Felony Murder Research Articles

The Maldives Criminal Court's Approach in Engaging the Parties in First-degree Felony Murder: A Content Analysis

The laws concerning first-degree felony murder in the Maldives allow mitigating the punishment if the victim pardons the offender. However, many offenders do not receive a pardon from their victims. Relevant literature suggests that a successful reconciliation would occur in an environment that fosters the expression of remorse and forgiveness. The contrasting outcome indicates a need to understand if the court procedures promote an empathetic outcome. The present analysis aims to address the gap by establishing the approach of the Criminal Court to engaging the parties in cases involving first-degree felony murder, identifying if the court encourages the expression of remorse and forgiveness and establishing how the current approach affects the outcome of the cases. By employing a content analysis method driven by the literature on restorative justice theory, the present study analysed seven different court cases concluded between 2020 and 2023 September that involved first-degree felony murder. The analysis showed that the approach of the Criminal Court to engaging the parties in a first-degree felony murder may include explaining the rights of a victim in the legal system of the Maldives, attempting to humanise the offender or the victim or simply seeking the opinion of the victim concerning the punishment. The case analysis also demonstrated that offenders were less remorseful and victims were less forgiving. The analysis showed that the current procedures are inadequate to foster remorse and forgiveness and recommended employing restorative justice processes to engage the parties.

Moral Jugdments and Knowledge about Felony Murder in Colorado: An Empirical Study

Moral Jugdments and Knowledge about Felony Murder in Colorado: An Empirical Study

On Reforming Common Law Criminal Statutes: Did California Accidentally Kill the Second-Degree Felony Murder Rule?

On Reforming Common Law Criminal Statutes: Did California Accidentally Kill the Second-Degree Felony Murder Rule?

Demographics, Trends, and Disparities in Colorado Felony Murder Cases: A Statistical Portrait

Demographics, Trends, and Disparities in Colorado Felony Murder Cases: A Statistical Portrait

Too Young for the Crime, Yet Old Enough to do Life: A Critical Review of How State Felony Murder Laws Apply to Juvenile Defendants

Too Young for the Crime, Yet Old Enough to do Life: A Critical Review of How State Felony Murder Laws Apply to Juvenile Defendants

Felony Murder Liability for Homicides by Police Officers: Too Unfair & Too Much to Bear

Felony Murder Liability for Homicides by Police Officers: Too Unfair & Too Much to Bear

The Wrongful Death of an Indian: A Tribe’s Right to Object to the Death Penalty

This Essay responds to the execution of Lezmond Mitchell, the only American Indian on federal death row. The execution was carried out on August 26, 2020 over the objection of both members of the victims’ family and the Navajo Nation. This Essay takes the clear position that because the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 requires tribal consent to seek the death penalty for murder, or felony murder predicted on robbery or kidnapping, that tribal consent should also have been required before the United States sought the death penalty in a carjacking case. The interpretation by the Ninth Circuit and the decision by the Executive to proceed with the execution undermine tribal sovereignty and are contrary to both congressional intent and statutory interpretation.

Lack of Statutory Foundation, Vagueness, and Violation of the Rule of Lenity of California Second Degree Felony Murder

Abstract Restrictions recently imposed by law on the application of felony murder in California Senate Bill n. 1437 amending Sections 188 and 189 of, and adding Section 1170.95 to, the Penal Code. and a judgment of a split California Court of Appeal rejecting the claim that the second-degree felony murder provision is unconstitutionally vague Cal. 4th App. Dist. April 30, 2019, see note 74. offer the occasion to analyze the Californian second degree murder. Second degree Felony murder in California, which is not spelled out by statute, relies on the jurisprudential construction of an “inherently dangerous felony”. According to the California Supreme Court, this criterion was conceived to accompany its overall aim of deterrence as well as function as a limitation on the application of felony murder itself. The purpose of this article is to highlight how the jurisprudential reconstruction of “inherently dangerous felonies” does not present a suitable criterion for determining whether second degree murder has taken place. While calling into play the goal of deterrence may bring forth paradoxical results, the “inherently dangerous felony,” upon which second degree felony murder relies, represents a double-edged sword. In fact, this article argues that it expands, rather than restricts, the application of felony murder, also posing several constitutional concerns. It follows that, since the “inherently dangerous” category acts as the essential base upon which second degree felony murder stands, the “crumbling” of the one should lead to the fall of the other.

Mitigations: The Forgotten Side of the Proportionality Principle

In the first change to the Model Penal Code since its promulgation in 1962, the American Law Institute in 2017 set blameworthiness proportionality as the dominant distributive principle for criminal punishment. Empirical studies suggest that this is in fact the principle that ordinary people use in assessing proper punishment. Its adoption as the governing distributive principle makes good sense because it promotes not only the classic desert retributivism of moral philosophers but also crime-control utilitarianism, by enhancing the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community and thereby promoting deference, compliance, acquiescence, and internalization of its norms, rather than suffering the resistance and subversion that is provoked by perceived violations of blameworthiness proportionality. Such a principle has been commonly used as the basis for criticizing improper aggravations, such as the doctrines of felony murder and “three strikes,” but the principle also logically requires recognizing a full range of deserved mitigations, not as a matter of grace or forgiveness but as a matter of entitlement. And given ordinary people’s nuanced judgments about blameworthiness proportionality, maintaining moral credibility with the community requires that the criminal law adopt an equally nuanced system of mitigations. Such a nuanced system ideally would include reform of a wide variety of current law doctrines as well as, especially in the absence of such specific reforms, adoption of a general mitigation provision that aims for blameworthiness proportionality in all cases. Such a general mitigation ought not be limited to cases of “heat of passion” or limited to cases of murder, as today’s liability rules commonly provide. It ought to be available whenever the offense circumstances and the offender’s situation and capacities meaningfully reduce the offender’s blameworthiness, as long as giving the mitigation does not specially undermine community norms.

Offences against the Person under the Criminal Code of the Principality of Liechtenstein

The article briefly analyzes the system of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Principality of Liechtenstein 1987 and considers its main features. The work emphasizes that the system of the special part of the Criminal Code of Liechtenstein, as most modern Criminal Codes, is built on the basis of a specific sequence of criminal legal protection: first it outlines the structures of the offences against the person, then against society and, finally, against the State. This approach reflects the ideology of criminal law, which regards identity as the main and most significant value. This article discusses issues related to criminal liability under the Criminal Code of the Principality of Liechtenstein for crimes against the person. The author analyses crimes against life and health, against future life, against freedom, against the honour and against privacy. Key features indicative of the relevant criminal law institutions in Liechtenstein are identified. Current official statistics is provided. Where necessary, there is a comparison with the Russian legislation. It is shown that the Liechtenstein's Criminal Code distinguishes between "felony murder" and "murder" and its variants. The first de facto composition is the main and subsequent-privileged. Since murder involves a sanction of up to life imprisonment, the legislator did not deem it necessary to allocate additional convoys of a qualified murder. The authors draw attention to the fact that Liechtenstein provided three link crane system and degrees of severity of the harm that aims at differentiation of responsibility for crimes against health. It is shown that in the criminal law of the country there is a fairly wide range of criminal acts unknown to the Russian Criminal Code. This is largely due to the specifics of the legal thinking of the criminal code developers in the neighboring Austria, from which they were transferred to Liechtenstein. It is proved that the rules of the Liechtenstein Criminal Code establishing liability for crimes against the person, can be used by Russian legislators when carrying out further reforms, and may also be taken into account in the domestic criminal law theory.

Intimate Partner Violence, Gender and Lethality: A Case Analysis of Two Fatalities

Deaths caused by intimate partner violence (IPV) are an area of significant concern for advocates, practitioners, and experts. Aspart of collaborative community interventions to curb violence,the creation of multi-agency fatality review teams has shown effectiveness in reducing IPV and concomitant homicides. The following study is deviant case analysis of 2 female perpetrators within a multi-phasic fatality review of 22 felony cases of IPV resulting in homicide in a city in the southeastern United States. This study was designed to effectively gauge whether gender is avariable for those accused of felony murder as a result of IPV. Results indicate gender disparities for women, including inabilityto act as free agents within increasingly violent relationships; disparate characterization of violent women as more egregious than those of male counterparts within law enforcement and behavioral health and the pressing need for legal and therapeutic rehabilitative services provided to violent women offenders.

Juvenile Sentencing in Illinois: Addressing The Supreme Court Trend Away from Harsh Punishments for Juvenile Offenders

The United States Supreme Court has steadily been changing the way it approaches juvenile sentencing since 2005. This ideological shift has occurred as a response to the increase in biological and sociological studies, which point toward fundamental differences between juveniles and adults. This Note addresses how the new mandates by the Supreme Court have been implemented around the country, with a focus on statutory changes Illinois should make moving forward. Specifically, this Note argues that there are several adjustments Illinois will have to make in regards to the way it sentences juvenile homicide offenders, in order to be considered Constitutional based on the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama. First, lengthy, consecutive term-of-years sentences should be abolished because it does not give juvenile offenders the “meaningful opportunity for release” required by Graham. This Note suggests that courts need to look at the idea of a “meaningful opportunity for release” differently when sentencing juveniles as opposed to adult offenders, because studies have shown that adolescents who are imprisoned have a much lower life expectancy than average. Second, Illinois should amend its sentencing statutes to require judges to consider several factors, while on record at a sentencing hearing, before sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to life in prison. These factors, laid out within this Note, will put Illinois at the forefront of ethical juvenile sentencing, while also ensuring that it does not violate the authority of Miller. Admittedly, these theories have been criticized for being too ‘soft’ on punishment for juveniles who are convicted of felony murder. However, the suggestions in this Note are meant to allow for the protection of the adolescent’s Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, while also considering the severity and nature of the offense.

Charles Lindbergh, Caryl Chessman, and the Exception Proving the (Potentially Waning) Rule of Broad Prosecutorial Discretion

Broad prosecutorial discretion is generally accepted by courts and legislatures and is widely blamed by academics for the explosion in the American prison population. Statutory revisions and judicial interpretations of kidnapping law, however, provide an exception to the deference generally given to prosecutors. The very high-profile execution of Caryl Chessman quite publicly raised the question of whether kidnapping, then a capital crime in California, was defined so broadly as to permit a prosecutor to obtain the death penalty for a number of non-capital crimes, such as robbery and rape. Chessman’s case raised widespread concern about the unchecked power of prosecutors and prompted reform of the specific law that led to his execution – kidnapping. For roughly the past two decades, academics have renewed concerns about unlimited prosecutorial discretion, but no single case has drawn attention to the cause. The more generalized problem in our prison system, however, has not escaped the public’s notice. This country’s epidemic of incarceration has raised considerable alarm, something academics attribute to the broad scope of criminal laws empowering prosecutors to seek prison sentences of ever-increasing lengths. This last term, in two virtually unnoticed cases, the Supreme Court appeared to take up the invitation of the academy to rein in the power of prosecutors by limiting the scope of traditional forms of criminal liability. Whether the Supreme Court’s recent incursion into traditionally state doctrines of criminal liability is a bell weather event or not remains to be seen, but the Court has traditionally avoided considering long-existing doctrines of criminal law and the academic criticism of criminal law’s broad scope extends far beyond the aspects of complicity and felony murder the Court considered last term.

Influence of Race and Ethnicity on Charge Severity in Chicago Homicide Cases

This research examines prosecutorial decision making at the initial charging stage in Chicago homicide cases during the late 1990s. The objectives of this investigation are to determine whether African Americans were prosecuted more severely than similarly situated White and Latino defendants in Chicago homicide cases prior to the abolition of the death penalty in Illinois and to identify the factors that affected how severely prosecutors prosecuted defendants during that time. The study participants are adults who were identified by the Chicago Police Department as suspects in homicide incidents during the years of 1994 and 1995 and whose cases were selected for prosecution. Other relevant factors that may have influenced charging decisions include the defendant–victim relationship, the homicide circumstances, and the number of victims in a particular homicide incident. General linear regression modeling is used to determine the factors that affected how severely prosecutors prosecuted Chicago homicide defendants. Charge severity is measured by the number of charges of Class M felony murder that were filed against a defendant. The results indicate that prior to the moratorium on the death penalty in Chicago, all defendants studied (regardless of the race/ethnicity of their victims) were charged with fewer counts of murder (prosecuted less severely) than African American defendants who were charged with killing White victims. This direct and significant relationship persists even after adding defendant–victim relationship and homicide circumstance interaction terms to the analysis.

Measure of Penalty on Juvenile Delinquents Held Liable under the Penal Code

Characteristic traits of the juvenile delinquents - persons who do not have a fully shaped personality or much life experience, and are susceptible to negative influences - are viewed as a sufficient reason for adopting separate principle of liability towards this category of offenders. The Author underlines that among basic principles of the Penal Law a significant place is taken by the determination of the offender's minimum age at which a young person stops to be a juvenile and can incur criminal liability on general terms (when an offender turned 17). According to art. 10, par. 2 of the Penal Code, it is allowed to treat a juvenile as an adult offender and punish him for an offence, when juvenile turned 15 and committed one of the acts prohibited under the regulations of the Penal Code (an attempt on the President's life, plain and felony murder, inflicting grievous bodily injury, causing a commonly dangerous situation, hijacking of a ship or an aircraft, causing disaster, aggravated sexual assault, qualified active assault on a public functionary, taking hostage or armed robbery) and the circumstances of the case, juvenile offender's stage of development, his traits and personal conditions warrant this, and when the previously applied didactic and corrective measures proved ineffective.

Economically disadvantaged juvenile offenders tried in adult court are perceived as less able to understand their actions, but more guilty

We investigated the influence of a juvenile defendant's socioeconomic status (SES) on mock jurors’ perceptions of a juvenile tried in adult court. As predicted, participants convicted the low SES juvenile defendant of felony murder significantly more than the middle or high SES juvenile defendant. Yet, participants also rated the low SES juvenile as less mature than the middle or high SES juvenile – a belief that past research shows predicts leniency in verdicts (i.e., not guilty judgments). Finally, stereotypes about the criminality of low SES juvenile defendants, not a lack of perceived similarity, partially mediated the effect of SES on guilt.

Sandra Macpherson Harm’s Way: Tragic Responsibility and the Novel FormHarm’s Way: Tragic Responsibility and the Novel Form. Sandra Macpherson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. xi+237.

<i>Sandra Macpherson</i> Harm’s Way: Tragic Responsibility and the Novel Form<i>Harm’s Way: Tragic Responsibility and the Novel Form</i>. Sandra Macpherson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. xi+237.

The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile LWOP: Applying the Tison Standard to Juvenile Peripheral Accomplices

This article argues for the application of the Tison v. Arizona capital punishment standard in sentencing juveniles to LWOP. The article follows reasoning of the recent Supreme Court doctrinal trend of reducing the severity of punishments available to juvenile offenders and treating JLWOP and capital punishment equally. In treating JLWOP the same as capital punishment for adult offenders, the Court has established that both punishments should be reserved for only the most heinous offenses and the worst offenders. As a result, this article argues that the Court should apply the Tison standard used in adult felony murder cases to felony murder cases involving juvenile offenders.The article argues that the difference in culpability amongst offenders the Court recognizes in the felony murder context most definitely exists amongst juvenile offenders involved in felony murders. As a result of these variances in culpability, the Court should implement similar safeguards to ensure that only the most involved juvenile accomplices are sentenced to the most severe punishments. The result of implementing the Tison standard is separating highly involved, primary juvenile accomplices from mere peripheral accomplices, and sentencing them accordingly.By establishing a framework for recognizing the twice diminished culpability of a juvenile peripheral accomplice, this article argues that these peripheral accomplices are not amongst the worst offenders, and thus, should not be sentenced the same. By recognizing the twice diminished culpability, and analyzing the constitutional proportionality of JLWOP, it becomes apparent that the sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate for peripheral accomplices, and as a result, the sentence should not be available to courts sentencing these juvenile peripheral accomplices.

Conviction Odds in Chicago Homicide Cases: Does Race/Ethnicity Matter?

This study investigates disparity as it exists in the conviction of Latino, African American, and White offenders in Chicago homicide cases. The study participants were adults who had been identified by the Chicago Police Department as suspects in homicide incidents for the years 1990 through 1995. Information about the offender, victim, homicide incident, and adjudication of the homicide case in court was collected from police and court records. Logistic regression modeling was used to determine the odds of conviction for Latino, African American, and White homicide offenders at the adjudication decision point of criminal case processing. Results indicated that in Chicago homicide cases, when deciding guilt or no guilt for Class M Felony murder, neither race nor ethnicity mattered; what did matter the most was the offender–victim relationship, the number of charges filed against the offender, and the mode of conviction. This study continues the important tradition in racial and ethnic disparity studies of measuring the effect of offender–victim dyads on case outcomes. It builds on prior research in 2 ways: (a) by measuring the impact of the offender–victim dyad's race and ethnicity on conviction odds and (b) by expanding the scope of case-processing research through examining decision making at the pre-sentence adjudication stage, a point researchers have heretofore rarely examined.

When Mandatory Isn’t Required: Mandatory Sentences under the UCMJ

Unlike the federal guidelines system, and many state sentencing regimes, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) typically vests unfettered discretion with the sentencing authority, limited only by the statutorily authorized maximum for the offenses of which the accused is convicted. Indeed, “no punishment” is an authorized punishment for virtually every offense under the UCMJ, and the members are advised of this option in the standard jury instructions. There are two exceptions to this general rule of broad sentencing discretion. The UCMJ prescribes a mandatory sentence for one crime, and a mandatory minimum sentence for two other offenses. Specifically, the UCMJ imposes a mandatory death penalty for a conviction of Article 106, Spies, and a mandatory minimum of a life sentence with the possibility of parole for a violation of Article 118, subsection (1) premeditated murder, or subsection (4) felony murder. In this article, I explore how these “mandatory” sentencing terms operate in practice, and consider the various pathways around the statutorily mandated sentences.