Political Finance Research Articles

PolitiFi: Just another meme, or instrumental for winning elections?

As the 2024 U.S. presidential election looms, the intersection of cryptocurrency and political finance has garnered significant interest. This study explores the new crypto category of PolitiFi, which merges politics and finance and is linked to political figures and agendas. Our analysis underscores the strategic deployment of these tokens to enhance visibility, shape narratives, and appeal to younger, more technologically adept voters within the crypto sphere. The alignment of cryptocurrency adoption with voter demographics highlights PolitiFi's potential to redefine political engagement and campaign strategies, and influence election outcomes. Empirical analyzes show that PolitiFi's development has exhibited a distinct trajectory, rapidly demonstrating independence and a critical decoupling from other meme coins in the cryptocurrency market.

The Effect of Media Framing on Public Perception of Political Financing in Kisii County, Kenya

Political financing involves using financial resources to influence the political process and election dimension. The media has been at the forefront of shaping how the public perceives political financing and attitudes. The aim of political financing is to balance the imperative of maintaining fairness and integrity in a political process aimed at gaining the trust of the voters. The current study therefore seeks to examine the effect of media framing on political financing in Kisii County, Kenya. The study objectives were; to assess the media definitions of the use of Money for Political activities in Kisii County, Kenya; to explore the communicative framing patterns that influence political financing in Kisii, County, Kenya; to examine media proposals on strategies used by politicians to finance in their political campaigns in Kisii County; to assess the implication of media framing on political financing in Kisii County, Kenya. The study was anchored on the agenda-setting theory, cultivation theory and framing theory. The current study employed a descriptive research design which accommodate both quantitative and quantitative data to carry out this study. The target population, were total of 155 respondents including ({(Governor (1), MPs (9), MCAs (45), two members of the community from each of the 45 wards (90), and media personnel operating within the county (8)). The study employed a purposive sampling technique, given that the data required is based on the specific respondent. Additionally, given the small target population of 155 respondents the study employed census method. The study employed both a structured questionnaire for quantitative data collection and interview schedule qualitative data. Quantitative data were analyzed using descriptive analysis and inferential statistics while for qualitative analysis study used thematic analysis and findings presented in terms of tables, charts and graphs as well as quotes from your participants respectively. The results of the regression analysis reveal that all the media-related factors examined have a positive and statistically significant impact on political financing in Kisii County. The unstandardized beta coefficients indicate that the Implication of Media Framing has the largest effect on political financing (0.297), followed by the Media Definition of Politician’s Use of Finance for Political Gain (0.347). The Communicative Framing Patterns Used by Media and the Media Proposal on Strategies Used also have depicted a positive influence, with coefficients of 0.109 and 0.231, respectively. In conclusion, the findings underscore the central role of media in shaping political financing in Kisii County. The study recommended that media outlets in Kisii County adopt more transparent and informative framing when discussing political financing.

Innovative but feeble: Civil society and political financing accountability in Uruguay

ABSTRACT This article examines the impact of civic action on enhancing accountability and combating corruption in political financing, focusing on two civil society initiatives in Uruguay. The initiatives aimed to digitize and map information on funding received by political parties and politicians in the 2009 and 2014 elections, presenting their findings through interactive online platforms. The paper engages theoretically with the literature on the dimensions of accountability and contributes to understanding the challenges faced by civil society organizations in promoting political financing accountability even in full democracies, a topic largely understudied. Findings highlight concerns beyond electoral authorities’ well-known resource constraints in detecting illicit political donations and spending in Uruguay. The paper shows that transparency is not enough to reduce corruption. We argue that for political finance accountability to be effective, it must encompass bottom-up, horizontal, and diagonal dimensions. The analysis suggests the need for complementary measures, such as digital solutions for reporting and disclosing political finance information, along with active horizontal and bottom-up oversight mechanisms. The article draws on qualitative analysis based on documentary research and 19 interviews with activists, academics, journalists, developers of the initiatives, and public officials involved in political finance regulation.

Reforms of Political Finance: Strengthening Democracy by Reducing the Impact of High-Cost Politics

This study has two objectives: First, to examine high-cost politics in Indonesian elections; Second, to propose measures to strengthen the Ministry of Home Affairs’ authority in political finance supervision and enhance regulations to promote electoral transparency, using the recent Indonesian elections as a case study. Indonesia’s political process is characterized by high-cost politics, where candidates often face pressure to raise substantial funds to finance their election campaigns. Consequently, elections, meant to serve as a democratic platform for all Indonesians, frequently become subject to abuse by individuals seeking to attain power. The primary goal of this study is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the high-cost politics in Indonesian elections and its impacts on democratic integrity. The study utilized a normative juridical methodology, incorporating statutory and conceptual approaches. The findings indicated that transactional and money politics, along with high-cost politics in Indonesia’s elections, pose a serious threat to democracy. The Ministry of Home Affairs and the General Election Supervisory Agency must strengthen their legal instruments to monitor political party finances. Furthermore, political actors must be encouraged to reduce high-cost politics.

The High Cost of Politics in Indonesia: An Exploration of Multi-perspectives from Academics, Students, Executive Officials, and Legislative Candidates

The issue of high electoral political costs in Indonesia has been a serious concern since the 1998 reforms. This study aims to explore the factors that contribute to the high political costs in Indonesia’s democratic electoral system. The research question posed is: “What are the factors that lead to high political costs in Indonesia’s democratic electoral system?” The study employs a qualitative method with an in-depth interview approach. The informants for this study included academics, students, executive officials, and legislative candidates, selected to explore perspectives from various levels of society and the state. The selection of these informants was based on their diverse backgrounds, which were considered capable of providing comprehensive views on this issue. The findings reveal that the high cost of politics is caused by several factors, including an unusual electoral system, a paradigm shift in political parties, the prioritization of popularity over competence, campaign finance sponsorship, payback politics, and the phenomenon of “dawn raids.” The conclusion of this study indicates that the high cost of politics is a complex problem that requires a cross-sectoral approach to find a solution. The implication of this study is the importance of a deeper analysis of the mechanisms of political financing and their impact on democracy in Indonesia. This study makes an important contribution to understanding and addressing the problem of electoral political costs in Indonesia and emphasizes the need for cross-sectoral cooperation to achieve sustainable solutions.

The price of politics: What the 2020 oil shocks in Nigeria teach us about transactional political systems

Political spending—funds that elite actors use to buy and sell political power—is the lifeblood of Nigerian politics. It fuels backroom deals, forges political coalitions, and is the means to incite or end violence. To date, political spending in Nigeria has largely been financed by its immense oil revenues flowing through the government. It is natural to assume that political budgets should rise and fall with oil’s boom-and-bust cycles, but the reality is not so straightforward. Based on an analysis of the 2020 oil crash in Nigeria, this paper examines how traumatic decarbonization—the sudden, unplanned loss of oil revenues—did not lead to a reduction in political budgets but did force a change in how they were funded and channeled. Despite the loss in oil revenues, patronage and the “contractocracy,” government contracts used to funnel rents to the elite, were protected and expanded massively in 2021 with funding from domestic and international loans. The 2020 oil crash demonstrated the resilience and rising cost of transactional politics in Nigeria, even when it came at the expense of the Nigerian people. Through this analysis, the paper further examines systemically corrupt political systems and how political actors adapt to changes in available political finance.

The new era of turbulence: Peacemaking trends in post-carbon times

Based on an empirical comparison of peace processes in carbon-dependent economies over time, this article investigates the impact of decarbonization and the related declining availability of political finance on peacemaking. While the period of high oil prices in the mid-2000s saw a small number of peace deals that attempted comprehensive settlements, the decline of oil prices in the years from 2014 resulted in a new era of turbulence. The turbulence is characterized by a high number of peacemaking attempts that strongly lean toward conflict management rather than resolution. The reasons for this new turbulence are twofold: the available means for substantial “buy-in,” into a political marketplace by ruling elites in carbon-dependent conflictive political marketplaces have vanished while, at the same time, the strategic interest of international powers in geopolitical stability and their willingness and capability to invest in such stability has declined.

Assessing the Relationship between Political Financing and Policy Bias in B40 Welfare Policies during COVID-19

This conceptual paper delves into the intricate relationship between political financing and policy bias in the implementation of welfare policies for the B40 (Below 40 is the 40% of the total population that earns the lowest tier of household income compared to the first group of T20-Top 20% and second category M40-Middle 40%) cluster in Kuala Lumpur Malaysia amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. The B40 cluster comprises the most economically vulnerable segment of the population residing in public housing (the heavily subsidized government-owned residential areas for underprivileged citizens with certain household income categories). This study aims to unravel how political financing influences the formulation and execution of welfare policies, potentially leading to bias in resource allocation and support provision. Through an exhaustive review of existing scholarly literature and analysis of pertinent case studies, this paper embarks on examining the degree to which political financing impacts the decision-making process concerning welfare policies. The analysis focuses on identifying potential biases in policy formulation that may favor the interests of political entities providing financial backing to policymakers. Furthermore, the study also explores the implications of such biases on the equitable distribution of resources to the B40 cluster during the global COVID-19 crisis. The conceptual framework employed in this paper draws from theories of political economy, corruption, and public policy. By dissecting the extant body of literature, the paper aims to offer a nuanced comprehension of the dynamics between political financing and policy bias in the realm of welfare policies for the B40 cluster. The eventual findings are poised to enrich the theoretical understanding of the influence exerted by political financing on the formulation and execution of welfare policies, particularly during periods of global crisis. By identifying policy biases stemming from political financing, this study aspires to catalyze critical discussions on the imperative of transparent and accountable decision-making processes. Such deliberations are vital to ensuring the fair and effective implementation of welfare policies for the B40 cluster in Kuala Lumpur amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper thus serves as a clarion call for enhanced governance mechanisms and institutional reforms to uphold the principles of fairness, equity, and social justice in welfare policy formulation and implementation. This study contributes to the existing literature by shedding light on the nexus between political financing and policy bias in the context of welfare policies for vulnerable populations. It underscores the importance of addressing systemic flaws in governance and decision-making processes to mitigate the adverse effects of political influence on welfare policy outcomes. Moreover, the findings of this study have practical implications for policymakers, advocacy groups, civil society organizations and other stakeholders involved in shaping welfare policy agendas and advocating for reform initiatives. In conclusion, this paper calls for a concerted effort to promote transparency, accountability, and integrity in the formulation and implementation of welfare policies. By fostering a culture of ethical governance and democratic participation, policymakers can ensure that welfare programs serve the interests of the most vulnerable members of society and contribute to equitable and sustainable development outcomes.

In Search of the Missing Link: Election Law Infractions and Candidate Sanctions

In contrast to the extensive literature on the determinants of campaign spending and its effect on candidates’ electoral performance, comparatively less literature exists on the legal and sanctioning characteristics of political finance systems. Though some contributions have analyzed and compared the institutional designs of these financing systems, limited literature has empirically examined infractions and sanctions of electoral laws, categorized as either a crime or a misdemeanor, by the candidates. Limited knowledge exists about the political and sociodemographic profile of candidates who commit such offenses or misdemeanors, a gap this study addresses by empirically analyzing electoral law infractions. Using the case of Chile and an unpublished database of infractions of 38,246 candidates in the local elections of 2008, 2012, and 2016, as well as the legislative elections of 2009, 2013, and 2017, we present four conclusions. First, only about one-fifth of candidates commit such infractions. Second, such infractions are more common during first-tier elections, especially in deputy and senatorial elections. Third, the candidates most likely to commit such infractions are independent candidates who compete in regions remote from large urban centers, especially in rural areas. Fourth, the rise in infractions is linked to a new law that more strictly regulates candidates’ campaign spending. The study enhances our understanding of the efficacy of political finance systems and the enforcement of electoral sanctions.

Vote Trading and Elections in Nigeria: Democracy as an Article of Trade?

This paper is underscored by the commodification and trading of votes in Nigeria which poses a threat to credible elections, democracy, and good governance. Domestic and global studies including election observers have established that there has always been widespread exchange of votes for money in Nigeria. In this regard, this paper looks at the issue of voting commodification in the country with a view to highlighting its attendant implications for present and future elections, democracy, and governance. Using descriptive and content analysis with data gathered through secondary sources the paper sought to answer the following questions: What is behind the narrative of vote trading in Nigeria? Why do politicians buy votes? Why do people sell votes? Is vote trading conditioned by individual beliefs or social norm? What are the consequences of vote trading on governance? What are the possible solutions to the problem? The paper argues that candidates and political parties engage in material gratification and vote trading during elections and that vote trading is propelled by independent, individual decision and mainly driven by material circumstances. It further contends that the more politicians engage in vote buying and gratification the more unstable the electoral process becomes as that prevents credible candidates from running for political office as they may not have the humongous amount required to contest in election. The study concludes that material vote selling and buying, and gratification pose negative tendencies for Nigerian political system, democracy, and good governance if not properly handled. The paper recommends among others taking political financing seriously with the electoral umpire- Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) more proactive in fighting vote trading and the electorates through political education be encouraged to avoid all kinds of inducements from political parties and candidates.

The Role of Money in India’s Elections: How Effective Is the Political Finance Regime?

Political finance does play a positive role in democratic regimes as it enables parties to strengthen their organizations and also run a dynamic electoral campaign. However, for the well-being of electoral democracies, it is imperative that political party funding/campaign finance is neither illegal nor illicit. Violation of political finance-related regulations erodes the citizens’ confidence in the fairness of the electoral system and also weakens trust in political parties. Like other democracies, India also faces the challenge of the infusion of big money, a large component of which remains unaccounted, corroding the fairness of what is otherwise a robust electoral system. The efforts of the Election Commission of India (ECI) to enforce a stringent political finance regime with the help of existing electoral laws, enforcement agencies and judicial intervention have so far met with limited success in checking the illegal and illicit money inflow and large-scale unaccounted expenditure. The task has been difficult due to perceived apathy of political parties, inadequate regulations and enforcement powers with the ECI.

Political Bondage (Ijon) and Democracy: How do Natural Resources Build High Electoral Political Financing Orders?

The practice of political bondage (ijon) in electoral political events is a threat to democracy, which to this day is still relatively limitedly studied. This creates minimal gaps in how to view the phenomenon of high electoral political financing from the perspective of natural resource politics. So far, natural resources have always been viewed as inanimate objects. However, in the study of natural resource politics, this object is not neutral. The presence of the political bondage system which is a small part of the form of transactional politics in the informal democratic space has actually become the identity and characteristic of electoral politics in Indonesia. In the context of political bondage, the exchange of roles between patron becoming client and, vice versa, client becoming patron will continue to recur. This research uses a qualitative approach with library research methodology. Researchers collect data through secondary data, namely various relevant literature, starting from media, books, journals, news reports, formal institutional data, and other data which is sorted according to research needs. The results show that the practice of political bondage still fulfils and always colors electoral politics in Indonesia. This informal democratic practice leads to high levels of financing of electoral politics. Interestingly, the involvement of corporations in funding general elections outside of political party funds also has an impact on reciprocation for the management of natural resources. The development of transactional political practices in informal spaces will create challenges for the quality of democracy: the birth of corrupt behavior, the weakening of the government structure, dynastic-oligarchic politics, and the increase in electoral political financing. The conclusion is that the practice of political bondage will always grow in the space of informal democracy. The relationship between the public sector, elites and the private sector will always exchange roles as patron and client according to the conditions and electoral political map in the field.

The Public Budget’ Coverage of the Electoral Campaigns and Elections (2017-2024) and the Prevention of the Abuse of State Resources for Free and Fair Elections in Albania

This paper aims to analyze the use of public budgets to finance the electoral process, including electoral campaigns and elections of the political parties, candidates and other electoral subjects. The focus in this paper is in organizing free and fair elections, by preventing the abuse of the state resources, considered as one of the main deficiencies of the new democracies, including Albania from the year 1991- onward. The abuse of state resources, as an important feature of political finance, focuses on the problems resulting from the undue influence of the incumbent political party that wants to stay in power as long as possible. It is related with the funds or other resources, gained by political parties and candidates that benefit the incumbent party, and it results in undue influence of the later, and prevents other political parties and candidates from having a fair electoral contest. The main research question of this paper is: what are the programs and activities that are funded by the public (national) budgets related with the parliamentary and local elections and what are the financing’ regulations and their effects? Also, does the government create a fair starting point for all of the political parties and candidates, as a mean to preventing the abuse of state resources? As a result, this paper will study the approved budgets and the differences that arise from year 2017- until now, and it will analyze the total spending or expenditures for the elections, given to CEC and to the electoral subjects. The methodology used here is the combination of qualitative methods, and by using primary and secondary sources of information from different international and national relevant institutions and the analysis of the public budgets, for the budgetary years of 2017-2024.
 
 Received: 12 February 2024 / Accepted: 17 March 2024 / Published: 23 March 2024

The coming twilight of a petro-state? Traumatic decarbonization as a driver of political transformation in Iraq

Iraq is a compelling example of a state highly dependent on a singular source of rent, namely oil revenue. Since 2003, Iraq has also been characterized by a fractured, rivalrous elite without central control over organized violence. This formula represents a “rentier political marketplace” in which state funds for salaries and contracts are the essential lubricant of the political system. During 2014–2021, successive shocks to national oil revenues represented a partial and temporary, but traumatic, decarbonization of Iraq’s government and political finance. In turn, this triggered a series of governance and political reconfigurations including a nominal decentralization process and fracturing of sectarian power, followed by a nationwide civic movement demanding transformational change. This paper traces these changes and the abrupt return to business as usual when oil prices rebounded. In doing so, the paper further investigates the nexus between oil and democracy in Iraq and addresses the unanswered question of how Iraq can decarbonize and democratize in the future.

THE ELECTORAL BONDS DILEMMA: BALANCING POLITICAL FUNDING WITH ELECTION FAIRNESS

The concept of electoral bonds offers a difficult conundrum at the junction of fair elections and political finance openness. Originally meant to simplify political contributions in India, electoral bonds enable supporters of political parties to remain anonymous, therefore presumably lowering uncontrolled cash flow. Proponents of this financing strategy claim it allows a simpler, more direct approach for donations without violating donor privacy, which may be particularly important in a politically sensitive climate that has polarizing public opinion. Critics counter that by letting unreported sums into political campaigns, it lessens democratic responsibility and shifts the balances in favor of those with more financial support.

Political Financing around the World: A Historical Overview and Financing Models; Which Model for Uganda?

This paper provides an overview of political financing in the world. This enables the proposal to select a suitable political financing model for Uganda. In this regard, an effort has been made to trace the origins of political financing from North America to Africa. The justification for its existence has also been illustrated. Political financing can facilitate the protection and promotion of international human rights standards. This is especially so, regarding citizens’ rights to participate in their public affairs. The paper also shows that money has justifiable and legitimate purposes in electoral campaigns. Its unregulated use, however, may lead to corruption. Finally, the paper suggests a political financing model appropriate to Uganda’s environment. Doctrinal methods of research were used to carry out the study. This method of research involves a library-based analysis of legal sources. There are two steps to the doctrinal research methods. The first step is finding the primary sources of law. The second step is the examination of these primary sources.

Parties, Political Finance, and Governance in Africa: Extracting Money and Shaping States in Benin and Ghana , Rachel Sigman, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2023, 332 pages

Parties, Political Finance, and Governance in Africa: Extracting Money and Shaping States in Benin and Ghana , Rachel Sigman, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2023, 332 pages

Political Finance and Party Systems in the Normative Theory of Partisanship: Toward a Civic Model

Abstract Political finance in liberal democracies is often regarded as a source of pathology accompanied by demands for reform. But on what principles and values should political finance reform be grounded? The existing scholarship provides no more than sketchy advice on such matters. To address this gap, this paper presents a normative framework to evaluate political finance rules, which proposes (a) that the design of such rules should take account of the party system in which the financing rules will operate; (b) that both political finance rules and party systems should be evaluated in terms of three normative dimensions of partisanship (collegiality, systemic voice, and systemic accountability); and (c) that political finance reforms ought to counterbalance the pathologies inherent to different party systems. A set of political finance rules that satisfies these three conditions is an instantiation of what we describe as the ‘civic model of political finance’.

International parliamentary institutions and political donations: the case of the European Parliament

Abstract International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) increasingly welcome non-state actors (NSAs) within their policy-making procedures. Political donations are an important tool in NSAs' lobbying toolbox that has been well researched at the national level. Nevertheless, we know little about the links between NSAs, IPIs and political finance. Employing the European Parliament as an exploratory case-study, the article meticulously assesses micro-level financial donor data. Contrasting neo-functional and intergovernmental approaches, the results demonstrate a cleavage formed between individuals supporting anti-integration political parties, and international business donating to pro-integration parties. Theoretically, the article validates postfunctionalist approaches as a model for parts of the NSA–IPI relationship. Conceptually, the analysis shows that IPIs can encourage transnational cleavage formation and serve a representative function, which addresses the concerns about democratic deficit that come with the transfer of policy-making authority to international organizations. Simultaneously, financial donations can strengthen movements that oppose an IPI, and have an asymmetric impact on the IPI's political legitimacy. This calls for further research on NSAs' political financing of IPIs, the impact of financial donations on IPIs and the need to update relevant regulatory frameworks.

Financing UK democracy: a stocktake of 20 years of political donations disclosure

AbstractPolitical donations in the UK have been subject to comprehensive disclosure since 2001. We study the data produced as part of this disclosure policy to evaluate the role of private and public political finance over time. Total political donations have grown by nearly 250 per cent since 2001, reaching over £100 million in real terms for the first time in 2019. This increase has been driven by donations from private individuals, who now account for approximately 60 per cent of donations in election years compared to 40–50 per cent up to the late 2010s. Furthermore, ‘super‐donors’ (those contributing more than £100,000) have been a prominent driver of the rise, increasing their own share from approximately 31 per cent in 2017 to 45 per cent in 2019. We also show that private donations to the Labour Party fell sharply in the final stages of Jeremy Corbyn's leadership. These trends have benefited the Conservative Party, leading to a historic donation gap between the two main parties emerging circa 2019. We calculate that this gap between parties now stands at approximately £27 million compared to a historic average of £8–£10 million. This gap remains even after considering publicly funded ‘Short’ money provided to the opposition, which aims to increase competitive balance in the UK's democratic system.