbol of the American way of life among a diverse population, even as his reputation has waned among the academic left because of his racism and slaveholding. That is because Jefferson was full of contradictions, and what he symbolizes varies so much in the eye of the beholder. Our problem with Jefferson is that there are simply too many of him, and they are all ghosts (196). Instead of acknowledging Jefferson's complexity, Americans plunder his writing in a distorted cherry-picking festival. Burstein describes Jefferson as ammunition held in reserve [as] moralizing fodder (x). Conservatives, for instance, do not want to saddle our posterity with our debt, but dismiss the quotation's context: Jefferson's disapproval of Madison's taxing to win the War of 1812. Conservatives see Jefferson as a sentinel against big government, while old liberals point to his advocacy of participatory democracy and each generation remaking laws to suit changing circumstances. Conservatives overlook that Jefferson feared strong, centralized government precisely because of its association with powerful banks and corporations. Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) was likewise playing fast and loose when he proclaimed, in defense of the New Deal, that [e]ven Jefferson realized that the government must intervene ... not to destroy individualism but to protect it. Burstein reinforces this Jeffersonian ventriloquism by weaving in John Dos Passos' ongoing use of Jefferson as the author transitioned from left to right (The Head and Heart of Thomas Jefferson [New York: Doubleday, 1954]). Burstein navigates seamlessly between past and present, showing how partisans share a misunderstanding of Jefferson's time--a preindustrial era when America's population was 1% of what it is today. …

The Fight For the Four Freedoms: What Made FDR and the Greatest Generation Truly Great. By Harvey J.Kaye. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. 292 pp.

The Fight For the Four Freedoms: What Made FDR and the Truly Great. By Harvey J. Kaye. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014. 292 pp. Arguing for the political nature of struggles over our shared public memory, author Harvey J. Kaye's The Fight for the Four Freedoms makes the case for remembering Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and his Four Freedoms in ways that allow them to serve as resources for reinvigorated American progressive action. Comprising 11 short chapters and toggling between FDR's rhetoric; his administration's policies; and the actions and words of unions, activists, and private individuals, Kaye presents the standard narrative of the Roosevelt administration and the years of Depression and war through a very specific ideological lens. The book's strength is its inclusion of anecdotal evidence and first-person narratives that both capture the author's argument and provide a vivid sense of the historical moment. The author is unabashedly partisan in that he is clearly trying to mobilize FDR and his legacy for a contemporary end. But this is no political screed, nor is it a polemic. Kaye works hard to be fair in his assessment of FDR (he is considerably less so in his assessment of those who opposed the president). He presents a history of the Roosevelt years, including all the familiar elements--the crisis of the Depression, the hope surrounding the 1932 inauguration, the rush of New Deal legislation, the continued economic difficulties leading to the Second New Deal, the 1936 election, and the subsequent overreaches of Court-packing and the congressional purge. Later chapters detail the preparedness debate and the war effort and its connection to democracy at home. He concludes with a discussion of U.S. history since 1945, arguing that the progressive impulse has been furthered in some ways (movement toward racial equality) and stifled in others (economic equality, the Red Scare). The lack of attention to post-9/11 politics here is a bit puzzling. The articulation of the Four Freedoms in FDR's 1941 State of the Union address provides the analytic anchor for the book, and the fight for those freedoms, for Kaye, is what actually made the Greatest Generation great (p. 7). In Kaye's analysis, that fight not restricted to the battlefields of World War II but also fought on the home front, in efforts to protect and extend American democracy to all Americans. This perspective requires Kaye to reason backward, arguing chat the Four Freedoms, delineated in 1941, actually animated programs that appeared much sooner. FDR's vision, according to Kaye, was global. But Roosevelt rooted it firmly in American experience and aspiration (p. 73). The book makes the case by tying these ideals together with the thread of FDR's political philosophy, which, Kaye correctly notes, largely about concern for, and care of, all the nation's citizens. …

Did Amrika promise Morocco's independence? The nationalist movement, the Sultan, and the making of the ‘Roosevelt Myth’

In January 1943, the leaders of the Allied Forces met in Casablanca to discuss their war strategy. During the course of the Anfa Conference, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) had a private dinner with Sultan Mohamed ben Youssef, which came to change the course of Moroccan history. Although the details of the conversation between the two statesmen remained shrouded in mystery due to FDR's untimely death just two years later, the Moroccan side later claimed that the American leader had promised to support their country's independence once the Second World War had ended. This article sheds fresh light on both the meeting and its impact on the trajectory of Moroccan history by utilising a number of new sources. It argues that the Sultan and the local nationalist movement seized this opportunity and created a ‘Roosevelt Myth’, thus turning FDR into a saint-like figure whose anti-colonial stance legitimised their own aspirations to abolish the French and Spanish Protectorates established in 1912. Until they finally obtained complete independence in 1956, the Moroccans used FDR's supposed promise to convince the highly reluctant US diplomats and politicians to support their anti-colonial struggle. The meeting between Roosevelt and Sidi Mohamed became one of the central elements of the national historical narrative, and the memory of the late President is still very much alive in the political discourse of today's Morocco.

Texans and the Civilian Conservation Corps: Personal Memories

Texans and the Civilian Conservation Corps:Personal Memories Mary L. Wilson (bio) Click for larger view View full resolution CCC group at Pineland, Texas, c. 1933-34. Photograph by Connie Ford McCann courtesy of University of North Texas Archives and Rare Books and found at The Portal to Texas History, <http://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth121755> [Accessed January 19, 2012]. [End Page 144] The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was one of the most visible and successful of the New Deal programs of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) in Texas as well as the rest of the nation. The CCC in its nine years of existence employed more than 2.5 million young men from ages eighteen to twenty-five. The program arose to combat some of the effects of the Great Depression, the greatest economic crisis the United States has ever faced. Unemployment shot from 3.14 percent in 1929 to 24.75 percent in 1933. One author claims it was more than 28 percent. Just before the United States entered World War II, it still stood at 14.45 percent, well above current government estimates. The economic hardships experienced in the 1930s are hard to comprehend for younger Americans. There were no social safety nets to cope with the crisis in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Government-sponsored employment on the scale of the CCC was unimaginable in the United States prior to the stock market crash on October 29, 1929. The American people were ready for different ideas, and President Roosevelt seemed to be the perfect leader to bring them to life.1 The newly elected president took office with many promises and ideas but little else. A newspaper cartoonist picked the term "New Deal" out of FDR's presidential nomination acceptance speech, and it became the name applied to any and all programs suggested by FDR's administration. The programs were as varied as the different populations that the Roosevelt Administration aimed them at. The Public Works Administration, [End Page 145] designed to stimulate heavy industry, gave money for projects costing more than $25,000, while the Federal Emergency Relief Administration gave federal monies to the states to distribute to the needy. For every federal dollar, the state was required to provide three. The largest project was the Tennessee Valley Authority, an experiment in regional planning. It funded the building of dams on the Tennessee River, affecting the economies of six states. Smaller projects included the Federal Music Project, which gave unemployed performers jobs, and the Federal Art Projects, which allowed artists to continue producing their art although practically no one could afford to buy it. Aimed at both urban and rural young men (the program was not open to women), one of the most popular of the programs was the rural-based CCC, which began in 1933.2 The CCC had three objectives: enrollment of workers so as not to interfere with normal employment; grants to states for relief work; and the development of a broad public works program to create jobs. The planners designed the CCC to be involved in forest protection and conservation, soil conservation, recreational development, aid to grazing and wildlife, reclamation, drainage, erosion control, flood control, and related projects.3 Evidence of these public works can still be seen across the country. The qualifications for enrollment in the CCC initially required men to be single and between eighteen to twenty-five years of age. Their families had to be on some type of public relief, and they had to be willing to send part of their paychecks home to their dependents. The pay was $30 a month, with the families receiving an allotment of $22 to $25 from this money. The enrollees kept the remaining $5 to $8 for their own use. These monetary requirements changed several times during the life of the organization; only the age and marital restrictions remained the same.4 Statistics abound that show how much money went to these young men and how much they sent home to their families. The missing dimension of the story that this article addresses is the effect the CCC had on the lives of the young men in Texas...

The lying doctor

As a doctor, is it ever morally justifiable to lie to—or indeed, for—your patient? This is one of the questions put before us in Peter Carson’s book, The Dying President and the Lying Doctor: The Fate of FDR , which examines the maelstrom of mystery and lies surrounding the health of the United States’s longest serving president—Franklin D Roosevelt (FDR). Described by Carson as America’s “greatest wartime leader,” FDR served as president of the US from 1933 to 1945. He played a fundamental role in ensuring the entry of the isolationist US into the second world war and in determining the fate of post-war Europe. He died from a bleed to the brain early into his fourth term as president in 1945, in mysterious circumstances. To further the intrigue, his medical records had disappeared from a hospital safe within 48 hours of his death.1 The …

Inflation (1943) and the Blacklist: The Disrupted Film Career of Cy Endfield

Inflation (1943) and the Blacklist: The Disrupted Film Career of Cy Endfield

Recasting the Bonds of Affection

Americans tend to take their patriotism for granted. Come the Fourth of July, foreigners struggle to be festive as Americans indulge in earnest and heartfelt, though often sanctimonious and mercenary, celebrations of their nation’s “birthday.” Most Americans are blithely unaware that the patriotic symbols and rituals they regard as timeless expressions of the national spirit are in fact of very recent origin. While Memorial Day was first observed in 1868, it was not enshrined as a national holiday until 1971; the Pledge of Allegiance was not written until 1891; and the national anthem, “The Star-Spangled Banner,” was not approved until 1931.Presidential icons were even slower to be enshrined in the pantheon ofnational heroes—the Washington Memorial was finally completed in 1884, 36years after construction began, after lack of funds delayed completion; the muchvaunted Lincoln Memorial was not finished until May 1922; the Jefferson Memorial was dedicated by Franklin D. Roosevelt (F.D.R.) as recently as 1943; and the Roosevelt Memorial, after much controversy, was consecrated in 1997. The latter holds the record for the fastest presidential memorial to be built—itwas opened only 53 years after F.D.R.’s death.

Cecelia Bucki, Bridgeport's Socialist New Deal, 1915–36. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001. 300 pp. $35.00 cloth; Janet Irons, Testing the New Deal: The General Textile Strike of 1934 in the American South. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000. 271 pp. $45.00 cloth; $16.95 paper.

What impact did the New Deal have at the local level? In these two volumes from the University of Illinois Press series, “The Working Class in American History,” historians Janet Irons and Cecelia Bucki use the vehicle of the case study to present detailed answers to this question. In so doing, each scholar makes a valuable contribution to our understandings of social and political change in the era of Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR). Looking at parts of the South (textile mill towns in North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and eastern Tennessee), Irons explores how white textile workers responded to changes in labor relations under the New Deal, a response that culminated in the failed 1934 general textile strike. In her study of Bridgeport, Connecticut, Bucki provides a sophisticated urban history, situating workers, ethnicity, class, and the economy firmly within a larger narrative of organized labor's quest for political power.

Howard University and U.S. Foreign Affairs during the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration, 1933-1945

As premier black institution of higher education, Howard University during critical years 1933-1945 attracted to its campus many outstanding African American scholars, educators, and students. These individuals came to constitute one of Americas most dynamic intellectual communities. During years from 1933 to 1945, members of Howard University community examined, evaluated, and expressed their approval or disapproval of U.S. involvement in international events that were rapidly unfolding. Through public pronouncements, media, and individual activism, they advanced their views. In certain situations, there were even attempts to effect U.S. foreign policy. Historically, African American pronouncements affecting United States foreign policy been severely curtailed, and foreign policy issues, until recent times, have traditionally been viewed as off-limits to non-whites. However, African Americans have spoken out in area of foreign relations and have attempted to influence di rection of U.S. foreign policy when it perceived as affecting lifestyle and existence of people of color. This essay identifies some of major international issues during Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) presidency that were evaluated, discussed, and debated at Howard, and what action, if any, taken or initiated to affect outcome of any U.S. policy or position. IMPERIALISM, THE ARMS RACE, AND INTERNATIONALISM Three general topics of interest examined at university were imperialism, the race, and internationalism. As nations of world moved toward armed conflict during 1930s, individuals at Howard saw and race as old evils leading mankind to destruction. Lyonel Florant, a Howard student activist and socialist, attended first World Student Congress Against War and Fascism held in Brussels, Belgium, in December 1935. Florant and his supporters were able to force adoption of resolutions against imperialism. (1) A powerful Howard voice critical of imperialism President Mordecai Wyatt Johnson. During 1939 opening university convocation, Dr. Johnson criticized past record of systematic expropriation of resources and manpower in Africa, India, and China by major European powers. (2) He questioned justification for continuing such practices and asserted that moral imperatives of democracy and humanity demanded that European powers give up their exclusive control and manipulation of these areas. (3) Also during mid-1940s, some Howard students expressed support for dissolution of European colonial empires. Eighty students, seventy-six of whom were young women, responded to a survey conducted by sociologist E. Franklin Frazier. Thirty-seven of seventy-six respondents favored dissolution of British empire; thirty-nine students felt that its continuation was necessary for maintenance of peace. (4) It is interesting to note that twenty-three students had no opini on African colonies, but majority felt they be granted independence after a period of preparation. (5) Seventy percent of respondents felt India should be given her freedom, while a few believed a period of preparation might be necessary. (6) The escalation of arms race criticized by both President Johnson and Rev. Francis J. Grimke, a former Howard trustee. Rev. Grimke decried military crassness prevalent in world during a 1935 address at Fifteenth Street Presbyterian Church in Washington, DC. Rev. Grimke warned his audience that permanent world peace would remain unachievable until greed for gain and lust for power were eradicated. (7) Echoing similar sentiments in a 1940 address at Riverside Church in New York City, Dr. Johnson insisted that a conscious increase in military power, be it armaments or armies, couldn't insure democracy at home or abroad. …

Threatening Times and the Election of Charismatic U.S. Presidents: With and Without FDR

Two hypotheses based on Max Weber's (1968) notion that charismatic leaders emerge in times of crisis were examined: Winning charismatic presidential candidates are more likely to win during threatening election years, and winning charismatic presidential candidates are more likely to have a higher margin of victory during threatening election years. Several derived predictions were tested with correlational and multiple regression strategies. Historians' judgments of the level of social, economic, and political threat for election years (McCann, 1996), charismatic style scores for the presidents (Simonton, 1988), popular vote data, and electoral vote data were used, and support was found for both hypotheses. However, subsequent analyses revealed that statistical support for the predictions vanished when the Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) elections were excluded because Roosevelt's supreme charismatic style was coupled with an extended period of unusually high societal threat. Nevertheless, it is concluded that it would be unwise to unequivocally infer that the two hypotheses were not supported.