Fourth Nuclear Test Research Articles

Political Viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline Project: An Analysis of the Role of the U.S.

This study analyzes the political viability of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline project. This analysis demonstrates that North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016 changed the dynamic of the project. Before the test, when inter-Korean relations were good, South Korea and Russia could make efforts to secure political support for the project. However, after the fourth nuclear test, this was no longer the case. As North Korea’s nuclear power status became more evident, this nuclear problem began to have profound implications for U.S. security. In response, Washington not only led the UN Security Council to impose very severe sanctions against North Korea, but also placed its own sanctions on the country. These sanctions began to contain provisions that could prevent the implementation of the pipeline project. In addition to these sanctions, the U.S. sanctions against Russia in 2017 over its intervention in the U.S. election and aggression against Ukraine also contained clauses that could hamper it. Therefore, unless the U.S. lifts or eases all of these sanctions, South Korea and Russia are unwilling to take any concrete actions to secure political support for the RNS pipeline project. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the U.S. now holds the most important key to its political viability.

Pseudo Change: China’s Strategic Calculations and Policy Toward North Korea after Pyongyang’s 4th Nuclear Test

After North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China’s response was stern enough for certain China analysts to posit that the Middle Kingdom’s approach to its Cold War ally was changing. In reality, however, China’s imports from North Korea, especially coal, a crucial mineral for the North’s income but banned by United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, did not decrease. Politically, China also strived to maintain mutual relations with North Korea. Based on its strategic and other cost-benefit calculations, Beijing needs to maintain economic and political ties with Pyongyang and thus has no incentive to seriously observe the U.N. resolution. In this context, China is expected to virtually repeat the gestures it made in the past in dealing with the North. Under these circumstances, sanctioning North Korea through China is not considered a viable option in tackling the nuclear issue; rather, the USA and South Korea should change their policy approach toward this problem.

Assessment of the announced North Korean nuclear test using long-range atmospheric transport and dispersion modelling

On 6 January 2016, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced to have conducted its fourth nuclear test. Analysis of the corresponding seismic waves from the Punggye-ri nuclear test site showed indeed that an underground man-made explosion took place, although the nuclear origin of the explosion needs confirmation. Seven weeks after the announced nuclear test, radioactive xenon was observed in Japan by a noble gas measurement station of the International Monitoring System. In this paper, atmospheric transport modelling is used to show that the measured radioactive xenon is compatible with a delayed release from the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. An uncertainty quantification on the modelling results is given by using the ensemble method. The latter is important for policy makers and helps advance data fusion, where different nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty monitoring techniques are combined.

China's Sanctions on North Korea After Its Fourth Nuclear Test

This article aims to evaluate the will of the Chinese government to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2270 following North Korea's fourth nuclear test (1 January 2016), thereby seeking out the implications on China's sanctions against the DPRK after its fifth nuclear test (9 September 2016). The results of analysis in this article can be summed up as follows. First, the following instances capture the willingness of the Chinese government regarding the implementation of sanctions against the DPRK: (i) China agreed to stronger sanctions against North Korea (Resolution 2270); (ii) China boasted about its wholehearted support for – and complete willingness to implement – the sanctions at home and abroad; and (iii) upon the agreement, Beijing revealed the lists of items banned from export to North Korea and items subject to additional sanctions more promptly than before. Second, in spite of China's expressed willingness, the following instances demonstrate that there remain some limitations to Beijing's will regarding a thorough implementation of sanctions against Pyongyang: (i) the Chinese government argued that the United States should be responsible for sanctions against the North after its fourth nuclear test; (ii) China proposed the parallel approach of pursuing denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and a peace treaty; (iii) China placed an emphasis on improving the living conditions of North Koreans; and (iv) China expressed opposition to deployment of terminal high‐altitude area defense on the Korean Peninsula. Third, such reactions are indicative of China's key essentials behind enforcing sanctions against the DPRK, which are the pursuit of Chinese national interests and the prevention of loss of those interests. To that end, China attempts to bypass the United States’ monitoring and pressure, considers the growing strategic value of North Korea as a result of intensifying conflicts between the United States and China, and induces the DPRK into a realm of dialogue. The fact that China needs to secure influence over North Korea and maintain the North Korean regime in a stable state even after its fifth nuclear test indicates that its sanctions against North Korea will be implemented within a boundary of not causing the regime collapse or chaos.

Managing North Korean Nuclear Threats: In Defense of Dialogue and Negotiations

Managing North Korean Nuclear Threats:In Defense of Dialogue and Negotiations Chung-in Moon (bio) Inter-Korean relations have hit rock bottom. Since President Park Geun-hye’s inauguration in February 2013, her government pursued the Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula initiative and tried to improve ties with North Korea. But such efforts have failed, and inter-Korean relations have worsened.1 After North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016, the Park government adopted a much tougher stance by closing the Kaesong industrial complex and completely suspending inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Seoul and Washington have also intensified joint military exercises and training on deploying strategic weapons. Pyongyang responded to these moves by conducting numerous missile test launches and by undertaking an additional nuclear test in September. A vicious cycle of action and reaction has heightened inter-Korean military tension, which has deepened public anxiety. The North and the South are engaging in a dangerous game of chicken without any channels of communication, increasing the risk that an accidental clash may well escalate into a full-blown military conflict. Over the past seven years—while the six-party talks have been derailed—North Korea is believed to have steadily amassed nuclear materials and is now estimated to possess more than ten nuclear warheads. Pyongyang has so far conducted five nuclear tests in total and acquired short-range Scud-type missiles, intermediate-range Nodong and Musudan missiles, and even submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It is also close to developing intercontinental ballistic missiles and claims to have made progress miniaturizing and diversifying its nuclear warheads as well. The North Korean nuclear threat is thus no longer fictional but real and poses serious security threats to the peninsula, all of Northeast Asia, and the world. North Korean nuclear weapons would significantly alter the [End Page 74] military balance on the Korean Peninsula and ultimately impede peaceful coexistence there. The regional security impacts are also profound—a nuclear domino effect might lead to proliferation elsewhere in Northeast Asia. And the possibility exists that North Korea will export nuclear materials, technology, and even warheads to other regions, threatening the very foundations of world security in this age of global terrorism. Against this backdrop, this essay provides a critical assessment of existing strategies to deal with the North Korean nuclear deadlock by focusing on sanctions and other pressures, deterrence and missile defense, and preemptive attack and nuclear armament. It then suggests dialogue and negotiation as a viable alternative. The Limited Effectiveness of Sanctions and Other Pressures The Park Geun-hye government has responded to the threats from North Korea by employing a variety of countermeasures ranging from sanctions and other pressures to deterrence, preemptive strikes, and defense. Its preferred method of managing Pyongyang’s unruly behavior has so far been sanctions. The Park administration strongly believes that North Korea’s crimes (possession of nuclear weapons and violation of UN resolutions) should be punished by comprehensive and forceful sanctions and that such sanctions can compel the North and its leader, Kim Jong-un, to choose a path toward denuclearization. Otherwise, the Kim regime will risk collapse. But sanctions have not been effective. Despite the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2270, North Korea has not shown signs of compliance. On the contrary, its behavior has become more defiant, with the Kim regime conducting a fifth nuclear test and additional missile tests. North Korea is still a closed society and is very much accustomed to sanctions. Moreover, China does not want to go ahead with any sanctions that would undermine stability in the North and lead to regime collapse. Given that 91.3% of North Korea’s trade is with China, as of December 2015, international sanctions cannot be effective without Beijing’s full cooperation.2 As sanctions and other pressures have not produced any tangible outcomes, the South Korean government has not only strengthened its deterrence posture but also begun to adopt a more assertive defense stance, especially against a potential North Korean missile attack. This deterrence [End Page 75] strategy is composed of three elements. The first is deterrence against the North by implementing a kill chain predicated on improved missile and...

Old Wine in a New Bottle?: China’s Korea Problem

China's dealings with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) have not been easy, not even during the Korean War in which the two fought side by side. The relationship has experienced many ups and downs over the years. Most recently, the nuclear tests by North Korea and the United States' planned deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea have forced China to rethink its policy toward North Korea.This essay will analyze the recent interactions between China and the DPRK and examine the factors that prompted China to adopt a tougher stance toward Pyongyang. However, this policy change has been complicated and mitigated by the United States' decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea. Given its multiple strategic interests, China must constantly balance between different players and options, and this has put it in an awkward situation. Nevertheless, together with the United States and other UN Security Council members, China supported UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2321. Looking forward, China is also faced with the uncertainties that result from South Korea's political crisis and the transition to the Donald Trump administration in the United States.Balancing ActSince Kim Jong-il's death and his son Kim Jong-un's assumption of power in December 2011, the Sino-DPRK relationship has been lukewarm. Four years after the 18th Party Congress and Xi Jinping's rise to the Chinese Communist Party's top post, no Xi-Kim meeting has happened yet. By contrast, in that time China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have not only exchanged state visits but also formed a free trade area, as the ROK has risen on China's foreign policy agenda.In October 2015, Liu Yunshan-one of the seven members of China's top leadership-traveled to Pyongyang for the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK). China made an effort to improve the Sino-DPRK relationship, but less than three months later North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016. The test immediately changed the dynamic of relations, and two months later China and the other UN Security Council members reached a consensus and released UNSCR 2270 to impose the toughest sanctions to date against North Korea. The resolution contains unprecedented inspection and financial provisions, including mandatory inspections of cargo to and from North Korea and a requirement to terminate banking relationships with North Korean financial institutions. Most significantly, it includes for the first time sectoral sanctions, which prohibit the DPRK from both exporting key resources such as coal, gold, iron, titanium, and rare earth materials and importing aviation and rocket fuel.1With UNSCR 2270, China became much more serious with respect to implementing the Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea's nuclear and missile development activities. In early April, the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs released a new list of embargoed items that cannot be imported from or exported to North Korea, though the list excluded items needed for maintaining the livelihood of ordinary people or providing humanitarian assistance.Pyongyang could not have been happy with the sanctions imposed by China. However, neither Beijing nor Pyongyang wanted to sever ties, and instead the two tried to maintain a normal relationship during this time of heightened tension. Shortly after the WPK had held its 7th Party Congress in May 2016-the first of its kind in more than 30 years-North Korea sent a high-level delegation to China to give a briefing on developments at the congress. The delegation was headed by Ri Su-yong, a member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Committee of the WPK, who met with President Xi. The delegation delivered a message from Kim Jong-un expressing his hope to work with China to strengthen and develop the two countries' traditional bilateral friendship and, ironically, maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia. …

North Korea, nuclear weapons, and the search for a new path forward

Since North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January, the Korean Peninsula has seemed more distant than ever from denuclearization. Leadership in Pyongyang, with its strongly realist incl...

North Korea, nuclear weapons, and the search for a new path forward

In January, Pyongyang proudly announced that it had successfully conducted a fourth nuclear test. This time, the North Koreans claimed, they had tested a thermonuclear device. Observers are skeptic...

Similar but Divergent Pathways: US-Cuba and US-North Korea Relations

The United States and Cuba moved to end five decades of hostility and agreed to revive diplomatic relations in December 2014 while US President Barack Obama finally made an official visit to Cuba on 20 March 2016 as the first sitting president to do so in 88 years. In contrast with the Cuban case, US–North Korea relations are only getting worse due to the North Korean nuclear program. The United States adopted new legislation for strong economic sanctions against North Korea after the country's fourth nuclear test was carried out on 6 January 2016 and its launching of a long-range missile on 6 February 2016. This study aims to find an answer as to why Cuba and North Korea are walking different paths in their relationships with the United States even though they have been subject to similar sanctions from the US. Recent analysis shows that factors in security, international and economic surroundings, geostrategic factors and domestic politics contribute to notable divergence between Cuba and North Korea in regards to their relationships with the United States.

The ROK-US Alliance and North Korea’s Nuclear Crisis

Kim Jung Un’s North Korea has declared itself as a nuclear power and continues to develop nuclear programs. The fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, and the subsequent missile test firing on February 7, 2017 has brought about a global response resulting in the toughest UN resolution 2270 to impose sanctions on North Korea. South Korea’s most impending security interest is to defend itself against North Korea’s aggression. The Park Geun Hye government has pursued the so-called the Trustpolitik, which made room for engaging with North Korea when progress is made in the measures of confidence building. However, since the fourth nuclear test, the South Korean government has been focused upon enhancing deterrence and strengthening sanctions, multilaterally and bilaterally. South Korea should be prepared to cope with: 1) all-out nuclear attack from North Korea; 2) asymmetric escalation based on nuclear capability; 3) increased propensity for conventional provocation stemming from stability-instability paradox; and 4) other asymmetric attacks using various terrorist measures.

China’s norms in its near abroad: understanding Beijing’s North Korea policy

ABSTRACTChina’s tough response to North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 raised expectations in the US, South Korea and Japan that Beijing might align its North Korea policy with the international community. Similar expectations were raised (and unmet) following North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling in 2010, a third nuclear test in 2013, numerous missile tests and military provocations in 2014–2015, and a fourth nuclear test and long-range missile test in early 2016. Many scholars and policymakers maintain that Beijing’s rationales for supporting Pyongyang are crumbling. This article argues that Chinese traditional worldviews and strategic thought remain motivating concepts for Beijing’s policy on North Korea. China’s norms in its near abroad—beliefs about stability, siege mentality, due deference and Confucian reciprocity—explain phases in Beijing’s policy on North Korea and why the Chinese approach does not change as much as external observers hope or expect.

North Korea's Politics: Path of Reclusive Tyranny

Kim Jong-un's obsession with full control of power and his single-minded pursuit of nuclear advancement, as seen in the fourth nuclear test in January 2016, have further isolated his country. North Korea apparently is taking a revisionist strategy: to change the rule of the game in Northeast Asia and in inter-Korean relations. North Korea exploits the Chinese dilemma of condemning the defiant behaviour but cannot abandon the country.

An Enduring Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula: The North Korean Nuclear Conundrum and South Korea`s Strategic Choices

This paper sheds new light on the North Korean nuclear conundrum, which has long been the source of security dilemmas on the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea’s strategic choices with regard to it. In doing this, this paper deals with four research questions: 1) How serious are North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities?; 2) What are the implications of international sanctions and countries’ positions?; 3) Can and will South Korea and the international community stop the North Korean nuclear program successfully?; and 4) And if not, what should South Korea do? This paper indicates that in the wake of North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and subsequent missile test, North Korea’s nuclear Pandora’s Box is almost about to open. It urges that if it indeed opens, it would completely change the strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. This deep frustration and a sense of urgency have driven South Korea and the international community to impose stronger and tougher sanctions against North Korea than before. However, this paper argues that multiple factors..South Korea’s limited ability; the escalation of the U.S.-China global and regional rivalry; the strategic consideration of countries involved, especially China; and North Korea’s tenacious survival strategy-engage in strong pessimism, leaving the North Korean nuclear situation unresolved. Therefore, on the one hand, South Korea has to make every effort to denuclearize North Korea until the last minute, exhausting every possible option and means. However, on the other hand, it has to prepare for a worst-case scenario. This paper points out that South Korea’s exit strategy should be a “strategy of delicate deterrence” that is a comprehensive strategy of deterrence to combine military, political and diplomatic means.

South Korea in 2013

In 2013 South Korea elected Asia's first female president. President Park Geunhye enjoyed high approval rating of 60% on average, possibly due to her diplomatic success with the United States and China and her firm North Korean policy. Unemployment trended downwards and South Korea's Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea reopened amid controversies. Relations with the North are however likely to worsen with mounting speculation of Pyongyang's possible fourth nuclear test.