Financial stress in agriculture, as indicated by the problems identified in Jolly et al.'s paper, can be caused by many factors. Farm failures can be the result of everything from poor individual management decisions to weather conditions in other countries. Differences in the causes of failures have different implications for the analysis of the effects of continuing stress. If, for example, all of the farmers who are failing today are simply poor managers, then the effects of continued stress are likely to be minimal. In fact, the elimination of poor managers might bring about net social benefits by reducing the cost of food. If good managers are being forced out of agriculture because of public policies, however, the effects may be substantially different. Thus, while the central purpose of this paper is to describe the measurable effects of sustained financial stress on the farm sector, identifying the causes of today's difficulties is an integral part of the research. Recent literature (Hughes and Penson; Perry et al.; Knutson, Richardson, and Jolly; Grant et al.) suggests three principal reasons for farmers' difficulties: macroeconomic policies, farm policies, and individual management decisions. The economic environment facing farmers has certainly played a central role in the current cash flow difficulties and/or resulting business failures characterizing American agriculture. Macroeconomic policies of recent years have generated prices and interest rates that have skewed economic returns in the economy away from capital-intensive and export-sensitive industries such as farming. Farm policies have also helped to shape current conditions. Although farm programs under the 1977 and 1981 farm bills were sufficient to mask the early stages of the current decline in farm profitability, the resources needed to continue to offset other factors have not been, nor are they likely to be, forthcoming. Finally, some farmers and farm lenders have contributed to their own problems. Many of the producers currently confronted with financial difficulties overcommitted themselves during the 1970s, assuming continuation of favorable economic conditions. As noted by King and Sonka, Because longterm debt and variable interest rates are often used to gain control of assets, managers need to consider the viability of a specific decision for several policy [and macroeconomic] scenarios in addition to the current policy. The rest of this paper is presented in three parts. First, discussion is focused on the aggregate effects of pursuing different macroeconomic policies through the end of this decade. The next section deals with the impacts of continued stress on different types of farms given different beginning leverage positions and farm policies. Finally, some of the effects of continued farm financial distress beyond the farm gate are discussed.