Forward-secure Signature Scheme Research Articles

Research on Quantum-Attack-Resistant Strong Forward-Secure Signature Schemes.

The security of digital signatures depends significantly on the signature key. Therefore, to reduce the impact of leaked keys upon existing signatures and subsequent ones, a digital signature scheme with strong forward security could be an effective solution. Most existing strong forward-secure digital signature schemes rely on traditional cryptosystems, which cannot effectively resist quantum attacks. By introducing lattice-based delegation technology into the key-iteration process, a two-direction and lattice-based key-iteration algorithm with strong forward security is proposed. In the proposed algorithm, a unique key pair is assigned to the signer in every period. Based on the proposed algorithm, a strong forward-secure signature scheme is further put forward, which achieves resistance to quantum attacks. Performance analysis shows that under the security assumption of the SIS problem on the lattice, the proposed strong forward-secure signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under the random oracle model. Ultimately, based on the proposed strong forward-secure signature scheme, a remote identity-authentication scheme that is resistant to quantum attacks is proposed, ensuring post-quantum security in the user-authentication process.

Privacy Protection of Cloud Computing Based on Strong Forward Security

Cloud computing is a new information technology. It is the product of the scientific and technological development of the times and plays an important role in the development of this country. In order to effectively solve the security problem of cloud computing data access, an identity-based privacy protection algorithm for cloud computing is proposed. The user information is stored in the cloud server at the registration stage, and the user identity is verified by signature when the information is obtained. The strong forward secure signature scheme can ensure that the signature is both forward secure and backward secure. At present, most signature schemes based on lattice focus on forward security. Therefore, this article constructs a strong forward secure signature scheme based on lattice and applies this signature scheme to cloud user authentication to ensure security.

An Efficient Certificateless Forward-Secure Signature Scheme for Secure Deployments of the Internet of Things

As an extension of the wired network, the use of the wireless communication network has considerably boosted users’ productivity at work and in their daily lives. The most notable aspect of the wireless communication network is that it overcomes the constraints of the wired network, reduces the amount of cost spent on wire maintenance, and distributes itself in a manner that is both more extensive and flexible. Combining wireless communication with the Internet of Things (IoT) can be used in several applications, including smart cities, smart traffic, smart farming, smart drones, etc. However, when exchanging data, wireless communication networks use an open network, allowing unauthorized users to engage in communication that is seriously destructive. Therefore, authentication through a digital signature will be the best solution to tackle such problems. Several digital signatures are contributing to the authentication process in a wireless communication network; however, they are suffering from several problems, including forward security, key escrow, certificate management, revocations, and high computational and communication costs, respectively. Keeping in view the above problems, in this paper we proposed an efficient certificateless forward-secure signature scheme for secure deployments in wireless communication networks. The security analysis of the proposed scheme is carried out using the random oracle model (ROM), which shows that it is unforgeable against type 1 and type 2 adversaries. Moreover, the computational and communication cost analyses are carried out by using major operations, major operations cost in milliseconds, and extra communication bits. The comparative analysis with the existing scheme shows that the proposed scheme reduces the computational cost from 19.23% to 97.54% and the communication overhead from 11.90% to 83.48%, which means that the proposed scheme is efficient, faster, and more secure for communication in the wireless communication network.

Binary Tree Based Forward Secure Signature Scheme in the Random Oracle Model

Binary Tree Based Forward Secure Signature Scheme in the Random Oracle Model

Forward-Secure Multi-User Aggregate Signatures Based on zk-SNARKs

As a solution to mitigate the key exposure problems in the digital signature, the forward security has been proposed. The forward security guarantees the integrity of the messages generated in the past despite leaks of a current time period secret key by evolving a secret key on each time period. In this paper, we propose a new forward secure aggregate signature scheme utilizing recursive zk-SNARKs (zero knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge). Our proposal has constant complexities in key/signature sizes, signature generation, and verification time. The proposed forward secure signature scheme can aggregate signatures generated by multiple users as well as a single user. The security of the proposed scheme is formally proven under zero-knowledge assumption and random oracle model. The experiment results show that our signature scheme yields 12 s for signing time, 1 ms for verification time, 25 s for aggregation time, with the 1.6 KB secret key size and signature size independent of the number of time periods.

An Efficient Identity-Based Forward Secure Signature Scheme from Lattices

With the use of a large number of mobile devices, the problem of key leakage becomes more and more serious. In view of the excellent characteristics of lattice cipher and forward-secure digital signature scheme, the construction of identity-based forward-secure digital signature based on lattice technology has become a research hotspot. However, the identity-based forward secure digital signature scheme on the existing grid has the disadvantage of excessive signature length. This paper uses the technique (without trapdoors) of Lyubashevsky and extended Samplepre, an efficient identity-based forward secure signature scheme from lattice is proposed. Its security is based on the Small Integer Solution (SIS) difficulty assumption, and the strong non-forgery of the signature scheme is achieved. The analysis results show that, compared with the existing schemes, the key and signature are smaller in size, more efficient in computing, able to resist quantum attacks, and more practical.

A Forward-Secure Certificate-Based Signature Scheme with Enhanced Security in the Standard Model

A Forward-Secure Certificate-Based Signature Scheme with Enhanced Security in the Standard Model

On the Tightness of Forward-Secure Signature Reductions

In this paper, we revisit the security of factoring-based signature schemes built via the Fiat–Shamir transform and show that they can admit tighter reductions to certain decisional complexity assumptions such as the quadratic-residuosity, the high-residuosity, and the $$\phi $$ -hiding assumptions. We do so by proving that the underlying identification schemes used in these schemes are a particular case of the lossy identification notion introduced by Abdalla et al. at Eurocrypt 2012. Next, we show how to extend these results to the forward-security setting based on ideas from the Itkis–Reyzin forward-secure signature scheme. Unlike the original Itkis–Reyzin scheme, our construction can be instantiated under different decisional complexity assumptions and has a much tighter security reduction. Moreover, we also show that the tighter security reductions provided by our proof methodology can result in concrete efficiency gains in practice, both in the standard and forward-security setting, as long as the use of stronger security assumptions is deemed acceptable. Finally, we investigate the design of forward-secure signature schemes whose security reductions are fully tight.

A Forward-secure Threshold Signature Scheme Based on Multiplicative Secret Sharing and Strong RSA Assumption

A Forward-secure Threshold Signature Scheme Based on Multiplicative Secret Sharing and Strong RSA Assumption

Lattice-based strongly-unforgeable forward-secure identity-based signature scheme with flexible key update

Lattice-based strongly-unforgeable forward-secure identity-based signature scheme with flexible key update

The Security Analysis of Forward-Secure Group Blind Signature Scheme Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem

The paper analyzes a forward-secure group blind signature scheme based on the Chinese remainder theorem in cryptographic method, and points out that the attackers can tamper with the parameters of signature algorithm easily, which causes that the attackers revoke legal group members randomly .At the same time, the article proves the scheme does not have the feature of the blind signature .At last the author comes to a conclusion that the scheme is not safe.

One forward-secure signature scheme using bilinear maps and its applications

Forward-secure signatures are proposed to deal with the key exposure problem. Compared to regular signatures, forward-secure signatures have a special update algorithm that can evolve the new private key in each time period. Therefore, it can protect the security of signatures previous to the time period of key exposure. The efficiency is an important issue of forward-secure signatures. In this paper, we construct a new forward-secure signature scheme using bilinear maps. In this scheme, all performance parameters have complexities of log magnitude in terms of the total time periods. In addition, our scheme needs very few (only triple) pairing operations in the verifying algorithm, which is very important because the pairing operation is very time-consuming. This scheme is proved to be forward secure in the random oracle model assuming the CDH problem is hard. Finally, we give some applications of this scheme including constructing an intrusion-resilient signature scheme and constructing a forward-secure threshold signature scheme.

An efficient forward-secure group certificate digital signature scheme to enhance EMR authentication process

The frequently used digital signature algorithms, such as RSA and the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), lack forward-secure function. The result is that, when private keys are renewed, trustworthiness is lost. In other words, electronic medical records (EMRs) signed by revoked private keys are no longer trusted. This significant security threat stands in the way of EMR adoption. This paper proposes an efficient forward-secure group certificate digital signature scheme that is based on Shamir's (t,n) threshold scheme and Schnorr's digital signature scheme to ensure trustworthiness is maintained when private keys are renewed and to increase the efficiency of EMRs' authentication processes in terms of number of certificates, number of keys, forward-secure ability and searching time.

New forward-secure signature schemes with untrusted update

In this paper, we present two forward-secure signature schemes (FSS) with untrusted update. Our constructions use ideas from the work of Abdalla et al. [1] and Kozlov and Reyzin [2] in their forward-secure digital signature schemes. Our schemes are proven to be forward-secure based on the hardness of factoring in the random oraclemodel. Both schemes use the same method to encrypt the private key and are more efficient than Libert scheme [3] without adding any burden to the original forward-secure schemes.

A Strong Forward-Secure Proxy Blind Signature Scheme

Combining the mechanism of the hash chain with the forward-secure proxy blind signature, we firstly propose a new strong forward-secure proxy blind signature scheme. This scheme has many secure characters, such as strong forward security, namely, although the attacker get the key in some period , the attacker cannot forge the signature in the past and future periods, verifiability, unforgeability, distinguishability, identifiability, strong blindness.

Improvement of a Forward-Secure Multi-Proxy Signature Scheme

This paper shows some insecurities in Xu’s forward secure multi-proxy signature scheme. There are two kinds of attacks on this scheme: (1) anyone can forge some certain messages which to be sign and cannot detect by the signature verifier. (2) This scheme can’t resist the dishonest signer forgery attack by forging its own public key. After that, the paper proposed two new forward-secure multi-proxy signature schemes based on discrete logarithm problem and quadratic residues. With verifying all the signers’ public keys, the improved schemes can resist lots of outsider attack and insider attack as above mentioned. The validity of the new scheme can be verified, and they are secure multi-signature schemes.

Security of signature schemes in the presence of key-dependent messages

Abstract In recent years, quite some progress has been made in understand- ing the security of encryption schemes in the presence of key-dependent plaintexts. Here, we motivate and explore the security of a setting, where an adversary against a signature scheme can access signatures on key-dependent messages. We propose a way to formalize the security of signature schemes in the pres- ence of key-dependent signatures (KDS). It turns out that the situation is quite different from key-dependent encryption: already to achieve KDS-security under non-adaptive chosen message attacks, the use of a stateful signing algorithm is inevitable-even in the random oracle model. After discussing the connection be- tween key-dependent signing and forward security, we present a compiler to lift any EUF-CMA secure one-time signature scheme to a forward secure signature scheme offering KDS-CMA security.

The ForwardDiffSig Scheme for Multicast Authentication

This paper describes ForwardDiffSig, an efficient scheme for multicast authentication with forward security. This scheme provides source authentication, data integrity, and non-repudiation since it is based on the use of asymmetric cryptography. At the same time, it offers also protection against key exposure as it exploits OptiSum, our optimized implementation of the ISum forward-secure signature scheme. A tradeoff exists in the used keys: Short keys provide speed at the signer, whereas long keys are preferable for long-term non-repudiation. Performance has been evaluated with a custom packet simulator and shows that, by grouping the packets, ForwardDiffSig is efficient in terms of speed even for long keys at the price of a significant signature overhead. Therefore, ForwardDiffSig is fast, exhibits low delay, and provides non-repudiation and protection against key exposure, but has a nonnegligible impact in applications with strict energy or bandwidth constraints.

Forward-Secure Multisignature, Threshold Signature and Blind Signature Schemes

Forward-secure signatures are proposed to tackle the key exposure problem , in which the security of all signatures prior to key leakage is still kept even if the secret key leaks. In this paper, we construct two forward-secure multisignature schemes, one forward-secure threshold signature scheme, and one forward-secure blind signature scheme. Our constructions are based on the recently proposed forward-secure signature scheme from bilinear maps in [11]. Our constructions are very efficient and useful thanks to the elegant structure of the base scheme. Such schemes play an important role in many electronic applications such as cryptographic election systems , digital cash schem es, and e-cheques.

Cryptanalysis of a Type of Forward Secure Signatures and Multi-Signatures

Sunitha and Amberker proposed a type of forward-secure signature and forward-secure multi-signature schemes like ElGamal signature scheme in ICDCIT2008. They claimed that their schemes satisfied forward security assuming discrete logarithm problem is hard. Since then, multiple papers based on these schemes have been published. In this paper, we analyse the security of their schemes and provide five algorithms to attack the security of these schemes. We make a conclusion that none of these schemes satisfies the forward security.