Form Of Ownership Structure Research Articles

Does the audit quality have any moderating impact on the relationship between ownership structure and dividends? Evidence from Jordan

The article aims at investigating whether audit quality impacts the relationship between ownership structure and dividends in companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The article is constructed on the analysis of time-series–cross-section (TSCS) (Panel Data). The study sample comprises 34 companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange between 2016 and 2021. The study sample’s content of the financial reports is analyzed to attain appropriate data for the study. The Findings indicate that family ownership and ownership of board members negatively impact dividends. In contrast, institutional ownership and concentrated ownership positively impact dividends, as no effect of foreign ownership is found on dividends. By introducing audit quality as a modified variable on the relationship between ownership structure and dividends, the findings demonstrate that audit quality positively enhances and strengthens this relationship. This article with its results is of great significance to future stockholders and shareholders, as they help in selecting companies capable of distributing higher dividends than other companies and achieving satisfactory investment returns. The findings of the study also focus on the significance of audit quality as a guarantor for regulating the relationship between forms of ownership structure and the distribution of dividends. This study is regarded among the little research investigating the factors that would impact the relationship between ownership structure and dividends. This article plays a key role in bridging the research gap related to the lack of studies dealing with the relationship between ownership structure and dividends in emerging markets.

Productivity Gains and Firm Ownership: The Case of the French Worker Cooperatives

In this study, we examine how different forms of ownership structure (worker cooperatives vs. traditional firms) affect firm productivity and performance. In particular, we analyze multi-method data from the French worker cooperatives’ movement (e.g., “SCOP”) to interrogate the relationship between ownership structure and productivity. We theorize, and find, that size and maturity are major predictors of the productivity of worker cooperatives. In a series of between and within-firm comparisons, we find that smaller and older SCOPs are more productive than comparable traditional firms. By contrast, larger and younger SCOPs face productive inefficiencies that hamper their overall performance. A survey of, and qualitative evidence gathered with, SCOP directors revealed the mechanisms that explain why productivity gains are associated with smaller and mature worker cooperatives. Specifically, workers in a limited in size and mature SCOP are (1) more motivated, (2) more productive, (3) more easily find a purpose in their job, (4) benefit more from higher group cohesion due to lower income inequalities, and (5) more likely to have clear and well-defined roles within the organization.

Literatur review: peranan board connection dalam meningkatkan kinerja perusahaan

This paper focuses on the systematic review related to literatures on board connection towards firm performance. The review utilizes the samples of 19 research articles published in 2015-2019 time period. The articles are taken in accordance with their journal’s outlet and publications, methodology and research theory, geography data, research concept, and research model. Taking into account, previous researches regarding this matter are still limited, therefore it can be developed into broader geography and research concepts. The main theories used in this concept are agency theory, resource dependence theory, and neo-institutional theory. Notably, this paper explores the characteristics of corporate governance in the form of ownership structure, board characteristics, and board connection where they can interact with one to another, and can influence the firm performance.

The effects of tax avoidance on corporate value

Taxes considered a significant cost to the corporations and shareholders, and it generally expected that shareholders prefer tax avoidance. However, the purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effects tax avoidance on firm value. Based on a sample of 34 Palestinian listed firms from 2011 to 2018, the authors use OLS regression. The results shows that firms tend to take advantages from cash flow saved from aggressive tax practices. On Palestinian context, our results are interesting. Palestine is very unique environment , since investors rights are weakly shielded , furthermore , Palestine stock exchange market is not developed enough , this arguments leash firms to benefit from tax savings , while investors didn’t need to transfer profits to other lower tax countries , since tax rate in Palestine considered low comparing with other countries negative relationship with tax avoidance. This study has spotlight on tax avoidance on unique environment in Palestine and thus extend literature that focused on developed countries. Simultaneously , considered as basis in Palestine and other Arab countries for future research in this area. Although the last implications of this study, it still has limitations, one is limited sample scope, as Palestine exchange market has few listed firms, as small country with precarious political situations. However, The study is the first that focused on the relationship between four forms of ownership structure and tax avoidance in unique environment as Palestine with very distinguished political and economic situations. Keywords Tax avoidance, Firm value, Effective tax rate , ROA DOI: 10.7176/RJFA/11-4-13 Publication date: February 29 th 2020

The Effects Of Financial Performance Toward Firm Value With Ownership Structure As Moderating Variable (The Study On Manufacturing Companies Listed In Indonesia Stock Exchange In The Period Of 2012-2016)

The aim of this study is to determine the effect of Financial Performance toward Firm Value with Ownership Structure as Moderating Variable on Manufacturing Companies Listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in The Period of 2012-2016. Independent variable of this study is Financial Performance with Return on Assets as a proxy. Dependent variable of this study is Firm Value with Tobin's Q as a proxy. While moderating variable used in this study is a mechanism of Corporate Governance in the form of Ownership Structure with Managerial Ownership and Institutional Ownership as the proxy. Then control variable in this study are Firm Size and Leverage. The research model of this study employs panel data analysis with Fixed Effect Model approach. The empirical result shows that Financial Performance has positive significant effect on Firm Value. Managerial Ownership and Institutional Ownership can't moderate the relation between Financial Performance on Firm Value. Firm Size has negative significant effect on Firm Value. And Leverage has insignificant effect on Firm Value.

Public control and strategic governance in stateowned public utilities: empirical evidence from Italian listed firms

Purpose of the paper : The present research investigates the governance of Italian public utilities whose top management is engaged in balancing the conflicting pressures of the business model and the social functions. In this regard, public control appears to influence only the form of ownership structure. Conversely, the nature of the public management mechanisms does appear to substantially affect the management side of these organisations. Methodology : The research performed an empirical quantitative evaluation of the 13 public utilities listed on the Italian Stock Exchange. In line with mainstream literature methodology, the ownership and governance structures are provided for each company, in the context of the government ’ s intention to maintain its central role in the management and control of the business activities. Findings : With reference to and in line with the best practices, as acknowledged by international literature on corporate governance, interesting predictions emerge, in relation to the degree of ownership concentration and dominance exercised by the government within the company. Corporate governance and board composition are further found to represent good proxies of the level of public management discretion in the decision-making process. Research limitations/implications : The specificity of the research ’ s geographic focus (i.e. Italy) de facto implies that there are some country-specific conditions that affect the industrial behaviour and financial performance of the observed firms in a different way than they would in other countries; thus, prohibiting generalisations in the international context. Additionally, the analysis does not adequately take into account the interference effects between industries (e.g. cross-sectorial learning). Finally, the research is largely interpretative and exploratory. And while this provides a solid scientific foundation for further research it does not, itself, subject any hypothesis to statistical testing and validation. Originality of the paper : The research sheds light on the subject of managing conflicting demands, top management ’ s autonomy and the preservation of the significant role of the public as well, in relation to public utilities organisations. It is an original study with Italy in its focus, but with international significance, which reframes managerial debates concerning privatization and public utilities functioning.

PATTERNS OF EFFICIENCY IN DISPERSED, DOMINANT AND CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES IN BRAZIL

ABSTRACT Purpose: The article aims to trace the behaviour of dispersed, dominant and concentrated ownership structures in Brazil and verify which of these structures is more efficient operationally and if there is a pattern to be followed. Originality/gap/relevance/implications: Static optimisation techniques are used by data envelopment analysis (DEA) to calculate the variable ‘efficiency', a differential in relation to previous studies that consider only outcome variables as a performance indicator. The article is one of the first in the area that traces the pattern of efficiency of ownership structures in Brazil. Key methodological aspects: The sample consists of 8,298 company years in the period between 1995 to 2012. To calculate the efficiency (dependent variable), static optimisation techniques were used by data envelopment analysis (DEA). After, the unbalanced panel data by GMM-Sys (system generalised method of moments) is applied to identify the influence of dispersed, dominant and concentrated ownership structures on efficiency. Summary of key results: The results showed that, although all the variables are positively related to efficiency, the graphic presented an inverted "U" format, i.e. dispersed and concentrated structures, mostly, are less efficient than dominant. Key considerations/conclusions: The study identifies that both agency problems and the expropriation of minority shareholders by the majority, stemming from weak legal protection in the country, significantly affect the efficiency of Brazilian companies, thus making dominant structures the most appropriated form of ownership structure in Brazil.

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA

The study has attempted to empirically examine the effect of capital structure and ownership structure on the accounting performance of Indian manufacturing firms listed and traded on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) of India during the period of 2009-16. The capital structure is represented by the debt to equity ratio whereas the various forms of ownership structure are represented by percentage of domestic promoters’ ownership, percentage of foreign promoters’ ownership and percentage of institutional ownership. Besides, return on assets and return on net worth are introduced to measure firms’ accounting performance. The study is based on panel data analysis. We have introduced Fixed Effect Model for the regression on such panel data. We estimated Restricted F test, Lagrange Multiplier Test and Hausman Test for the purpose of final selection of appropriate model for our regression analysis. Finally, the study found a significantly negative effect of capital structure on accounting performance of our sampled firms. However, the study found a significant and positive impact of almost all forms of ownership structure on firms’ accounting performance. Thus, the study proposed the firms’ accounting performance as the function of almost all the variables of capital and ownership structure used in the study.

Firm Performance and the Nature of Agency Problems in Insiders-controlled Firms: Evidence from Pakistan

More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith (1776) showed skepticism about the efficiency of joint stock companies because of the separation of management from ownership. He observed that managers of joint stock companies cannot be expected to watch over the business with the same anxious vigilance as owners in a partnership would. Adam Smith’s worry remained buried for a century and a half until Berle and Means (1932) rekindled interest in this area when they hypothesised in their book that dispersed shareholding is an inefficient form of ownership structure. They argued that separation of ownership and management control has changed the role of owner from being active to the passive agent. Dispersed shareholders lack incentives to monitor self-interested managers who possess only a small fraction of the total shareholdings. The propositions by Adam Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932) received some support when Jensen and Meckling (1976) tied together the elements of property rights, agency costs, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure of a firm. Jensen and Meckling asserted that agency costs are real, which the owner can reduce either by increasing ownership stake of the agent in the firm or by incurring monitoring and bonding costs. In early tests, several research studies supported the views of Jensen and Meckling. However, these studies did not account for endogeneity problem.

The Implications for Corporate Governance of the Proposed Mutual Ownership of Water Utilities and Public Transport

Recently, there has been a growing interest in the UK in the potential of the “mutual” form of ownership structure. In particular, there has been speculation about how the restructuring of utilities that are natural monopolies might be achieved through mutual forms in which investor-ownership is replaced by consumer-ownership. This article focuses on water and public transport, in particular on water utilities in England and Wales, Railtrack and the London Tube. It discusses the reasons why mutual forms are being advocated at this time, outlines three organisational models that have been proposed, and notes potential similarities and differences in their governance structures. It checks to see how important organisational form is compared with other important variables that affect corporate governance, then examines arguments for and against consumer ownership and control. Having established that there are strong arguments for privileging consumers over other stakeholders, it analyses the likely motivations of consumers to find out if they would be prepared, in practice, to take part in governance. In this task it draws on a theoretical model of what motivates people to participate currently being developed at Stirling University.1 The model predicts that individual customers are, in general, more likely to participate in transport than in water provision, though in both the level of participation may always be low. The collective action problem can be mitigated in transport by making use of voluntary user groups that already exist. If management can be relied on to maximise participation, then a full consumer mutual is viable. However, if this cannot be guaranteed, or if individual membership proves too costly to sustain, then a non-profit with membership drawn from user groups would better guarantee good governance in the long term.