Financial Frictions Research Articles

Adoption of green technology with financial friction

We investigate firms’ incentives to adopt green technology. To cover the adoption costs, a firm needs a bank loan. The bank cannot observe firms’ adoption costs and offers a loan contract that allows it to earn an intermediation margin. The Pigouvian tax leads to optimal abatement but inefficiently low adoption. The first-best outcome is achieved via a combination of environmental tax and loan subsidy. If the regulator is restricted to an environmental tax, it faces a trade-off between optimal adoption and optimal abatement. In this case, the second-best tax rate exceeds the Pigouvian tax rate.

Home construction financing and search frictions in the housing market

This paper studies the effects of financial frictions in construction on housing market dynamics. To this end, we build a search-theoretic model of the housing market in which there is endogenous entry of buyers and developers face credit constraints. We capture credit frictions by assuming that developers must search for financing before building a home à la Wasmer and Weil (2004). Our model explores a novel channel that links credit frictions faced by developers to the housing market. We calibrate the model to quantify the size of the credit channel during the 2012–2019 housing market recovery. Through a series of counterfactuals, our model predicts that the credit channel had a large impact on housing liquidity, construction, and the vacancy rate. Furthermore, it accounts for around half of the rise in prices during the 2012-2019 housing market recovery.

Asset bubbles and financial frictions in small open economies☆

Financial cycles involving asset bubbles frequently coincide with the cyclical expansion and contraction of credit conditions. The collapse of asset and credit bubbles frequently precedes financial crises and economic recessions. We develop a small open economy DSGE model that incorporates asset bubbles and banking frictions. Credit-constrained firms trade in intrinsically useless bubble assets. Financial intermediaries, constrained by their balance sheets, introduce banking friction into financial markets. The static analysis suggests that increases in foreign interest rates unfavorably impact the formation of domestic bubbles. Dynamic analysis indicates that asset bubbles amplify macroeconomic fluctuations, with banking leverage constraints intensifying this effect. Therefore, asset bubbles amplify and propagate economic fluctuations. Unconventional monetary policy, macroprudential policy, and bubbly bailout policy could mitigate the amplification effects of banking leverage constraints and asset bubble bursts on macroeconomic fluctuations, which are mediated through reducing risk premiums, curbing capital outflows, and sustaining asset bubble channels, respectively. Finally, combining unconventional monetary policies with bubbly bailout policies and macroprudential policies yields superior outcomes.

Aggregate Fluctuations and the Role of Trade Credit

This paper studies the aggregate implications of trade credit in a dynamic, general equilibrium model where heterogeneous entrepreneurs choose their lending and borrowing of trade credit in the presence of financial frictions. Motivated by empirical evidence, the model shows how trade credit flows from less constrained firms to more constrained ones, both in the cross-sectional distribution and in firms' response to heterogeneous financial shocks. In the face of an aggregate financial shock, entrepreneurs reduce their trade credit lending, further tightening their customers' borrowing constraints, resulting in an amplification of the initial shock. In contrast, when the financial shock only affects some, but not all, entrepreneurs, trade credit facilitates the flow of financing to entrepreneurs in financial distress, thereby mitigating its negative impacts. This mechanism, however, is only effective when the shock affects a sufficiently small number of entrepreneurs.

Does climate policy uncertainty influence the corporate cost of debt?

This paper employs a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies spanning from 2011 to 2022 to empirically investigate the influence of climate policy uncertainty on the corporate cost of debt, based on the theory of financial friction. We find that climate policy uncertainty significantly increases the corporate cost of debt, and the result is supported by robustness tests. To avoid biases arisen from endogeneity, this paper introduces an instrumental variable approach and propensity score matching method for verification. The endogeneity test results support the baseline regression results as well. Finally, this paper also discovers that financing constraints are the potential mechanism behind the impact of climate policy uncertainty on the corporate cost of debt.

Taxing versus subsidizing debt under financial frictions

AbstractWe examine optimal credit market policies in two models with durables/capital as collateral. Pecuniary externalities rationalize ex-ante debt taxes as macroprudential regulation, achieving constrained efficiency. Ex-post debt subsidies can implement first-best by stimulating collateral demand. Due to the same effect, debt subsidies that are constant over time can be superior to debt taxes. Saving subsidies can further enhance efficiency by addressing distributive effects of pecuniary externalities via interest rate reductions. The analysis shows that debt-increasing subsidies can outperform macroprudential regulation, and that constrained inefficiency caused by collateral externalities is insufficient to establish debt taxes as optimal credit market policies.

FIRM SIZE AND BUSINESS CYCLES WITH CREDIT SHOCKS

AbstractI study the macroeconomic implications of firm heterogeneity in the presence of financial frictions. I build a business cycle model in which firm size is jointly determined by idiosyncratic productivity and collateral constraints. I estimate skewed idiosyncratic shocks and align the model with the evidence on firm size, leverage, and investment moments. The extent of resource misallocation is driven by a small number of highly productive but financially constrained firms. A credit shock severely affects such firms, further constraining their ability to borrow. This generates a large and persistent economic downturn that is comparable to the Great Recession.

Measuring the U.S. monetary noise shocks

AbstractAgents' beliefs regarding future monetary policy changes influence their current decisions. However, these expectations may not always materialize in the future. This study shows that the monetary fundamental shocks (exogenous changes consistent with expectations) stabilize output and inflation, while the noise shocks (biased beliefs that fail to be realized in the future) increase economic fluctuations. Moreover, factors that amplify financial frictions—the spread between the capital return of entrepreneurs and the risk‐free interest rate of a central bank—can increase anticipation effects associated with these two types of monetary policy shocks.

Limited Firm Insurance and Aggregate Implications

This paper studies the impacts of financial shocks on firm insurance, firm dynamics, and macroeconomic implications. A key departure from the literature is that firms provide wage insurance contracts to risk-averse workers in a long-term relationship. Such contracts endogenously impose a form of inflexible debt liability to firms, and make firms with limited financial net worth more vulnerable to shocks than others. In our model, firms have heterogenous productivity and financial net worth, and also firms face financial frictions. Search and matching in the labor market endogenously determines the value of wage contract, and thus the level of liability to the firm. We have three new findings: (1) The wage dynamics of the quantitative model are consistent with those in empirical studies, with significant insurance against firm-level idiosyncratic shocks, and also a weak comovement between aggregate wage and GDP when there are aggregate shocks. (2) Firms with limited financial resources are hit by financial shocks significantly more than others, with larger negative impacts on dividends, credit borrowing, firm value, and firm entry; the endogenous wage insurance also becomes more limited, and there are more separations. These impacts on both firms and workers are different from—and cannot be accounted for by—standard models with a representative firm or worker. (3) Quantitative exercises for the Great Recession in the United States suggest that aggregate productivity shocks and financial shocks play different roles; without financial shocks, we cannot account for the dynamics of financial variables, including the reduced credit borrowing, spikes in credit spreads, and large drops in dividend payments. Lastly, we provide microlevel empirical supports for our model implications. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Funding: Y. Wang acknowledges the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72150003] and the grant from Shenzhen Municipal Government [Grant 1210614103]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01627 .

Carbon taxes and tariffs, financial frictions, and international spillovers

Ambitious climate policy, coupled with financial frictions, has the potential to create macrofinancial stability risk. Such stability risk may expand beyond the economy implementing climate policy, potentially catching other countries off guard. International spillovers may occur because of trade and financial channels. Hence, we study the design and effects of climate policies in the world economy with international trade and financial flows. We develop a two-sector, two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model with financial frictions, climate policies, including carbon tariffs, and macroprudential policies. Using the calibrated model, we evaluate spillovers from unilateral domestic carbon pricing to foreign economies and back. We also examine more ambitious climate architectures involving carbon tariffs or a global carbon price. We find that accounting for cross-border financial flows and frictions in credit markets is crucial to understand the effects of climate policies and to guide the implementation of macroprudential policies at the global scale aimed at minimizing transition risk and paving the way for ambitious climate policy.

Retail CBDC: Implications for Banking and Financial Stability

This article reviews the literature examining how the introduction of a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) would affect a modern economy, focusing on the implications for the banking sector and for financial stability. A CBDC can improve welfare by reducing financial frictions, countering market power in deposit markets, encouraging financial inclusion, and enhancing the payment system. However, a CBDC also entails noteworthy risks, including the possibility of bank disintermediation and associated contraction in bank credit, as well as potential adverse effects on financial stability. The recycling of the new CBDC liability through asset purchases or lending by the central bank plays an important role in determining the economic consequences of the introduction of a CBDC, raising fundamental questions about the footprint of central banks in the financial system. Ultimately, the effects of a CBDC depend critically on its design features, particularly remuneration.

Nominal GDP growth targeting vs. Taylor rules in a model with financial frictions

Nominal GDP growth targeting has gained favor over the last few decades in monetary policy literature (e.g., Ireland 2020; Garín et al. 2016; Beckworth and Hendrickson 2020). Calibrated, small-scale New Keynesian DSGE models have supported the proposition that nominal GDP growth (NGDP growth) rate targeting will improve welfare as compared with alternative strategies such as inflation targeting and Taylor rules with standard parameter settings. This paper examines that proposition in the context of a medium-scale New Keynesian model having a financial sector with frictions. In that model, NGDP growth rate targeting does poorly as compared with the Optimal Taylor rule and a wide range of Taylor rule settings leading up to the Optimal (representative agent utility maximizing) Taylor rule. The presence of the financial sector reveals that not only is NGDP growth rate targeting the least successful among the alternative targets and rules in creating welfare in this model; NGDP growth rate targeting also creates dramatically higher volatility of the policy rate and most financial variables.

The Marginal Value of Cash: Corporate Savings, Investment, and Financing

The fact that internal liquidity is a key source of corporate funding puts the marginal value of cash at the center of a variety of firm decisions, including investment, payout, financing, savings, and risk management policies. The marginal value of cash is inherently a dynamic concept, because a firm facing financing frictions has to be forward-looking, managing its asset and liability structures in a unified framework and carefully trading off the use of liquidity across time and states. We present a dynamic framework for corporate liquidity management and survey the related literature, with a focus on the determinants of the marginal value of cash and its ubiquitous role in firm decisions.

Climate defaults and financial adaptation

We analyze the relationship between climate-related disasters and sovereign debt crises using a model with capital accumulation, sovereign default, and disaster risk. We find that disaster risk and default risk together lead to slow post-disaster recovery and heightened borrowing costs. Calibrating the model to Mexico, we find that the increase in cyclone risk due to climate change leads to a welfare loss equivalent to a permanent 0.95% consumption drop. However, financial adaptation via catastrophe bonds and disaster insurance can reduce these losses by about 21%. Our study highlights the importance of financial frictions in analyzing climate change impacts.

Seller-Orchestrated Inventory Financing Under Bank Capital Regulation

To help small firms secure bank financing, large sellers often orchestrate joint finance programs, linking their small dealers with major banks that lend to all participating dealers based on the information the seller provides. We examine supply chain decisions (pricing and inventory) and lending terms under such seller-orchestrated financing programs. In loan pricing, we highlight a form of financial friction that is of particular importance under such schemes—bank capital regulation. Banks are globally mandated to maintain regulatory capital to mitigate unforeseen loan losses, using either the standardized approach (where regulatory capital is a fixed percentage of the loan amount) or the internal rating-based (IRB) approach (where it depends on the loan’s value-at-risk). We consider a game-theoretic model consisting of a large seller and multiple capital-constrained newsvendor-type dealers, who obtain financing from banks that are subject to capital regulation. The seller decides the wholesale price and whether to orchestrate a joint finance program for its dealers by collaborating with a bank, and the dealers choose their inventory level and the financing channel. We find that a seller should only orchestrate the joint financing program when the bank adopts the IRB approach and the dealers are of low risk. Such a program is more profitable to the seller when the demand correlation among dealers is low, and there is a large number of dealers. Although always benefiting the seller, these programs may hurt dealers with intermediate risk. Facing dealers with varying financial situations, the terms under the joint finance program should be designed as if the financially strong dealers subsidize the weak ones. Finally, allowing the seller to share part of the loan loss could further enhance the performance of joint financing, but only when the seller’s opportunity cost of capital is low. Our findings provide guidance to large sellers on how to orchestrate joint finance schemes, and to small dealers on making their corresponding operational decisions.

How important are trend shocks? The role of the debt elasticity of interest rate

We study how financial frictions affect the importance of trend productivity shocks for macroeconomic fluctuations. Using long-run data from 17 small open economies (SOEs), we compare two variants of a workhorse SOE real business cycle model featuring a debt-elastic interest rate (DEIR), a measure of financial frictions. The first variant estimates the DEIR parameter, while the second fixes it to 0.001, effectively abstracting from financial frictions. On average, ignoring financial frictions doubles the contribution of trend shocks to output fluctuations. This suggests that a proper assessment of the quantitative effects of trend shocks requires reasonable DEIR values.

ESG‐oriented analysts and corporate green innovation

AbstractThis paper investigates whether and how analysts' ESG orientation affects corporate green innovation in China. We find that ESG‐oriented analysts in brokerage firms with strong ESG performance significantly stimulate the target firms' green innovation. Mechanism analyses suggest that ESG‐oriented analysts enhance the anticipated benefits of corporate environmental risk management, and reduces the costs associated with managerial myopia and financial frictions. The effect could not be fully explained by analysts' competence. Our findings are robust to propensity score matching and difference‐in‐differences analyses. We provide valuable insights into the crucial role of analysts' ESG values in driving innovation‐oriented corporate sustainability.

Cash is King? Understanding Financing Risk in Housing Markets

Abstract In Los Angeles, all-cash home purchases quintupled during the last decade. Compared with an else-equal mortgage offer, a cash offer is associated with 29% shorter time-to-close and a 2-3.9% price discount, indicating a substantial amount of financing risk—the risk to a seller that a transaction may not close on time and may fail to occur again because a mortgage contingency fails. The estimated cash discount aligns well with a canonical model calibrated to the sample market. Our findings reveal that closing risk alone is insufficient to explain the cash discount. Rather, it turns on the possibility that a property back on the market may fail to sell, requiring a substantial risk compensation. The estimated cash discount is smaller during booms and in larger markets, highlighting the inseparability of financial frictions in the mortgage market and search frictions in the housing market.

The empirical performance of the financial accelerator since 2008

We evaluate the empirical performance of financial frictions à la Bernanke et al. (1999) during and after the Global Financial Crisis. We document that in an ex-post analysis based on nonlinear Bayesian methods, these frictions do not improve the standard medium-scale DSGE model's ability to explain the macroeconomic dynamics during the Great Recession. The reason is that in the estimated model with financial frictions, the drastic post-2008 collapse of investment causes firms' leverage to decline. Taking the model at face value, this would trigger a narrowing of the credit spread, contradicting the observed persistently large credit spread throughout the post-2008 period. Additionally, the estimated model attributes only a minor role to risk shocks à la Christiano et al. (2014). These findings are confirmed independently for US and euro area data.

Financial crises and the global supply network: Evidence from multinational enterprises

This paper empirically examines the effects of financial crises on the organization of production of multinational enterprises. We construct a panel of European multinational networks from 2003 through 2015. We compute a multinational-specific shock based on the geographical structure of the network and the extent of the financial crisis in the countries belonging to the network. We document that multinationals facing a larger shock to their network experience lower growth in their number of affiliates and a deterioration in parents’ performance. This adjustment to the financial crisis is accounted for by multinationals with initially more leveraged parents, and it is exacerbated in networks more dependent on external financing. Moreover, initially more leveraged affiliates are more likely to be dropped from a multinational network. These findings lend support to financial frictions shaping multinational activity.