Foreclosure Costs Research Articles

Mortgage Contracts and Underwater Default

We analyze recently proposed mortgage contracts that aim to eliminate selective borrower default when the loan balance exceeds the house price (the ``underwater'' effect). We show contracts that automatically reduce the outstanding balance in the event of house price decline remove the default incentive, but may induce prepayment in low price states. However, low state prepayments vanish if the benefit from home ownership is sufficiently high. We also show that capital gain sharing features, such as prepayment penalties in high house price states, are ineffective as they virtually eliminate prepayment. For observed foreclosure costs, we find that contracts with automatic balance adjustments become preferable to the traditional fixed-rate contracts at mortgage rate spreads between 50-100 basis points. We obtain these results for perpetual versions of the contracts using American options pricing methodology, in a continuous-time model with diffusive home prices. The contracts' values and optimal decision rules are associated with free boundary problems, which admit semi-explicit solutions.

A Crisis of Missed Opportunities? Foreclosure Costs and Mortgage Modification During the Great Recession

We investigate the impact of Great Recession policies in California that substantially increased lender pecuniary and time costs of foreclosure. We estimate that the California Foreclosure Prevention Laws (CFPLs) prevented 250,000 California foreclosures (a 20% reduction) and created $300 billion in housing wealth. The CFPLs boosted mortgage modifications and reduced borrower transitions into default. They also mitigated foreclosure externalities via increased maintenance spending on homes that entered foreclosure. The CFPLs had minimal adverse side effects on the availability of mortgage credit for new borrowers. Altogether, findings suggest that policy interventions that keep borrowers in their homes may be broadly beneficial during times of widespread housing distress.

A Crisis of Missed Opportunities? Foreclosure Costs and Mortgage Modification During the Great Recession

We investigate the impact of Great Recession policies in California that substantially increased lender pecuniary and time costs of foreclosure. We estimate that the California Foreclosure Prevention Laws (CFPLs) prevented 250,000 California foreclosures (a 20% reduction) and created $300 billion in housing wealth. The CFPLs boosted mortgage modifications and reduced borrower transitions into default. They also mitigated foreclosure externalities via increased maintenance spending on homes that entered foreclosure. The CFPLs had minimal adverse side effects on the availability of mortgage credit for new borrowers. Altogether, findings suggest that policy interventions that keep borrowers in their homes may be broadly beneficial during times of widespread housing distress.

A Crisis of Missed Opportunities? Foreclosure Costs and Mortgage Modification During the Great Recession

AbstractWe investigate the impact of Great Recession policies in California that substantially increased lender pecuniary and time costs of foreclosure. We estimate that the California Foreclosure Prevention Laws (CFPLs) prevented 250,000 California foreclosures (a 20% reduction) and created $\$$300 billion in housing wealth. The CFPLs boosted mortgage modifications and reduced borrower transitions into default. They also mitigated foreclosure externalities via increased maintenance spending on homes that entered foreclosure. The CFPLs had minimal adverse side effects on the availability of mortgage credit for new borrowers. Altogether, findings suggest that policy interventions that keep borrowers in their homes may be broadly beneficial during times of widespread housing distress.

The Effect of Foreclosures on Homeowners, Tenants, and Landlords

How costly is foreclosure? Estimates of the social cost of foreclosure typically focus on financial costs. Using random judge assignment instrumental variable (IV) and propensity score matching (PSM) approaches in Cook County, Illinois, we find evidence of significant non-pecuniary costs of foreclosure, particularly for foreclosed-upon homeowners. For all homeowners (IV and PSM), foreclosure causes housing instability, reduced homeownership, and financial distress. For marginal homeowners (IV) but not average homeowners (PSM), foreclosure also causes moves to worse neighborhoods and elevated divorce. We show that the difference between IV and PSM is due to treatment effect heterogeneity: marginal homeowners have more to lose than average homeowners. We find similar financial costs for landlords, although the non-financial effects we find for owners are absent. We find few negative effects for renters whose landlord forecloses. The contrast between our results for owners, renters, and landlords implies that the financial costs come from the financial loss while the non-financial costs for owners are due to a combination of eviction and financial loss rather than either individually. Our estimates imply that foreclosure is far more costly than current estimates imply, particularly for marginal cases that are most responsive to foreclosure mitigation policies, and that the costs are disproportionately borne by owners who lose their home.

Improving Risk Sharing and Borrower Incentives in Mortgage Design

In a traditional fixed rate mortgage, the borrower pays a fixed amount each period regardless of the value of the mortgaged property. One problem with this contract is that the borrower is less willing to pay when the house value falls. This was clearly seen in the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath when mortgage default rates and foreclosures skyrocketed as the housing market crashed. A more efficient contract design should link payments to house prices so that the borrower’s incentive to pay is not undermined by a decline in property value. In addition, this design can save the lender the deadweight foreclosure costs. In this article, we examine two proposed index linked mortgages that have this risk sharing feature. We analyze the effect of both designs on borrower incentives in a multiperiod setting.

The Influences of Foreclosure Factors on the Value, Yield, Duration and Convexity of a Mortgage

AbstractThis article presents a theoretical model that considers the influence of foreclosure factors, including foreclosure lag, foreclosure costs and the ratio of the auction price to the unpaid balance of a mortgage (APUPB ratio), on that mortgage's value, yield, duration and convexity. We used data obtained by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to perform the numerical analyses. The results indicate that the average default period and the average foreclosure lag are 2.5 years and 1.9 years, respectively. For each percentage increase in the APUPB ratio, the foreclosure lag decreases by about 4.6 days as we specify a linear relationship between the foreclosure lag and APUPB. The lender's opportunity cost is greater than the foreclosure settlement costs, and the total foreclosure costs are 25% of the house's auction price. Moreover, the foreclosure lag, foreclosure costs and the discounted auction price (i.e., 1‐ APUPB ratio) are negatively correlated with the mortgage's value, duration and convexity, but they are positively correlated with the yield. In addition, a change in the default probability has the greatest influence on mortgage's convexity and the next greatest on the yield. Our study provides a useful tool for portfolio managers and lenders to more appropriately measure the yield, duration and convexity of a mortgage.

The effect of foreclosure laws on securitization: Evidence from U.S. states

A mortgage that defaults is more likely to enter foreclosure rather than renegotiation if it has been securitized in the private non-agency market, according to previous research. We study whether this foreclosure-propensity affects lenders’ securitization decision ex-ante. Due to the higher foreclosure probability, the value of a mortgage should be more sensitive to foreclosure costs if it is securitized. Comparing loans made in the same metropolitan area but under different foreclosure laws, we find that lenders are less likely to securitize mortgages in states with higher foreclosure costs, as measured by laws requiring judicial foreclosure. Two additional results are consistent with the proposed channel. First, the effect increases for loans with higher expected default rates and disappears for mortgage-like loans not subject to these laws. Second, the effect of judicial requirements increases for loans with higher expected default rates, consistent with differences in loss given default driving the results. Borrowers in states without judicial requirements also get riskier loans.

Property Risk, Foreclosure Costs and Rational Lending Discrimination

Observations of significant differences in access to credit, loan terms and the volume of lending between demographically distinct groups of borrowers are often interpreted as evidence of potential ethnic, racial or gender discrimination by lenders. The competitive structure of credit markets and the accuracy of measuring individual credit risk render extant models of lending discrimination based on assumptions of credit market inefficiencies, such as adverse selection, increasingly implausible. In stark contrast to existing models of demographic discrimination, we consider a model of mortgage lending in an economy having complete markets, common knowledge and arbitrage-free pricing. Market equilibria in this classical environment may exhibit discrimination even when borrowers, who are distinguished only by observable demographic traits, share an identical measure of individual credit risk. Relatively costlier loan terms, a higher frequency of loan denials, or a complete rationing of credit to a particular demographic class of borrowers may be a value-maximizing strategy when rational lenders perceive that one or more such traits are directly related to adverse features of the representative property securing the loan to a borrower in this class. Omitted from standard statistical underwriting and regulatory review procedures, these features reduce the value of the collateral available to the lender in the event of future default. When loans are secured by such properties and both lenders and borrowers act strategically, discrimination on this basis will be a property of all market equilibria and can be consistent with an efficient allocation of credit.

Borrower protection and the supply of credit: Evidence from foreclosure laws

Laws governing the foreclosure process can have direct consequences for the costs of foreclosure and, therefore could affect lending decisions. We exploit the heterogeneity in judicial requirements across US states to examine their impact on banks’ lending decisions in a sample of urban areas straddling state borders. A key feature of our study is the way it exploits an exogenous cutoff in loan eligibility to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) guarantees, which shift the burden of foreclosure costs onto the GSEs. We find that judicial requirements reduce the supply of credit only for jumbo loans, which are ineligible for GSE guarantees, i.e., in the nonsubsidized segment of the market. Thus, while we find a significant effect on credit supply, the aggregate impact is muted by the indirect cross-subsidy by the GSEs to borrower-friendly states.

The Cost of Foreclosure Delay

We measure the cost of foreclosure delay by estimating time‐related foreclosure costs using a large national sample of residential mortgages before, during, and after the recent U.S. housing crisis. The large volume of foreclosures, coupled with an unprecedented series of government interventions in mortgage servicing practices, significantly extended foreclosure timelines during and after the crisis. Costs were especially pronounced in judicial review states, which saw average foreclosure costs go up 15 percentage points, 24 percentage points in the highest cost state. Cost increases of this magnitude are likely to have consequences for servicing practices and mortgage credit availability.

Improving Risk Sharing and Borrower Incentives in Mortgage Design

In a traditional fixed rate mortgage, the borrower pays a fixed amount each period regardless of the value of the mortgaged property. One problem with this contract is that the borrower is less willing to pay when the house value falls. This was clearly seen in the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath when mortgage default rates and foreclosures skyrocketed as the housing market crashed. A more efficient contract design should link payments to house prices so that the borrower's incentive to pay is not undermined by a decline in property value. In addition this design can save the lender the deadweight foreclosure costs. In this paper we examine two proposed index linked mortgages which have this risk sharing feature. We analyze the effect of both designs on borrower incentives in a multi-period setting.

Borrower Protection and the Supply of Credit: Evidence from Foreclosure Laws

Laws governing the foreclosure process can have direct consequences on the costs of foreclosure and could therefore affect lending decisions. We exploit the heterogeneity in the judicial requirements across U.S. states to examine their impact on banks’ lending decisions in a sample of urban areas straddling state borders. A key feature of our study is the way it exploits an exogenous cutoff in loan eligibility to GSE guarantees which shift the burden of foreclosure costs onto the GSEs. We find that judicial requirements reduce the supply of credit only for jumbo loans that are ineligible for GSE guarantees. These laws do not affect, however, the relative demand of jumbo loans. Our findings, which also hold using novel nonbinary measures of judicial requirements, illustrate the consequences of foreclosure laws on the supply of mortgage credit. They also shed light on a significant indirect cross-subsidy by the GSEs to borrower-friendly states that has been overlooked thus far.

Borrower Protection and the Supply of Credit: Evidence from Foreclosure Laws

Laws governing the foreclosure process can have direct consequences on the costs of foreclosure and could therefore affect lending decisions. We exploit the heterogeneity in the judicial requirements across U.S. states to examine their impact on banks’ lending decisions in a sample of urban areas straddling state borders. A key feature of our study is the way it exploits an exogenous cutoff in loan eligibility to GSE guarantees which shift the burden of foreclosure costs onto the GSEs. We find that judicial requirements reduce the supply of credit only for jumbo loans that are ineligible for GSE guarantees. These laws do not affect, however, the relative demand of jumbo loans. Our findings, which also hold using novel nonbinary measures of judicial requirements, illustrate the consequences of foreclosure laws on the supply of mortgage credit. They also shed light on a significant indirect cross-subsidy by the GSEs to borrower-friendly states that has been overlooked thus far.

Perceived Financial Costs and Neighborhood Effect of Foreclosures by Next-Door Neighbors in USDA Rural Areas

Many studies on foreclosures have collected information on individuals or families who experience foreclosure. Other studies have computed actual costs of foreclosure instead of the perception of foreclosure costs. Others have used aggregate data on foreclosed homes, as their unit of analysis. But no single study found has looked at the perceived financial cost and neighborhood effect of a foreclosed home in rural areas, neither have they used the next-door neighbors as the unit of analysis. This study fills this gap in knowledge by investigating how the next-door homeowners perceive financial and neighborhood changes because of their adjacent foreclosed home. The study used a financial and social scale as well as perceptions of foreclosures in general and about their neighbors’ foreclosure in particular to answer the research questions. An additional uniqueness of this study is that it was conducted in USDA rural designated areas.

Appraising the Lender's Opportunity Cost Induced from the Foreclosure Lag of Defaulted Mortgages

Foreclosure is the most important tool to protect the mortgage lenders from excessive default losses. The goal of this paper is to present models that can help lenders and insurers calculate the length of the foreclosure period (referred to as the foreclosure lag) and the opportunity cost incurred during this period. Further, we apply the VaR method to estimate the loss scenarios for a given foreclosure lag at a given significance level. This can help lenders to accurately estimate their losses for different degrees of foreclosure lag. Using empirical foreclosure data, we find that the actual lag fits well with the exponential distribution after linear transformation, and we estimate that the expected opportunity cost per monetary unit of the outstanding mortgage balance is nearly twice the mortgage rate. Our results also reveal that different state foreclosure policies, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, and the loss rate significantly influence the foreclosure lag. In the real empirical case, the banks needed on average about two years to complete the foreclosure process. The lag increases 0.52 years if the state policy is judicial foreclosure and 0.1437 years if it is redemption. Both the LTV ratio and the loss rate are negatively related with the foreclosure lag. Our results can help lenders forecast their foreclosure costs and calculate their capital requirements based on the Basel Accord.

The Effect of Foreclosure Regulation: Evidence for the US Mortgage Market at State Level

Do laws to protect borrowers curb foreclosures? This question is addressed by analysing the impact of foreclosure laws on default rates at state level in the US mortgage market. Using panel data techniques, we find a statistically significant effect of regulation on the different stages of the foreclosure process. More precisely, we analyse the effect of regulation on 60-day delinquencies and foreclosure starts, with a focus on three protective elements commonly found in state foreclosure laws, namely requiring a judicial process, granting a redemption period and banning a deficiency judgment. We find that, whereas protective states exhibit, on average, lower 60-day delinquency rates, more protection does not ultimately bring about lower foreclosure rates. Lenders seem to ration credit to mitigate costly protective laws, thereby reducing delinquency rates; but this effect is overshadowed by a moral hazard problem since, once borrowers are delinquent, they have incentives to take advantage of the protection due to the lower costs of foreclosure. We also find that the recent housing market crisis has exacerbated that behaviour. Finally, we show that lengthening the foreclosure process is no cure for the foreclosure crisis.

Borrower Protection and the Supply of Credit: Evidence from Foreclosure Laws

Laws governing the foreclosure process can have direct consequences on the costs of foreclosure and could therefore affect lending decisions. We exploit the heterogeneity in judicial requirements across U.S. state borders to examine their impact on banks' lending decisions in a sample of urban areas straddling state borders. A key feature of our study is the way it exploits an exogenous cutoff in loan eligibility to GSE guarantees which shift the burden of foreclosure costs onto the GSEs. We find that judicial requirements reduce the supply of credit only for jumbo loans that are ineligible for GSE guarantees. These laws do not affect, however, the relative demand of jumbo loans. Our findings, which also hold using novel non-binary measures of judicial requirements, illustrate the consequences of foreclosure laws on the supply of mortgage credit. They also shed light on a significant indirect cross-subsidization by the GSEs to borrower-friendly states that has been overlooked thus far.

The Principal Principle

AbstractI analyze optimal loan modification schemes in a stochastic home price and stochastic interest-rate environment. Lenders maximize loan values by managing the borrower’s option to default on the loan and prepayment option. Given negative equity, controlling for the borrower’s ability to pay, rate reductions and maturity extensions result in a higher probability of redefault by homeowners even after modification of their loans. In contrast, loan write-downs (the Principal Principle), not a favored recipe, are value maximizing for the lender. A shared-appreciation mortgage enhances the ability to pay, mitigates adverse selection, and reduces the present value of expected deadweight foreclosure costs.

Housing market regulation and the social demand for job protection

Controlling for country fixed effects, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the degree of housing market regulation (HMR) and the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) in OECD countries. We provide a model in which HMR increases foreclosure costs in case of mortgage default, while EPL raises the administrative cost of dismissal. Owing to banks' lending behavior, individuals' demand for job protection increases with the cost of foreclosure. We use the model to discuss social housing and family insurance, the case for mortgage unemployment insurance, the impact of min down-payment policies, regulations on the use of fixed-term contracts, the failure of a 2006 French reform of labor contracts, and feed-back effects from HMR to EPL.