Four-category Ontology Research Articles

Transubstantiation

This article aims to provide an intelligible explication of the doctrine of Transubstantiation. A model of this doctrine is formulated within the formal, neo-Aristotelian metaphysical and ontological framework of Jonathan Lowe, termed Serious Essentialism and the Four-Category Ontology. Formulating the doctrine of Transubstantiation within this metaphysical and ontological framework will enable it to be explicated in a clear and consistent manner, and the oft-raised intelligibility question against it can be answered.

A Transformational Incarnation

This article aims to provide an explication of the doctrine of the Incarnation. A ‘Transformational Model’ of the doctrine is formulated within the metaphysical and ontological framework of Jonathan Lowe (i.e. his Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Four-Category Ontology). Formulating this model within this specific framework will enable the doctrine of the Incarnation to be explicated in a clear and consistent manner, and the oft-raised objections against it can be answered.

J. Ladyman, D. Dennett and E. J. Lowe: Scientific Realism and Metaphysics of Possibilities

The paper aims to show that combining D. Dennett’s conception of real patterns as the “object” ontology, understood as the fundamental concept of existence (D. Ross, J. Ladyman), and E. J. Lowe’s four-category ontology as the “base”, we can get an original conception of scientific realism, which will compete successfully with others in terms of traditional arguments for and against scientific realism, or in terms of interpreting the requirements posed by modern science, and will also be successful as an independent conception of metaphysics, setting original ideas about substantiality, identity, modality and causality. The adoption of E.J. Low’s “serious essentialism” helps to solve the problem of J. Ladyman’s ontic structural realism about the matching of nomological (natural) and metaphysical modalities. E. J. Lowe’s statement that “the subject of metaphysics is the possible, but only science can say which of the alternative metaphysical possibilities is actual” reinforces the required relationship between science and metaphysics. The fact that we choose the neo-Aristotelian rather than the Quinean type of metaphysics helps to formulate sufficient conditions for the pattern existence, as well as to adopt an understanding of causality in terms of “forces”, “predispositions” and “manifestations”, connected by a formal (not real!) ontological relation of metaphysical dependence. In this sense, dealing with H. Putnam’s question “what realism is”, we can answer that scientific realism is an exercise in the epistemology of modality, associated with clarifying the essence of the objects of scientific theory in terms of “basic” philosophical ontology.

Particulars and Universals in Aristotelian Substance Theory

There has been contemporary disagreement about Aristotle`s substance theory. This disagreement has mainly focused on the problem of whether Aristotelian forms are particular or universal. According to the majority of the criteria which are stipulated by Aristotle in Metaphysics Zeta, forms are substances. However, Aristotle also explicitly outlines in the Zeta, and especially in chapters 13 and 16, that no universal can be a substance. At these points in his work, Aristotle should have been clearer regarding whether forms are universals or particulars. In terms of the conclusion of Chapter 13 of Zeta, as well as some other criteria, one may conclude that, if the substance is form, then it should be particular. There are many instances, however, where Aristotle says that since universals are knowable, particulars cannot be known. It seems that if substances are particulars, it is hard to see how they can be knowable. Furthermore, if they are universal, it is hard to say whether particular forms are substances. Since Aristotle never mentioned whether forms could be both universal and particular, this causes difficulties. To examine this problem in more depth, I will not only analyse some textual evidence which is often used to justify the view that forms are universal, but also some textual evidence which is used to justify the view that forms are particular. In so doing, I will also identify some possible solutions regarding the problem of the status of forms in Aristotle`s substance theory. Lastly, I will suggest that individual forms are substances because they are instances of universals and, hence, may be knowable. I will support my view by employing the neo-Aristotelian substance theory posited by Jonathan Lowe; namely, the “Four-Category Ontology.” . 

The Ontology of Documents, Revisited

Three contributions are made to understanding the nature of documents. A survey of definitions of "document" from the last century shows that those definitions which most accurately reflect the ways in which the term "document" is used in practice are typically compound definitions, consisting of two or three elements that each refer to a different function of documents: medium, message, and meaning. Locating documents in E. J. Lowe's four-category ontology results in consideration of documents as universals rather than as particulars. Analysis of B. Smith's theory of document acts suggest that all documents, not just the ones that are involved in declarations, are creative in the special sense that they are generative of quasi-abstract entities of the kind that collectively comprise social reality.

Чотирикатегорiальна онтологiя Едварда Джонатана Лоу (огляд)

Британський аналiтичний фiлософ Едвард Джонатан Лоу створює чотирикатегорiальну онтологiю як основу для метафiзики як теорiї категорiй. Фундаментальними онтологiчними категорiями онтологiї Е.Дж. Лоу є: об’єкт як субстанцiальна партикулярiя, вид як субстанцiальна унiверсалiя, властивостi та вiдношення як несубстанцiальнi унiверсалiї, спосiб буття як несубстанцiальна партикулярiя. Об’єкт є конкретним прикладом виду, який водночас може бути втiлений властивостями та вiдношеннями i характеризуватися способами буття. Способи буття є конкретними прикладами властивостей i вiдношень. Види можуть бути охарактеризованi властивостями та вiдношеннями.

Normative Objectivity Without Ontological Commitments?

Several non-naturalist philosophers look for ways to maintain the objectivity of morals without making any (robust) ontological commitments. Recently Derek Parfit proposed an account of non-ontologically existing irreducible moral properties. My first aim in this paper is to outline that such an account is doomed to fail. My second aim in this paper is to argue that irreducible moral properties can be integrated with adaptions into an ontological framework such as E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology. If it can be shown that irreducible moral properties have a proper place in such an ontology, then there is no need to distinguish between an ontological and non-ontological mode of existence, which, in turn helps to eschew the obscurities that this distinction brings in its wake.

The Non-existence of Ontological Categories: A defence of Lowe

Abstract This paper addresses the ontological status of the ontological categories as defended within E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology (kinds, objects, properties/relations, and modes). I consider the arguments in Griffith (2015. “Do Ontological Categories Exist?” Metaphysica 16 (1):25–35) against Lowe’s claim that ontological categories do not exist, and argue that Griffith’s objections to Lowe do not work once we fully take advantage of ontological resources available within Lowe’s four-category ontology. I then argue that the claim that ontological categories do not exist has no undesirable consequences for Lowe’s brand of realism.

E.J. Lowe on the Unity Problem

Some properties are connected in a perspicuous and unproblematic way. For instance, the possession of shape clearly entails the possession of size (and vice versa). In other cases the connection is not so perspicuous. For instance, assuming that the precise rest mass and negative charge of an electron are both among its fundamental intrinsic properties, what links them, given that those properties are inherently separable? (Their separability is apparent from the fact that other kinds of particle have the same mass as an electron but a different charge, or the same charge but a different mass.) Given the inherent separability of those properties, what explains their conjunction in this case? Oderberg (2007, 2011) calls this the "unity problem", and attempts to solve it have issued from assorted schools of thought within both substance ontology and the metaphysics of natural kinds. One of the more significant of these solutions is proffered by E.J. Lowe as part of his four-category ontology. Here I explicate his solution, raise a possible objection, and suggest a reply.

The No-Category Ontology

In this paper we argue that there are no categories of being⎯at least not in the robust metaphysical sense of something fundamental. Central arguments that metaphysicians provide in support of fundamental categories, such as indispensability and theoretical utility arguments, are not adequate to guarantee their existence. We illustrate this point by examining Jonathan Lowe’s [2006] four-category ontology, and indicating its shortcomings. In contrast, we offer an alternative, no-category ontology, which dispenses with any fundamental categories of being, and provides a deflationary understanding of any categorization in terms of concepts. Concepts, we insist, as opposed to fundamental ontological categories, can always be revised, refined, and recast. A distinctive deflationary, no-category ontology then emerges.

Book Review: “Classifying Reality,” by David S. Oderberg (ed.) (2013)

Book Review: “Classifying Reality,” by David S. Oderberg (ed.) (2013)

Review: The Four-Category Ontology

The Four-Category Ontology by Jonathan Lowe . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2006. 240. H/b £40.00 , P/b £18.00 .

Some Formal Ontological Relations

Some formal ontological relations are identified, in the context of an account of ontological categorization. It is argued that neither formal ontological relations nor ontological categories should themselves be regarded as elements of being, but that this does not undermine the claim of formal ontology to be a purely objective science. It is also argued that some formal ontological relations, like some ontological categories, are more basic than others. A four-category ontology is proposed, in which two basic categories of universals and two basic categories of particulars are distinguished in terms of certain formal ontological relations characteristically obtaining between entities belonging to the different categories.

The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Reply to MacBride

In this brief reply to Fraser MacBride's critical examination of the four-category ontology and the place within it of the particular - universal distinction, it is argued that the prospects for identifying the four basic ontological categories in terms of the characteristic patterns of ontological dependency between entities belonging to the different categories are rather more promising than MacBride suggests.

Some problems for Lowe's four-category ontology

Journal Article Some problems for Lowe's four-category ontology Get access Max Kistler Max Kistler Université Paris X-Nanterre, and Institut Jean Nicod1bis, av. Lowendal 75007 Paris, Francekistler@ehess.fr Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 64, Issue 2, April 2004, Pages 146–151, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.2.146 Published: 01 April 2004

Some problems for Lowe's four-category ontology

In E.J. Lowe's ontology, (individual) objects are property-bearers which 1) have identity and 2) are countable. This makes it possible to become or cease to be an object, by beginning or ceasing to fulfil one of these conditions. But the possibility of switching fundamental ontological categories should be excluded. Furthermore, Lowe does not show that “quasi-individuals” (which are not countable) can exist. I argue against Lowe that kinds cannot be property-bearers in a more genuine sense than properties, that they are not absolutely countable, whether conceived according to science or common sense, and that they are dependent on individual objects.

The four-category ontology: reply to Kistler

I am grateful to Max Kistler (2004) for providing me with this opportunity to clarify certain aspects of what I call 'the four-category ontology' (a name first employed in Lowe 1998: 203; for a comprehensive account see Lowe forthcoming). According to this categorial scheme, entities may be partitioned into four fundamental categories by distinguishing between them in two different ways: between universals and particulars on the one hand, and between characterizing and characterizable items on the other. Characterizing universals are shareable properties and relations, such as redness, roundness, loving, and betweenness and in saying that they are 'shareable' I mean simply that many different things may be characterized by one and the same characterizing universal. Characterizing particulars more popularly known as tropes are particular instances of characterizing universals, such as the redness of this particular rose or John's love for Mary: such properties and relations are non-shareable and nontransferable. Characterizable particulars are such items as this rose or John, which are particular instances of characterizable universals, such as the kinds flower and man. As Kistler indicates, I consider that characterizable particulars are further distinguishable into three sub-categories, which I call particular individual objects, particular quasi-individuals, and particular quasiobjects. (Henceforth I shall drop the qualification 'particular' and take it as read, unless I specify otherwise.) Individual objects possess both countability and fully determinate identity-conditions, whereas quasi-individuals possess only the latter and quasi-objects possess only the former. As putative examples of quasi-individuals, I cite quantities of homogeneous stuff (whose existence is only hypothetical), while as putative examples of quasi-objects I cite sub-atomic particles, such as electrons. Kistler raises the worry that, according to my understanding of what qualifies something as being a quasi-individual or a quasi-object, something could qualify as a member of one of these categories at one time and yet fail to do so at another. This would indeed be a problem, because I agree with him that an entity cannot change its categorial status. The reason for this is that ontological categories are themselves identifiable in terms of the characteristic existenceand identity-conditions of their members. But an entity cannot undergo a change with respect to its own existenceor identity-conditions, and therefore cannot exchange its ontological category for another.