Financial CEOs Research Articles

An empirical examination of the determinant of the US financial CEOs’ compensation for the post-financial crisis period

The US financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent Global Financial Crisis were considered by many economists the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As a results, Dodd-Frank Act has passed and aims “(1) to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end "too big to fail", (2) to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, (3) to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.” The enactment of Dodd-Frank Act, in part, intended to significantly influence accountability on executive compensation especially for the financial institutions. This paper empirically investigates the changes in Financial CEOs’ compensation since the Financial Crisis of 2008. Our findings show that in the post- Financial Crisis period financial leverage is significant factor influencing the CEOs’ total compensation. In addition market based performance such as stock price and market-to-book ratio shows significant positive relationship with CEO compensation. This change can be interpreted an attempt to reduce opportunistic behavior of top executives after the financial crisis and the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act

Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Politicians, Supervision Regime, Financial Structure and Market View

Almost all literature on the evolution of financial supervision architecture stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the recent trend toward more unification. In the real world, however, it is not always clear to what extent market features are important. We present two complementary approaches to gain insight into the above relationship, focusing on the political cost and benefit analysis. First, a cross-country study tests two alternative theories; the helping hand and the grabbing hand views of government; to determine the impact of market structure on the supervisory setting. Our evidence seems more consistent with the grabbing hand view, considering the degree of banking concentration as a proxy of the capture risk, and presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, the results of a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a market preference for a more consolidated supervisory regime but reveals only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and those of market operators.

Helping hand or grabbing hand?: Politicians, supervision regime, financial structure and market view

Almost all the literature on the evolution of the financial supervision architecture stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the recent trend toward more unification. But in the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features matter. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship, focusing on the political cost and benefit analysis. First, a cross-country study tests two alternative theories—the helping hand and the grabbing hand view of government—to determine the impact of the market structure on the supervisory setting. Our evidence seems more consistent with the grabbing hand view, considering the degree of banking concentration a proxy of the capture risk and presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, the results of a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirm a market preference for a more consolidated supervisory regime but reveal only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and those of the market operators.

Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Supervisory Architecture, Financial Structure and Market View

The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First, an empirical test of two theories-the helping and the grabbing hand view of government-seems more consistent with the latter, presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a consolidated supervisory regime and reveals only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and the market operators.

Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Supervisory Architecture, Financial Structure and Market View

The literature stresses the importance of financial market characteristics in determining the supervisory architectures. In the real world it is not always clear to what extent market features are taken into account. We present two complementary approaches to gain insights in the above relationship. First, an empirical test of two theories-the helping and the grabbing hand view of government-seems more consistent with the latter, presuming the market demonstrates a preference for consolidation of supervisory powers. Second, a survey among financial CEOs in Italy confirms a preference for a consolidated supervisory regime and reveals only weak consistency between the views of the policymakers and the market operators.