Firm Disclosure Policy Research Articles

Disclosure and liquidity management: Evidence from regulation fair disclosure

We examine the effect of the firm’s information environment on its liquidity policy by exploiting a natural experiment involving Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD). We find, on average, Regulation FD has a negative impact on firm cash holdings. We also directly evaluate changes in firm disclosure policy and find the negative Regulation FD-cash holdings relation is stronger for firms that increased public disclosure and holds largely for firms that faced lower proprietary costs of public disclosure. Furthermore, we find this negative relation is more pronounced for firms with limited access to the credit market. We capture the medium-term effect of Regulation FD two years before and two years after the implementation. Overall, our results suggest that the change in the amount of information disclosed in response to Regulation FD, an externality effect, affects information asymmetry between firms and outside investors and thus cash holdings.

Are all outside directors created equal with respect to firm disclosure policy?

Empirical evidence on the association between outside directors and firms’ voluntary disclosures is mixed and controversial. We hypothesize that the outside directors do not represent a homogeneous group of people as considered in the literature. Using hand-collected data from a sample of biotechnology firms, we find that the aforesaid association differs based on the directors’ professional backgrounds. Our results are consistent with two ideas. First, an outside director’s influence on firm disclosure policy is shaped by her professional background. Second, firms match outside directors’ professional backgrounds with their disclosure policy. We cannot distinguish between the two explanations. Yet, we make an important contribution to the literature. We show that the impact and the selection prospects of outside directors are not as uniform as previously considered in the literature. Thus, the researchers examining financial disclosures must take into account the background characteristics of all outside directors, not just of those in the audit committee. And investor bodies must consider the background characteristics of candidates in their recommendation for outside-director selection.

Managerial Response to Non-Fundamental Price Shocks

We find that managers significantly alter their behavior in response to non-fundamental declines in price. In particular, after an exogenous, non-fundamental price drop, managers increase their disclosure quality, and shift accrual earnings management to real earnings management. Moreover, managers with high equity incentives engage more in real earnings management, while managers at firms with high litigation risk tend to increase their disclosure quality and decrease accrual earnings management. We confirm that the net effect of earnings management, in response to non-fundamental price shocks, results in firms more frequently reporting suspicious earnings. Firms that experience large non-fundamental price declines are more likely, on average, to meet or beat analysts’ earnings expectations by 1 or 2 cents in our sample. Our findings suggest that non-fundamental price variation is an important driver of firm disclosure policy and earnings management.

How Institutional Investors on Boards Impact on Stakeholder Engagement and Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting

AbstractInstitutional investors are relevant dominant owners with a very high representation on the boards of European firms. Despite their prevalence, research on the role of institutional directors and their impact on firm disclosure policy is scarce. We examine the association between institutional directors and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting, distinguishing between pressure‐sensitive (e.g. banks) and pressure‐resistant directors (e.g. funds). We find that institutional directors show different incentives and conflicts of interests towards increasing CSR reporting. Specifically, we note that directors representing banks are likely to promote additional information about the firm's environmental and social commitments in order to lower the risk faced by lenders, minimise the probability of default, and maintain their prestige and professional reputation. On the other hand, directors representing fund institutions overweight short‐term earnings potential, which decreases their incentives to improve a firm's CSR reporting. Our findings confirm the importance of institutional investors on CSR reporting policy of firms. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

The Influence of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Firm Financing Decisions

Extant theory claims a firm's information environment impacts the choice between debt and equity financing. However, empirical evidence supporting this contention is limited. We evaluate this relation within the context of Regulation FD (Reg FD) which prohibited the use of selective disclosure. We find firms with high proprietary costs of public disclosure are more likely to resort to debt financing following the passage of Reg FD. This relation is not sensitive to whether a firm has relied on selective disclosure in the pre Reg FD regime. We also evaluate changes in firm disclosure policy and find firms that adopted an expansive public disclosure policy are more likely to turn to equity financing. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the pecking order theory: firms with deteriorated firm information environments increase their use of less information sensitive debt while firms with improved information environments favor the use of equity financing.

Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy

We examine whether board connections through shared directors influence firm disclosure policies. To overcome endogeneity challenges, we focus on an event that represents a significant change in firm disclosure policy: the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance. Our research design allows us to exploit the timing of director interlocks and therefore differentiate the director interlock effect on disclosure policy contagion from alternative explanations, such as endogenous director-firm matching or strategic board stacking. We find that firms are more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance if they share directors with previous guidance stoppers. We also find that director-specific experience from prior guidance cessations matters for disclosure policy contagion. The positive effect of interlocked directors on the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms with interlocked directors who experienced positive outcomes from prior guidance cessation decisions. Overall, our evidence is consistent with interlocked directors serving as conduits for information sharing that leads to the spread of corporate disclosure policies.

Board Interlocks and the Diffusion of Disclosure Policy

We examine whether board connections through shared directors influence firm disclosure policies. To overcome endogeneity challenges, we focus on an event that represents a significant change in firm disclosure policy: the cessation of quarterly earnings guidance. Our research design allows us to exploit the timing of director interlocks and therefore differentiate the director interlock effect on disclosure policy contagion from alternative explanations, such as endogenous director-firm matching or strategic board stacking. We find that firms are more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance if they share directors with previous guidance stoppers. We also find that director-specific experience from prior guidance cessations matters for disclosure policy contagion. The positive effect of interlocked directors on the likelihood of quarterly earnings guidance cessation is particularly strong for firms with interlocked directors who experienced positive outcomes from prior guidance cessation decisions. Overall, our evidence is consistent with interlocked directors serving as conduits for information sharing that leads to the spread of corporate disclosure policies.

Firm Disclosure Policy and the Choice Between Private and Public Debt*

Contemporary Accounting ResearchVolume 28, Issue 1 p. 293-330 Firm Disclosure Policy and the Choice Between Private and Public Debt* DAN S. DHALIWAL, DAN S. DHALIWAL University of Arizona and University of KoreaSearch for more papers by this authorINDER K. KHURANA, INDER K. KHURANA University of MissouriSearch for more papers by this authorRAYNOLDE PEREIRA, RAYNOLDE PEREIRA University of MissouriSearch for more papers by this author DAN S. DHALIWAL, DAN S. DHALIWAL University of Arizona and University of KoreaSearch for more papers by this authorINDER K. KHURANA, INDER K. KHURANA University of MissouriSearch for more papers by this authorRAYNOLDE PEREIRA, RAYNOLDE PEREIRA University of MissouriSearch for more papers by this author First published: 18 October 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01039.xCitations: 63 † Accepted by Michael Welker. We thank Michael Welker (associate editor), two anonymous reviewers, Chris Barry, Jere Francis, Sun Kim, Mark Lang, Vassil Mihov, Ken Shaw, Terry Shevlin, Robert Trezevant, and workshop participants at Boston University/Charles River Associates, Columbia University, University of Kansas, MIT, New York University, University of Missouri-Columbia, University of North Carolina, University of North Texas, Texas Christian University, University of Texas at Austin, and Wharton for helpful comments. We also thank Shawn X. Huang and Xiumin Martin for excellent research assistance. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume28, Issue1Spring 2011 (March)Pages 293-330 RelatedInformation

Does Voluntary Disclosure Improve Stock Price Informativeness?

According to theory, comovement in stock prices reflects comovement in the fundamental factors underlying the values of stocks. Recent theory contends that stock price comovement can be driven by information markets or the informational opacity of the firm. To the extent that voluntary disclosure reduces information acquisition cost and enhances firm transparency, we predict that enhanced voluntary disclosure reduces stock price comovement. We provide evidence in support of this prediction using analyst evaluation of firm disclosure policy. Overall, our evidence supports the effectiveness of firm disclosure policy in increasing the amount of firm‐specific information contained in stock returns.

Does the Firm Information Environment Influence Financing Decisions? A Test Using Disclosure Regulation

Extant theory claims a firm’s information environment impacts the choice between debt and equity financing. However, empirical evidence supporting this contention is limited. We evaluate this relation within the context of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which prohibited the use of selective disclosure. We find that firms with high proprietary costs of public disclosure are more likely to resort to debt financing following the passage of Reg FD. This relation is not sensitive to whether a firm has relied on selective disclosure in the pre-Reg FD regime. We also evaluate changes in firm disclosure policy and find that firms that adopted an expansive public disclosure policy are more likely to turn to equity financing. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the pecking order theory: firms with deteriorated firm information environments increase their use of less information-sensitive debt, whereas firms with improved information environments favor the use of equity financing. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.

Firm Growth and Disclosure: An Empirical Analysis

AbstractExtant theoretical research posits that information asymmetry and agency issues affect the cost of external financing and hence impact the ability of firms to finance their growth opportunities. In contrast, the literature on disclosure policy posits that expanded and credible disclosure lowers the cost of external financing and improves a firm's ability to pursue potentially profitable projects. An empirical implication is that disclosure can help firms grow by relaxing external financing constraints, thereby allowing capital to flow to positive net present value projects. This paper empirically evaluates this prediction using firm-level data over an 11-year period. As anticipated by theory, we find a positive relation between firm disclosure policy and the externally financed growth rate, after controlling for other influences.

Firm Growth and Disclosure: An Empirical Analysis

Extant theoretical research posits that information asymmetry and agency issues affect the cost of external financing and hence impact firms' ability to finance its growth opportunities. In contrast, the literature on disclosure policy posits that an expanded and credible disclosure lowers the cost of external financing and improves firm's ability to pursue potentially profitable projects. An empirical implication is that disclosure can help firms grow by relaxing external financing constraints, thereby allowing capital to flow to positive NPV projects. This paper empirically evaluates this prediction using firm-level data over an eleven-year period. As anticipated by theory, we find a positive relation between firm disclosure policy and externally financed growth rate, after controlling for other influences.

The Endogeneity Bias in the Relation Between Cost-of-Debt Capital and Corporate Disclosure Policy

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a discussion of the problems associated with endogeneity in empirical accounting research. We emphasize problems arising when endogeneity is caused by (1) unobservable firm specific factors and (2) omitted variables and discuss the merits and drawbacks of using panel data techniques to address these causes. Second, we investigate the magnitude of endogeneity bias in Ordinary Least Squares regressions of cost-of-debt capital on firm disclosure policy. We document how including a set of variables which theory suggests to be related with both cost-of-debt capital and disclosure and using fixed effects estimation in a panel dataset reduces the endogeneity bias and produces consistent results. This analysis reveals that the effect of disclosure policy on cost-of-debt capital is 200% higher than what is found in Ordinary Least Squares estimation. Finally, we provide direct evidence that disclosure is impacted by unobservable firm-specific factors that are also correlated with cost-of-capital.

The endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-of-debt capital and corporate disclosure policy

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a discussion of the problems associated with endogeneity in empirical accounting research. We emphasize problems arising when endogeneity is caused by (1) unobservable firm-specific factors and (2) omitted variables, and discuss the merits and drawbacks of using panel data techniques to address these causes. Second, we investigate the magnitude of endogeneity bias in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of cost-of-debt capital on firm disclosure policy. We document how including a set of variables which theory suggests to be related with both cost-of-debt capital and disclosure and using fixed effects estimation in a panel data-set reduces the endogeneity bias and produces consistent results. This analysis reveals that the effect of disclosure policy on cost-of-debt capital is 200% higher than what is found in OLS estimation. Finally, we provide direct evidence that disclosure is impacted by unobservable firm-specific factors that are also correlated with cost of capital.

Disagreements among Shareholders over a Firm's Disclosure Policy

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the issue of voluntary disclosure of information by firms with heterogeneous shareholders. It shows that in a rational expectations setting, better informed shareholders prefer less disclosure than less well‐informed shareholders. This is due to differences in the adverse risk‐sharing effect and the beneficial cost‐saving effect of disclosure among shareholders with different risk tolerances and information acquisition cost functions. The presence of individual liquidity shocks is shown to reduce shareholder disagreements regarding a firm's disclosure policy.

Disagreements among Shareholders Over a Firm's Disclosure Policy

Disagreements among Shareholders Over a Firm's Disclosure Policy