Family Resemblance Concept Research Articles

Making sense of the definition of public-private partnerships

PurposeDespite the widespread study and application of public-private partnerships (PPPs) since the 1980s, the field lacks a universally accepted definition that captures the concept's complexity. This study aims to offer a definition and foster a more substantive and comprehensive discourse on PPPs to improve communication and understanding between academics and practitioners from diverse disciplines and legislative backgrounds.Design/methodology/approachGrounded in the family-resemblance concept proposed by German philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, this study conducts a comprehensive literature review to identify core and non-core elements frequently cited in PPP descriptions. The authors used these findings to develop the PPP sunflower model as a structured framework for defining PPPs.FindingsThe analysis elucidates six core elements consistently present in PPP descriptions: clarity of roles and responsibilities, appropriate risk allocation and sharing, injection of expertise and resources, cooperation and teamwork, a bundle of services, and long-term contracts. Coupled with identified non-core elements, these core components comprise the PPP sunflower model, a structured framework for defining PPPs that accommodates their multi-faceted nature.Originality/valueThe PPP sunflower model distinguishes itself as a unique contribution to the PPP literature. It offers a rigorous theoretical framework that can elucidate the complexity of PPPs for various stakeholders. The model serves as a practical tool for evaluating the authenticity and viability of PPP projects. The study's novelty lies in its adoption of the family-resemblance concept, thereby providing a comprehensive, multi-dimensional framework that enhances the understanding of PPPs across different disciplines and legislative contexts.

Cora Diamond on the concept of ethics

AbstractIs ethics about anything? Cora Diamond has famously argued that ethics lacks a subject matter by providing a variety of examples of ethical discourse, which, she claims, are ethically significant without being about anything ethical. They do not have a moral subject matter, but are nonetheless instances of moral thinking. This raises the question what it means for a piece of discourse to be moral. What does Diamond mean by the concept of ethics? Diamond never gives this question a direct answer, which is a cause for concern, among other things because there is reason to worry that any workable account of the concept of ethics will lead back to the idea that ethics has a subject matter. I explain how this worry can be averted by construing the concept of ethics as a family resemblance concept.

Social Entrepreneurship as a Family Resemblance Concept with Distinct Ethical Views

Almost 25 years after Dees’ article on the meaning of social entrepreneurship, conceptual controversy persists. Based on a qualitative analysis of 209 definitions of social entrepreneurship and respective academic articles, we argue that the concept follows a family resemblance structure and identify the 12 distinct attributes that comprehensively define it. Membership in social entrepreneurship is not defined by a case possessing a universally accepted set of criterial features but by carrying shared attributes with other cases. The family resemblance structure points to the persistent fallacy of using the same term to label different phenomena and cautions researchers against causal homogeneity assumptions among different conceptual subtypes. Assuming a descriptive stance, we shed light on how distinct ethical positions relate to different definitions of social entrepreneurship. Among the existing conceptual variety, we identify four prominent subtypes and find that ‘market-based’ conceptualizations relate to economism, the ‘social business’ subtype relates to rule utilitarian positions, ‘efficiency-driven’ definitions are associated with hedonistic act utilitarian views, and the ‘transformational impact’ subtype is akin to a eudemonic act utilitarian stance.

Is There a Limit to Resemblances?

The notion of family resemblance has recently emerged as a promising and fruitful approach to characterising the nature of science (NOS) in science education research, offering solutions to some perplexing challenges such as capturing both the domain-general and domain-specific features of science with a single framework. At the same time, however, criticism has been levelled that the resemblance might eventually extend to certain activities that are not scientific but pose as science. This would be an undesirable consequence for science educators, particularly given the increasing need for individuals to discern pseudoscientific claims circulated on social media from scientific information. Many pseudoscientific and non-scientific activities resemble science in terms of their aim to explain nature, their use of evidence-based methods, and their interrelation with politics and society. In this theoretical article, we build on the concept of family resemblance to consider how it can simultaneously explain the diversity and unity of science and help students to learn about the nature of science and that of pseudoscience in science education. We put forward three principles that can guide teaching about pseudoscience based on the family resemblance conceptualisation of science.

Margaret Macdonald on the definition of art

ABSTRACT In this paper, I show that, in a number of publications in the early 1950s, Margaret Macdonald argues that art does not admit of definition, that art is – in the sense associated with Wittgenstein – a family resemblance concept, and that definitions of art are best understood as confused or poorly expressed contributions to art criticism. This package of views is most typically associated with a famous paper by Morris Weitz from 1956. I demonstrate that Macdonald advanced that package prior to Weitz, indeed, prior to any other philosopher of art of the period. Despite this, Macdonald’s contribution is nowhere to be found in the subsequent literature on the definition of art. In closing, I raise the prospect that Macdonald was in fact the primary influence on the development of Weitz’s critique of the definitional project.

Rethinking Perspectives of Power in Collaborative Governance

Power is an important concept in understanding collaborative governance, however, the existing research is largely dominated by the functional and critical perspectives of power. Aided by a conceptual content analysis of power used in collaborative governance literature in the top public administration journals, we viewed power as a family resemblance concept that should be conceptualized through four perspectives: functional, critical, social construction, and pragmatic. We provide elaboration of each of these four perspectives and propose counterarguments to assumptions that have arisen due to the reliance on a functional or critical perspective of power. We conclude that viewing power as a family resemblance concept with at least four perspectives offers collaborative governance researchers the ability to adopt the best perspective that is the most useful for their analysis and most helpful for public administrators to understand power in their collaborative efforts.

Entrepreneurship as a family resemblance concept: A Wittgensteinian approach to the problem of defining entrepreneurship

Why is consensus and clarity about the definition of entrepreneurship so elusive? The central premise of this paper is that we can gain a better understanding of the problem of defining entrepreneurship, of what it means to us as a field of research, and what we can hope to achieve by grappling with it, by substituting one question for another. The question we must start with to get a clear view is not “What is entrepreneurship?”, but rather “What sort of concept is entrepreneurship?” This reframing enables us to see that entrepreneurship is a family resemblance concept. It follows from this metacognitive insight, if it is correct, that all attempts to define entrepreneurship will be subject to counterexamples. This perspective is used to therapeutically alleviate emotional and behavioral problems in the field of entrepreneurship, and to offer practical suggestions for how to deal productively with paradigmatic diversity in the field.

Transforming Family Resemblance Concepts into Fuzzy Sets

This article aims to clarify fundamental aspects of the process of assigning fuzzy scores to conditions based on family resemblance (FR) structures by considering prototype and set theories. Prototype theory and set theory consider FR structures from two different angles. Specifically, set theory links the conceptualization of FR to the idea of sufficient and INUS (Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition, which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result) sets. In contrast, concept membership in prototype theory is strictly linked to the notion of similarity (or resemblance) in relation to the prototype, which is the anchor of the ideational content of the concept. After an introductive section where I elucidate set-theoretic and prototypical aspects of concept formation, I individuate the axiomatic properties that identify the principles of transforming FR structures into fuzzy sets. Finally, I propose an algorithm based on the power mean that is able to operationalize FR structures considering both set-theoretic and prototype theory perspectives.

Medicine as science. Systematicity and demarcation

While medicine is solidly grounded on scientific areas such as biology and chemistry, some argue that it is in its essence not a science at all. With medicine playing a substantial societal role, addressing questions about the scientific nature of medicine is of obvious urgency. This paper takes on such a task and starts by consulting the literature on the “demarcation” problem in the philosophy of science. Learning from failures of earlier approaches, it proposes that we adopt a Deflated Approach, which acknowledges that “science” is a family resemblance concept that admits differences of degrees to nonscientific undertakings. Then, drawing on Paul Hoyningen-Huene’s (Systematicity: The nature of science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013); (Synthese 196: 907–928, 2019) account of systematicity and Alexander Bird’s (Synthese 196: 863–879, 2019) analysis of examples from the history of medicine, the paper argues that medicine meets the requirement for systematicity on all dimensions and thereby qualifies as a science. The paper then considers and defuses two objections. First, it is shown that nonepistemic differences linked to the distinctive duality of medicine do not warrant thinking that medicine is not science. Second, against some recent criticism (Oreskes in Synthese 196: 881–905, 2019), the paper uses homeopathy as an example to show that (synchronic and diachronic) systematicity can succeed as a demarcation criterion.

Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense

The aim of this paper is to show that a corollary of resolute readings of Wittgenstein’s conception of nonsense cannot be sustained. First, I describe the corollary. Next, I point out the relevance to it of Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance concepts. Then, I survey some typical uses of nonsense to see what they bring to an ordinary language treatment of the word “nonsense” and its relatives. I will subsequently consider the objection, on behalf of a resolute reading, that “nonsense” is a term of philosophical criticism. Finally, I conclude that resolute readings have not sufficiently accounted for how nonsense behaves in our language; they have failed to heed Wittgenstein’s warning: “don’t think, but look!”

The Emergence of Wittgenstein’s Views on Aesthetics in the 1933 Lectures

In this paper I offer a genetic account of how Wittgenstein developed his ideas on aesthetics in his 1933 lectures. He argued that the word ‘beautiful’ is neither the name of a particular perceptible quality, nor the name of whatever produces a certain psychological effect, and unlike ‘good’, it does not stand for a family-resemblance concept either. Rather, the word ‘beautiful’ has different meanings in different contexts as we apply it according to different criteria. However, in more advanced regions of aesthetics the word ‘beautiful’ ceases to play an important role. Instead, we judge things to be more or less correct according to genre-specific standards or criteria, which in an aesthetic discussion are presupposed, rather than argued for. Finally, Wittgenstein came to realise that providing support for an aesthetic appraisal according to some given criteria is not the only and perhaps not even the main focus of aesthetic discussion. More interesting to him became the idea of a puzzle or perplexity in aesthetics, which he discussed in greater detail in his 1938 lectures.

The Policy-Making Capacity of Foreign Ministries in Presidential Regimes: A Study of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 1946–2015

This article investigates the sources of foreign ministries’ policy-making capacity in presidential regimes. Using the concept of family resemblance, we argue that professionalization of the diplomatic corps is a necessary condition, whereas the institutional attributions of the ministry and the degree of presidential delegation are relevant but substitutable elements. The higher the scores on either of the latter dimensions, the stronger is the capacity of the foreign ministry to influence the chief executive and to contest other players’ policy preferences. To empirically validate our concept, we measure the three dimensions in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico between 1946 and 2015 using data on diplomats’ recruitment and career paths, influence of diplomatic schools and doctrines, appointment patterns of foreign ministers, and relevance of presidential diplomacy, with an emphasis on travels abroad. Our analysis indicates that Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico enjoy a high level of professionalization of their diplomatic corps; however, differences—both across countries and over time—remain regarding institutional attributions and presidential delegation.

Gattungsgeschichte und ihr Gattungsbegriff am Beispiel der Novellen

Gattungsgeschichte und ihr Gattungsbegriff am Beispiel der Novellen

Wushu: a culture of adversaries

ABSTRACTWushu is widely misunderstood and its essentially combative nature is being challenged in public discussion. Understanding and recovering its essential nature has become a core issue. This paper first conducts a review of the history of the Chinese hieroglyphic 武 (Wu) which is the core of the phrase of Wushu, and explores the word’s two most widely-accepted interpretations: ‘to carry a dagger-axe to fight with’ and ‘to put away the dagger-axe and stop fighting’. Understanding these two interpretations of Wu is the key to understand Wushu which is an art about Wu. Second, this paper, referencing cultural history, analyzes different methods of Wushu practice: Gedou (free combat), Taolu (compiled routine) and Gongfa (basic prowess). Third, based on Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance, this paper analyzes the different sorts of opponents, either real or imagined, in Taolu, Gedou, and Gongfa. Finally, this paper redefines Wushu as a culture of adversaries where such adversaries implicitly transfer the practitioner’s focus ‘from non-human to human’ and ‘from others to the self’.

Veterinarians between the Frontlines?! The Concept of One Health and Three Frames of Health in Veterinary Medicine

The “One Health” initiative promises to combine different health-related issues concerning humans and animals in an overarching concept and in related practices to the benefit of both humans and animals. Far from dismissing One Health, this paper nevertheless argues that different veterinary interventions are determined by social practices and connected expectations and are, thus, hardly compliant with only one single conceptualization of health, as the One Health concept suggests. One Health relies on a naturalistic understanding of health focusing on similar bodies that show a similar etiology. However, logics, normativity, and practices exhibit differences when it comes to combatting infectious diseases, maintaining productivity of livestock animals or preventing companion animals from suffering. Therefore, drawing from Charles Rosenberg’s groundbreaking texts on framing disease, we suggest to conceive of health as dispersed in different frames. Thus, this paper proposes to interpret health as complex and multi-layered concept. We distinguish and introduce an objectivist, a functional, and a sentientistic frame of health. Instead of reducing the differential veterinary practices to one paradigmatic understanding, health is seen as a model case of Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance. Different and distinct perspectives on veterinary medicine show sufficient overlapping that allows for a common conceptualization, but there is not one single underlying logic suitable to understand and ethically reflect all veterinary interventions. This differentiability promises to reduce moral stress in veterinary professionals since it allows the interpretation of various, seemingly contradicting practices as dependent on multi-layered and socially determined scopes of responsibility.

Language as a Family-Resemblance Concept in Wittgenstein

The article begins by considering Wittgenstein’s notion of family-resemblance concepts. The article purports to defend that there is something wrong with the idea that language is a family-resemblance concept, that is, that we take behaviour as being linguistic merely in virtue of undetermined similarities with paradigmatic linguistic behaviour. In order to achieve this goal, it is first clarified in which sense so-called psychological concepts are not family-resemblance concepts. The essential link between the use of the expressions “language” and “linguistic behaviour” and the use of some expressions conveying psychological concepts, such as “saying something”, is then demonstrated.

Privacy: Essentially Contested, a Family Resemblance Concept, or a Family of Conceptions?

The status of the concept of privacy is disputed. In this paper I consider arguments by Daniel Solove, that privacy is a family resemblance concept (in the sense of Wittgenstein, and by Deirdre Mulligan et al that it is an essentially contested concept (in the sense of Gallie). I argue that, although there are good reasons for taking it as a family resemblance concept, that this only explains agreement, not disagreement. Hence the theory will not serve Solove's purposes, and is rather consistent with agreement. Similar considerations suggest that privacy is not a normative concept, and hence that it is cannot be essentially contested. I argue instead that there are multiple conceptions of privacy, and furthermore disagreement about privacy are explained by the existence of parallel conversations about privacy that take place at 7 levels.

The “Species” Concept as a Gateway to Nature of Science

The nature of science (NOS) is a primary goal in school science. Most teachers are not well-prepared for teaching NOS, but a sophisticated and in-depth understanding of NOS is necessary for effective teaching. Some authors emphasize the need for teaching NOS in context. Species, a central concept in biology, is proposed in this article as a concrete example of a means for achieving increased understanding of NOS. Although species are commonly presented in textbooks as fixed entities with a single definition, the concept of species is a highly discussed one in the science and the philosophy of biology. A multitude of species concepts exist, reflecting both the views and interests of researchers and their utility in different organism groups. The present study serves to address the following questions: How do textbooks in Norwegian primary and lower secondary schools present the concept of species? Can inquiries into the concept of “species” serve to highlight aspects of NOS? A review of the available literature on species and species concepts in school is also performed. In the schoolbooks, the biological species concept is commonly used as the main definition, whereas the morphological species concept is represented by additional remarks of similarity. The potential and pitfalls of using the species concept for teaching NOS are discussed, with NOS being discussed both as a family resemblance concept and as a consensus list. Teacher education is proposed as a starting point for inducing a more sophisticated view of biology into schools.

Four conceptions of social pathology

This article starts with the idea that the task of social philosophy can be defined as the diagnosis and therapy of social pathologies. It discusses four conceptions of social pathology. The first two conceptions are ‘normativist’ and hold that something is a social pathology if it is socially wrong. On the first view, there is no encompassing characterization of social pathologies available: it is a cluster concept of family resemblances. On the second view, social pathologies share a structure (e.g. second-order disorder). The last two conceptions are ‘naturalist’ and hold that something is wrong because it is pathological. The third view takes it that society is the kind of substance that can fall ill – an organism. The fourth view operates with the notion of a social life that can degenerate. The four conceptions are compared along six criteria: (1) is the view plausible?; (2) is it informative (if true)?; (3) does it help define the task of social philosophy?; (4) does it take naturalistic vocabulary seriously?; (5) does it hold that pathologies share a structure?; and (6) how does it see the primacy of being wrong and being pathological?

The many roads to Rome: family resemblance concepts in the social sciences

What are the different ways in which family resemblance conceptual structures can be used in the social sciences? When should they be used and what are the specific advantages and challenges they pose? What are the descriptive and causal implications derived from their use? This paper advances our understanding of these conceptual structures by answering these questions and illustrating them with examples from established scholarship in political science. The paper first breaks down the broad category of family resemblance concepts into three types of structures, using set theoretic logic: individual sufficiency, INUS, and mixed structures. Second, we discuss when these alternative structures are more useful for concept formation, proposing three different prototypical situations to use them: when we seek to disaggregate an abstract attribute, when our concept relies on the negation of classic concepts, and when our concept rests on what we label as cumulative signification. Third, the paper introduces the logic of subtype formation in family resemblance and compares it with classical subtypes, showing that unlike the latter, subtypes in family resemblance do not require additional attributes; sufficient combinations of the main concept can at the same time be subtypes. Forth, the paper analyzes the descriptive and causal implications of using family resemblance conceptual structures, showing a trade-off between empirical differentiation and potential causal heterogeneity. A concluding section evaluates some misuses of family resemblance, highlighting the importance of avoiding empirical and theoretical pitfalls.