False Memory Studies Research Articles

Unringing the bell: Successful debriefing following a rich false memory study

In rich false memory studies, familial informants often provide information to support researchers in planting vivid memories of events that never occurred. The goal of the current study was to assess how effectively we can retract these false memories via debriefing – i.e., to what extent can we put participants back the way we found them? We aimed to establish (1) what proportion of participants would retain a false memory or false belief following debriefing, and (2) whether richer, more detailed memories would be more difficult to retract. Participants (N = 123) completed a false memory implantation protocol as part of a replication of the “Lost in the Mall” study (Loftus & Pickrell, Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720-725, 1995). By the end of the protocol, 14% of participants self-reported a memory for the fabricated event, and a further 52% believed it had happened. Participants were then fully debriefed, and memory and belief for the false event were assessed again. In a follow-up assessment 3 days post-debriefing, the false memory rate had dropped to 6% and false belief rates also fell precipitously to 7%. Moreover, virtually all persistent false memories were found to be nonbelieved memories, where participants no longer accepted that the fabricated event had occurred. Richer, more detailed memories were more resistant to correction, but were still mostly retracted. This study provides evidence that participants can be “dehoaxed”, and even very convincing false memories can be retracted.

False memory in a second language: The importance of controlling the knowledge of word meaning.

In the globalized world we live in, it is increasingly common for people to speak more than one language. Although research in psychology has been widely interested in the study of false memories with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, to date, there is a scarcity of studies comparing false memories in the first and the second language (L1 and L2, respectively). It is noteworthy that one of the most studied variables in the DRM paradigm, the backward associative strength (BAS), has hardly been studied in the L2. Moreover, the only study that recently examined this matter found differences in the knowledge of L2-word meaning between the high-BAS and low-BAS lists, which would hinder the interpretation of the BAS effect in L2 false memories. Taking all this into account, the current work examined false memories in the L1 (Spanish) and the L2 (English) as a function of BAS overcoming the limitations of the previous study. We selected DRM lists using both Spanish and English free association norms and lists were constructed to vary in BAS values while controlling the knowledge of word meaning. Results showed that false recognition was greater in the L1 or dominant language than in the L2 or non-dominant language. Furthermore, BAS modulated the false recognition in both the L1 and the L2. That is, false recognition was higher in high-BAS than low-BAS lists in both languages. Sensitivity index from the signal-detection theory helped us gain further insight into these results. The main findings are discussed in the light of theoretical models from both the false memory and the second language processing literature. Finally, practical implications and future research are provided.

How do participants feel about the ethics of rich false memory studies?

ABSTRACT Deception is often a necessity in rich false memory studies, but is this deception acceptable to participants? In the current study, we followed up with 175 participants who had taken part in a replication of the Lost in the Mall childhood false memory study (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), as either a research subject or a familial informant. We found that both participants and informants were generally very positive about their experience, did not regret taking part and found the deceptive methods acceptable. Importantly, the vast majority reported that they would still have taken part had they known the true objectives from the beginning. Participants also reported learning something interesting about memory and enjoying the nostalgia and family discussions that were prompted by the study. We would encourage other researchers to assess the ethical implications of false memory research paradigms and to incorporate the valuable feedback from participants and informants.

Can we learn from errors? Retrieval facilitates the correction of false memories for pragmatic inferences

Errorful learning suggests that, when perfect learning has not yet been attained, errors can enhance future learning if followed by corrective feedback. Research on memory updating has shown that after retrieval, memory becomes more malleable and prone to change. Thus, retrieval of a wrong answer might provide a good context for the incorporation of feedback. Here, we tested this hypothesis using sentences including pragmatic sentence implications, commonly used for the study of false memories. Across two experiments with young adults, we hypothesized that corrective feedback would be more efficient at reducing false memories if provided immediately after retrieval, when memory is more malleable than after being exposed to the material. Participants’ memory was assessed as a function of the type of learning task (Experiment 1: retrieval vs. restudy; and Experiment 2: active vs. passive recognition); and whether participants received corrective feedback or not. In both experiments, we observed that retrieval not only improved correct recall (replicating the testing effect) but also promoted the correction of false memories. Notably, corrective feedback was more effective when given after errors that were committed during retrieval rather than after restudy (Experiment 1) or after passive recognition (Experiment 2). Our results suggest that the benefits of retrieval go beyond the testing effect since it also facilitates false memories correction. Retrieval seems to enhance memory malleability, thus improving the incorporation of feedback, compared to the mere presentation of the information. Our results support the use of learning strategies that engage in active and explicit retrieval because, even if the retrieved information is wrong—when immediate feedback is provided—memory updating is promoted and errors are more likely to be corrected.

Fool me twice: how effective is debriefing in false memory studies?

ABSTRACT Deception is often necessary in false memory studies, especially when the study aims to explore the effect of misinformation on memory. At the end of the study, participants are debriefed, but does this eliminate the influence of misinformation? In the current study, we followed up 630 participants six months after they participated in a study in which they were exposed to fabricated political news stories. We compared the memories of these “continuing participants” for both novel and previously seen news stories to the memories of 474 newly recruited participants. Relative to new recruits, continuing participants were less likely to report a false memory for a story that they had been previously exposed to, and they were also less likely to report a false memory for a novel fake news story. Continuing participants were more likely to report a memory for previously seen true events than novel true events. Both groups of participants reported enjoying the experience and feeling confident that they understood which stories were fabricated. Importantly, this study did not find any negative long-term effects of participating in our false memory experiment, and even exhibited some positive effects.

False memories in music listening: exploring the misinformation effect and individual difference factors in auditory memory

ABSTRACTThe study of false memory has had a profound impact on our understanding of how and what we remember, as shown by the misinformation paradigm [Loftus, E. F. (2005). Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation of the malleability of memory. Learning & Memory, 12(4), 361–366. doi:10.1101/lm.94705]. Though misinformation effects have been demonstrated extensively within visual tasks, they have not yet been explored in the realm of non-visual auditory stimuli. Thus, the present study aimed to investigate whether post-event information can create false memories of music listening episodes. In addition, we explored individual difference factors potentially associated with false memory susceptibility in music, including age, suggestibility, personality, and musical training. In two music recognition tasks, participants (N = 151) listened to an initial music track, which unbeknownst to them was missing an instrument. They were then presented with post-event information which either suggested the presence of the missing instrument or did not. The presence of misinformation resulted in significantly poorer performance on the music recognition tasks (d = .43), suggesting the existence of false musical memories. A random forest analysis indicated that none of the individual difference factors assessed were significantly associated with misinformation susceptibility. These findings support previous research on the fallibility of human memory and demonstrate, to some extent, the generality of the misinformation effect to a non-visual auditory domain.

Associative strength or gist extraction: Which matters when DRM lists have two critical lures?

The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm is often used in the study of false memories. This paradigm typically uses lists of words associated with one critical lure. The primary objective of our study was to understand the production of false memories using the DRM paradigm when lists of words are associated with two critical lures. Three experiments were performed, and it was observed that the critical lures associated with the first set were significantly more frequently recalled than the critical lures associated with the second set. This result was verified when the words were presented in descending order of association with the critical lure (Experiment 1), when the words of the second set were presented in ascending order of association with the critical lure (Experiment 2), and when all the words in the list had the same associative strength (Experiment 3). Results are explained by the activation/monitoring and fuzzy-trace theories.

The Study of False Memories: Historical Refl ection

The Study of False Memories: Historical Refl ection

The influence of perceptual similarity and individual differences on false memories in aging

Previous false memory research has suggested that older adults' false memories are based on an overreliance on gist processing in the absence of item-specific details. Yet, false memory studies have rarely taken into consideration the precise role of item-item similarity on the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying perceptual false memories in older adults. In addition, work in our laboratory has suggested that when investigating the neural basis of false memories in older adults, it is equally as critical to take into account interindividual variability in behavior. With both factors in mind, the present study was the first to examine how both controlled, systematic differences in perceptual relatedness between targets and lures and individual differences in true and false recognition contribute to the neural basis of both true and false memories in older adults. Results suggest that between-subject variability in memory performance modulates neural activity in key regions associated with false memories in aging, whereas systematic differences in perceptual similarity did not modulate neural activity associated with false memories.

Attentive Observation Is Essential for the Misattribution of Agency to Self-Performance.

Recent studies have repeatedly demonstrated a false memory phenomenon in which people falsely remember having performed an action by oneself when in fact they have only observed the action by another person. We investigated the attentional effect to the action itself on the observation inflation. Fifty-four participants first performed and read actions (Phase 1); then, they observed the action video that showed another’s actions (Phase 2), some of which they had not performed in Phase 1. In the Phase 2, they were required to focus on either the actor’s performance (i.e., attentive observation condition) or irrelevant objects, which were presented in the background (i.e., inattentive observation condition) to modulate their attention. Around 2 weeks later, participants took a surprise source-memory test (Phase 3). In this phase, we asked them to judge whether they “performed,” “read,” or “not presented” the action in Phase 1. Three participants were removed from analysis, because they could not attend Phase 3 within 10–16 days after completion of the second phase. We found observation inflation only in the attentive condition, which contradicted the notions from other false memory studies that showed that attention to the target stimuli reduced false memory in general. We discussed the observation inflation mechanism from the perspective of the “like me” system, including the mirror neuron system, self-ownership, and self-agency.

False memories and real epistemic problems

The dichotomy between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ in relation to memory is difficult to clearly sustain. The veridicality of memory is typically established by drawing on the local, normative procedures that operate in a given setting (e.g. legal, clinical, social). Since all procedures are strictly relative, all memories are technically either ‘relatively falsified’ or ‘relatively as-yet-unfalsified’. False memory studies claim to be able explain the production of false memories, but do not offer criterion to effectively differentiate populations of so-called ‘true’ and ‘false’ victims. The narrative of the discovery of the ‘false memories’ themselves is inconsistent and demonstrates a significant level of imagination inflation and suggestibility to dominant narratives in post-war psychology. In attending to the setting specificity of memory, researchers may wish to consider how their work impacts on the experience–ecologies to which they contribute.

False Memories and Free Speech: Is Scientific Debate Being Suppressed?

SummaryCommentators have raised important points, including the relative contribution of false beliefs versus false memories and the issue of how findings in the laboratory can be generalized to the real world, which we have addressed here. However, some of the commentaries misrepresent what we said, make criticisms that are unfounded, or imply that our article should not have been published in Applied Cognitive Psychology. We relate these responses to a more general literature on the suppression of unwanted scientific findings and suggest that the study of false memory would be better served by more openness to alternative perspectives. Copyright © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd

The Potential for False Memories is Bigger than What Brewin and Andrews Suggest.

SummaryBrewin and Andrews (2016) reviewed the literature on false memory propensity for childhood events. In this commentary, we critically evaluate their basic claim that proneness to false memories of childhood experiences is more limited than has been articulated in the literature. We show that Brewin and Andrews were selective in their inclusion of false memory studies, thereby ignoring relevant research related to autobiographical false memories. Equally important, and in contrast to what Brewin and Andrews claim, we show that implanted false memories elicited by misinformation are characterized by high confidence. © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

What's the gist? The influence of schemas on the neural correlates underlying true and false memories

The current study used a novel scene paradigm to investigate the role of encoding schemas on memory. Specifically, the study examined the influence of a strong encoding schema on retrieval of both schematic and non-schematic information, as well as false memories for information associated with the schema. Additionally, the separate roles of recollection and familiarity in both veridical and false memory retrieval were examined. The study identified several novel results. First, while many common neural regions mediated both schematic and non-schematic retrieval success, schematic recollection exhibited greater activation in visual cortex and hippocampus, regions commonly shown to mediate detailed retrieval. More effortful cognitive control regions in the prefrontal and parietal cortices, on the other hand, supported non-schematic recollection, while lateral temporal cortices supported familiarity-based retrieval of non-schematic items. Second, both true and false recollection, as well as familiarity, were mediated by activity in left middle temporal gyrus, a region associated with semantic processing and retrieval of schematic gist. Moreover, activity in this region was greater for both false recollection and false familiarity, suggesting a greater reliance on lateral temporal cortices for retrieval of illusory memories, irrespective of memory strength. Consistent with previous false memory studies, visual cortex showed increased activity for true compared to false recollection, suggesting that visual cortices are critical for distinguishing between previously viewed targets and related lures at retrieval. Additionally, the absence of common visual activity between true and false retrieval suggests that, unlike previous studies utilizing visual stimuli, when false memories are predicated on schematic gist and not perceptual overlap, there is little reliance on visual processes during false memory retrieval. Finally, the medial temporal lobe exhibited an interesting dissociation, showing greater activity for true compared to false recollection, as well as for false compared to true familiarity. These results provided an indication as to how different types of items are retrieved when studied within a highly schematic context. Results both replicate and extend previous true and false memory findings, supporting the Fuzzy Trace Theory.

Comparative study of false memory in dementia with Lewy bodies and Alzheimer's disease

The production of false memories (FMs) is a normal phenomenon, which can be affected in neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's disease (AD). Only few studies investigated FMs in patients with dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB). The aim of our preliminary study was to assess FMs in patients with DLB and to identify the underlying cognitive deficits influencing the production of FMs in DLB and AD. Ten AD patients and nine DLB patients performed a memory task (free recall and recognition) coupling two paradigms, namely the DRM (Deese-Roediger-McDermott) paradigm, promoting the production of FMs and the "Remember/Know" (R/K) paradigm, allowing to investigate the phenomenological experience during the recollection of a memory. A standard cognitive evaluation of memory, executive and instrumental functions completed the assessment. No FM was found in the DLB group during free recall, while the number of FMs was substantially identical in both groups during recognition. However, FMs differed from the phenomenological experience, with more K responses in DLB patients and more R responses in AD patients. None of the tests of the standard neuropsychological evaluation did correlate with measures of interest of FMs. In AD patients, the R responses associated with FMs reflect an alteration of the source memory. In DLB patients, the critical item lead to a sense of familiarity, without recollection of the circumstances in which the item was encoded, hence the K responses. This indicates a preservation of their source memory. Contrary to expectations, the type of FMs in both groups was not correlated to their cognitive profile. Hence, cognitive processes underlying the FMs appear to be different in AD and the LBD, but FMs seem independent of memory and executive abilities in these diseases.

The malleability of developmental trends in neutral and negative memory illusions.

Among many legal professionals and memory researchers there exists the assumption that susceptibility to false memory decreases with age. In 4 misinformation experiments, we show that under conditions that focus on the meaning of experiences, children are not always the most susceptible to suggestion-induced false memories. We begin by presenting a short overview of previous developmental false memory studies, the majority of which have found that the susceptibility to misinformation decreases with age. In Experiment 1, 6/7-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults received a video and were confronted with misinformation about related but nonpresented details. Older children and adults had higher misinformation acceptance rates than younger children. In Experiment 2, we replicated this finding adding a younger child group (4/6-year-olds). In Experiments 3 and 4, we used new material and again found that susceptibility to misinformation increased with age. Together, these experiments show that children’s memory accuracy is not necessarily inferior to that of adults.’

Forced-Choice False Recognition Controlling for Response Bias Correlates With Dissociative Amnesia Controlling for Imagery, but Not With Image Vividness Controlling for Dissociation

In the present study of false memory, subjects completed the Prevalence of Visual Imagery Test (PVIT), the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), and the Curious Experiences Survey (CES); then, after generating visual images, viewing categorically related pictures, and viewing categorically related words, subjects completed forced-choice source recognition tests for whether they had “imaged” the word, the picture, or the image in a given category. Scoring higher on the CES Dissociative Amnesia/Fugue factor—controlling for the VVIQ and the PVIT—was associated both with poorer memory of the imaged source of visual images and with false memory of an imaged source for pictures. In contrast, greater image vividness on the VVIQ—controlling for CES factors—was not statistically associated with memory of an imaged source for images, pictures, or words. Greater image prevalence on the PVIT—controlling for CES factors—was associated with better memory of the imaged source of visual images and with less false memory of an imaged source for words.

Falsas Memórias e o Paradigma DRM: Uma Abordagem por Meio de Fotos Emocionais Associadas

O estudo das falsas memórias tem sido beneficiado pelo uso do paradigma DRM (Deese-Roediger-McDermott), no qual listas de palavras associadas induzem à falsa lembrança de itens não apresentados previamente. Para demonstrar a eficácia de uma categoria alternativa de estímulos, investigou-se a influência da emoção nas falsas memórias por meio de conjuntos de fotografias temática e emocionalmente associadas, extraídas do IAPS (International Affective Picture System). Foram verificados índices de falsas memórias comparáveis àqueles observados em estudos que utilizaram estímulos verbais ou estímulos visuais simples. Conjuntos negativos eliciaram maiores índices de memórias verdadeiras e de falsas memórias do que conjuntos positivos. Sugere-se que resultados tipicamente observados com o DRM podem ser obtidos por meio de conjuntos de fotografias, estímulos mais complexos e ecológicos do que palavras.

Identificabilidade dos temas de listas formadas por associação retrógrada (backward): Contributo para o estudo das memórias falsas

O paradigma DRM tem sido frequentemente usado no estudo das memórias falsas e baseia-se na utilização de listas de palavras associadas convergindo para um determinado tema. Neste estudo são apresentadas as percentagens de identificabilidade dos temas de 79 listas formadas por associação retrógrada. Cada grupo de listas (composto por 15/16 listas) foi testado por um número mínimo de 98 participantes. Após a apresentação auditiva de cada lista DRM, os participantes geraram uma palavra que consideraram como o melhor definidor do tema dessa lista. Os resultados evidenciam grande variabilidade na percentagem de identificação dos temas das listas e incentivam a realização de estudos futuros para melhor compreender o papel da identificabilidade dos temas das listas na formação de memórias falsas.

False Beliefs Can Shape Current Consumption

In this study, we explore whether false beliefs about a past experience affect current consumption of wine by suggesting to participants that they either “Loved” or “Got Sick” from drinking white wine before age 20. Specifically, we report the consequences of false beliefs about wine, which could take the form of either increased or decreased wine consumption. In response to the suggestion, and similar to other false memory studies many participants became more confident that the suggested event occurred in their past. However, it was easier to influence participants’ consumption behavior when we used the “Loved” suggestion rather than the “Got Sick” suggestion. This finding has implications for marketers who use suggestions to influence product consumption by connecting consumers to their autobiographical memories.