Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act Research Articles

Impact of FDICIA Internal Controls on Bank Risk Taking

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with $500 million or more in total assets (raised to $1 billion in 2005) for bank risk taking prior to the recent financial crisis and its consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1,138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.

Unintended consequences of the increased asset threshold for FDICIA internal controls: Evidence from U.S. private banks

We examine the unintended consequences of the 2005 increase from $500 million to $1 billion in the asset threshold for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) internal control reporting requirements. We focus on a test sample of banks that increased their total assets from between $100 million and $500 million prior to the change in regulation to between $500 million and $1 billion within two years following the change. These “affected” banks are no longer subject to the internal control requirements but would have been had the regulation not been changed. We hypothesize that these affected banks are likely to make riskier loans, which will increase the likelihood of failure during the crisis period. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Affected banks have higher likelihood of failure during the crisis period than banks from two different control samples. We also find that auditor reputation (i.e., whether the bank is audited by a Big 4 auditor or an industry specialist auditor) has a moderating effect on the likelihood of failure for these affected banks.

Unintended Consequences of the Increased Asset Threshold for FDICIA Internal Controls: Evidence from U.S. Private Banks

We examine the unintended consequences of the 2005 increase from $500 million to $1 billion in the asset threshold for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) internal control reporting requirements. We focus on a test sample of banks that increased their total assets from between $100 million and $500 million prior to the change in regulation to between $500 million and $1 billion within two years following the change. These “affected” banks are no longer subject to the internal control requirements but would have been had the regulation not been changed. We hypothesize that these affected banks are likely to make riskier loans, which will increase the likelihood of failure during the crisis period. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Affected banks have higher likelihood of failure during the crisis period than banks from two different control samples. We also find that auditor reputation (i.e., whether the bank is audited by a Big 4 auditor or an industry specialist auditor) has a moderating effect on the likelihood of failure for these affected banks.

Impact of FDICIA internal controls on bank risk taking

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 was designed, among other things, to introduce risk-based deposit insurance, increase capital requirements, and improve banks’ internal controls. Of particular interest in this study are the requirements for annual audit and reporting of management’s and auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control for banks with $500 million or more in total assets (raised to $1 billion in 2005). We study the impact of these requirements on banks’ risk-taking behavior prior to the recent financial crisis and the consequent implications for bank failure and financial trouble during the crisis period. Using a sample of 1138 banks, we provide evidence that banks required to comply with the FDICIA internal control requirements have lower risk taking in the pre-crisis period. Specifically, the volatility of net interest margin, the volatility of earnings, and Z score show less risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, these banks are less likely to experience failure and financial trouble during the crisis period.

The Cost Effectiveness of the Private-Sector Resolution of Failed Bank Assets

In this paper, we examine how the cost of resolving bank failures differs between an FDIC liquidation and a private-sector resolution where the assets remain in the banking system. Our findings show that private-sector resolutions do not deliver the expected cost-savings prior to the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. We obtain this result when we control for the selection bias that arises from the resolution process. In contrast, during the post-FDICIA period, we observe that private-sector resolutions yield significant cost savings over FDIC liquidations. We also find that the direct costs are lower for private-sector resolutions over the sample period. We derive these results from a sample that spans all failures between 1986 and 2007.

The federal deposit insurance corporation improvement act, bank internal controls and financial reporting quality

Altamuro and Beatty (2009) examine financial reporting quality before and after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). They document increases in the validity of the loan-loss provision, earnings persistence, predictability of future cash flows and reductions in benchmark-beating for banks complying with FDIC's internal control regulations relative to non-complying banks. Our discussion focuses on Altamuro and Beatty's interpretation of the results, specifically that the internal control provision of FDICIA improved financial reporting quality. In this paper, we provide a brief overview of FDICIA in an attempt to assess the importance of FDIC's internal control regulations. We then review the findings of other studies on internal control regulations with the goal of evaluating what new insights we gain from Altamuro and Beatty. Next, we report new evidence relating to the sub-groups driving the changes in financial reporting quality surrounding the FDICIA. Finally, we discuss the results in the context of the current financial crisis and suggest avenues for future research.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Bank Internal Controls and Financial Reporting Quality

Altamuro and Beatty (2009) examine financial reporting quality before and after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). They document increases in the validity of the loan loss provision, earnings persistence, predictability of future cash flows and reductions in benchmark-beating for banks complying with FDIC’s internal control regulations relative to non-complying banks. Our discussion focuses on Altamuro and Beatty’s interpretation of the results, specifically that the internal control provision of FDICIA improved financial reporting quality. In this paper, we provide a brief overview of FDICIA in an attempt to assess the importance of FDIC’s internal control regulations. We then review the findings of other studies on internal control regulations with the goal of evaluating what new insights we gain from Altamuro and Beatty. Next, we report new evidence relating to the subgroups driving the changes in financial reporting quality surrounding FDICIA. Finally, we discuss the results in the context of the current financial crisis and suggest avenues for future research.

FDICIA and Risk Shifting 1n the Banking Industry

This is an empirical study that examines how the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 in the U.S. banking industry affects the moral hazard risk-taking incentives of banks. We find that FDICIA appears to be effective in significantly reducing the systematic risk-taking incentives of the banks. Considering that the banks' asset portfolios are necessarily largely systematic risk-related, the significant decrease in their systematic risk-taking incentives provides some evidence of the effectiveness of FDICIA. However, with respect to the nonsystematic risk-taking behavior, the results generally indicate statistically insignificant decreases in the risk-taking incentives after FDICIA. To well-diversified investors who can diversify nonsystematic risk away, nonsystematic risk may not be a risk any more. However, to maintain a sound banking environment and to reduce the risk to individual banks, this result implies that regulatory agents should monitor the banks’ nonsystematic risk-taking behavior more closely, as long as it is positively related to the banks’ failures. We further test the change in the risk-taking incentives by partitioning the full sample into two groups: Banks with higher moral hazard incentives as those with larger asset size and lower capital ratio and banks with lower moral hazard incentives as those with smaller asset size and higher capital ratio. The main result for this test is that, with FDICIA, the decrease in the risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives (larger asset-size and lower capital-ratio banks) is less than that of the banks with lower moral hazard incentives (smaller asset-size and higher capital-ratio banks), with respect to both systematic and nonsystematic risk-taking measures. Furthermore, the change in the nonsystematic risk-taking incentives of the banks with higher moral hazard incentives is rather mixed, while their systematic incentives are decreased. These findings imply that the regulatory agents should allocate more time and effort toward monitoring the banks with higher moral hazard incentives with particular emphasis on their nonsystematic risk-taking behavior.

The impact of FDICIA and prompt corrective action on bank capital and risk: Estimates using a simultaneous equations model

One of the requirements of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) was that bank regulators establish capital ratio zones that mandate prompt corrective action (PCA) and early intervention in troubled banks. However, prior research suggests that increases in regulatory capital standards can lead to offsetting increases in risk. This paper develops and estimates a 3SLS model to examine the simultaneous impact of PCA on both bank capital and credit risk. The results document that the FDICIA was effective in that, subsequent to its passage, US banks increased their capital ratios without offsetting increases in credit risk.

The impact of FDICIA on bank returns and risk: Evidence from the capital markets

This study examines the impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 on bank stock returns and risk. We find that FDICIA had a generally positive effect on bank stock returns and resulted in a significant reduction in bank risk. The extent of the risk reduction varies based on the capitalization, size, and credit risk of the institutions with poorly capitalized, large, and high credit risk banks experiencing the greatest risk reduction. The results obtained using two separate control groups also bolster the conclusion that FDICIA’s passage resulted in a significant decline in bank risk.

Obstacles To Optimal Policy: The Interplay Of Politics And Economics In Shaping Bank Supervision And Regulation Reforms

This paper provides a positive political economy analysis of the most important revision of the U.S. supervision and regulation system during the last two decades, the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). We analyze the impact of private interest groups as well as political-institutional factors on the voting patterns on amendments related to FDICIA and its final passage to assess the empirical importance of different types of obstacles to welfare-enhancing reforms. Rivalry of interests within the industry (large versus small banks) and between industries (banks versus insurance) as well as measures of legislator ideology and partisanship play important roles and, hence, should be taken into account in order to implement successful change. A divide and conquer' strategy with respect to the private interests appears to be effective in bringing about legislative reform. The concluding section draws tentative lessons from the political economy approaches about how to increase the likelihood of welfare-enhancing regulatory change.

THE EFFECT OF FDICIA REGULATION ON BANK HOLDING COMPANIES

AbstractWe examine market reactions to legislative announcements surrounding the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. Research shows that bank regulation adversely affects shareholder wealth on the one hand, yet often provides government subsidies on the other. The removal of Federal regulators' discretionary authority and the imposition of mandatory regulations in the FDICIA have an overall negative effect on our sample of bank holding companies. The results are consistent with either the costly regulation hypothesis or the decreased subsidies hypothesis.

Regulatory Monitoring, Closure Costs and Bank Moral Hazard Behavior

We theoretically analyze the efficacy of close regulatory monitoring and early bank closure policies, introduced by the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), in reducing the FDIC‘s losses and curbing bank moral hazard behavior induced by mis-priced deposit insurance. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we demonstrate that continuous bank monitoring and early closure may in fact exacerbate the moral hazard problem if bank shareholders face a penalty upon closure. Moreover, if reputational disincentives and monitoring costs prevent the regulator from implementing timely closure then the bank‘s moral hazard incentives are significantly altered. These results suggest several new policy implications.

THE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991 ON BANK STOCKS

AbstractIn this study we use a multivariate regression model to investigate the effect of the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 on returns to the shareholders of bank‐holding companies. The empirical results suggest that the shareholders of well‐capitalized banks benefited from the enactment of the FDICIA, while those of undercapitalized banks experienced significant losses during the announcement period. However, the shareholders of adequately capitalized banks did not gain or lose significantly from the enactment of the FDICIA. The FDICIA also affected stock returns of large and small bank‐holding companies similarly.