Fair Inequality Research Articles

What is Fair? Experimental Evidence on Fair Equality vs Fair Inequality

What is Fair? Experimental Evidence on Fair Equality vs Fair Inequality

Social inequality in the context of natural justice

The problem of social equality and social inequality is investigated in the light of the concept of justice, the concept of just inequality and unfair equality. The author substantiates the interrelation of justice and equality as concepts and phenomena that are presented in an indissoluble unity and are actually a two-pronged problem. Justice is interpreted by the author as a measure of social equality and social inequality. The author explores the problem of social inequality from the point of view of a materialistic understanding of history, the principle of development and an axiological approach. The concept of natural justice is investigated as the basis of justice established by people, that is, social justice. The legitimacy of the conditional use of the concept of natural justice as a natural right of an individual to use his natural gifts, which under certain conditions of social life activity can be decisive in human life, can give him fair advantages over other members of the society. The natural personal potential of an individual can cause significant differences in the intellectual and spiritual abilities of people, which, in the presence of diligence, determination and appropriate social norms, necessarily generate social inequality in society. Fair inequality does not contradict natural justice. Natural justice is contradicted by unfair inequality. A person by nature has the right to life, freedom and property in compliance with the mandatory norms established in this society. Justice established by people should not contradict natural justice. The validity of the use of the concept of legitimate elite as the most outstanding personalities in various respects, having high achievements and services to society in various spheres of human activity, is substantiated.

Unfair inequality and growth*

AbstractFighting against economic inequality is one fundamental social goal in the agendas of most governments. However, recent studies highlight that people actually prefer unequal societies, as they accept inequality generated by an individual's effort and wish to reduce only unfair inequality (generated by factors beyond an individual's control). This distinction might help to explain the fundamental unsolved question about whether inequality is good or bad for growth: unfair inequality (UI) could be growth‐deterring, while fair inequality (FI) might be growth‐enhancing. We derive a reduced‐form growth equation from a stylized overlapping‐generations model with human capital that includes FI, UI, and poverty. Then, using an instrumental variable approach, we show for alternative samples and inequality measures at the worldwide level that the estimated coefficient associated with UI is always negative, while the coefficient of total inequality increases when UI is included in the regression. Moreover, we find that poverty mediates this relationship because the higher the poverty rate, the smaller the impact of either type of inequality on growth.

Gini decomposition: An inequality of opportunity perspective

Economic inequality that arises due to circumstances is unfair, whereas fair inequality is the one that emerges because of differences in individual efforts. We assume that an individual’s income is determined only by circumstances and efforts, where both factors are evident and can be ordered. We then decompose the Gini coefficient into unfair, fair, and residual Gini. The last component emerges whenever circumstance and effort jointly affect income differences, where distinguishing between fair and unfair inequalities becomes impossible.

Нравственные основы привилегий и иммунитетов в уголовном судопроизводстве России

The article considers the principle of equality of all before the law and the court. The article analyzes the exceptions allowed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation from the principle of equality in the form of criminal procedural immunities. The immunities established by law are examined from the position of compliance with the moral foundations of the criminal process. Despite the fact that the measure of morality in the question of compliance with criminal procedural immunities granted to certain categories of persons is the interrelated principles of justice and equality. The concept of formal equality is studied from the position of the libertarian-legal theory of law, which allows us to conclude that inequality can be either fair or not. As a fair inequality, legal advantages are highlighted in the form of benefits provided by a person to increase the level of legal capacity sufficient for the realization of general legal personality. Unfair exceptions to the principle of equality are privileges granted to individuals or categories of persons. Criminal procedural immunity is examined from the point of view of ensuring equality of rights of the parties in criminal proceedings and is considered as a legal advantage over the prosecutor, due to the need to ensure the impartial activities of the subject possessing it. Based on the analysis of the essence of criminal procedural immunity, it is concluded that immunity is not a privilege, therefore, the legal advantages provided to them correspond to the moral foundations of the criminal process.

Inequality can double the energy required to secure universal decent living

Ecological breakdown and economic inequality are among the largest contemporary global challenges, and the issues are thoroughly entangled – as they have been throughout the history of civilisations. Yet, the global economy continues toward ecological crises, and inequalities remain far higher than citizens believe to be fair. Here, we explore the role of inequality, alongside traditional drivers of ecological impacts, in determining global energy requirements for providing universal decent living. We consider scenarios from fair inequality – where inequalities mirror public ideals – through a fairly unequal world, to one with a super-rich global elite. The energy-costs of inequality appear far more significant than population: even fair levels increase the energy required to provide universal decent living by 40%, and a super-rich global 1% could consume as much energy as would providing decent living to 1.7 billion. We finish by arguing that total population remains important nonetheless, but for reasons beyond ecological impacts.

Constrained Fairness in Distribution

In “Weighing Up Weighted Lotteries: Scarcity, Overlap Cases, and Fair Inequalities of Chance”, Gerard Vong addresses intriguing problems in which it is impossible to give an equal chance of receiving a good to a set of equal claimants, because goods can be distributed only via groups which have overlapping membership. Vong proposes a rule for distributing chances that he argues is sensitive to both comparative and absolute fairness. This comment discusses some formal difficulties with Vong’s proposal and argues that it is better to separate the two concerns and to allow the tradeoffs between them to depend on characteristics of the goods to be distributed.

‘Fair’ inequality, consumption and climate mitigation

Economic inequality and climate change are pressing issues that have climbed high up the political agenda, yet action to mitigate both remains slow. As income is a key determinant of ecological impacts, the Global North—and wealthier classes elsewhere—are the primary drivers of global carbon emissions, while the least well off have contributed the least yet are set to be hit hardest by climate impacts. These inequalities are clearly unjust, but the interrelations between economic inequality and ecological impacts are complex, leaving open the question of whether reducing the former would mitigate the latter, in the absence of reductions in total economic output. Here, we contribute to these debates by estimating the carbon-footprint implications of reducing income (and hence expenditure) inequalities within 32 countries of the Global North to the levels people consider to be fair; levels that are substantially smaller than currently exist. We find that realising these levels of economic inequality brings comparable reductions in carbon-footprint inequalities. However, in isolation, implementing fair inequalities has a negligible impact upon total emissions. In contrast, recomposing consumption—by reducing inequalities in household expenditure and the overall levels, then reallocating the reductions to public services—reduces carbon footprint by up to 30% in individual countries and 16% overall and, crucially, still allows the consumption of those at the bottom to rise. Such reductions could be significant on a global level, and they would be additional to the full range of conventional technological and demand-side measures to reduce carbon emissions.

Legitimacy of law as a dialogue between the legislator and his addressees about law and justice

Is justice a necessary condition for law’s legitimacy? Traditionally, the legitimacy of law has focused on addressees of the norms — public acceptance or, according to H. Hart, by those who receive and use norms as guidance. Thus, the legislator is preferably neutral about fate of their created norms. Thus, an ongoing dialogue between lawmakers and addressees (primarily judges and officials, but also civil society actors and “ordinary” citizens) is necessary. This dialogue grounds the context regarding the relationship between legitimacy and legality, lawfulness and justice. It is a dialogue about “judicial law” addressed to the moral-legal value of justice — justice as substantive equality (equality in due). Mutual recognition by the legislator and addressees achieves the desired consensus of existing norms. This is how law is legitimized as “judicial law” — due, not because of changing external targets, but because of the rooted idea of justice in the nature of law as the basic value. These values are non-relative but also not autonomous. The author analyses justice as a basic value of law in a necessary connection with other basic values — freedom (equality in freedom) and human dignity. The proposed approach can be at the basis of the discussion how the principles of law correspond. Therefore, the author criticises especially “material equality” and proportionality as a “fair inequality”. By relating legal principles, the basic values of law are embodied in the principles and receive a normative practical orientation, thus obliging lawmakers and law enforcers to follow these principles. The critical potential of justice characterizes general legal principles as requirements of justice. As a general legal principle, justice motivates the addressees of norms to critically evaluate them and to request from the legislator a due “judicial law”. This provides a realistic perspective on the legal policy. A “science of the politics of law” (L. I. Petrazhitskii) could synthesise positive and “natural” law, based on the immanent necessity of “rightness” and justice. This would facilitate legislative innovation with legitimating sanction of “judicial law”.

Inégalités des chances dans le recours aux soins des jeunes adultes en France

Alors que la sante des jeunes adultes est un enjeu reconnu de sante publique en France, moins d’attention est accordee a leur recours aux soins. Cet article s’interroge sur l’existence d’ine‑galite des chances dans le recours aux soins des jeunes adultes a partir des donnees de l’Enquete nationale sur les ressources des jeunes (2014). En mobilisant le cadre de la philosophie de la responsabilite, une distinction est faite entre des inegalites « injustes » liees a des circonstances en dehors du controle des jeunes et des inegalites « justes » liees a des caracteristiques relevant de leur responsabilite. Des modeles de probabilite lineaire sont mobilises pour estimer les associations entre les probabilites de non‑recours (non‑utilisation et renoncement aux soins) et les caracteristiques parentales (assurance complementaire sante, activite principale, revenu, situation familiale et statut vital) d’une part et celles du jeune (education, activite principale, cohabitation, ressources financieres, assurance complementaire sante) d’autre part, traduisant respectivement l’existence d’inegalites injustes et d’inegalites justes. La decomposition de la variance permet de quantifier ces inegalites et suggere que les inegalites injustes sont plus importantes que les inegalites justes.

Weighing Up Weighted Lotteries: Scarcity, Overlap Cases, and Fair Inequalities of Chance

After providing a novel taxonomy of lottery procedures for fairly distributing scarce goods, I defend a new weighted lottery theory. This taxonomy is necessary because the debate between unweighted...

Fairness and the proportionality principle

How should income be distributed in a way that respects both the egalitarian ideal that inequalities due to differences in opportunities should be eliminated and the liberal ideal that people should be free to pursue their own idea of the good life without interference from society? We show that reasonable interpretations of the egalitarian and the liberal ideal characterize what we refer to as the generalized proportionality principle. This principle states that an individual should have the share of total income that he or she would have had if everyone had the same opportunities and these opportunities were given by the average of the pre-tax income functions of all individuals in society. We argue that a redistribution mechanism based on this principle would eliminate unfair inequalities and preserve fair inequalities, and discuss when the generalized proportionality principle is equivalent to the simple proportionality principle.

In search of income reference points for SLCA using a country level sustainability benchmark (part 1): fair inequality. A contribution to the Oiconomy project

This paper is part 1 of our twin articles on income reference points for Social Life Cycle Assessment (SLCA). Preventative costs based LCA systems, such as the EcoCost system and the Oiconomy system, need targets (performance reference points) to determine the marginal preventative costs, the costs of the most expensive measure that globally needs to be employed to reach the target. To extend the EcoCost system for social issues, targets are required for issues like fair wages and fair inequality of wages, issues for which no agreed standard, no effect level or target exists. One way of setting targets is to take best practices as benchmark, e.g. the practices of a group of best performing countries. The purpose of this part 1 article is to first develop a well-founded benchmark group of the 20 % best performing countries and thereafter propose a well-founded target for the issue of inequality for preventative costs based SLCA, which can also serve as performance reference point for SLCA in general and for other uses. In part 2, for the same purposes and using the same benchmark group, we propose targets for fair minimum wages for every country. A benchmark group of countries for the setting of targets was determined by an assessment of available country performance indicators, based on 5 criteria. Thereafter, we derived a proposal for a maximum inequality ratio based on existing democratically determined inequality ratios in the benchmark group. The Sustainable Society Index–Human Wellbeing proved the best indicator for a country benchmark for preventative cost-based SLCA. Using the average of maximum democratically determined income differences in a benchmark group of countries determined by this index, a performance reference point for SLCA for the issue of fair inequality was derived and proposed, resulting in a maximum ratio of income differences for governmental institutions of 14.1, for government ruled companies of 18.3 and for industry of a factor 23.8. It proved possible to derive a target for maximum inequality of wages, based on democratic choices in a benchmark group of the 20 % best performing countries. The target for governmental institutions may be called objective, and proposed augmentations for government ruled companies and industry, though value choices, seem reasonable for the consumer who requires prevention of all possible harm as consequence of his purchase choices and who, as a voter, contributes to governmental standards.

Equity theory and fair inequality: a neuroeconomic study.

The present paper reports results from, to our knowledge, the first study designed to examine the neuronal responses to income inequality in situations in which individuals have made different contributions in terms of work effort. We conducted an experiment that included a prescanning phase in which the participants earned money by working, and a neuronal scanning phase in which we examined how the brain responded when the participants evaluated different distributions of their earnings. We provide causal evidence for the relative contribution of work effort being crucial for understanding the hemodynamic response in the brain to inequality. We found a significant hemodynamic response in the striatum to deviations from the distribution of income that was proportional to work effort, but found no effect of deviations from the equal distribution of income. We also observed a striking correlation between the hemodynamic response in the striatum and the self-reported evaluation of the income distributions. Our results provide, to our knowledge, the first set of neuronal evidence for equity theory and suggest that people distinguish between fair and unfair inequalities.

Justice and Gini coefficients

Gini coefficients, which measure gross inequalities rather than their unfair components, are often used as proxy measures of absolute or relative distributive injustice in Western societies. This presupposes that the fair inequalities in these societies are small and stable enough to be ignored. This article presents a model for a series of ideal, perfectly just societies, where comfortable lives are equally available to everyone, and calculates the Gini coefficients for each. According to this model, inequalities produced by age and other demographic factors, together with reasonable choices under equal opportunity, can raise the Gini coefficients for perfectly just societies to levels at least as high as those of any current Western country, and can as easily account for differences in Gini coefficients between such societies or within one such society over time. If Gini coefficients at these levels are possible for ideal societies without distributive injustice, then they should not be used as proxy measures of distributive injustice in real societies.

Tax Policy and Fair Inequality

The standard economic approach to tax policy has to a large extent relied on welfarist theories of justice, in particular the utilitarian view that the government should try to maximize the sum of individual welfare. This welfarist framework has proved a productive point of departure for much economic analysis, but it has an important limitation in its inability to take into account considerations of personal responsibility. Welfarist theories evaluate policies solely on the basis of their consequences for individual welfare, and thus do not assign any intrinsic importance to how a specific situation came about.

Fair Inequalities in Income

Fair Inequalities in Income

Health Inequalities — fair inequality?

Health Inequalities — fair inequality?

The choice of inequality measure in empirical research on distributive judgements

We analyse questionnaire data from a representative sample of the Flemish working population. For 781 respondents we construct their perception of the actual and of the fair income distribution. We check whether the use of different inequality measures leads to different interpretations of these data. The ranking of individuals on the basis of their perceived and fair inequality is hardly affected and the same is true for the explanation of the interindividual variation. However, the simple classification of individual respondents in those who want and those who do not want less inequality does depend on the measure used in 20% of the cases. Moreover, the tendency to equalise is a poor measures of conservatism.