Fiscal Externalities Research Articles

Fiscal externalities and underinvestment in early-life human capital: Optimal policy instruments for a developing country

We study policy instruments to correct inefficiently low investment in maternal nutrition in India, where one-fifth of all births occur. We focus on fiscal externalities: healthier babies become more productive adults, who pay more tax. However, parents do not internalize this externality, which, combined with other distortions, results in mothers weighing too little during pregnancy. We calibrate the first sufficient-statistics policy model for the quantitatively important case of fiscal externalities and maternal nutrition in developing countries. The optimal subsidy is large. Yet, welfare gains are even greater from public investment in state capacity to monitor nutrition, enabling targetted incentives.

Fiscal Federalism in the Twenty-First Century

Fiscal federalism concerns the division of policy responsibilities among different levels of government. Many current economic and policy developments, such as globalization, environmental crises, and rising inequality, may not appear to be favorable to fiscal federalism, yet countries are further decentralizing their fiscal systems. We summarize the efficiency and equity aspects of fiscal decentralization, fiscal competition, fiscal externalities, and intergovernmental grants. The review introduces readers to theoretical reasons for/against a federalist structure. We discuss how federalism relates to classic problems in economics: externalities, inequality, spillovers, information, and aspects of political economy. Our review integrates both theory and empirics, while also focusing on the variety of federal systems in different countries, both developing and developed. We conclude by discussing how fiscal federalism is being shaped by economic, technological, and environmental changes, while discussing the effects of globalization, polarization, and global crises on the future of federal systems.

The individual Laffer curve: evidence from the Spanish income tax

AbstractThis paper characterises the Laffer curve of each individual taxpayer in a schedular multi-rate income tax with income shifting. Analytical expressions for the revenue-maximising tax rate and the revenue-maximising elasticity are provided for the individual taxpayer and the aggregate population, as well as new estimates of the Elasticity of Taxable Income. Applying these to the Spanish income tax demonstrates that 44.72% (58.49%) of the taxpaying population in the non-savings tax base (savings tax base) is on the “normal” side of the Laffer curve. On average, these taxpayers are 6.59 points (24.73 points) above (below) the maximum of the Laffer curve. The fraction of total tax revenue lost through behavioural responses amounts to 53.77%. However, this fraction varies by population subgroup and decreases when we account for income-shifting responses, suggesting the presence of fiscal externalities in the Spanish PIT.

Misallocation under Trade Liberalization

This paper formalizes a classic idea that in second-best environments trade can induce welfare losses: incremental income losses from distortions can outweigh trade gains. In a Melitz model with distortionary taxes, we derive sufficient statistics for welfare gains/losses and show departures from the efficient case (Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare 2012) can be captured by the gap between an input and output share and domestic extensive margin elasticities. The loss reflects an endogenous selection of more subsidized firms into exporting. Using Chinese manufacturing data in 2005 and model-inferred firm-level distortions, we demonstrate that a sizable negative fiscal externality can potentially offset conventional gains. (JEL D22, F14, H25, L60, O19, P31, P33)

Global shocks, budgets deficits, and international fiscal policy coordination

AbstractA simple two‐country model with trade, fiscal and interest rate externalities is used to study strategic interactions between national policymakers. Optimal fiscal policy internalizes a trade‐off between output stability and fiscal stability. With lump‐sum taxation, the noncooperative equilibrium is inefficient and both countries are better off under coordination. These results also hold if taxation is distortionary and trade generates a fiscal externality as well, regardless of how strong the preference for output stability is. In response to a negative global demand shock, consistent with the disruptions that occurred during the recent pandemic, the optimal policy response is to increase spending by more under cooperation. However, if budget deficits generate a sufficiently strong negative cross‐border externality through higher interest rates, the optimal response calls for lower spending under cooperation.

Is a fiscal union optimal for a monetary union?

When is a fiscal union appropriate for a monetary union? In a monetary union without fiscal externalities, when local fiscal authorities have an informational advantage over a central fiscal authority in terms of their knowledge of countries’ preferences for government spending, a decentralized fiscal regime dominates a centralized one. Our novel result is that in the presence of fiscal externalities across countries, however, a decentralized fiscal regime is optimal for small monetary unions, whereas a centralized fiscal regime is optimal for large ones. These results shed new light on the debate on fiscal integration within the EU and its enlargement.

Unemployment benefits and redundancies: Incidence and timing effects

The literature on unemployment insurance (UI) has primarily focused on its impact on unemployment outflows. Using administrative data and a discontinuity in UI benefits at a job tenure threshold, I show that inflows also respond to the generosity of UI. Based on bunching estimates, I measure that 10% of layoffs in an 4-week window before the threshold are delayed, creating a bunching mass on the high-benefit side of the cutoff. Examining the mechanisms, the evidence suggests that employers and employees bargain over contract termination. Taken together, employers and employees show sophisticated reactions to UI with effects on employment duration. However, this retiming response accounts for a very small share of the fiscal externality of differentiating UI benefits at a tenure threshold, relative to the moral hazard cost.

Vertical fiscal externality in public education inputs: When federal and state governments have different time perspectives

This study investigates how equilibrium under a unitary nation can be achieved through fiscal transfer from (to) the federal government to (from) the state government when both levels of government supply public education to immobile residents under a simple endogenous growth framework fueled by human capital accumulation. We introduce the different time perspectives of both levels of government as a key consideration. Although both levels of government are interested in both the utility level of the present generation and the growth rate that can be attained by accumulating human capital through education, they place different weight on the value of these objectives. We first show that the federal government can replicate the equilibrium outcome that can be achieved under a unitary nation by implementing fiscal transfer between the different levels of government. Second, if the federal government places a large weight on the growth rate, or has a more long-run perspective than the state government, the federal tax rate becomes positive. Third, as the federal government has a stronger long-run perspective, fiscal transfer from the federal government to the state government increases.

Should higher education be subsidized more?

SUMMARY We investigate in which countries fiscal externalities provide a justification for increasing subsidies to higher education. First, we show that the marginal fiscal recovery rate, i.e., the ratio of the change in total net fiscal revenues and the change in total subsidy costs caused by a small change in tuition subsidies, is the key statistic: if larger than a well-specified threshold value, then a small increase in subsidies is desirable from a welfare point of view. We also show that the marginal fiscal recovery rate depends on three statistics: the elasticity of participation with respect to subsidies, the success probability of the marginal student, and the ratio of the net fiscal revenue gain and the subsidy level of a degree in higher education. Second, we use this formula to approximate the marginal fiscal recovery rate in twenty OECD countries. The average marginal fiscal recovery rate is equal to 0.94, meaning that, on average, 0.94 euro is recovered of an increase in subsidies by one euro. This average hides substantial heterogeneity between countries. In six countries, the marginal fiscal recovery rate is larger than one, implying that an increase in subsidies to higher education is unambiguously desirable (i.e., a Pareto improvement) in these countries. In the other 14 countries, the marginal fiscal recovery rate is below one. Yet, if the degree of inequality aversion is not extreme, then increasing subsidies is also desirable in 12 additional countries. Third, to check the quality of our approximation of the marginal fiscal recovery rate, we simulate it for Belgium (region of Flanders) on the basis of a more detailed model. This simulation provides a somewhat lower, yet fairly similar result compared to the approximation.

The Forward-Looking Effect of Increasing the Full Retirement Age

Abstract This paper analyses the effects of increasing the statutory retirement age for claiming full pension benefits on the labour force participation of middle-aged individuals and their partners. Identification relies on a difference-in-differences setting that exploits the heterogeneous increase in age eligibility for retirement caused by an unexpected pension reform. We detect a rise in the participation rate of middle-aged women that spills over into the labour supply of their husbands, who choose to postpone their retirement. The overall labour supply response has important implications for the extent of the fiscal externality associated with pension reforms that increase the retirement age.

Mind the Gap: Schooling, Informality, and Fiscal Externalities in Nepal

Abstract While increasing years of schooling has been a long-standing development priority, the associated fiscal costs and benefits have been less studied, because of a lack of appropriate data. Recently, an UNESCO-funded project measured subsidies, by levels of schooling, from all levels of government, in eight developing countries including Nepal. The household-level Nepal Living Standards Measurement Survey provides information to estimate the degree of formality, tax payments, and benefit receipts as a function of schooling years. Using a simple Mincer-like model, this study estimates the fiscal externality of an additional year of school. It finds that within primary school, fiscal benefits and costs, on the margin, are quite balanced, with subsidies close to the present value of future taxes minus benefits. At higher levels of schooling, however, marginal fiscal benefits exceed costs by 5 percent of per capita consumption. This contrasts with previous literature on social returns and assumptions underlying multilateral development goals.

Vertical migration externalities

State income taxes affect federal income tax revenue by shifting the spatial distribution of households between high- and low-productivity states, thereby changing household incomes and tax payments. We derive an expression for these fiscal externalities of state taxes in terms of estimable statistics. An empirical quantification using American Community Survey data reveals that the externalities range from large and negative in some states, to large and positive in others. In California, an increase in the state income tax rate and the resulting change in the distribution of households across states lead to a decrease in federal income tax revenue of 39 cents for every dollar of California tax revenue raised. The externality amounts to a 0.27% decrease in total federal income tax revenue for a 1 pp increase in California’s state tax rate. Our results raise the possibility that state taxes may be set too high in high-productivity states, and set too low in low-productivity states.

Worker selectivity and fiscal externalities from unemployment insurance

A robust prediction of job search models is that unemployment insurance (UI) makes workers more selective about which jobs they accept, thereby raising average accepted wages and thus generating a positive fiscal externality. We provide a sufficient-statistics formula for evaluating the size of this selectivity effect and argue theoretically that it is likely to be small. In a standard sequential search model, the effect of UI on wages is linked to its effect on the job-finding hazard; the slope of the relationship between these elasticities depends on a small number of estimable statistics, key among them observed worker flows. Plausible calibrations of the model imply that the magnitude of the wage elasticity is small relative to the job-finding elasticity. Although ignoring the wage effect of UI would over-estimate its fiscal cost and under-estimate its welfare benefit, the model-implied formula predicts the magnitude of this bias to be small.

Who wants (them) to work longer?

This paper examines age-specific individual preferences for the legal retirement age. Within a theoretical model, we develop the hypothesis that retirees prefer a higher legal retirement age than workers, and that newly retired individuals prefer the highest retirement age. Retirees benefit from a positive fiscal externality. A higher legal retirement age leads to higher pension benefits, without retirees having to bear the costs in the form of a longer working life. We corroborate the hypothesis empirically with a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and show that newly retired individuals are indeed most in favor of an increasing retirement age. We conclude that in aging societies the political feasibility of raising the legal retirement age increases.

Coordination of sectoral climate policies and life cycle emissions

Drastically reducing greenhouse gas emissions involves numerous specific actions in each sector of the economy. The costs and abatement potential of these measures are interdependent because of sectoral linkages. For instance, the carbon footprint of electric vehicles depends on the electricity mix. This issue has received large attention in the literature on Life Cycle Assessments (LCA). This paper analyzes how life cycle considerations should be integrated into policy design. We model a partial equilibrium with two vertically connected sectors, an upstream (e.g. electricity) and a downstream (e.g. transportation) one. In each sector, a dirty and a clean technology are available. The clean downstream technology consumes the upstream good and may thus shift emissions to the upstream sector. Our main contribution is to detail how optimal subsidies on clean technologies should incorporate life cycle emissions when carbon pricing is limited. The optimal downstream subsidy should be corrected for all external costs generated in the upstream sector, not only unpriced pollution but also the fiscal externality due to the subsidy to the clean upstream technology. We also analyze the joint optimization of upstream and downstream policies. The upstream subsidy should not incorporate features of the downstream sector, whereas the downstream optimal subsidy depends upon the upstream sector characteristics. All results are illustrated using a calibrated example of the electrification of passenger cars.

Optimal unemployment policy

AbstractThis paper shows that the optimal policy to deal with unemployment features important roles for monitoring of search and job search assistance, with the optimal combined policy also incorporating more generous unemployment insurance (UI). These results are significantly different from the previous literature, which has overwhelmingly focused on UI on its own. I incorporate two empirically relevant phenomena that have often been ignored: private consumption smoothing and fiscal externalities from income taxes. I estimate a job search model using indirect inference on data from the March Current Population Survey, and simulate the model to evaluate a variety of policy reforms.

Competition in taxes and intellectual property right

AbstractWe examine competition for foreign direct investment when governments compete in tax incentives along with intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. Higher IPRs result in a lower probability of imitation and thus higher expected profits and tax revenues, all else equal. We derive the Nash equilibrium strategies of two competing jurisdictions and show that since individual hosts do not internalize the benefit of lower prices for other jurisdiction's consumers, the non‐cooperative equilibrium exhibits an IPR externality in addition to the well‐known fiscal externality from tax competition. Thus, compared to joint policy setting, equilibrium IPRs are too high.

Local Policy Choice: Theory and Empirics

This paper critically surveys the growing literature on the policy choices of local governments. First, we identify various reasons for local government policy interactions, including fiscal competition, bidding for firms, yardstick competition, expenditure spillovers, and Tiebout sorting. We discuss theoretically what parameters should be estimated to determine the reason for competition among local governments. We emphasize how the policy outcomes emerging from this competition are affected by the presence of constraints imposed by higher-level governments. Second, we integrate theoretical and empirical analyses on the effects of fiscal decentralization on mobility, spillovers, fiscal externalities, economic outcomes, and distributional issues. Third, we identify key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of strategic interactions among local governments and highlight recent quasi-experimental evidence that has attempted to identify the mechanism at work. Finally, a synthesis model, containing multiple mechanisms and fiscal instruments, resolves some puzzles and provides guidance for future research. (JEL D72,H20, H71, H72, H73, H77, R51)

Redistribution In A Globalized World

Abstract Due to technological change, the opening of borders, and increased economic integration, the financial costs of relocating businesses and factors of production, moving residences, changing jobs, and transporting goods and services across borders pose new challenges for countries and subnational governments seeking to implement redistributive policies. This increasing mobility across borders implies that redistributive policies may amplify interjurisdictional fiscal externalities. In this article, we selectively review the literature relating to redistributive policy in an open economy setting. We then consider some of the implications of globalization for policy design, both within federal systems and across countries. Although globalization poses new challenges for fiscal systems, it does not necessarily imply that redistributive policy becomes untenable and possibly enhances the need for redistribution.

The joint macroeconomic impacts of capital markets integration and fertility

AbstractPopulation aging puts pressure on the financing of pension systems in many developed economies over the long run. Higher fertility would reduce the speed at which a population ages, and thus ease the financing pressure. The positive fiscal externality of childbearing decisions is well known in a single‐country context. I perform a quantitative investigation of this externality in a multi‐country context, to investigate the role of capital markets integration. On a sample of 14 European countries confronted with population aging, I find with simulations that the fiscal gains from a 70‐years increase in fertility are on average 1.3 larger with integrated capital markets than with separated capital markets in 50 years, while the GDP per capita gains are 5.0 larger. Positive fertility shocks indeed depress the capital‐labor ratio, increase the interest rate and thus attract foreign investors, when capital markets are open. Fertility increases and capital markets integration are however not sufficient to deal fully with the public finance challenge generated by population aging. More reforms are needed.