Foundations Of Empirical Knowledge Research Articles

Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown (By Mohammad Azadpur)

Reviewed by: Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown by Mohammad Azadpur Muhammad U. Faruque (bio) Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna: Knowing the Unknown Mohammad Azadpur New York: Routledge, 2020. Viii + 128 Pages. Recent years have witnessed a revival, and even a defense, of traditional, non-modern epistemologies. One thinks of Robert Pasnau’s After Certainty, which shows what is wrong with contemporary epistemology by arguing that the narrow epistemic ideals to which modern philosophers subscribe are unattainable.1 In a similar vein, in his recent Platonism and Naturalism, Lloyd Gerson defends Platonism against the anti-representationalism (the possibility of attaining truthful representations in the sciences) of Richard Rorty by establishing the explanatory role of the superordinate first principle of all, the Idea of the Good.2 In its own way, Mohammad Azadpur’s groundbreaking book makes a strong case for Avicenna’s (d. 1037) anti-naturalist account of perception vis-à-vis some of the limitations of contemporary Anglo-American discussions in empirical knowledge and sensory intentionality. In particular, the book engages in a constructive dialogue between Avicenna and such major twentieth-century analytic philosophers as Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell. Judged from its philosophical sophistication and philological precision, the book must be regarded as a major study of Avicenna that sheds new light on the contemporary relevance of one of the greatest thinkers of all time. Since the book presents a highly nuanced account of Avicennian epistemology, I shall first provide a sketch of its chapter outlines, before proceeding to engage with some of its key arguments. [End Page 102] The first chapter examines Sellars’s attack on the so-called “the Myth of the Given” concerning the foundation of empirical knowledge. This idea itself goes back to the Cartesian dualism of mind and world, and to the argument that the world somehow gives itself to us in a way that we can understand. For Sellars, the epistemological Given encompasses various empiricist views, according to which knowledge is grounded in non-inferential knowledge of matter-of-fact. According to the Myth, non-inferential knowledge is foundational in that it is not justified by a more basic form of knowledge. Sellars challenges this account by arguing that knowledge requires concepts, and since concepts are linguistic entities, an initiation into the linguistic space of reasons is what enables us to establish non-inferential knowledge. Chapter 2 investigates Sellars’s account of the pseudo-intentionality of sense impressions and its relation to the cognitive order. Appropriating Franz Brentano’s seminal concept of “intentionality” (i.e., object-directedness), Sellars distinguishes between pseudo-intentionality and genuine intentionality in relation to both sense impressions and the cognitive order. Sellars’s psychological nominalism leads him to a naturalistic account of intentionality that conforms to his scientism, according to which progress in science leads to a more accurate representation of the world. Chapter 3 discusses Sellars’s scientism in relation to his distinct version of philosophia perennis. This chapter defends the argument that the “manifest image” (i.e., our commonsense experience of the world) of things is real but constantly refined through scientific progress. Importantly, Azadpur claims that Sellarsian perennialism, in tandem with McDowell’s revision of the Myth of the Given, enables us to resist the debilitating effects of scientism on our knowledge of the world. In Chapter 4, Azadpur argues that Avicenna is in agreement with Sellars regarding the naturalistic fallacy of the Myth of the Given, since he, too, grounds non-inferential factual knowledge in conceptual sensory experience. However, Sellars claims that sensory experience is non-relationally intentional, whereas, Avicenna assigns a relational intentionality to the senses due to the intellect’s involvement in sensory perception. Chapter 5 delves into the deeper dimensions of Avicenna’s philosophy of mind and his complex view of experience. It argues that in contrast to the Sellarsian space of reasons, Avicenna’s account of cognition reaches all the way out to sensory impingements (cf. similar views in McDowell’s Mind and World).3 In Azadpur’s view, this particular reading of Avicenna contributes to McDowell’s refined epistemology, as it develops an account of the categorial unity of the space of reasons through modifying Aristotle’s substance ontology. The...

SENSES AND “SENSUAL DATA”

One of the main goals of modern philosophy was to achieve an in-depth insight into the foundations of empirical knowledge. The problem was expected to be resolved by the analysis of experience. However, the road to a plausible account of experience was at the very beginning obstructed by turning the analysis into a search for clear and distinctive elements of experience and by sticking to purely intellectual intuition as means of this analysis. Moreover, clear and distinctive elements of experience were thought of as the basis of cognitive certainty. Both psychology and philosophy, at least until the nineteen-thirties, were deeply influenced by this essentially rationalistic conception of sensor experience. It is gestalt psychology and phenomenology that should be merited for overcoming that ill-conceived model. Only by taking into account the immediate sensor relation between the human subject and the environment, it is possible to show the kind of unity which is the prerequisite of human intellect.

Induction and Epistemological Naturalism

Epistemological naturalists reject the demand for a priori justification of empirical knowledge; no such thing is possible. Observation reports, being the foundation of empirical knowledge, are neither justified by other sentences, nor certain; but they may be agreed upon as starting points for inductive reasoning and they function as implicit definitions of predicates used. Making inductive generalisations from observations is a basic habit among humans. We do that without justification, but we have strong intuitions that some inductive generalisations will fail, while for some other we have better hopes. Why? This is the induction problem according to Goodman. He suggested that some predicates are projectible when becoming entrenched in language. This is a step forward, but not entirely correct. Inductions result in universally generalised conditionals and these contain two predicates, one in the antecedent, one in the consequent. Counterexamples to preliminary inductive generalisations can be dismissed by refining the criteria of application for these predicates. This process can be repeated until the criteria for application of the predicate in the antecedent includes the criteria for the predicate in the consequent, in which case no further counterexample is possible. If that is the case we have arrived at a law. Such laws are implicit definitions of theoretical predicates. An accidental generalisation has not this feature, its predicates are unrelated. Laws are said to be necessary, which may be interpreted as ‘“Laws” are necessarily true’. ‘Necessarily true’ is thus a semantic predicate, not a modal operator. In addition, laws, being definitions, are necessarily true in the sense of being necessary assumptions for further use of the predicates implicitly defined by such laws. Induction, when used in science, is thus our way of inventing useful scientific predicates; it is a heuristic, not an inference principle.

Mystical Experience and Non–Basically Justified Belief

Two theses are central to foundationalism. First, the foundationalist claims that there is a class of propositions, a class of empirical contingent beliefs, that are ‘immediately justified’. Alternatively, one can describe these beliefs as ‘self–evident’, ‘non–inferentially justified’, or ‘self–warranted’, though these are not always regarded as entailing one another. The justification or epistemic warrant for these beliefs is not derived from other justified beliefs through inductive evidential support or deductive methods of inference. These ‘basic beliefs’ constitute the foundations of empirical knowledge. One can give a reason for the justification of a basic belief even though the justification for that belief is not based on other beliefs. Thus, according to Chisholm, if asked what one's justification was for thinking that one knew, presently, that one is thinking about a city one takes to be Albuquerque, one could simply say ‘what justifies me…is simply the fact that I am thinking about a city I take to be Albuquerque’.

Alfred Jules Ayer

Alfred Jules Ayer (1910– ) was born in London and educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. He attended sessions of the logical positivist ‘Vienna Circle’ in 1932, and taught at Oxford from 1933 until joining the Army in 1940. His Language, Truth and Logic was published in 1936, and The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge in 1940. After war service he returned to Oxford in 1945, and became Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College, London, the following year. The Problem of Knowledge was published in 1956. In 1959 he returned to Oxord as Wykeham Professor of Logic, a post he held until his retirement in 1977. He had been made a Fellow of the British Academy in 1952, and was knighted in 1970. Among his publications after he returned to Oxford are The Concept of a Person (1963), Philosophical Essays (1965), The Origins of Pragmatism (1968), Metaphysics and Common Sense (1969), Russell and Moore: the Analytical Heritage (1971), Probability and Evidence (1972), The Central Questions of Philosophy (1973), and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (1982).

Alfred Jules Ayer

Alfred Jules Ayer (1910– ) was born in London and educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. He attended sessions of the logical positivist ‘Vienna Circle’ in 1932, and taught at Oxford from 1933 until joining the Army in 1940. His Language, Truth and Logic was published in 1936, and The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge in 1940. After war service he returned to Oxford in 1945, and became Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic at University College, London, the following year. The Problem of Knowledge was published in 1956. In 1959 he returned to Oxord as Wykeham Professor of Logic, a post he held until his retirement in 1977. He had been made a Fellow of the British Academy in 1952, and was knighted in 1970. Among his publications after he returned to Oxford are The Concept of a Person (1963), Philosophical Essays (1965), The Origins of Pragmatism (1968), Metaphysics and Common Sense (1969), Russell and Moore: the Analytical Heritage (1971), Probability and Evidence (1972), The Central Questions of Philosophy (1973), and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (1982).

Foundations of Empirical Knowledge—Again

Foundations of Empirical Knowledge—Again

C. I. Lewis's Radical Foundationalism

No topic was of more concern to C. I. Lewis than the foundations of empirical knowledge. Lewis held (i) that empirical knowledge has empirical foundations and (ii) that these foundations are in the given data of sense and in memory. On both of these points the judgment of history, if so brief a history has judgment, has been negative. I believe that this judgment has been twice incorrect. My concern is with (i). While Lewis accepted a version of (i) which is open to serious objections, I shall provide a version of (i) which is not open to these objections. I shall examine one sort of consideration which may have led Lewis to accept his version of (i) rather than mine. In doing this, I shall explore some of the relations among credibilities, probabilities, and the probability calculus. Before turning to these tasks, I shall introduce some of Lewis's assumptions and terminology.

Market Structure and Economic Performance in U.K. Manufacturing Industry

THERE is now a wealth of literature investigating the empirical relationships between various structural and behavioural characteristics of industries and their economic performance.1 The original objective of this work was to test the simple hypothesis that excessive market power, by removing the need to keep prices down to their competitive levels, enables firms to earn excessive profits. It was thought that the market power enjoyed by a firm depends on two factors, the degree of seller concentration in the industry it is operating in, and the height of barriers to entry into the market. The difficulty of entry was assumed to depend mainly on the importance of economies of scale, and the extent to which product differentiation is supported by high advertising expenditure. The relevant profit rate was taken to be either the rate of return on assets or the price-cost margin, and the degree of seller concentration was measured by the percentage of industry sales (or employment or assets) accounted for by a given number of the largest firms in the industry. Thus the hypothesis was normally tested by looking for a positive association between profit rates, averaged over the firms in each industry in a chosen sample of industries, and measures of the factors thought to determine market power; or alternatively, by looking for a positive relation between the profit rates of each firm in a chosen sample of firms, and the measures of market power. The results showed that there is indeed a positive correlation between concentration and profit rates, and entry barriers and profit rates, but the association was not strong and varied considerably according to the sample of industries chosen, the particular variables used, and the source of the data. No categorical statements about the relationships between market power and economic performance could be made on the basis of these studies. The importance of this work stems from the desire to base government policy towards the structure and behaviour of industry on a firm foundation of empirical knowledge. Public policy towards monopolies and mergers rests on the idea that increased seller concentration may lead to excess prices and

The Foundation of Empirical Knowledge.

The Foundation of Empirical Knowledge.

Professor Ayer's“The Problem Of Knowledge”

Professor Ayer's new book1 is of very great interest. All the discussion is skilful, much of it is ingenious; the arguments ramify, but never get out of control; the prose is pleasant, the presentation polished and civilized. Once before, Professor Ayer investigated the foundations of empirical knowledge; and the central topics of his new book are, to a large extent, the same as those of his earlier one. These are topics which have been much discussed since 1940. Ayer takes account of many of these discussions, and his views, in consequence, have changed. They have not changed quite so radically as one might have expected. Ayer thinks that the old-style sceptic ought still to be given a run on the old course against the old competitors. If I am not mistaken, it is important to keep this guiding thought in mind in trying to understand his book. For it is easy to glide comfortably over the smooth surface of this prose without noticing transitions and modulations which, in a less expertly composed treatise, might have given one a jolt.

Sense Data, Linguistic Conventions, and Existence

The following remarks have been stimulated by Mr. A. J. Ayer's recent essay “The Terminology of Sense Data.” In this paper Mr. Ayer restates several of the points he has made in his book The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. The context of his argument is that of the traditional distinction between two kinds of things, sense data, percepts, phenomenal or direct given-nesses on the one hand and so-called physical objects on the other. In this context, Mr. Ayer's argument is, to my mind, very admirable; so I do not intend to comment on it. In some other contexts, some of his formulations may, I fear, give rise to misunderstandings; these, naturally, are the points on which I wish to comment. But before specifying them, I had better make sure that we are talking about the same thing by briefly restating several of Mr. Ayer's points. With some of these, if I understand them correctly, I find myself in agreement; the merit of some others I shall presently examine.

The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. By Alfred J. Ayer, M.A., Research Student of Christ Church, Oxford. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1940. Pp. x + 276. Price 10s. 6d.)

The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. By Alfred J. Ayer, M.A., Research Student of Christ Church, Oxford. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1940. Pp. x + 276. Price 10s. 6d.)

The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.

The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.

The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge

FOR more reasons than one it is important that those who are engaged in acquiring empirical knowledge should sometimes ask what it is precisely that they are doing, and what is the significance of their work. Much depends on the answer to this question, for in the long run it determines the direction which history takes. High explosive and incendiary bombs may destroy the material products of civilization, but if civilization survives it can produce others: a false idea is a bomb of the delayed action type which may destroy civilization itself. For this reason I have on more than one occasion protested against the false notion, coming unfortunately from authoritative sources within the world of science itself, that what we call empirical knowledge can be acquired without recourse to experience, and that future experience must conform to it.

Book Review: The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge

Book Review: The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge

The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge

The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge