Folk Psychology Research Articles

Ontology After Folk Psychology; or, Why Eliminativists Should Be Mental Fictionalists

ABSTRACTMental fictionalism holds that folk psychology should be regarded as a kind of fiction. The present version gives a Lewisian prefix semantics for mentalistic discourse, where roughly, a mentalistic sentence “p” is true iff “p” is deducible from the folk psychological fiction. An eliminativist version of the view can seem self‐refuting, but this charge is neutralized. Yet a different kind of “self‐effacing” emerges: Mental fictionalism appears to be a mere “parasite” on a future science of cognition without contributing anything substantial. The paper then rebuts the objection, illustrating that prefix semantics resolves a lingering problem for eliminativism from Boghossian. The problem is that eliminativists seem unable to adopt realism about neuroscience, for such realism implies that neuroscientific statements represent reality accurately. However, a deflationary version of prefix semantics allows the eliminativist to draw an ontologically relevant distinction (roughly) between truths that have a storytelling prefix and those that do not. (Deflationism means there is no implication that the unprefixed sentences robustly represent reality). The overarching lesson is that eliminativists need to approach ontology carefully so as to avoid self‐refutation; however, prefix‐semantical mental fictionalism provides the resources for them to do so.

Psychology of religion and spirituality in Jewish contexts: A synthetic review

Jewish spirituality and religion include dynamics that are different from other traditions and have important implications for relational forms of spirituality. Certain approaches to relational Judaism (e.g. Mussar) have offered insights for understanding the folk psychology of relational spirituality in Jewish contexts but have not generated empirical research. Existing research in the psychology of Jewish religion and spirituality draws on several theoretical frameworks and has generated helpful findings. In this synthetic review, we foreground the role of theory in psychological research and offer a brief review of several theoretical frameworks used in research on the psychology of Jewish religion and spirituality (cognitive-behavioral, psychodynamic, cultural psychology of religion, and positive psychology). The relational spirituality model (RSM) is summarized as a conceptual framework that could be useful for future research in this area. We use the RSM as a heuristic organizing framework to review several lines of prior empirical research on the psychology of Jewish religion and spirituality that fit within the RSM domains of spiritual dwelling, seeking, and struggles. The final section outlines future directions in research in this area based on the RSM, with particular attention to dimensions of diversity (e.g. gender, sexual orientation), diverse contexts of Jewish spirituality, Jewish spirituality in relation to both mental health suffering and flourishing, and historical trauma. We also highlight the need for research on Jewish spiritual development in communal settings (e.g. congregations, seminaries) to provide a deeper understanding at both individual and communal levels, and interdisciplinary integration with Jewish theology.

Narrative construction of vocational identity in university students: The role of influential experiences and significant others in the framework of cultural psychology

This study sought to understand the process of construction of the vocational identity of university students. Assuming cultural psychology as a theoretical reference, a qualitative methodology was adopted, with a narrative perspective. In-depth interviews were conducted with 20 participants, male and female engineering, and psychology students from two universities in Colombia about their exploration process, choice, commitment, and reconsideration to the career. In the findings the vocational identity emerges as a product of the negotiation of meanings between the personal dimension and the social dimension of individuals, which allows them to intentionally orient their actions towards the achievement of their life goals. In turn, the negotiation between these two dimensions occurs through psychosocial processes derived from the influential experiences and interactions with significant others. These processes facilitate the appropriation of the folk psychology of a socio-cultural context, a background of meanings about occupational and/or educational practices on which the vocational identity is configured. It is concluded that vocational identity is a process in constant formation shaped by a social scaffolding mechanism; namely, support structures that provided by the relational resource in the context of everyday interactions and that assist in the configuration of vocational identity of young people. It has an important organizing function of experiences, emotions, cognitions, and actions in the occupational and educational spheres. The conceptual model validated by the findings allows understanding the process of negotiation of identity meanings and the construction of possible vocational worlds.

Dimensions of wisdom perception across twelve countries on five continents

Wisdom is the hallmark of social judgment, but how people across cultures recognize wisdom remains unclear—distinct philosophical traditions suggest different views of wisdom’s cardinal features. We explore perception of wise minds across 16 socio-economically and culturally diverse convenience samples from 12 countries. Participants assessed wisdom exemplars, non-exemplars, and themselves on 19 socio-cognitive characteristics, subsequently rating targets’ wisdom, knowledge, and understanding. Analyses reveal two positively related dimensions—Reflective Orientation and Socio-Emotional Awareness. These dimensions are consistent across the studied cultural regions and interact when informing wisdom ratings: wisest targets—as perceived by participants—score high on both dimensions, whereas the least wise are not reflective but moderately socio-emotional. Additionally, individuals view themselves as less reflective but more socio-emotionally aware than most wisdom exemplars. Our findings expand folk psychology and social judgment research beyond the Global North, showing how individuals perceive desirable cognitive and socio-emotional qualities, and contribute to an understanding of mind perception.

The origin and function of external representations

External representations ( ERs) are objects or performances in the world whose proper function is to communicate about other things in the world. Why and how did we make them, and what do they give us? We outline a simple framework for thinking about ERs grounded in modern machine learning. We propose a minimal set of neural mechanisms needed for open-ended ER production. Our constructivist enactive view contrasts with nativist views which propose specialist neural modules requiring symbolic internal representations. We propose a plausible set of (biological and cultural) evolutionary steps to full Gricean symbolic communication via a set of increasingly complex enactive algorithms for ER production. A pragmatic space of games is defined, which includes not only fully cooperative language games but also science, art, and evolved signal manipulation games. This space is defined by the complexity of learning needed by sender and receiver. We propose that one important step towards open-ended ER use was selection for bush reading, which like mind-reading is an inferential process requiring complex contextual and syntactic understanding of cues about events displaced in space and time. Bush reading pre-adapted receivers to be receptive, competent, and perspicacious interpreters of later intentionally produced signals about hidden topics such as felt mental states. This paved the way for minimally Gricean communication, which subsequently could be bootstrapped into explicit theories of mind, folk psychology narratives, and symbolic language in general. Recent findings in cognitive archaeology are integrated within the framework, and new experiments in machine learning suggested.

Exposing, Reversing, and Inheriting Crimes as Traumas from the Neurosciences to Epigenetics: Why Criminal Law Cannot Yet Afford A(nother) Biology-induced Overhaul

In criminal proceedings, offenders are sentenced based on doctrines of culpability and punishment that theorize why they are guilty and why they should be punished. Throughout human history, these doctrines have largely been grounded in legal-policy constructions around retribution, safety, deterrence, and closure, mostly derived from folk psychology, natural philosophy, sociocultural expectations, public-order narratives, and common sense. On these premises, justice systems have long been designed to account for crimes and their underlying intent, with experience and probabilistic assumptions shaping theoretical discourses on the nature of crimes and offenders’ punishability. As scientific discoveries, inventions, and methodologies progressively developed to refine such doctrines and displace long-held assumptions, criminal courtrooms have increasingly witnessed counsels and judges relying on scientific evidence to submit, dispute, or validate claims. For instance, over the last century, criminal courtrooms have selectively admitted neuroscientific models, exams, and insights claiming to revolutionize our understanding of who is culpable and deserving of punishment. Most recently, advancements in epigenetics have promised even more profound challenges to long-standing criminal law doctrines. This article examines the reasons reversibility and inheritability of epigenetic markers might warrant revising culpability and punishment and concludes that epigenetic findings are not yet robust enough to justify such revisions.

Folk Concepts and the Effective Regulation of New Technologies

One argument that is at times adduced against proposals for legal change, such as granting personhood to autonomous agents, is that the change in question will be inefficacious if it takes the law too far from the folk world of people. By contrast, in this article we argue that legal concepts and folk concepts are more malleable than we tend to assume. We turn to (legal) history to demonstrate that the relationship between legal concepts and folk concepts is not one-directional, which means that changes in the law can and have influenced folk psychology as well as vice versa. This has implications for debates around the regulation of new technologies: the ‘lack of efficacy’ argument is not a strong one and mere reference to current folk concepts cannot suffice in such debates. Moreover, the efficacy argument does not, and cannot, replace normative arguments in this respect, so the malleability of folk concepts needs to be considered by legal decision-makers. Current conceptual apparatuses (legal or folk) are not immutable, and reification of the current status quo should not be presupposed.

Canonical Narratives as a Tool of Analysis in Psychology

In this article, I develop the concept of canonical narratives, drawing on Jerome Bruner’s (1915-2016) later writings on the central role of culture in shaping human psychology. I argue that we can develop the concept of canonical narratives past its initial purpose in explaining how folk psychology acquires meaning for individuals and develop the concept into a tool of analysis that can shed new light on the broader dialectic between academic psychology and social-cultural environments. I examine the role of canonical narratives in contemporary psychology by focusing on the narrative that human beings are best conceptualized as machines. I argue that not only are psychology’s constructs shaped by social-cultural environments, which have been well established but that their meanings are, to some extent, established through a dialectic with canonical narratives.

Primacy of theory? Exploring perspectives on validity in conceptual psychometrics.

Several conceptions of validity have emphasized the contingency of validity on theory. Here we revisit several contributions to the discourse on the concept of validity, which we consider particularly influential or insightful. Despite differences in metatheory, both Cronbach and Meehl's construct validity, and Borsboom, Mellenbergh and van Heerden's early concept of validity regard validity as a criterion for successful measurement and thus, as crucial for the soundness of psychological science. Others, such as Borgstede and Eggert, regard recourses to validity as an appeal to an (unscientific) folk psychology. Instead, they advocate theory-based measurement. It will be demonstrated that these divergent positions converge in their view of psychological theory as indispensable for the soundness of psychological measurement. However, the formulation of the concept (and scope) of scientific theory differs across the presented conceptions of validity. These differences can be at least partially attributed to three disparities in metatheoretical and methodological stances. The first concerns the question of the structure of scientific theories. The second concerns the question of psychology's subject matter. The third regards whether, and if, to which extent, correlations can be indicative of causality and therefore point toward validity. These results indicate that metatheory may help to structure the discourse on the concept of validity by revealing the contingencies the concrete positions rely on.

Are Beliefs Voluntary in Moral Decision?

For each individual, the standards of morality are completely different. People will make decisions based on their life experiences, social environment, family education, and other factors to develop their moral standards. The essay argues that beliefs are voluntary to guide an individual’s decisions and actions. Based on the moral experiment, people struggle with the importance of their family or personal will. Some people might make their decision based on others' thoughts and feel regret after many years. However, their belief and moral system guide them to determine the results, and they have complete responsibility for their action. In this essay, I will first discuss voluntary belief from the perspective of doxastic voluntarism and folk psychology. The second perspective will adopt psychoanalysis, developed by Sigmund Freud. Finally, this essay will demonstrate the necessity of voluntary belief using a moral accountability argument grounded in social psychology.

Philosophy of Body: Embodiment, Perception, and Understanding Other Minds

The lived body, as an embodied self, lives, breathes, perceives, acts and reasons (Drew Leder, 1990, 1-8). The imaginative, with its schematic structures, has a role in thought (Lakoff, 1987, 275; Johnson 1987, 76,) even as we show preference for the biological and psychological turn. The problem of other minds is about how we come by the power to understand other people, comprehend their behaviours, know their intentions, and discern their mental processes. In the Husserlian phenomenology, we come to know and recognize the other through bodily movement. The kinaesthetic experience of having a grip on its surrounding world leads the ego into the knowledge and recognition of the other (Husserl, 1937, 16, § 62). We can take this kinaesthetic experience of knowing the other through motor behaviour farther. Following an empathic understanding that comes from our shared motor resonance system, we understand others when their motor behaviour is put in a narrative framework (Gallagher, 2006). We admit, as Gallagher does, that neither a “cold theoretical logic” (of folk psychology ) nor a “self-controlled simulation” (of simulation theory ) replaces the powers associated with the primary- and secondary inter-subjectivity that attend the way we interact with others, first as babies and later as children (Gallagher, 2006, 12).

Resolution and Resolve

Folk psychology holds that resolving to do something is effective in resisting temptation. What is a resolution? Resolutions are often understood as two-tier intentions or an intention-desire pair. However, both accounts of resolution are subject to a problem. Why should we expect the second-order aspect of resolutions to resist temptation? Even if we posit that we have additional or independent reasons for the second-order intention or desire, these reasons will be insufficient in the face of temptation, because temptation makes one’s reasons for acting on tempting desires very salient. From the first-person perspective there is no neutral deliberative space from which to take stock of reasons when being tempted. I conclude that rationally resisting temptation instead requires forestalling temptation through the practical virtue of resolve. Resolve understood as a virtue involves dispositions to deliberate and desire in accordance with one’s resolutions.

Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action

Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? While agentive luck and epistemic luck have been widely thought to be independent phenomena, we argue that agentive luck has an epistemic dimension. We present several thought experiments where epistemic luck seems to undermine both knowledge-how and intentional action and we report experimental results that corroborate these judgments. These findings have implications for the role of knowledge in a theory of intentional action and for debates about the nature of knowledge-how and the significance of knowledge representation in folk psychology.

Facing up to the problem of intentionality

AbstractWe distinguish between different problems of “aboutness”: the “hard” problem of explaining the everyday phenomenon of intentionality and three less challenging “easy” sets of problems concerning the posits of folk psychology, the notions of representation invoked in the mind‐brain sciences, and the intensionality (with an “s”) of mental language. The problem of intentionality is especially hard in that, as is the case with the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness, there is no clear path to a solution using current methods. We argue that naturalistic theories of mental representation do not address the hard problem—either they are only intended to address the easy problems, or the claims they make help address the problem of intentionality only under undefended and prima facie implausible assumptions to the effect that the hard problem reduces to some combination of the easy problems. We offer a positive account of what would be required to properly face up to the problem of intentionality.

Neurophilosophy: A Philosophical Analysis for Interpretation of fMRI to Replace the Commonsense Psychology

For thinking, brain activity occurs, yet not every area of our brain is active when we think about various things. There are significant ramifications for cognitive psychology and neuroscience from functional brain areas. It should enable us to apply neurophilosophical theories to the brain. This review aims to draw attention to neurophilosophy and its focus on fundamental problems in neuroscientific theories to address age-old metaphysical issues, i.e., the nature of consciousness, thinking, intention, and action. There are different theories and points of view in the field of neurophilosophy, but eliminative materialists and reductive materialists (a.k.a. mind-brain identity theory) are both strong candidates. Those are very well-established in the philosophy of mind, and they run counter to the development of conceptual succession in neuroscience. Both theorists rely on neuroscience to back up their conclusions about the mind. Eliminative materialism has received a lot of attention from several philosophical points of view. It begins with a critique of commonsense psychology and offers neurophilosophy as an alternative. So, for reductive materialists, mind is brain, whereas for eliminativists mind as brain. Both theorists have different views about mental states to cohere with neurophysiology. The philosophical problem of dualism, as the body/brain (physical), and mind/cognition (mental) is discussed in psychiatry, neuropsychology, and neuroscience. Neurophilosophy deals with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data to shed light on psychosocial problems like moral psychology, free will, social interaction, and mood disorders. An fMRI is a neuroimaging technique and an essential tool for bridging cognitive psychology and neurophilosophic theories. It is used to investigate mental resilience, impairments, changes in neural dynamics, and neuroplasticity mainly for brain trauma. I will tie this discussion by discussing fMRI and commonsense psychology as exploratory rather than confirmatory evidence in my conclusion.
 How to cite this: Sohail A. Neurophilosophy: A Philosophical Analysis for Interpretation of fMRI to Replace the Commonsense Psychology. Life and Science. 2023; 4(4): 494-500. doi: http://doi.org/10.37185/LnS.1.1.392

Development of a Naïve Theory of Superstition

ABSTRACT Superstitious behaviors persist across time, culture, and age. Although often considered irrational and even potentially harmful, superstitions have recently been shown to have positive effects on stress levels, confidence, and ultimately, performance. However, it remains unclear how people conceive of superstitious behaviors, specifically, whether people attribute apparent superstitious efficacy to magical forces or to something else, such as reduced stress or increased confidence. In two studies we asked 6- to 9-year-old children and adults from the United States to rate how causally connected superstitious behaviors were to desired outcomes. In Study 1, participants provided open-ended responses to questions probing why they believed the actions were tied to the outcomes. Participants were more likely across ages to offer natural than magical explanations to explain the connection – this became more pronounced with age. In Study 2, half the stories did not permit a plausible natural explanation, thus any perceived causal relation could only be attributable to magic. Participants were asked how connected the superstitious behaviors were to the outcomes. We found significant differences in ratings of connectedness between stories that held plausible natural explanations and those that did not in our adult sample only. Our findings suggest that people recruit their naive psychology when reasoning about the efficacy of superstitious behaviors; however, children may also believe magic to be causally relevant.

Humans as Creativity Gatekeepers: Are We Biased Against AI Creativity?

With artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly involved in the creation of organizational and commercial artifacts, human evaluators’ role as creativity gatekeepers of AI-produced artifacts will become critical for innovation processes. However, when humans evaluate creativity, their judgment is clouded by biases triggered by the characteristics of the creator. Drawing from folk psychology and algorithm aversion research, we examine whether the identity of the producer of a given artifact as artificial intelligence (AI) or human is a source of bias affecting people’s creativity evaluation of such artifact and what drives this effect. With four experimental studies (N = 2039), of which two were pre-registered, using different experimental designs and evaluation targets, we found that people sometimes—but not always—ascribe lower creativity to a product when they are told that the producer is an AI rather than a human. In addition, we found that people consistently perceive generative AI to exert less effort than humans in the creation of a given artifact, which drives the lower creativity ratings ascribed to generative AI producers. We discuss the implication of these findings for organizational creativity and innovation in the context of human-AI interaction.

An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions

ABSTRACT In recent years, some authors have shown a renewed interest in interpretivist theories of folk psychological ascription [Hutto 2013. “Fictionalism About Folk Psychology.” The Monist 96 (4): 582–604.; Mölder 2010. Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Sanchez-Curry 2020. “Interpretivism and Norms.” Philosophical Studies 177 (4): 905–930.; Mölder 2021. “Interpretivism Without Judgement-Dependence.” Philosophia 49 (2): 611–615.; Slors 2015. "Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State Ascriptions." Studia Philosophica Estonica, 10 (2): 18–27.]. Part of the virtue of interpretivism lies in its ability to provide an answer to elminativist arguments without falling into the assumptions and problems of intentional realism. However, some recent developments in semantic expressivism applied to normative expressions could help to build an alternative theory to interpretivism that would enjoy the same virtues. The aim of this paper is to present and defend an expressivist approach to the status of folk psychological ascriptions. According to this view, mental states ascriptions are evaluative and non-descriptive statement that express or reflect certain normative standards or values of the attributor. After presenting the view and contrasting it with interpretivist positions, with which expressivism shares important motivations and claims, I present two arguments to favor the expressivist analysis. In line with the first argument, expressivism can account for fundamental aspects of disagreements regarding mental attributions while the second highlights the capacity of the view to explain the widespread justificatory and exculpatory uses of mental states ascriptions.

Biology, Society, or Choice: How Do Non-Experts Interpret Explanations of Behaviour?

Explanations for human behaviour can be framed in many different ways, from the social-structural context to the individual motivation down to the neurobiological implementation. We know comparatively little about how people interpret these explanatory framings, and what they infer when one kind of explanation rather than another is made salient. In four experiments, UK general-population volunteers read vignettes describing the same behaviour, but providing explanations framed in different ways. In Study 1, we found that participants grouped explanations into 'biological', 'psychological' and 'sociocultural' clusters. Explanations with different framings were often seen as incompatible with one another, especially when one belonged to the 'biological' cluster and the other did not. In Study 2, we found that exposure to a particular explanatory framing triggered inferences beyond the information given. Specifically, psychological explanations led participants to assume the behaviour was malleable, and biological framings led them to assume it was not. In Studies 3A and 3B, we found that the choice of explanatory framing can affect people's assumptions about effective interventions. For example, presenting a biological explanation increased people's conviction that interventions like drugs would be effective, and decreased their conviction that psychological or socio-political interventions would be effective. These results illuminate the intuitive psychology of explanations, and also potential pitfalls in scientific communication. Framing an explanation in a particular way will often generate inferences in the audience-about what other factors are not causally important, how easy it is to change the behaviour, and what kinds of remedies are worth considering-that the communicator may not have anticipated and might not intend.

Children attribute higher social status to people who have extraordinary capabilities

Throughout history, individuals believed to have extraordinary capabilities were generally highly ranked in their communities; this suggests a universal “extraordinary-dominant expectation” in human minds, which may play a key role in religious thought, even in modern societies. This study shows that 5–6-year-old children, who begin to understand real-world causalities regarding how the body and mind of human beings work, predict that individuals who exhibit extraordinary capabilities have higher social status in interactions with individuals who exhibit ordinary capabilities. In Experiment 1, we showed children two individuals achieving goals using either humanly possible or impossible methods, the latter involving simple forms of violation of intuitive psychology (knowing without seeing), physics (flying), or biology (fire breathing). The children clearly judged the latter as surprising and unusual. More importantly, the children predicted that individuals showing extraordinary capabilities will gain contested resources and play a dominant role in interactions with ordinary individuals, indicating a higher social status. Further investigations suggested that the children specifically linked extraordinary capacities to social status, as they did not attribute dominance to individuals who apply surprising/unusual but possible methods (Experiment 2), and that they did not indiscriminately attribute positive characteristics to extraordinary capabilities despite a strong extraordinary-dominant expectation being replicated (Experiment 3). These findings demonstrate that extraordinary-dominant expectations can be observed in childhood across different intuitive knowledge domains, helping understand the cognitive mechanisms of religious thought and the cognitive foundations of hierarchical social systems.