False Autobiographical Memories Research Articles

Relation between Deese-Roediger-Mcdermott recall measures of false memory and the fading affect bias

The fading affect bias (FAB) is the faster fading of unpleasant affect than pleasant affect for autobiographical event memories, and it is considered a healthy coping mechanism because it is positively related to healthy measures (e.g., self-esteem and positive PANAS), whereas it is negatively related to unhealthy measures (e.g., psychological distress and negative PANAS). Some researchers suggest that Deese-Roediger McDermott (DRM) critical lure false memories for words are conceptually equivalent to false memories for autobiographical event memories, which has not been examined. Based on the finding that false autobiographical event memories negatively predict FAB, the current study tested if false DRM word memories would negatively predict FAB for autobiographical event memories, which would demonstrate support for the conceptual equivalence of DRM memories and autobiographical event memories. We found that three measures of false word recall positively predicted FAB, which is a result that is contrary to prior findings and the contention that DRM false memories for words are conceptually the same as autobiographical event memories.

Implanting false autobiographical memories for repeated events

ABSTRACT Research to date has exclusively focused on the implantation of false memories for single events. The current experiment is the first proof of concept that false memories can be implanted for repeated autobiographical experiences using an adapted false memory implantation paradigm. We predicted that false memory implantation approaches for repeated events would generate fewer false memories compared to the classic implantation method for single events. We assigned students to one of three implantation conditions in our study: Standard, Repeated, and Gradual. Participants underwent three interview sessions with a 1-week interval between sessions. In the Standard condition, we exposed participants to a single-event implantation method in all three interviews. In the Repeated condition, participants underwent a repeated-event implantation method in the three interviews. The Gradual condition also consisted of a repeated-event implantation method, however, in the first interview alone, we suggested to participants that they had experienced the false narrative once. Surprisingly, within our sample, false memories rates in the Standard condition were not higher compared to the Repeated and Gradual conditions. Although sometimes debated, our results imply that false memories for repeated events can be implanted in lab conditions, likely with the same ease as false memories for single events.

CORRIGENDUM

Applied Cognitive PsychologyVolume 35, Issue 1 p. 317-317 CORRIGENDUM Free Access CORRIGENDUM This article corrects the following: Commentary for special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology in honor of Alan Scoboria D. Stephen Lindsay Volume 34Issue 6Applied Cognitive Psychology pages: 1345-1349 First Published online: November 3, 2020 First published: 17 January 2021 https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3780 AboutSectionsPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat D. Stephen Lindsay: ‘Commentary for special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology in honor of Alan Scoboria.’ Applied Cognitive Psychology, 34,1345-1349. On page 1348 it was stated: “Brewin and Andrews (2017) reviewed the literature on false memories and argued that the rate of false memories in the real world is no higher than 15% of individuals exposed to suggestive influences. But any “upper limit” on the percentage of adults who can be led to experience false memories will depend on interactions among numerous variables.” In fact, the figure of 15% mentioned by Brewin and Andrews referred to the rate of false memories among experimental participants, and they did not claim anywhere in their article that it applied to the real world. The correct statement should be: Brewin and Andrews (2017) reviewed the literature on false memories and argued that the rate of full false autobiographical memories in that literature is no higher than 15% of individuals exposed to suggestive influences. In the real world, the percentage of adults who can be led to experience false memories will depend on interactions among numerous variables. This has been corrected within the article. The author apologies for this error. REFERENCE Lindsay, D. S. (2020). Commentary for special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology in honor of Alan Scoboria. Appl Cognit Psychol, 34, 1345– 1349 https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3758. Wiley Online Library Web of Science®Google Scholar Volume35, Issue1January/February 2021Pages 317-317 ReferencesRelatedInformation

False Memories in the Laboratory and in Life: Commentary on Brewin and Andrews (2016)

SummaryReviewing laboratory experiments, Brewin and Andrews (this issue) conclude that memory implantation techniques induce full‐blown false autobiographical memories in only 15% of subjects. Does this imply that guided imagery and related methods are unlikely to generate false memories of childhood sexual abuse in adult psychiatric patients? Not necessarily. Although these methods alone may seldom produce false memories, additional factors common in clinical settings are likely to amplify their capacity to do so in psychiatric patients (e.g., belief that repressed memories of trauma can cause symptoms; belief that these methods can recover repressed memories; high scores on dissociation measures). Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The consequences of suggesting false childhood food events

We combined data across eight published experiments (N=1369) to examine the formation and consequences of false autobiographical beliefs and memories. Our path models revealed that the formation of false autobiographical belief fully mediated the pathway between suggesting to people that they had experienced a positive or negative food-related event in the past and current preference for that food. Suggestion indirectly affected intention to eat the food via change in autobiographical belief. The development of belief with and without memory produced similar changes in food preferences and behavior intention, indicating that belief in the event drives changes in suggestion-related attitudes. Finally, positive suggestions (e.g., “you loved asparagus the first time you tried it”) yielded stronger effects than negative suggestions (e.g., “you got sick eating egg salad”). These findings show that false autobiographical suggestions lead to the development of autobiographical beliefs, which in turn, have consequences for one's attitudes and behaviors.

Implausibility inhibits but does not eliminate false autobiographical beliefs.

The role of the plausibility of suggested events in the formation of false autobiographical beliefs and memories has long been debated. In two studies, the shape of the relationship between presuggestion personal plausibility and the development of postsuggestion false beliefs was examined. Participants rated personal plausibility and autobiographical belief for childhood events. They later received a suggestion that an unlikely event occurred during their childhood and provided postsuggestion ratings. The best fit was a curvilinear relationship between plausibility and belief, with the lowest risk for false belief at the plausibility scale floor. Above this threshold, the risk for false belief increased sharply and remained similar across all other levels of plausibility. A minority of those who initially viewed the event as highly implausible showed increased beliefs; this was accompanied by large increases in personal plausibility. We conclude that only extreme implausibility inhibits suggestion-induced false autobiographical beliefs, unless suggestions cause increases in plausibility ratings.

Personalized and not general suggestion produces false autobiographical memories and suggestion-consistent behavior

Suggesting false childhood events produces false autobiographical beliefs, memories and suggestion-consistent behavior. The mechanisms by which suggestion affects behavior are not understood, and whether false beliefs and memories are necessary for suggestions to impact behavior remains unexplored. We examined the relative effects of providing a personalized suggestion (suggesting that an event occurred to the person in the past), and/or a general suggestion (suggesting that an event happened to others in the past). Participants (N = 122) received a personalized suggestion, a general suggestion, both or neither, about childhood illness due to spoiled peach yogurt. The personalized suggestion resulted in false beliefs, false memories, and suggestion-consistent behavioral intentions immediately after the suggestion. One week or one month later participants completed a taste test that involved eating varieties of crackers and yogurts. The personalized suggestion led to reduced consumption of only peach yogurt, and those who reported a false memory showed the most eating suppression. This effect on behavior was equally strong after one week and one month, showing a long lived influence of the personalized suggestion. The general suggestion showed no effects. Suggestions that convey personal information about a past event produce false autobiographical memories, which in turn impact behavior.

Imagining implausible events does not lead to false autobiographical memories: Commentary on Sharman and Scoboria (2009)

In several studies over the past ten years, we have reported that false memories are significantly less likely to be suggestively planted for events that are relatively implausible. Recently, Sharman and Scoboria (2009) reported no effect of event plausibility on rates of planting false childhood memories; that is, imagination inflation resulted for both moderate and low plausibility false childhood events after imagining those events. However, considerable differences in methodology, differences in operational definitions of key terms, and differences in data analysis techniques between these two studies bar these conclusions. Their study is also plagued by an error of circular logic; the researchers did not define the independent variable (plausibility) independently of the dependent variable (LEI change scores). In light of these problems, the findings of Pezdek et al. (2006), and the cognitive model they proposed, remain unchallenged by the results of Sharman and Scoboria. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

False memories and fantastic beliefs: 15 years of the DRM illusion

This article reviews research using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) associative memory illusion, whereby people falsely remember words that were not presented. This illusion has broadly influenced basic theories of memory in cognitive psychology and neuroscience and naturally raises the question as to how these theories apply to more complex autobiographical memories. Some applicability is evident from research linking individual differences in the DRM illusion to false autobiographical memories (e.g., misremembering public events) and fantastic autobiographical beliefs (e.g., memories from past lives). But which aspects generalize? Here it is argued that a process-oriented approach is needed in order to answer this question. Many productive years of DRM research indicate that multiple and often opposing psychological processes cause even the most basic false memories. In light of these discoveries, more researchers need to use methods that isolate these component processes if the goal is to understand false memories both in the lab and in life.

True and false autobiographical memories in schizophrenia: Preliminary results of a diary study

The frequency of true and false autobiographical memories and associated states of conscious awareness, i.e., conscious recollection and simply knowing, as well as the respective roles of affective and cognitive processes in autobiographical memory construction, were assessed in eight patients with schizophrenia and eight control participants. A diary study methodology was used in combination with the Remember/Know procedure. The results showed a higher frequency of Know responses associated with the retrieval of both true and false memories in patients than in control participants. Whereas control participants rated higher at retrieval than at encoding the distinctiveness and personal importance of events, as well as the extent to which events furthered current personal plans, patients exhibited an opposite pattern of ratings, with ratings being lower at retrieval than at encoding. These preliminary results show a high frequency of simply knowing associated with the retrieval of true and false autobiographical memories in patients with schizophrenia and provide evidence for the interest of the diary study methodology for studying autobiographical memory in schizophrenia.

Digitally manipulating memory: Effects of doctored videos and imagination in distorting beliefs and memories

In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings.

False memory propensity in people reporting recovered memories of past lives.

Are elevated rates of false recall and recognition in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm associated with false autobiographical memories in everyday life? To investigate this issue, the authors recruited participants who reported improbable memories of past lives and compared their DRM performance with that of control participants who reported having lived only one life (i.e., their current one). Relative to control participants, those reporting memories of past lives exhibited significantly higher false recall and recognition rates in the DRM paradigm, and they scored higher on measures of magical ideation and absorption as well. The groups did not differ on correct recall, recognition, or intelligence. False memory propensity in the DRM paradigm may tap proneness for developing false memories outside the laboratory.

Hindsight Bias, the Misinformation Effect, and False Autobiographical Memories

Hindsight bias can be considered a type of memory distortion. In this article we compare hindsight bias to two other types of memory distortion, the misinformation effect and the experimental creation of false autobiographical beliefs and memories. We underline the similarities in the procedures used to elicit these phenomena and propose that the results favor a reconstructive explanation of all three. We also discuss possible mechanisms that might subsume them.

Imagination and memory: Does imagining implausible events lead to false autobiographical memories?

Previous studies have reported that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories. This finding has been used to suggest that psychotherapists who have clients imagine suspected repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse may, in fact, be inducing false memories for the imagined events. In this study, at Time 1 and then, 2 weeks later, at Time 2, 145 subjects rated each of 20 events on the Life Events Inventory as to whether each had occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, the subjects were told that 2 target events were plausible and 2 were implausible. They were then asked to imagine 1 plausible and 1 implausible target event. Plausibility and imagining interacted to affect occurrence ratings; whereas imagining plausible events increased the change in occurrence ratings, imagining implausible events had no effect on occurrence ratings.

Discussion affects memory for true and false childhood events

AbstractAlthough people often reminisce about their past experiences, little research has assessed how discussion might influence people's autobiographical memories. There were two major aims to this study: first, to assess how adults' memories for genuine childhood experiences might be affected by discussion, and second, to extend research on false memories by exploring how memories for false events might be affected by discussion. Siblings attempted to recall four childhood events—three true and one false—three times independently, and then discussed their memories with each other. Results showed that subjects incorporated elements from each other's reports into their own; 24% also reported details about the false event by the end of the individual phase, although false reports dropped dramatically after the discussion phase. Our research shows discussion can influence both true and false autobiographical memories. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Recovered Memories

The issues surrounding repressed, recovered, or false memories have sparked one of the greatest controversies in the mental health profession in the twentieth century. We review evidence concerning the existence of the repression and recovery of autobiographical memories of traumatic events and research on the development of false autobiographical memories, how specific therapeutic procedures can lead to false memories, and individual vulnerability to resisting false memories. These findings have implications for therapeutic practice, for forensic practice, for research and training in psychology, and for public policy.

The effects of prevalence and script information on plausibility, belief, and memory of autobiographical events

SUMMARY Theoretical predictions of a recently proposed ‘nested’ model of factors involved in the creation of false memories for childhood events (general plausibility, personal plausibility, autobiographical belief and autobiographical memory) were tested. Prevalence and/or script-relevant information related to one of two unlikely childhood events was administered to a sample of 92 undergraduate participants. Predictions were (a) that script-knowledge would impact general, but not personal plausibility; and (b) that prevalence information would lead to changes in personal plausibility and to a lesser degree autobiographical belief. Memory ratings should not be affected by these manipulations. Predictions were upheld for plausibility, and were partially upheld for autobiographical belief in one of two target events. New post-manipulation support for the nested model was demonstrated. Implications for the nested model, and the creation of false autobiographical beliefs and memories for childhood events are discussed. Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. A growing body of research has demonstrated the many ways in which suggestions that

Relations between emotion and conscious recollection of true and false autobiographical memories: an investigation using lorazepam as a pharmacological tool.

Conscious recollection for autobiographical memory is the subjective experience of reliving a personal event mentally. Its frequency is strongly influenced by the emotion experienced at the time of the event. We addressed the issue of whether conscious recollection for autobiographical memories is also influenced by the emotion experienced at the time of retrieval. We used lorazepam, a benzodiazepine, as a pharmacological tool to modulate this emotional experience. Autobiographical memories were recorded in eight healthy volunteers using a diary study methodology. Each day, four entries were made by each subject: two true events, one altered event and one false event. For each event, the subjects were asked to rate emotional variables at encoding and at retrieval. Two months later, there were two sessions of recognition tests during which the subjects received orally an acute administration of either lorazepam (0.038 mg/kg) or placebo using a cross-over design. Subjective states of awareness were assessed using the Remember/Know/Guess procedure. Compared to placebo, lorazepam increased levels of conscious recollection, as assessed by Remember responses, for both true and false memories and induced an overestimation of the personal significance and emotional intensity of past events. Structural equation modelling showed that this overestimation was causal in the increased frequency of conscious recollection. Our results provide experimental evidence that the frequency of conscious recollection for both true and false autobiographical memories is influenced by the emotion experienced at the time of retrieval.

Imagination can create false autobiographical memories

Previous studies have shown that imagining an event can alter autobiographical beliefs. The current study examined whether it can also create false memories. One group of participants imagined a relatively frequent event and received information about an event that never occurs. A second group imagined the nonoccurring event and received information about the frequent event. One week before and again 1 week immediately after the manipulation, participants rated the likelihood that they had experienced each of the two critical events and a series of noncritical events, using the Life Events Inventory. During the last phase, participants were also asked to describe any memories they had for the events. For both events, imagination increased the number of memories reported, as well as beliefs about experiencing the event. These results indicate that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories.

Structure and strategy in the associative false memory paradigm

List-learning experiments can have several levels of structure: individual words, the gist (if any) of each list, and the task in which those lists are embedded. The usual presentation of the DRM associative paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) strongly encourages a focus on gist and produces a high rate of false recall of key words (FRK). The experiments reported here were designed to invite the use of memory strategies based on structures other than the gist and thus reduce FRK. The crucial condition of Experiment 1, short lists followed by rehearsal, encouraged a focus on individual words and produced a low rate of FRK. In Experiment 2, the lists were embedded in a guessing game, which virtually eliminated FRK. FRK was also low in Experiments 3a and 3b when participants engaged in a complex task involving the first letters of list words. The relevance of these findings to false memories in the DRM and the connection of false autobiographical memories is discussed.