Eyewitness Identification Confidence Research Articles

Assessing the effect of eyewitness identification confidence assessment method on the confidence-accuracy relationship.

Assessing the effect of eyewitness identification confidence assessment method on the confidence-accuracy relationship.

Do Multiple Doses of Feedback Have Cumulative Effects on Eyewitness Confidence?

We tested whether multiple doses of feedback have cumulative effects on eyewitness-identification confidence. In Experiment 1, participants made mistaken identifications and received or did not receive three forms of confirming feedback: (1) co-witness feedback; (2) vague feedback from the experimenter (“You’ve been a good witness”); and (3) inference-based feedback, in which eyewitnesses were led to infer that their identification was accurate. Co-witness feedback and inference-based feedback independently inflated eyewitness confidence, providing some evidence of cumulation. In Experiment 2, participants received or did not receive co-witness feedback and/or inference-based feedback following their mistaken lineup identifications. Two doses of feedback produced significantly higher confidence than did one dose of feedback, demonstrating significant cumulation. These findings suggest that multiple doses of subtle post-identification feedback can cumulate to have large distorting effects on later testimony.

The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship Using Scale Versus Other Methods of Assessing Confidence

Historically, researchers have collected eyewitness identification confidence using scales; however, in practice, eyewitnesses are more commonly asked for a verbal statement. In Experiment 1, participants viewed a simultaneous lineup and provided confidence in their own words, by explaining why they made their decision or by selecting from statements made by real eyewitnesses, and then provided a scale rating (0–100%) or provided only the scale rating. In Experiment 2, participants viewed a sequential lineup and provided confidence in their own words followed by the scale rating or provided only the scale rating. Confidence predicted identification accuracy in all conditions, although verbal statements were highly variable and challenging to interpret. For example, only when scale-based confidence was high (80%+) did interpretation of the verbal confidence statement reliably align with scale-based confidence. These data highlight the complexity of verbal confidence statements and the need to establish meaningful boundaries for interpreting verbal confidence statements.

The effect of biased lineup instructions on eyewitness identification confidence

SummaryAlthough it is well‐known that biased lineup instructions (i.e., those that do not inform witnesses the perpetrator may not be in the lineup) inflate false identifications, their effects on witness confidence are less well understood due to methodological limitations of past studies. We report two studies that use novel methodologies to obviate these limitations. Study 1 (N = 177) demonstrated that biased lineup instructions increased witnesses' average estimates of the likelihood that a lineup member is guilty. Study 2 (N = 137) introduces a novel debiasing paradigm that allows a parsing of choosers into those who made an identification only because of the biased instructions (induced choosers), and those who would have chosen despite the instructions (inherent choosers). Biased lineup instructions inflated confidence only among induced choosers, but not among inherent choosers. Contrary to legal reasoning, witness confidence is an insufficient metric to determine the suggestiveness of biased instructions.

The Effect of Retention Interval on the Eyewitness Identification Confidence–Accuracy Relationship

Individual researchers express a variety of views about the eyewitness confidence–accuracy relationship, but an argument could be made that the consensus view in the field is that (1) confidence is, at best, a weak indicator of accuracy, (2) the confidence–accuracy relationship becomes weaker still as the retention interval increases, and (3) eyewitnesses who express high confidence tend to be overconfident – perhaps even more so following a long retention interval. Here, we reanalyze the data from four previous retention interval studies in terms of suspect ID accuracy ( Mickes, 2015 ). We argue that this measure is more relevant to the information sought by a court of law than either a correlation coefficient or a calibration curve (the two traditional confidence–accuracy measures). The results of our reanalysis suggest that the confidence accuracy relationship remains strong – and that high-confidence IDs remain highly accurate – even after retention intervals as long as 9 months.

The Moderating Effect of Ecphoric Experience on Post-identification Feedback: A Critical Test of the Cues-based Inference Conceptualization

Summary: Confidence inflation from confirming post-identification feedback is greater when the eyewitness is inaccurate than when the eyewitness is accurate, which is evidence that witnesses infer their confidence from feedback only to the extent that their internal cues are weak. But the accurate/inaccurate asymmetry has alternative interpretations. A critical test between these interpretations was conducted by including disconfirming feedback conditions. Student participants (n=404) witnessed a mock crime, had either a strong or weak ecphoric experience when making their line-up identifications, and subsequently received no feedback, confirming feedback, or disconfirming feedback. Consistent with a cues-based conceptualization of the feedback effect, disconfirming feedback influenced witnesses with weak ecphoric experiences more than witnesses with strong ecphoric experiences, ironically increasing the confidence-accuracy relation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Mistaken eyewitness identification appears to be the primary cause of the criminal conviction of innocent people; over 75% of DNA-based exonerations were cases of mistaken eyewitness identification (Innocence Project, 2008). But mistaken identification per se does not lead to the conviction of innocent people. Instead the innocent are at risk of conviction only if the witness is both mistaken and believable (to the triers of fact). Eyewitness science has long been interested in eyewitness identification confidence because people rely heavily on the confidence of the eyewitness to decide whether the witness made an accurate identification (e.g. Wells,

Uses and abuses of eyewitness identification confidence

When attempting to identify an offender whom they saw commit a crime, eyewitnesses are frequently asked to indicate their confidence in their memories. Confidence judgments may be expressed prior to seeing a line‐up, after making an identification decision or in the courtroom. Such judgments can exert an important influence on decision making within the criminal justice system. Here, I examine theory and evidence that bear on the likely usefulness of such confidence judgments for diagnosing the accuracy of the associated identification. Contrary to often expressed views, I argue that confidence recorded immediately after the identification test is informative about the identity of the offender. Confidence expressions obtained at other times are likely to be misleading. Important directions for future confidence research are identified.

The malleability of eyewitness confidence: Co-witness and perseverance effects.

A theft was staged 70 times for pairs of eyewitnesses (N = 140) who then made a photo-lineup identification. Witnesses then received 1 of 9 types of information regarding the alleged identification decision of their co-witness. Witnesses told that their co-witness identified the same person whom they had identified showed an increase in the confidence they expressed to a confederate police officer. Confidence deflation occurred among witnesses who thought their co-witness either identified another person or had stated that the thief was not in the lineup. Initial co-witness information was not mitigated by subsequent changes to that information. A second study showed videotapes of these witnesses' testimonies to observers (n = 378) whose credibility ratings of the testimony paralleled the witnesses' self-rated confidence. Eyewitness identification confidence is highly malleable after the identification has been made despite the fact that physical resemblance between the culprit and person identified has not changed. If an eyewitness says am absolutely confident that he is the guy I saw rob the liquor store, it is rather difficult for people to accept the idea that the witness could be wrong. Numerous studies have demonstrated a close relation between the confidence expressed by an eyewitness and people's propensities to accept that eyewitness's testimony as accurate (e.g., Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Fox & Walters, 1986; Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells & Leippe, 1981; Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979; Yarmey & Jones, 1983). It is probably quite rational to place more trust in the validity of someone's judgment when that person makes a statement with high confidence rather than with little confidence. In the case of eyewitness identification testimony, however, the observed empirical relation between accuracy and confidence is surprisingly weak. A meta-analysis by Bothwell, Deffenbacher, and Brigham (1987) indicates that eyewitness confidence accounts for about 6% of the variance in eyewitness identification accuracy. Hence, it is not uncommon in research to find eyewitnesses making false identifications with high self-rated confidence that they are correct (or, conversely, eyewitnesses being quite unsure and yet accurate in their identifications).