Firms In Common Law Countries Research Articles

Lawyers in the boardroom and firms’ environmental performance

This paper studies whether and how firms’ legal environment influences their environmental performance. After presenting new evidence on the positive link between civil law origin and firms’ environmental outcomes, we propose and show that directors with legal study or work experience exert a stronger impact on firms’ environmental outcomes in civil law than in common law countries. The results suggest the compliance effect of legal directors is stronger for firms located in civil law countries than the litigation risk effect for firms in common law countries. Using a quasi-natural experiment of the Paris Agreement, we find evidence consistent with our interpretation.

Firm- and country-level determinants of green investments: an empirical analysis

PurposeThis study aims to examine the determinants of corporate green investments (GI) by using a series of both firm- and country-level factors.Design/methodology/approachThe authors collect information on environmental expenditures of 763 firms from 40 countries and use random effects regressions to identify the determinants of GI.FindingsThe authors find that larger firms tend to invest more in green projects, whereas firms that are highly valued or more profitable are less likely to go green. In terms of country-level determinants, we find that the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and population are positively related with GI, while GDP growth and surface area are negatively associated with GI. Additionally, firms in common-law countries and English-speaking countries make fewer GI than firms in other countries.Social implicationsThe findings of this research not only contribute to the academic literature in these areas, but also have important implications for both regulators and policymakers in countries that exhibit sub-par GI or who otherwise aim to increase GI by firms operating in their country.Originality/valueThe authors identify and explore the key determinants of GI from both a firm- and country-level perspective.

The impact of catering incentives on the dividend policy: evidence from Turkish firms

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to empirically analyse the propensity to pay dividends and investigate whether the catering theory is valid in an emerging market.Design/methodology/approachThe sample of this study comprises listed firms on the stock market of Turkey, Borsa Istanbul, with 2,438 observations during the period 1999–2015. In line with previous studies in the literature, appropriate control variables are used that may have an impact on Turkish firms' dividend policy. Control variables are examined in the likelihood of paying dividends by using Fama–Macbeth (1973) style cross-sectional logistic regressions. In addition, the linkage between the dividend premium and the propensity to pay is revealed to test the validity of the catering theory.FindingsThe findings of the study confirm the tenets of the catering theory for Turkey. When a positive dividend premium exists, that is when investors demand dividend, firms cater them and distribute dividend; on the contrary, when there is no demand, firms prefer not to pay. The effect of catering incentives on the dividend policy provides useful information for managers because the catering theory claims that investors' demand for dividends has an impact on the valuation of firms.Originality/valueIn the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis, Turkey implemented far-reaching reforms and policy initiatives to improve the efficiency of capital markets and to overcome the obstacles sourcing from their culture and civil law origin. With the adoption of these major economic and structural reforms, as a civil law origin country, Turkey has managed to ameliorate the protection of investors as in common law countries. Ferris et al. (2009) state that the catering theory is applicable to firms in common law countries but not in civil law countries. In addition, prior research is not so extensive regarding the impact of catering incentives on the dividend policy of firms in emerging markets. The results of the analyses suggest that the catering theory is valid for Turkey as a civil law origin emerging country, and to the best of authors' knowledge, this study is the first to test the catering theory in the Turkish capital markets.

Do country-level legal, corporate governance, and cultural characteristics influence the relationship between insider ownership and dividend policy?

We explore how the effects of the change in insider ownership concentration on the dividend policy in different legal, corporate governance, and cultural environments in Asian countries. The severity of agency problems of controlling insiders and outside investors in Asian countries provides a unique circumstance for exploring this issue. Unlike previous findings, we find an inverse U-shaped relation between insider ownership and dividend payouts in Asian countries. Second, we note that Asian firms in common law countries pay higher dividends compared with Asian firms in civil law countries. We further find that countries with more robust corporate governance structure have higher dividend payouts, and there is an inverse U-shaped relation between insider ownership and dividend payouts in Asian countries with more robust corporate governance. Finally, we also find cultural dimension measures play an essential role in payout policy.

Legal origin, financial development, and innovation: evidence from large public and private firms in the U.S. and Europe

This paper investigates the interplay between legal origin, financial market development, and the growth and innovation patterns of the population of large firms in U.S. and Europe. We document that common law countries (namely U.S., U.K., and Ireland) are characterized by a higher degree of stock market development and an increased propensity of firms to be publicly traded relative to Continental Europe. We also find that firms based in common law countries are more innovative, consistent with the view that market-based systems are more capable of financing intangible assets than bank-based systems. Also, these systems are effective at accelerating firm growth, as large firms in common law countries are sensibly younger and went public earlier than their Continental European peers, and this is particularly true for innovative firms.

Cash Holdings Are Increasing and Financial Crisis Strengths It

The goal of this paper is to study the determinants of firms’ cash holdings and how cash holdings were affected by the financial crisis of 2008. Using data from the period of 1995 to 2014 of non-financial firms, we present almost 265,000 firm-year observations. Our results suggest that cash holdings have a positive relationship with investment set and a negative relationship with liquidity and firm size. Our results also show that cash holdings are influenced by capital market development and banking sector, as well as by inflation. Agency theory determinants demonstrate that firms in common law countries and countries with higher law enforcement still hold higher amounts of cash holdings. Cash holdings post-crisis are higher than pre-crisis and there is a spike in cash holdings during 2009. Our hypothesis for these results are explained by the precautionary motive.

Financial Decisions and Investment Outcomes in Developing Countries: The Role of Institutions

This paper analyzes how differences in legal origin, judicial efficiency, and investor protection affect firm leverage and earnings volatility across developing countries. Using a large number of developing countries, four main findings are highlighted. First, firms in civil legal origin countries rely more on debt financing compared to firms in common law countries, and they exhibit lower earnings volatility. Second, under weak judicial enforcement, firms tend to borrow more but they take less risk. Third, stronger creditor rights increase debt financing and reduce earnings volatility. Fourth, firm listing on a developed stock exchange shifts the capital structure towards more equity financing, and it increases the firm’s ability to borrow more when the judicial system is inefficient. The results reinforce the importance of strengthening laws and institutions as well as deepening capital markets in developing countries to improve financing conditions and investment outcomes.

Dividend Catering, Investor Protection, and Sentiment: A Cross-Country Analysis

This study investigates the international presence of dividend catering in different legal regimes in twenty-one countries from 1996 to 2010. Using modified dividend premiums, we find evidence of dividend catering among firms in common law countries, but not among those in civil law countries. Catering in common law countries persists even after controlling for the effect of fundamental variables like profitability, size, and growth opportunities. In civil law countries, cash dividends are less responsive to the value premium of dividend paying firms. However, we find that if taxation penalties on dividends are controlled, firms in common law countries cater to investors only when investor sentiment is negative. Our results suggest that when investors are well protected and negative sentiment is present, they force dividends from managers by placing a high value on dividend paying firms.

What drives the disappearing dividends phenomenon?

We study the determinants of dividend payout policy and examine the role of liquidity, risk and catering in explaining the changes in propensity to pay. Our results indicate that risk plays a major role in firms’ dividend policy. The evidence substantiates from a large sample of firms representing 18 countries over the sample period from 1989 to 2011. For firms in the US, France, UK and Other European markets, liquidity is additionally an important determinant of dividend policy. We find that, although catering incentives persist only among firms in common law countries and not in civil law countries, after adjusting for risk there is little support for catering theory even among firms incorporated in common law countries. Our results indicate that catering incentives reflect the risk-reward relationship in the changing propensity to pay dividends.

Why Dividends Disappear in the UK – Catering, Risk or Liquidity?

We study the determinants of dividend payout policy and examine the role of liquidity, risk and catering in explaining the changes in propensity to pay. Our results indicate that risk plays a major role in firms’ dividend policy. The evidence substantiates from a large sample of firms representing eighteen countries over the sample period from 1989 to 2011. For firms in the US, France, UK and Other European markets, liquidity is additionally an important determinant of dividend policy. We find that, although catering incentives persist only among firms in common law countries and not in civil law countries, after adjusting for risk there is little support for catering theory even among firms incorporated in common law countries. Our results indicate that catering incentives reflect the risk-reward relationship in the changing propensity to pay dividends.

Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin

Using the persistence of corporate profits as a measure of the intensity of product market competition in 19 countries for the period 1995-2005, we find that civil law systems are more competitive, in this sense, than common law ones. Greater shareholder protection increases competition between firms in common law countries, but reduces it in civil law ones. We conclude that shareholder rights act as complements to product market competition in the common law world but not in the civil law world, and explain this result by reference to the common-law origins of shareholder-orientated corporate governance.

The impact of IFRS adoption on the value relevance of book value and earnings

In this study, we investigate the impact of IFRS adoption in Europe and Australia on the relevance of book value and earnings for equity valuation. Using a sample of 3488 firms that initially adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005, we are able to compare the figures originally reported for the 2004 fiscal years to the IFRS figures that were provided in 2005 as the 2004 IFRS comparative figures. As part of the inquiry, we introduce a cross-product term, equal to the product of EPS and BVPS, into the traditional linear pricing models. The estimated coefficient on the cross-product term is statistically significant and negative, as theory suggests in the presence of important nonlinearities. Further, there is increased non-linearity in the data subsequent to IFRS adoption, with the increase being most pronounced for firms in Common Law countries. With non-linear effects controlled for, there is no observed change in price relevance for firms in either Code Law or Common Law countries, contradicting the results from the linear pricing models. The results also suggest that the distribution of measurement errors becomes more similar across Code Law and Common Law countries after the adoption of IFRS, removing one difference between these groups. Thus, IFRS enhances comparability, an inference that would not be possible had we confined the analysis only to linear pricing models.

Institutions, Investor Protection, and Corporate Choices in Developing Economies

This paper examines the extent to which differences in legal tradition, judicial efficiency, and investor protection affect debt financing and risk taking across developing economies. We find that firms in common law countries have the highest preference for debt financing while corporations in countries of socialist legal tradition assume the greatest levels of risk. Further, judicial efficiency matters most across developing economies. When legal formalism is high, firms contract more debt, but they are less willing to undertake risky investments. The findings also support the “dark side” to strong creditor rights in bankruptcy, but this “dark side” is sector-dependent.

International Corporate Capital Structure: Dynamics and Determinants

This paper uses the GMM estimator with target adjustment to examine the dynamics of capital structure in 28 countries. Firms are found to adjust their capital structures slowly to the target level indicating the existence of adjustment costs in the process of adjusting the debt level toward its target. Our results provide evidence that firms in common law countries, and in countries with better stock market development or liquidity, carry lower debt ratios indicating that the lower information asymmetry in these countries enhances the We find a positive relationship between corruption perception index. These results are found to vary among industry sectors in terms of the effect of these factors on the use of total and long-term debt ratios.

Do Shareholders Value Insider Trading Laws? International Evidence

This article characterizes insider trading in controlled firms as an agency problem. Using a standard agency model of corporate value diversion through insider trading by a controlling shareholder, I derive testable hypotheses about the relationship between corporate value and insider trading laws. The article tests these hypotheses using cross-sectional data on firms from a group of developed countries. The results show that stringent insider trading laws and enforcement are associated with greater corporate valuation among firms in common law countries, a result that is consistent with the claim that insider trading laws can mitigate agency costs. In contrast, insider trading laws and enforcement are generally insignificant to corporate valuation among firms in civil law countries. These results are robust to alternative regression specifications and to controlling for a variety of relevant factors and they suggest that the firm-level impact of insider trading regulation may depend on the local context in which it is applied.

Law and Firms' Access to Finance

Why does a country's legal origin influence its firms' access to finance? Using data from over 4,000 firms in 38 countries, the authors show that firms in countries with French legal origin face significantly higher obstacles in accessing external finance than firms in common law countries. Next, their results indicate that French legal origin countries tend to have (1) less adaptable legal systems, as defined by the degree to which case law and principles of equity rather than simply statutory law are accepted foundations of legal decisions, and (2) less politically independent judiciaries, as defined by the degree of tenure of supreme court judges and their jurisdiction over cases involving the government. Finally, the authors find that the adaptability of a country's legal system is more important for explaining the obstacles that firms face in contracting for external finance than the political independence of the judiciary. So, they distinguish among competing explanations of why law matters for financial development by empirically documenting the links running from international differences in legal origin to the operation of the financial system at the firm level.

Investor Protection, Earnings Opacity and Corporate Valuation

This paper examines how investor protection, as measured by an index of anti-director rights affects earnings opacity, which in turn is shown to be linked to corporate valuation. Earnings opacity is positively affected by the level of anti-director rights in line with a penalty hypothesis given that insiders' incentives to hide their rent-seeking activities are stronger when outsiders can effectively penalize them. The data from 24 countries also indicate that the exogenous component of earnings opacity - the component defined by anti-director rights - is negatively associated with corporate valuation, as measured by Tobin's q. The direct effect of civil law and corporate valuation is as expected negative and significant. There is evidence of higher valaution of firms in common law countries with lower earnings opacity.