Financial Crisis In Thailand Research Articles

Deteksi Krisis Keuangan di Indonesia Berdasarkan Indikator Nilai Tukar Riil Menggunakan Model SWARCH (2,3)

The financial crisis that hit Asia in mid-1997 began with the financial crisis in Thailand which then spread to Indonesia. The impact of the financial crisis in Indonesia is so severe that a crisis detection system is needed. The financial crisis detection system can be done by simple monitoring of macroeconomic indicators such as real exchange rate. Excessive real exchange rate is predicted to have a great chance of crisis.<br />The result shows that the real exchange rate from January 1990 to June 2013 has heteroscedasticity effect and there are structural changes so it can be modeled using SWARCH model (2,3) with ARMA (1.0) as conditional average model and ARCH (3) as model conditional variance. The inferred probabilities value of the SWARCH (2,3) model in February 1998 of 1 and July 1998 of 0.9968 over 0.5 indicates that the period is in a high volatile condition indicating a crisis. The SWARCH model (2.3) based on the real exchange rate indicator was able to capture the high volatile conditions in February 1998 and July 1998 as the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.<br />Keywords : Deteksi, krisis keuangan, nilai tukar riil, SWARCH

Financialization in the Crypto-Colonies: Greece and Thailand

This essay elucidates analogies between the financial crisis in Thailand in the 1990s and the ongoing crisis in Greece by drawing on the concept of crypto-colonialism. It explores the analogies not only in the domain of the financialized infrastructure of economies, but also in the domain of racialized superstructures. Both countries experienced exceptionally rapid economic growth in the time preceding the crises, as well as increased current account deficits, but were also first to implode in the time of uncertainty. Production of subjectivities and race through political economy is elucidated as part of the disciplinary austerity mechanisms imposed in the aftermath of the crises in Greece and Thailand.

Do Regime Shifts Affect Mixed-Asset Portfolios in Thailand?

This study examines the benefits of diversification by adding real estate to a portfolio of traditional assets in Thailand during various regimes from January 1994 to June 2013. More specifically, Amonhaemanon compares the performance of a stock portfolio (benchmark portfolio) and that of an optimal mixed portfolio composed of stock and real estate (direct and indirect real estate). Using the Sharpe ratio as a measure of portfolio performance, the author tests whether there is a statistically signifi cant difference between benchmark and mixed portfolios among different regimes. The empirical results show that all types of real estate provide benefits for Thai investors in the sense that the mixed portfolio always performs better than does the benchmark portfolio. However, the Sharpe ratio of the two portfolios is statistically significantly different only since the year 2000, after the financial crisis in Thailand.

Macro Volatility and Financial Crisis in Thailand: Some Historical Evidence

This paper uses national income identity to explain the causal relationships among Thailand’s aggregate volatility, deficient financial structure, financial liberalization, and financial crisis in this country. Relatively good macroeconomic policies and diversified structure were able to compensate for financial imperfections and weak corporate governance in the financial sector in the period 1970–90. Under these conditions, real GDP growth was positive, inflation was relatively low, and consumption was relatively less volatile than GDP. The 1997 crisis, however, severely affected the ability of central authorities to smooth fluctuation. Investment and consumption volatility increased substantially. This implies that, when counter-cyclical policies are difficult to implement and incomplete markets exist, it is much more difficult to stabilize consumption.

Ten Years After the Financial Crisis in Thailand: What Has Been Learned or Not Learned?

The 1997 financial crisis provided many lessons about the weaknesses of Thailand's economic and financial system before the crisis, weaknesses that eventually led to the crisis. Since then, these lessons have led to many economic and financial reforms. This paper reviews the lessons and reforms that have been carried out. These include improvements to the data system needed for adequate macroeconomic monitoring, changes to the macroeconomic management framework and monetary policy regime, and various aspects of financial sector reforms. This paper also indicates the lessons that might not yet have been sufficiently learned and new risks to future economic stability. These include political interference in financial institutions, leading to inappropriate or excessive lending, and lack of transparency in fiscal liabilities that could mislead macroeconomic management.

Comment on “Ten Years After the Financial Crisis in Thailand: What Has Been Learned or Not Learned?”

Comment on “Ten Years After the Financial Crisis in Thailand: What Has Been Learned or Not Learned?”

Comment on “Ten Years After the Financial Crisis in Thailand: What Has Been Learned or Not Learned?”

Comment on “Ten Years After the Financial Crisis in Thailand: What Has Been Learned or Not Learned?”

Bank Relationship and Firm Performance: Evidence From Thailand Before the Asian Financial Crisis

Abstract: This study examines the relation between bank relations and market performance in Thailand, an economy in which commercial banks play a crucial role through lending relationship and, for a number of companies, equity ownership. Overall, bank relationships, both equity‐based and debt‐based, positively affect capital investment. However, there is a negative relation between lending relationships, both short‐term and long‐term, and market performance indicating that bank lending may not always be consistent with value maximization. There is also evidence of a positive marginal effect of bank monitoring through equity ownership on market performance. Further, the relation between bank equity ownership and market performance appears to be non‐linear with a concave function. Ownership by corporate insiders is also negatively related to bank equity ownership. Overall, the findings highlight the detrimental effects of excessive short‐term debt usage, one of the factors believed to contribute to the financial crisis in Thailand, and the marginal benefit of the equity‐based relationship on firm value.

Ownership and its Impact on Coping with Financial Crisis: Differences in State-, Mixed-, and Privately-Owned Enterprises in Thailand

Corporate turnarounds have been studied widely in Western contexts, but few empirical studies detail turnaround experience in non-western countries, especially those undergoing or recovering from financial crisis. An assumption in recent privatization policies has been that change in ownership triggers a form of performance reversal or turnaround. Here, we compare firms with three different forms of ownership two years after the financial crisis in Thailand. This study assesses the impact of ownership differences on the level of corporate entrepreneurship, human resource management practices, and worker effort among state-, mixed- and privately-owned enterprises in Thailand. The results suggest cautious optimism about changes in ownership as a potential means for triggering organizational changes that lead to increased productivity for threatened economies. Mixed ownership may be an effective substitute for private ownership or, alternately, an effective transitional form of restructuring state enterprises in preparation for private ownership.

What Happened to the Banking Sector in the Aftermath of Financial Crisis: The Case of Thailand

This paper examines the impact of the crisis and the financial sector restructuring introduced after 1997 financial crisis in Thailand on Thai banking industry. The study is based on a new micro-level dataset covering 6 years for 1995-2000 of bank level panel data on financial statements and to examine whether domestic and foreign banks performed differently under the same unfavourable economic environment. It is found the domestic banks experienced larger negative impacts from the financial crisis than foreign banks and foreign banks' performance rebounded faster than that of domestic banks. It can be inferred that stronger and efficient banks can survive under adverse situations and weaker players are forced to exit. Positively, efficiency and professionalism in Thai banking industry can be a stimulus for domestic banks to adjust themselves in improving financial system infrastructure.

Sino—Thai Corporate Profligacy and the Financial Turmoil of 1997

This paper seeks to examine the 1997 financial crisis in Thailand through an analysis of the structure and performance of Sino–Thai companies in banking, finance, and property. It argues that the crisis exposed structural weaknesses which had long been evident in Chinese corporations in South East Asia, and that, although many institutions – for example the Bangkok Bank – were able to survive by restructuring, a large number simply collapsed. The paper, which has a strong historical dimension, examines the relationships between Sino–Thai banks and business groups, the growth of finance companies in Thailand during the boom of the 1980s and early 1990s, the heavy inflows of foreign capital into the kingdom during the boom, the behaviour of the stock market and the property market, and the failure of Thai financial regulators to impose discipline on the Thai financial sector in the years leading to the crisis.

Once Only the Sky was the Limit: Bangkok's Housing Boom and the Financial Crisis in Thailand

This paper explores the causes of the collapse of the housing sector in Bangkok in 1997 and its impact on the financial sector and the economy of Thailand. With the liberalisation of the Thai economy and its integration into the world economy during the 1980s and the early 1990s, real estate companies gained access to US$-nominated off-shore loans at low interest rates. Because of the availability of cheap loans and the speculative demand for housing, financial institutions and real estate developers did not conduct market research and invested in doubtful projects, resulting in an enormous oversupply of housing. The close relationship between bankers, developers and politicians ensured that the government would bail out insolvent real estate companies and financial institutions. In 1996, exports fell and the economy stopped growing due to increased international competition. Unhedged foreign debts reached dangerous levels and speculative attacks forced the government to devalue the currency. Real estate companies and financial institutions would have collapsed without continued bail-outs by the government. However, the government's non-transparent policies eroded the confidence of the general public and international investors, resulting in capital flight and a serious financial and economic crisis.

The financial crisis in Thailand: Causes, conduct and consequences?

The financial crisis in Thailand was a “private sector failure,” expressing itself partly in increasing current account problems but mainly in careless lending/borrowing and the accumulation of nonperforming loans in the financial sector. During a period when the real economy showed signs of weakening with sluggish exports and an increase in the current account deficit, “hot money” flowed in and covered the deficit, but also led to careless investments. Financial liberalization in an uncontrolled financial sector resulted in misallocation and mismatching. Political instability, indecisiveness and mismanagement at the political and administrative level also contributed to the financial meltdown in Thailand.

Growth of ambulatory surgery and anaesthesia in Thailand

Growth of ambulatory surgery and anaesthesia in Thailand has been much slower than in the United States due to non-encouraging government funding, the health care reimbursement system, and cultural factors. In contrast to the situation in most other countries, the growth that has taken place is the result of an inadequate number of beds in public hospitals and not of economic pressures from the health administrator. On the contrary, surgery with overnight hospitalization has steadily increased in private hospitals. However, with the financial crisis in Thailand and South-East Asia, ambulatory anaesthesia will eventually be promoted by both the government and insurance companies.