Force Intervention Brigade Research Articles

The Force Intervention Brigade: A Conscious Departure

Abstract This article examines lessons learned from the Force Intervention Brigade in relation to the fundamental principles of peacekeeping. Whilst the Security Council declared that the Brigade, deployed in the dr Congo in 2013, was created ‘without a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping’ this article will consider how it has challenged our understanding of these principles and will question to what extent a precedent has been set within peacekeeping. As the UN’s peace operation in the Congo, monusco, is set to withdraw and regional actors involved in the creation of the Brigade seek to deploy forces, the article will argue that the Brigade expanded peacekeeping to its very limits, amounting to a ‘conscious departure’ from the peacekeeping principles which should be avoided in any future UN peace operations.

The Force Intervention Brigade in the drc, Civilian Security and Women Peace and Security

Abstract This article examines the UN Security Council (unsc) authorised Force Intervention Brigade (fib) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (drc) and the component of the mandate that articulates civilian security as a rationale for justified force. In examining civilian protection (articulated as both civilian security and as the protection of civilians), we explore the parallels between the women, peace and security agenda and the image – versus the reality – of civilian vulnerability in the drc. In focusing on the narratives of civilian security we explore how the ten years of repeat authorisations for the fib replicate heteronormative and colonial tropes that have ultimately undermined security in the drc and, for international lawyers, undermine peacekeeping principles, authorisations of force, and understandings of consent. The contradictions between the Security Council’s commitments to addressing and preventing conflict-related sexual violence and the mobilisation of the fib are drawn on to demonstrate the ways in which gender simultaneously strengthens the Council’s legitimacy and yet produces few spaces of significant change from a feminist perspective. We conclude that not only is the legacy of the fib detrimental to women’s security in the drc given reports of sexual exploitation and abuse (sea) perpetrated by peacekeepers but that the fib has transformed peacekeeping away from peace, embedding militarised responses to a complex humanitarian crisis.

Response comment to “Peace Enforcement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Reflections on the Force Intervention Brigade”

Response comment to “Peace Enforcement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Reflections on the Force Intervention Brigade”

Peace Enforcement in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In the past two decades, the world has witnessed a speedy evolution of peacekeeping mandates. In Africa, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has become the biggest testing ground where United Nations missions have transformed from traditional peacekeeping to a novel complex of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The crescendo of this evolution is exemplified by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098 that authorized, within MONUSCO, a Force Intervention Brigade to neutralize all armed groups working contrary to the objectives of peace and stability in the eastern part of the country. This paper assesses the Force Intervention Brigade in order to determine whether it's operations have matched the expectations set by its proponents. It argues that, against the promise, FIB operations have been impeded by political and strategic factors which have far-reaching implications in the form and structure of future peace operations on the African continent.

The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade: Wither the SADC/ICGLR Synchronised Peace Support Efforts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Recurring Conflict?

From the time it deployed in the eastern DRC in 2013 up to the first quarter of 2016, arguably no much tangible progress has been made by the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (UN FIB). The security situation in eastern Congo continues to be unstable. This instability has serious direct security threats and spillover effects on respective neighbouring countries that are either part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). There are certain constraints that the FIB has continued to encounter in the context of regional and international political and strategic dynamics surrounding eastern Congo recurring conflict. This paper argues that one of the contributing factors behind the challenges encountered by the UN Force is the fact that both the ICGLR and the SADC efforts at enhancing peace enforcement in the eastern DRC have been overshadowed by the self-interests of international actors. Arguably, this scenario has impacted negatively on the ICGLR/SADC synchronised efforts towards the effectiveness of the FIB. The paper makes some recommendations on how best to attain sustainable synergy between the ICGLR and SADC in order to enhance the strategic and operational efficiency and the effectiveness of the UN FIB in the eastern Congo conflict.

The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo

ABSTRACTRecent scholarship has discerned an increasing tendency of the UN Security Council to push the boundaries of UN peacekeeping beyond traditional doctrine by equipping peace operations with ever more robust and even peace enforcement mandates. The first and most frequently cited example of this turn is the so-called Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DR Congo. Yet, a comprehensive account of the FIB experience is still missing. Authorized in March 2013 to launch offensive military operations against insurgent groups, the FIB may come to epitomize a sea change in the transition from robust peacekeeping to a qualitatively different kind of UN peace operation. Thus, studying the FIB can offer important insights about the advantages and challenges that may be in store for the UN, should the organization indeed turn towards peace enforcement. The articles analyses the origins, performance and consequences of the FIB in terms of conflict resolution and state-building. It also examines its organizational impact on the UN peace operation in which it was embedded (Monusco). It finds that the FIB has not proven to be the game changer. Instead, it had unintended negative consequences both on state-building and the performance of UN peacekeepers.

The UN Force Intervention Brigade in DR Congo: "Offensive" Peacekeeping

The UN Force Intervention Brigade in DR Congo: "Offensive" Peacekeeping

Offensive Use of Force in Peace Operations: The Force Intervention Brigade

This study focuses on the establishment of the force intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as an offensive armed force into the equation of peacekeeping and on the paradox related to legal, military and political issues. Introducing an overtly offensive combat force will confront controversial implications for UN peacekeeping’s basic principles regarding the use of force, consent of the host country and impartiality. The intervention brigade changed unprecedentedly the boundaries of peacekeeping while creating an environment of hesitation and reluctance in spite of successful actions and its renewed mandate since 2013.

Offensive Use of Force in Peace Operations: The Force Intervention Brigade

This study focuses on the establishment of the force intervention brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as an offensive armed force into the equation of peacekeeping and on the paradox related to legal, military and political issues. Introducing an overtly offensive combat force will confront controversial implications for UN peacekeeping’s basic principles regarding the use of force, consent of the host country and impartiality. The intervention brigade changed unprecedentedly the boundaries of peacekeeping while creating an environment of hesitation and reluctance in spite of successful actions and its renewed mandate since 2013.

UN Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Protection of Civilians

UN peacekeeping has had a long and controversial involvement in the affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The current operation there constitutes one of the UN’s most challenging missions to date. MONUC’s (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du Congo) mandate evolved over time and the force adopted an increasingly robust posture. MONUC needed the military capacity to take action to support the transitional process and to deter spoilers, while at the same time ensuring the protection of civilians who were at risk. As the situation deteriorated, the response of the UN was to modify the mission to meet what were seen as the main challenges to stability. In 2010 MONUC became United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO). This led to a reconfiguration and change in role to that of a stabilisation mission. Subsequently in 2013, the Security Council approved the establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade. This reflected an acknowledgement of the scale of the crisis and that it was necessary to take the initiative militarily to neutralise spoilers. The combat nature of the Brigade mission distinguishes it from other UN operations under Chapter VII and has important implications for the status of the military personnel comprising the whole MONUSCO mission. MONUSCO continues to be subject to criticism for its failure to protect civilians. While the situation would almost certainly have been worse without UN involvement, MONUSCO cannot continue to try and manage the conflict indefinitely while failing to protect civilians

The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade: Wither the SADC/ICGLR Synchronised Peace Support Efforts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Recurring Conflict?

The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade: Wither the SADC/ICGLR Synchronised Peace Support Efforts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Recurring Conflict?

The Congo Trap: MONUSCO Islands of Stability in the Sea of Instability

<p class="p1">2014 was a hopeful year for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The M23 movement had been defeated in military operations in which one of the last peacekeeping experiments, the UN Force Intervention Brigade, had played a decisive role. A third UN stabilization plan, the ‘islands of stability’ was proposed to continue the stabilization of a country considered in a post-conflict phase. However, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has almost tripled in the country since 2007. This article will argue that DRC is still immersed into an old social conflict that existed before the Congo Wars and the roots of which are not being addressed. It will argue that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the ‘islands of stability’ strategy can address some of the secondary causes of the Congo conflict, such as its internationalization, the presence in DRC of foreign armed groups or the ‘blood minerals’, but cannot address its primary causes: land struggles, an old cycle of violence and the fragmentation of the Congolese society and political elite that is jeopardizing the restoration of the state authority. The huge dimensions of each of these factors make the Congo conflict ‘one of the most complex and intricate environments ever faced by a peacekeeping mission’, for which MONUSCO’s mandate, resources and stabilization strategy do not seem powerful enough. When the UN organized the 2006 elections legitimized a ‘spoiler state’, the bottleneck of all the reforms needed to stabilize the country. The UN fell thus into a trap and became part of the conflict. Lessons learned should be taken for future UN operations.

The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo

The United Nations has been engaged in peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the period of the country’s independence. First it was the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (onuc), then the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (monuc), and the most recent un peacekeeping force is called Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Congo (monusco). Most recently, monusco acquired a Force Intervention Brigade (fib). In this contribution, an analysis is made of how the bedrock principles of peacekeeping – impartiality, consent, and a restricted use of force – have evolved in the Congo. To do so, the journey begins in the 1960s, and ends in early 2015. For each principle, we will look at its traditional meaning, as well as its application to onuc, monuc, and monusco with its Force Intervention Brigade.

The Force Intervention Brigade—United Nations Forces beyond the Fine Line Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

As United Nations (UN) peacekeeping evolved from interposition forces to multidimensional missions, the UN adjusted its peacekeeping principles and allowed a wider use of force. As the latest adjustment, the Security Council adopted a new mandate for UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo creating the ‘Force Intervention Brigade’, described as the first contingent of troops to conduct targeted offensive operations against armed groups. However, this role of the UN as an enforcement actor within a non-international armed conflict was not prepared by an assessment of the rules applicable to UN missions. These rules provide the Force Intervention Brigade with an ambiguous double status being at the same time a specially protected peacekeeping force and a party directly engaged in hostilities. As a consequence, peacekeeping missions as a whole are put at a higher risk of failing to perform their assigned mediation between the conflict parties and of themselves becoming the target of attacks. As a preliminary policy advice, I propose a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement troops with a view to protect the peacekeeper’s perceived legitimacy and to reconcile the status of peace enforcement troops with the law applicable to the conflicts they, in fact, became a party to.

MONUSCO: a atuação brasileira em operações de paz robustas

The Resolution 2098 of the UN Security Council (UNSC) of March 28th 2013 authorized with originality, the creation of a Force Intervention Brigade to work in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although the appointed Brazilian General to command MONUSCO does not operate as an official representative of Brazil but instead as an UN official, this action reinforces the interest of Brazil on UN peace operations. Stressing the Brazilian efforts to win a seat as a permanent member of the UNSC and considering its participation since 1956, in 47 UN peacekeeping missions, this article questions the Brazilian’s intention and capacity to be active in robust operations.Keywords: MONUSCO, Brazilian participation, military capability.

(Il)legality of Killing Peacekeepers: The Crime of Attacking Peacekeepers in the Jurisprudence of International Criminal Tribunals

On 28 March 2013, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 2089 extending the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and creating the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)c the first-ever offensive combat unitwithin the structure of a peacekeepingmission.The establishment of theBrigadehas raised anumberof political and legal controversies, one ofwhich iswhether, and underwhat circumstances, attacking peacekeepers operating under robust mandates entails individual criminal responsibility under international law. The UN press release issued after the combat death of aTanzanian FIB member, although condemnatory, did not classify the attack as criminal, implying that he may have been a lawful target. In the future, such robust peacekeepingmandates are likely to becomemore common, raising questions about the boundaries of international humanitarian law for ‘peacekeepers’, and the scope of the international criminal law prohibition on attacking them.This article addresses those questions through the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court. Unfortunately, existing jurisprudence fails to adequately accommodate the possibility of peacekeepers becoming parties to the conflict.This article proposes a functional approach based on participation in offensive operations.

MONUSCO: A ATUAÇÃO BRASILEIRA EM OPERAÇÕES DE PAZ ROBUSTAS

The Resolution 2098 of the UN Security Council (UNSC) of March 28 th 2013 authorized with originality, the creation of a Force Intervention Brigade to work in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although the appointed Brazilian General to command MONUSCO does not operate as an official representative of Brazil but instead as an UN official, this action reinforces the interest of Brazil on UN peace operations. Stressing the Brazilian efforts to win a seat as a permanent member of the UNSC and considering its participation since 1956, in 47 UN peacekeeping missions, this article questions the Brazilian’s intention and capacity to be active in robust operations. Keywords: MONUSCO, Brazilian participation, military capability.

DEPLOYMENT PSYCHOLOGY: EVIDENCEBASED STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE MENTAL HEALTH IN THE MILITARY/AB Adler, PD Bliese and CA Castro (eds.)

On 23 March 2013, South African (SA) soldiers made contact with theSeleka rebel group as part of the South African operational involvement in theCentral African Republic (CAR). The ensuing battle between the militia and the SAtroops left the latter with 27 wounded and, to date, 14 dead. The media coverage,which followed our troop losses in the CAR, was a reminder for many of the integralinvolvement of SA forces, in the form of the South African National Defence Force(SANDF), across the African continent. With the passing of the United Nations(UN) Security Council Resolution 2098, in March 2013, SANDF troops are nowbeing deployed as part of a roughly 3 000-strong UN Force Intervention Brigade(FIB) in the DRC. In many ways the increased involvement of SA troops in theCAR and the unfortunate loss of SA soldiers in the CAR serve as a stark reminder ofthe important role played by mental health practitioners in providing our troops withthe appropriate psychological support during deployments. It is in this vein thatDeployment psychology: Evidenced-based strategies to promote mental health in themilitary serves as a useful and timely repository for psychologists, registeredcounsellors, and other mental health practitioners working in the SANDF.