I describe and interpret from a behavior analytic viewpoint the following aspects of contemporary American higher education: (a) administrators, (b) faculty, and (c) nontraditional and for-profit institutions. Some of the contingencies operating in these three areas are described. Although there is a vast and ever-growing literature about America's system of higher education, behavior analysts, with few exceptions (e.g. Fraley 1998; Lamal, 2001; Lamal, Rakos, & Greenspoon, 2000; Michael, 1991; Moore, 2001; Rakos, 2001), have not addressed this critical cultural practice. In what follows I describe and interpret from a behavior analytic viewpoint the following aspects of contemporary American higher education: (a) administrators, (b) faculty, and (c) nontraditional and for-profit institutions of postsecondary education. My description and interpretation of these facets of American higher education makes no claim to being exhaustive. It also uses real-life examples as a form of case studies that do not permit the drawing of conclusions about what caused what. The examples, however, add verve to my account and prompt the reader to further explore the issues that the examples illuminate. I have not attempted to address all of the facets of American higher education; to do so would require the writing of a book. Administrators The behavior of administrators and the contingencies controlling their professional behaviors are key elements in the interlocking sets of contingencies that characterize higher education. A recent trend is the increased power of administrators. There is widespread acknowledgement that administrators and boards of trustees have increased their power at the expense of the (Lamal, Rakos, & Greenspoon, 2000, p. 228). This trend has also been noted by Smith (2000) and Readings (1996), among others. Administrators exercise greater control over the curriculum, including decisions about what programs, departments, and colleges within universities may be created, as well as terminated. They also determine which departments and colleges will be allocated new or replacement faculty positions and such other putative positive reinforcers as additional funds for equipment and faculty travel. The increased control exercised by administrators is exemplified by the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. The faculty of each department in the College formerly selected their department chairperson. Now, however, department faculty are required to forward to the College dean two candidates, and the dean chooses the chairperson. It is reasonable to believe that a chairperson selected by the dean is more likely to behave in ways approved by that dean if there is conflict between the dean and that department than is a chairperson selected by the department faculty. Important facets of the behavior of many chairpersons are controlled by the positive reinforcer of continuing in the position. This is readily understandable, as administrators earn significantly more than the typical faculty member (The Nation, 1998). Another positive reinforcer for many chairs is doubtless the level of control they are able to exercise over such matters as faculty personnel decisions (e.g., promotion, granting of tenure, merit pay) and the facilitation of good results (Lamal, Rakos, & Greenspoon, 2000). At some institutions, particularly community colleges, faculty members' discretion in the design of courses or departments in the design of the curriculum is circumscribed by central administration directives. This programming may involve the development of procedures manuals that specify the form of the syllabus to be prepared, the precise manner for delineating and measuring the achievement of course objectives, the criteria for prerequisites (Bess, 1988, pp. 62 & 63). And as stronger external demands for efficiency (e.g., by state legislatures [Robst, 2001]) are encountered, an increased emphasis on programmed coordination can be expected. …