Words matter. We should be conscious of their impact. Or would it be better to say we should be aware of their impact? The articles by Lüders et al.1 and accompanying commentary by Blumenfeld and Meador2 provide thoughtful analyses of the inadequacies of a simple concept of consciousness to characterize seizures. No fewer than five varieties of alterations of consciousness are needed to span the behaviors commonly seen during seizures. With such a large range, how practical is consciousness as a descriptor? Consciousness is beyond dispute as an important aspect of human experience and as an area for scientific study, but seizure classifiers need to be definable and detectable in a simple, replicable way. Consciousness is neither of these. What are the alternatives? One approach is to define focal seizures as a single large category, with no formal subdivisions, as proposed by the 2010 International League Against Epilepsy (ILAE) Commission.3 This takes consciousness out of the picture, except as an optional descriptor. A second approach is to define a subcategory called “focal dyscognitive seizures,” as was done by Blume et al.4 and the 2001 ILAE Glossary task force. As pointed out by Blumenfeld and Meador,2 focal dyscognitive is understandable, but not equivalent to common current use of the term complex partial. Dyscognitive does not imply loss of consciousness. A more practical approach would be to base seizure classification on measurable behaviors, such as memory, responsiveness, and awareness, as well as specific motor, sensory, autonomic, and cognitive malfunctions. Numerous studies of consciousness use awareness, memory, responsiveness5 or orientation, language, visual processing, motor praxis, sensorimotor responses, and visual tracking6 as testable surrogates for the level of consciousness, although not to the exclusion of subjective phenomena. While awake, it is possible to be conscious and unresponsive or conscious and amnestic, but probably not conscious and unaware of the external world. Professor Blumenfeld commented that “An altered level of consciousness, evidenced by decreased overall arousal and responsiveness [italics added], is the defining feature of complex partial seizures.”7 Given that arousal, awareness, and responsiveness comprise the defining features, and consciousness can be measured only via surrogates and subjective reports, why propose, as Blumenfeld and Meador do in their commentary, “Focal Aware Conscious Seizures,” instead of “Focal Aware Seizures.” This is not the place to propose a specific classification, but only to argue that a seizure classification should be based on measurable behaviors and simple subjective perceptions, such as numbness. We can decide whether someone should be driving based on awareness, responsiveness, and sensorimotor abilities during a seizure. Specification of details of consciousness is not required. Einstein advised us that “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler,”8 Consciousness does not simplify classification of seizures. I have no conflicts of interest to disclose. I confirm that I have read the Journal's position on issues involved in ethical publication and affirm that this report is consistent with those guidelines. Dr. Robert S. Fisher is the Maslah Saul MD Professor of Neurology & Neurological Sciences at Stanford University in Stanford, California.