Claims that the State should provide recognition for same-sex partnerships necessarily require some argument as to why such recognition should be provided: these are moral arguments. Intellectual honesty and political expediency combine: gay rights advocates must rely on moral arguments. My purpose in this paper is not to construct the most convincing moral argument in support of the recognition of same-sex partnerships. Rather my purpose is to examine a number of moral arguments advanced in support of and against such recognition. My selection of arguments is, as will quickly become apparent, far from exhaustive. I focus on natural law arguments against partnership recognition and egalitarian arguments in favour of recognition. My basis for focusing on natural law arguments is my intuition that arguments against the recognition of same-sex partnerships are at root moral arguments that rely on some natural law type account of human sexuality. My basis for focusing on egalitarian arguments is my intuition that equality provides the most compelling basis on which to argue for partnership recognition. Clearly my argument is incomplete, but my hope is to make some contribution to those aspects of this debate that I have chosen, somewhat arbitrarily, to focus on. Within these limits, the purpose of this paper is ultimately two-fold: first, to assess whether some recognition of same-sex partnerships is morally permissible or required; secondly and if so, to assess which form of recognition best reflects the moral argument that justified recognition in the first instance.