False Announcements Research Articles

The Need of Trustworthy Announcements to Achieve Driving Comfort

An Intelligent Transport System (ITS) is more demanding nowadays and it can be achieved through deploying Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). Vehicles and Roadside Units (RSUs) exchange traffic events. Malicious drivers generate false events. Thus, they need to be identified to maintain trustworthy communication. When an authorised user acts maliciously, the security scheme typically fails. However, a trust model can isolate false messages. In this paper, the significance of trustworthy announcements for VANETs is analysed. To this end, a series of experiments is conducted in Veins to illustrate how the trustworthiness of announcements affects travel time. A traffic scenario is created where vehicles detour to an alternate route with an announcement from the leading vehicle. Both true and false announcements are considered. Results confirm that false announcements and refraining from announcements increase travel time. However, the travel time is reduced with trustworthy announcements. From this analysis, it can be concluded that trustworthy announcements facilitate driver comfort.

La Noticias falsas y desinformación sobre el Covid-19: análisis comparativo de seis países iberoamericanos

Introducción: Los productores de desinformación y noticias falsas encuentran en el temor, la incertidumbre en tiempos de pandemia y las redes sociales virtuales facilitadores para su difusión, haciendo más difícil su detección para expertos y legos en el tema. Las tipologías diseñadas para la identificación y clasificación de bulos permiten su análisis desde perspectivas teóricas como las cámaras de eco, las burbujas de filtro, la manipulación de la información y la disonancia cognitiva. Método: Se realizó un análisis de contenido a 371 noticias falsas, previamente verificadas por fact-checkers. Luego de una prueba de intercodificadores, se procedió a clasificar los bulos según su tipo, intencionalidad, tema principal abordado, las redes en que circularon, la técnica de engaño, el país de origen, su carácter transnacional, entre otras variables. Resultados: La intención de bulo más común fue de carácter ideológico, asociada con temas como los falsos anuncios de gobiernos, organizaciones o personajes públicos, así como con la técnica de contexto falso para su elaboración. Una cuarta parte de los bulos analizados se repitieron en varios países, promoviendo principalmente falsas curas con contenidos fabricados como técnica de engaño. Discusión y Conclusiones: Desinformar es un fenómeno de manipulación y filtraje basado en la coincidencia ideológica y emocional que comparten quienes circulan bulos. La (des)información que converge con los intereses de sus usuarios, hace que su difusión se haga de manera indiscriminada y facilite su transnacionalidad, con leves modificaciones, sin que esto afecte su aceptación y su recirculación

Stock Repurchases And False Signals

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Each year many firms repurchase shares of their common stock. Research evidence shows that when firms announce the repurchase of common stock, their share prices typically rise.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>Numerous studies attribute these increases to a signaling effect.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>But some firms that announce their intention of repurchasing shares of common stock either repurchase no shares at all or repurchase fewer shares than initially announced. Although the practice of firms intentionally announcing the repurchase of more shares than they expect to repurchase is illegal, the expected increase in share prices may give firms an incentive to make such false announcements.</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"> </span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This study surveys top financial executives to learn the extent that firms repurchase fewer shares than announced, identify the reasons for this activity, and learn how managers view this activity.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>We surveyed 642 firms that conducted common stock repurchases from January 1998 to September 1999.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>Based on 218 responses, we find that while managers are uncertain about the legality of this activity, they believe that the intentional repurchase of fewer shares than announced is unethical, sends a false signal to the market, and damages the firm’s credibility with its stockholders.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>Managers also believe that firms repurchasing fewer shares than announced should publicly reveal both the reason for not repurchasing all shares and the amount by which the repurchase fell short of the firm’s announced intentions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>Despite these beliefs, managers report that repurchasing fewer shares than announced is a common practice.</span></span></p>

Not just babble: Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment

We let subjects in a voluntary contribution experiment make non-binding numerical announcements about their “possible” contributions and, in some treatments, send written promises to contribute specific amounts. We find that announcements were responded to both by others’ announcements and by real play, for example announcements led to costly punishment when found to be misleading. We also find that adding pre-play announcements to treatments with punishment can increase efficiency by letting cost-free warnings substitute for costly punishment. The threat of punishing false announcements and promises helps reduce false signals, but only when promise statements can be sent is the effect sufficient for achieving greater efficiency.

Not Just Babble: Opening the Black Box of Communication in a Voluntary Contribution Experiment

We let subjects in a voluntary contribution experiment make non-binding numerical announcements about their possible contributions and, in some treatments, send written promises to contribute specific amounts. We find that announcements were responded to both by others' announcements and by real play, for example announcements led to costly punishment when found to be misleading. We also find that adding pre-play announcements to treatments with punishment can increase efficiency by letting cost-free warnings substitute for costly punishment. The threat of punishing false announcements and promises helps reduce false signals, but only when promise statements can be sent is the effect sufficient for achieving greater efficiency.

Strategic Product Pre-Announcements in Markets with Network Effects

It is a widely adopted practice for firms to announce new products well in advance of actual market availability. The incentives for pre-announcements are stronger in markets with network effects because they can be used to induce the delay of consumers' purchases and forestall the build-up of rival products' installed bases. However, such announcements often are not fulfilled, raising antitrust concerns. We analyze the effects of product pre-announcements in the presence of network effects when firms are allowed to strategically make false announcements. We also discuss their implications for consumer welfare and anti-trust policy.

A Comment on Choi, Kristiansen and Nahm

Journal Article A Comment on Choi, Kristiansen and Nahm Get access Christian Wey Christian Wey *DIW Berlin, Technische Universität Berlin, and CEPRLondon e-mail: cwey@diw.de . Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar CESifo Economic Studies, Volume 51, Issue 2-3, 2005, Pages 321–328, https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/51.2-3.321 Published: 01 September 2005

The Macroeconomic Effects of False Announcements

Suppose that the government were to announce the economy will be booming in six months, and this announcement is based on false data. What effect would such an announcement have on future aggregate activity? This paper employs revisions of the series of leading economic indicators to test the hypothesis that such an announcement would have a positive effect on future activity. We find that the evidence is generally consistent with the hypothesis and that for the time period 1976–1988 the expectational shocks measured by these revisions explain over 20 percent of the fluctuation in the quarterly growth rate of industrial production.

THE CROTTE CURE AGAIN.

At the Columbus meeting of theAmerican Medical Associationdesperate efforts were made by a representative of a Frenchman, named Crotté, to have theAssociationendorse his electrical method of treating consumption, for which he claimed great virtues. In spite of the fact that he failed to get recognition in any of the devious ways attempted, he caused to be sent out through the press dispatches the announcement that theAssociationhad not only endorsed his treatment, but that the members had tendered him a banquet in token of the great work he had done for suffering humanity. Through efforts made byThe Journal, the same publicity was given to a general denial that had been given to the false announcements. Later, we find these people working in another way to get medical endorsement of the method. Asserting that medical men would not give the method a fair trial, and