Financial Trilemma Research Articles

Monetary Policy Challenges and Strategies in the Globalization: An Analysis of the Federal Reserve's Approach to the Trilemma

This study explores the Federal Reserve's (Fed's) approach to the financial trilemma in the era of globalization, emphasizing the trade-offs between monetary policy autonomy, exchange rate flexibility, and open capital markets. It delves into the challenges posed by increased global financial integration and the effectiveness of traditional and innovative monetary tools. The paper advocates for the adoption of a macroprudential policy framework to enhance financial system stability without compromising policy objectives. The findings highlight the Fed's strategic use of macroprudential measures alongside conventional tools to navigate the trilemma, illustrating the importance of flexibility and innovation in central banking practices amidst global financial complexities.

A Tale of Two Trilemmas: Comparing the International Monetary and Financial Trilemmas

We critically analyze and compare the analytical structures of the international monetary and financial trilemmas. The first structure says that countries cannot have all three of fixed exchange rates, free capital mobility, and monetary autonomy. The second argues that countries cannot have all three of financial globalization, absence of financial crises, and financial autonomy. While the monetary trilemma is often described as being based on the Mundell–Fleming model, this is true only under the assumption of perfect capital mobility. Imperfect mobility can be caused by factors other than capital controls and in this case the constraints of the monetary trilemma need not be binding in the short run. In order to have a mechanism to provide balance of payments equilibrium, however, the theory of economic policy demonstrates that the monetary trilemma must be binding in the long run. While pointing to an important issue the financial trilemma formulation does not provide the most useful way to analyze the tradeoffs generated by financial globalization. More useful for this purpose is the literature on international externalities and public goods. We also argue that for many countries, giving up monetary autonomy will be more costly than giving up financial policy autonomy.

Financial globalisation in ASEAN+3: Navigating the financial trilemma

AbstractThis paper offers a critical narrative of the ASEAN+3 economies' tryst with financial globalisation over the last two decades, with a specific focus on the evolution of the region's internationalisation of the financial sector. By applying the ‘Financial Trilemma’ framework, we posit how the recent emergence of foreign fintech players, digital banks, and Big Techs in finance are promoting further de facto financial integration in the region whilst also simultaneously exacerbating financial stability concerns alongside posing other non‐financial risks to market integrity, consumer privacy, and data protection. The regulation of fintechs and Big Tech in finance introduces a different type of policy trilemma for regulators across three discrete policy objectives/outcomes, viz. financial stability/market integrity; market efficiency/competition; data privacy/consumer protection. We argue that this necessitates greater regional financial cooperation by the ASEAN+3 economies which inevitably requires regional financial regulators to be prepared to forsake a degree of sovereign autonomy over respective national financial policies and to stave off systemic risks arising from the interconnected nature of transnational digital banking conglomerates.

Regulatory arbitrage and economic stability

This paper shows that national bank regulation can ensure financial and economy stability only if business cycles are driven by domestic and non-financial global shocks. If global financial shocks are more important, by contrast, national regulatory policies can be destabilizing. These inferences are drawn from a two-country DSGE model with global banking, financial regulation and the financial accelerator mechanism. The results indicate that bank regulation suppresses the amplification effects of the financial accelerator mechanism when countries face domestic and non-financial global shocks. When there is a global financial shock, however, highly-regulated countries are more vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of global bank lending since their firms are more leveraged and externally funded. More generally, the results imply that the financial trilemma is not binding in economies where domestic and non-financial global shocks drive the business cycle.

The Rise and Stall of EU Macro‐Prudential Policy. An Empirical Analysis of Policy Conflicts over Financial Stability, Market Integration, and National Discretion*

AbstractThe 2007–09 financial crisis appeared to demonstrate the need for a strong, supranational EU macro‐prudential policy framework to prevent similar future disasters. The implemented framework, however, is neither. It is highly complex, involving many constraints on the use of macro‐prudential instruments. It is also one of the principal areas of national discretion in EU banking regulation. To explain this, I build on the ‘financial trilemma’ thesis which holds that there are inherent tensions between pursuing financial stability, financial integration and national financial policies. Supranationalizing macro‐prudential policy proved difficult due to a lack of consensus on how to measure systemic risks and because of the distributional consequences involved. This increased the tension between stability and integration, as national macro‐prudential policies could constrain cross‐border finance and they could be misused for competitiveness considerations. Key policy actors disagreed on which goals to prioritize, with bargaining leading to a convoluted policy framework.

International Finance Trilemma as a Tool for Balanced Development of an Economy

International financial trilemma is a challenge of balancing the governmental policies ensuring healthy financial sector for facilitating economic development of a country. The scientific purpose of the paper is to develop a model of the international financial trilemma, defining the three key pillars of the international financial trilemma, the corresponding relevant metrics of economy, as well as describing expansion of financial technology as a disruptive element on a trilemma balance. Taking into account the experience of other researches of trilemma concept, analogically to the Energy Trilemma index, the authors developed the trilemma concept for the financial sector. The paper proposes determining the Financial trilemma index basing it on the following pillars: financial stability, financial inclusion and transparency. The authors analyse FinTech services as disruptive element affecting the International Financial trilemma index. As statistical basis of the financial trilemma and its building blocks the set of data from publicly available databases, such as the Global Competitiveness index, the Financial Development index, Global Findex and Doing Business is determined. The generally accepted quantitative and qualitative methods of economic science, inter alia comparative analysis, parameter estimation, grouping, economically mathematical modelling, synthesis, inductive, deductive and logically constructive methods have been used for the research. The financial trilemma index could be used as a tool for modelling an impact assessment of planned policy actions, as well as for developing determined steps for rising values of particular trilemma elements.

Trans-Tasman Cooperation in Banking Supervision and Resolution

Four major Australian banks span the Australian and New Zealand banking system. Applying the financial trilemma model, this article investigates possible approaches for cooperation in the supervision and resolution of these cross-border banks. The article first reviews the current arrangement in the Trans-Tasman Council of Banking Supervision, which is based on a soft law approach. Next, this article explores a trans-Tasman banking union, which would encompass joint supervision and joint resolution based on burden sharing. The challenge is political. Are the two countries willing to join forces in banking policies and thus give up part of their sovereignty in this field? And can New Zealand, as the smaller one of the two, ensure an effective voice in joint arrangements?

Trans-Tasman cooperation in banking supervision and resolution

Four major Australian banks span the Australian and New Zealand banking system. Applying the financial trilemma model, this article investigates possible approaches for cooperation in the supervision and resolution of these cross-border banks. The article first reviews the current arrangement in the Trans-Tasman Council of Banking Supervision, which is based on a soft law approach. Next, this article explores a trans-Tasman banking union, which would encompass joint supervision and joint resolution based on burden sharing. The challenge is political. Are the two countries willing to join forces in banking policies and thus give up part of their sovereignty in this field? And can New Zealand, as the smaller one of the two, ensure an effective voice in joint arrangements?

Assessing Monetary Policy Targeting Regimes for Small Open Economies

This paper quantifies the performance of five monetary policy regimes in controlling macroeconomic volatility triggered by a variety of supply, demand and external shocks in small open economies. While the proposed macroeconomic model is generic, the application is to the case of Sri Lanka. The investigated regimes separately target the exchange rate, a monetary aggregate, nominal GDP, the CPI inflation rate and a Taylor composite of output gaps and inflation. The results suggest that inflation targeting offers the least macro-economic volatility overall. Consistent with earlier research and Mundell’s financial trilemma, its stabilising power is greatest under demand and external shocks, which have grown more prominent as product and financial markets have opened.

Resolution of international banks: Can smaller countries cope?

AbstractThe stability of a banking system ultimately depends on the strength and credibility of the fiscal backstop. While large countries can still afford to resolve large global banks on their own, small and medium‐sized countries face a policy choice. This paper investigates the impact of resolution on banking structure. The financial trilemma model suggests that smaller countries can either conduct joint supervision and resolution of their global banks (based on single point of entry resolution) or reduce the size of their global banks and move to separate resolution of these banks' national subsidiaries (based on multiple point of entry resolution). Euro‐area countries are heading for joint resolution based on burden sharing, while the United Kingdom and Switzerland have implemented policies to downsize their banks.

Resolution of International Banks: Can Smaller Countries Cope?

The stability of a banking system ultimately depends on the strength and credibility of the fiscal backstop. While large countries can still afford to resolve large global banks on their own, small and medium-sized countries face a policy choice. This paper investigates the impact of resolution on banking structure. The financial trilemma model indicates that smaller countries can either conduct joint supervision and resolution of their global banks (based on single point of entry resolution) or reduce the size of their global banks and move to separate resolution of these banks' national subsidiaries (based on multiple point of entry resolution). Our empirical results show that the euro-area countries are heading for joint resolution based on burden sharing, while the UK and Switzerland have started a process of downsizing their banks.

Resolution of International Banks: Can Smaller Countries Cope?

The stability of a banking system ultimately depends on the strength and credibility of the fiscal backstop. While large countries can still afford to resolve large global banks on their own, small and medium-sized countries face a policy choice. This paper investigates the impact of resolution on banking structure. The financial trilemma model indicates that smaller countries can either conduct joint supervision and resolution of their global banks (based on single point of entry resolution) or reduce the size of their global banks and move to separate resolution of these banks' national subsidiaries (based on multiple point of entry resolution). Our empirical results show that the euro-area countries are heading for joint resolution based on burden sharing, while the UK and Switzerland have started a process of downsizing their banks.

Internationalised banking, alternative banks and the Single Supervisory Mechanism

This paper sets out to explain the preferences of the seven northern euro area member states on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) concerning the threshold set for direct European Central Bank (ECB) control over bank supervision. Building on the concept of the ‘financial trilemma’, it argues that different bank internationalisation patterns in the seven northern member states explain different preferences on the transfer of supervisory powers over less significant banks to the ECB. In particular, the reach of internationalisation into a national banking system – notably the extent to which even smaller banks were exposed to foreign banking operations – is shown to be the core factor explaining different national preferences on threshold. In the five countries with a large number of small and parochial alternative (cooperative and savings) banks, it is necessary to examine the system-specific structures of these banks to explain better the reach of internationalisation and national preferences on the threshold. Determined German opposition to ECB supervision of smaller alternative banks is juxtaposed with either less hostile or more positive support of at least four other countries despite the important presence of small alternative banks.

The Financial Trilemma and Macroeconomic Instability: Empirical Evidence from Kenya

The purpose of the study is to test whether the financial trilemma holds for a small open economy, and examine the implication of the implicit financial trilemma configuration on macroeconomic instability using Kenyan data. First, the study constructs the trilemma and macroeconomic instability indices and tests the financial trilemma. Second, the study empirically examines the effect of financial trilemma on macroeconomic instability. The results show that the financial trilemma does not hold for Kenya. However, by using the overall foreign participation to total equity turnover as a measure of financial openness, the trilemma indices are statistically significant. The results imply that the increasing financial openness is potentially driving the Kenyan economy towards financial trilemma characterized by a delicate balance of improving monetary independence and exchange rate stability. Financial openness is associated with increased macroeconomic instability. International reserve accumulation acts as a buffer and does not cause macroeconomic instability, implying that the Central Bank of Kenya conducted effective sterilization during the study period. This is the first study to test for the financial trilemma using Kenyan data. This study differs from other similar studies in a number of important ways. First, the study construct alternative financial trilemma indices that reflect the various reforms taking place in Kenya. Second, the study uses a unique data set based the newly released quarterly GDP data unlike most other studies that depend on annual data.
 JEL Classifications Code: F31

Financial Trilemma in China and a Comparative Analysis with India

AbstractA key challenge facing most emerging market economies today is how to simultaneously maintain monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration subject to the constraints imposed by the trilemma, in an era of widespread globalization. In this paper we review and contrast the trilemma policy choices and trade‐offs faced by the two key drivers of global economic growth: China and India. China's trilemma configurations are unique relative to other emerging markets in terms of the predominance of exchange rate stability, and in the failure of the trilemma regression to capture a consistently significant role for financial integration. In contrast, the trilemma configurations of India are in line with choices made by other emerging countries. Over time, India, like other emerging economies, has converged towards a middle ground among the three policy objectives, and has achieved comparable levels of exchange rate stability and financial integration buffered by sizeable international reserves.

Can European bank bailouts work?

Cross-border banking needs cross-border recapitalisation mechanisms. Each mechanism, however, suffers from the financial trilemma, which is that cross-border banking, national financial autonomy and financial stability are incompatible. In this paper, we study the efficiency of different burden-sharing agreements for the recapitalisation of the 30 largest banks in Europe. We consider bank bailouts for these banks in a simulation framework with stochastic country-specific bailout benefits. Among the burden sharing rules, we find that the majority and qualified-majority voting rules come close to the efficiency of a bailout mechanism with a supranational authority. Even a unanimous voting rule works better than home-country bailouts, which are very inefficient. If we assume additional systemic risk benefits, the efficiency of burden sharing rules comes close to the supranational solution.

Can European Bank Bailouts Work?

Cross-border banking needs cross-border recapitalisation mechanisms. Each mechanism, however, suffers from the financial trilemma, which is that cross-border banking, national financial autonomy and financial stability are incompatible. In this paper, we study the efficiency of different burden-sharing agreements for the recapitalisation of the 30 largest banks in Europe. We consider bank bailouts for these banks in a simulation framework with stochastic country-specific bailout benefits. Among the burden sharing rules, we find that the majority and qualified-majority voting rules come close to the efficiency of a bailout mechanism with a supranational authority. Even a unanimous voting rule works better than home-country bailouts, which are very inefficient. If we assume additional systemic risk benefits, the efficiency of burden sharing rules comes close to the supranational solution.

The Financial Trilemma in China and a Comparative Analysis with India

A key challenge facing most emerging market economies today is how to simultaneously maintain monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial integration subject to the constraints imposed by the trilemma, in an era of widespread globalization. In this paper we review and contrast the trilemma policy choices and trade‐offs faced by the two key drivers of global economic growth: China and India. China's trilemma configurations are unique relative to other emerging markets in terms of the predominance of exchange rate stability, and in the failure of the trilemma regression to capture a consistently significant role for financial integration. In contrast, the trilemma configurations of India are in line with choices made by other emerging countries. Over time, India, like other emerging economies, has converged towards a middle ground among the three policy objectives, and has achieved comparable levels of exchange rate stability and financial integration buffered by sizeable international reserves.

Europe after the crisis: less or more role for nation states in money and finance?

With the completion of the single European market and the full liberalization of capital markets two separate trilemmas emerged in the early 1990s: a monetary trilemma between free capital movements, fixed exchange rates, and national monetary autonomy; and a financial trilemma between free capital movements, financial stability, and national financial supervision autonomy. The paper argues that although these two trilemmas stem from the same root cause, financial integration, the financial trilemma is particularly acute for countries that have chosen to resolve the monetary trilemma by entering into a monetary union. The lesson from the recent crisis is that eurozone countries need to replace their national financial supervision institutions by supranational institutions capable of managing and resolving financial crises. This will require pooling together some of their fiscal sovereignty. © The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press.

The financial trilemma

The financial trilemma states that financial stability, financial integration and national financial policies are incompatible. Any two of the three objectives can be combined but not all three; one has to give. This paper develops a model to underpin the financial trilemma.