Extreme Political Attitudes Research Articles

Respondents with more extreme views show moderation of opinions in multi-year surveys in the USA and the Netherlands

People with extreme political attitudes are often assumed to be more resistant to change than moderates. If this assumption is true, extreme attitudes would ossify and continuously aggravate intergroup conflict and polarization. To test this assumption of stubborn extremists, we use large-scale panel surveys of attitudes towards policy issues and general ideologies across up to 13 years (combined N = 16,238). By tracking the same people across multi-year periods, we are able to ascertain whether extreme attitude holders exhibit less change in policy attitudes than moderates. The results revealed that extreme attitude holders are more likely to change their attitudes than moderates across various policy issues and general ideologies, and tend to directionally moderate over time. A final experiment finds that lay people incorrectly believe that extreme attitudes holders are more resistant to change, contrary to the results found here. We discuss the implications of this finding for understanding the evolution of extreme attitude holders, the misperception of ideological and policy differences, and the role of inaccurate out-group perceptions in shaping polarization and intergroup conflict.

The role of political devotion in sharing partisan misinformation and resistance to fact-checking.

Online misinformation is disproportionality created and spread by people with extreme political attitudes, especially among the far-right. There is a debate in the literature about why people spread misinformation and what should be done about it. According to the purely cognitive account, people largely spread misinformation because they are lazy, not biased. According to a motivational account, people are also motivated to believe and spread misinformation for ideological and partisan reasons. To better understand the psychological and neurocognitive processes that underlie misinformation sharing among the far-right, we conducted a cross-cultural experiment with conservatives and far-right partisans in the Unites States and Spain (N = 1,609) and a neuroimaging study with far-right partisans in Spain (N = 36). Far-right partisans in Spain and U.S. Republicans who highly identify with Trump were more likely to share misinformation than center-right voters and other Republicans, especially when the misinformation was related to sacred values (e.g., immigration). Sacred values predicted misinformation sharing above and beyond familiarity, attitude strength, and salience of the issue. Moreover, far-right partisans were unresponsive to fact-checking and accuracy nudges. At a neural level, this group showed increased activity in brain regions implicated in mentalizing and norm compliance in response to posts with sacred values. These results suggest that the two components of political devotion-identity fusion and sacred values-play a key role in misinformation sharing, highlighting the identity-affirming dimension of misinformation sharing. We discuss the need for motivational and identity-based interventions to help curb misinformation for high-risk partisan groups. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Social Media Expression, Political Extremity, and Reduced Network Interaction: An Imagined Audience Approach

The recent rise of political extremity and radicalization has presented unique challenges to contemporary politics, governance, and social cohesion in many societies in the world. In this study, we propose an imagined audience approach to understand how social media’s expanded expression capabilities are related to users’ political extremity and reduced network interaction. We demonstrate the usefulness of our imagined audience framework using a multi-country survey data set. Results from the United States, South Korea, and Japan reveal that expressive use of social media is associated with more extreme political attitudes and heightened intolerance, but the effect is contingent on whom the expresser has in mind as their audience. In particular, expressing one’s political self has a depolarizing effect for those expecting low audience reinforcement. We test the boundary conditions of our model in a more restricted information environment with a Chinese sample. We conclude by discussing the significance of our imagined audience approach and its relevance to today’s technology-mediated self-presentation.

Intergenerational gaps in West Bank Jewish communities

ABSTRACT This article examined the differences between the political attitudes of two generations of religious Zionists settlers in the West Bank. Theoretical approaches on intergenerational socialization were reviewed, predicting trends of continuity vis-à-vis change in intergenerational attitudes. Also, previous studies of the religious Zionist sector subgroups, the settlements, and their residents were reviewed. The study was conducted with a quantitative method, while the research tool was an online research questionnaire. The study findings verify the research hypothesis regarding the intergenerational differences in political attitudes, as most issues that were examined found that the younger generation holds more hawkish attitudes in comparison to their parents. Finally, the young Torani were emphasized in the research as the secondary group of settlers who, in most cases, hold the most extreme political attitudes.

On the relationship between right‐wing attitudes, conspiracy beliefs, and intergroup threat: Introducing an indirect measure for intergroup threat

Recent theoretical models stress the importance of both personal and contextual factors in the development of political extremism. One such theory is the Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT) that suggests a relationship between extremism and intergroup threat (i.e., the perception that one's ingroup is threatened by a particular social outgroup). Using an adaptation of the Semantic Misattribution Procedure (SMP), the present research aimed at replicating the results of previous studies using a novel measure. In a first study (N = 88, 77% female), self-reported intergroup threat was significantly and positively related to two types of extreme political attitudes, namely, right-wing authoritarianism and generic conspiracy beliefs. The SMP score, in contrast, was only significantly correlated to right-wing authoritarianism. In a second study, these results were replicated in a larger sample (N = 243, 68% female). Moreover, both self-reported and indirectly measured intergroup threat were related to hostile attitudes and stereotypes against immigrants. When compared to explicit intergroup threat, however, the SMP score was not incremental in the prediction of hostile attitudes against immigrants. These results support the validity of the SMP for the assessment of intergroup threat. Replications should explore the practical utility of the SMP in other samples using additional validation criteria.

Ideological Tripolarization, Partisan Tribalism and Institutional Trust: The Foundations of Affective Polarization in the Swedish Multiparty System

Currently, very little is known about the individual level foundations of affective polarization outside the US context. This paper addresses this research gap by exploring the predictors of affective polarization in Sweden, using nationally representative survey data. From 2010 till the 2018 elections, the Swedish multiparty system was divided into two affectively converged mainstream party blocs that were moderately polarized between each other, and an asymmetrically polarized populist right party that invoked significantly more hostility from the supporters of mainstream parties than vice versa. To unpack the foundations of affective polarization in such a tripolar configuration, we employ a methodological approach that distinguishes not just between in‐ and outparties but also in‐ and out‐blocs, and separates different conflict dimensions. We find that: (1) voters with stronger partisan identities and more extreme political attitudes exhibit higher levels of affective polarization. The latter, however, is a better predictor of direct dislike towards political opponents; (2) the effects of political attitudes correspond to the tripolar nature of the party system: while affective polarization between the centre‐right and ‐left blocs is mostly driven by socioeconomic positions, the hostility towards Sweden Democrats links predominantly to cultural issues, most notably immigration; (3) institutional trust has a two‐edged relationship with affective polarization: populist right voters that trust the country’s central institutions more, are less polarized towards mainstream blocs, whereas among centre‐right voters, higher trust associates with stronger animosity towards Sweden Democrats. We believe that these findings could have broad implications for affective polarization research in multiparty systems.

Political correctness and the alt-right: The development of extreme political attitudes.

Recent studies have documented a shift from moderate political attitudes to more extreme attitudes at the ends of the political spectrum. This can be seen in Political Correctness (PC) on the left, and white identitarian (WI) attitudes on the ‘Alt-Right’ (AR). While highly covered in mainstream media, limited academic research has investigated their possible antecedents and psychological correlates. The current study investigated the prevalence and psychological predictors of these attitudes. Utilising a quota-based sample of 512 U.S. participants, we found that extreme political attitudes were associated with various personality traits, social media use, and upbringing. PC attitudes were associated with agreeableness, black-white thinking, social-media use, and perceived overprotective parenting. WI attitudes were associated with low agreeableness and openness, and high black-white thinking. Our results show that extreme left and right attitudes are separated by individual differences, and that authoritarianism can be seen on both the left and the right.

The Dark Triad traits predict authoritarian political correctness and alt-right attitudes

It is well established that mainstream personality traits are associated with moderate, traditional political attitudes. However, very little is known regarding trait predictors of extreme political attitudes. In the current study (N = 511 U.S. residents), we examined the relationships between the Dark Triad traits, Entitlement and three extreme political attitudes that are highly covered in mainstream media: White Identitarianism (‘Alt-Right’), Political Correctness-Authoritarianism, and Political Correctness-Liberalism. We found that Dark Triad traits and Entitlement had incremental validity in the prediction of these 3 attitudes over demographic factors. The Dark Triad traits and Entitlement explained a substantial portion of variance in White Identitarianism and Political Correctness-Authoritarianism, and only a small portion of variance in Political Correctness-Liberalism. Across all attitudes, Psychopathy and Entitlement were the most consistent, strongest predictors. Results indicate that, from a Dark Triad perspective, Authoritarian PC advocates have more in common with extreme right advocates than those holding PC views related to compassion.

Political Attitude and Fertility: Is There a Selection for the Political Extreme?

There is growing evidence that human ideology as well as social and political attitudes also have a genetic basis. In case of some genetic predisposition of political attitude, an association with fertility would be a hint of potential selection on political ideology. We therefore investigated on the basis of men and women that have completed, respectively, almost completed reproduction, of three different data sets (the World Value Survey 1981–2014 covering a wide range of countries and developmental levels, n = 152,380, the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe of 2005, n = 65,912, and the General Social Survey of the United States 1972–2014, n ∼ 6200) whether political attitude is associated with number of children. Overall, in the world wide survey, both extreme political attitudes, albeit more pronounced for right/conservative than for left/liberal attitude, are associated with higher average offspring number compared to intermediate attitudes. If countries are analyzed separately, however, the picture is inconsistent, and in most countries, the association is non-significant. In the European and the US-survey, only the political right is associated with above average number of children. The time series of US data from 1972 to 2014 shows that at least in the US-sample, this pattern emerged during the 1990s: in the 1970s and 1980s, also in the US-sample both political extremes had a reproductive advantage, which vanished for left wing individuals during the 1990s. From an evolutionary perspective, we are not able to draw final conclusions as the association between political attitude and reproduction varies across countries and time. Nonetheless, the overall pattern suggests that in human evolutionary history, both left and right political attitudes may have conveyed fitness benefits so that both attitudes have been kept in the population.

Sharing the Same Political Ideology Yet Endorsing Different Values: Left- and Right-Wing Political Supporters Are More Heterogeneous Than Moderates

Members of extreme political groups are usually perceived as more homogeneous than moderates. We investigated whether members of the general public who share the same political ideology would exhibit different levels of heterogeneity in terms of human values across 20 European countries and Israel. We directly compared the variability across moderate-, left-, and right-wing groups. Our findings suggest that the values of more extreme (left-wing or right-wing) supporters are usually more heterogeneous than those with more moderate views. We replicated this finding for politics-related variables such as attitudes toward immigrants and trust in (inter)national institutions. We also found that country-level variables (income, religiosity, and parasite stress level) did not moderate the pattern of value variability. Overall, our results suggest that endorsing the same political ideology is not necessarily associated with sharing the same values, especially in the case of common citizens holding extreme political attitudes.

Development and validation of the Monopoly on Truth Scale. A measure of political extremism.

Extreme political attitudes have been on the rise since the economic and political crisis of 2008. This surge of extremism constitutes a real threat, as attitudes like these are dangerous for the peaceful, democratic functioning of society. A new cognitive style, Monopoly on Truth has been proposed, based mainly on the concept of naïve realism. The development and validation of a scale for this new construct is the main objective of this study. A pilot study (N=209) was performed in order to gather the items that make up the final scale; and a main study (N=369) was conducted to test the validity and predictive power of the scale. The validation is successful as the scale shows good reliability scores, while also proving to be linked to extremism-related constructs. Additionally, the scale shows signs of not being ideologically biased. Results show the scale to be a very useful tool for studying extremism and other political trends. Future directions and other implications of the Monopoly on Truth are also discussed.

Does social media use really make people politically polarized? Direct and indirect effects of social media use on political polarization in South Korea

To help inform the debate over whether social media is related to political polarization, we investigated the effects of social media use on changes in political view using panel data collected in South Korea (N = 6411) between 2012 and 2016. We found that, although there were no direct effects of social media use, social media indirectly contributed to polarization through increased political engagement. Those who actively used social network sites were more likely to engage in political processes, which led them to develop more extreme political attitudes over time than those who did not use social network sites. In particular, we observed a clear trend toward a more liberal direction among both politically neutral users and moderately liberal users. In this study, we highlight the role of social media in activating political participation, which eventually pushes the users toward the ideological poles. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Collective Trauma From the Lab to the Real World: The Effects of the Holocaust on Contemporary Israeli Political Cognitions

This research tested whether chronic or contextually activated Holocaust exposure is associated with more extreme political attitudes among Israeli Jews. Study 1 (N = 57), and Study 2 (N = 61) found that Holocaust primes increased support for aggressive policies against a current adversary and decreased support for political compromise via an amplified sense of identification with Zionist ideology. These effects, however, were obtained only under an exclusive but not an inclusive framing of the Holocaust. Study 3 (N = 152) replicated these findings in a field study conducted around Holocaust Remembrance Day and showed that the link between Holocaust exposure, ideological identification, and militancy also occurs in real‐life settings. Study 4 (N = 867) demonstrated in a nationally representative survey that Holocaust survivors and their descendants exhibited amplified existential threat responses to contemporary political violence, which were associated with militancy and opposition to peaceful compromises. Together, these studies illustrate the Holocaustization of Israeli political cognitions 70 years later.

Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion of Understanding

People often hold extreme political attitudes about complex policies. We hypothesized that people typically know less about such policies than they think they do (the illusion of explanatory depth) and that polarized attitudes are enabled by simplistic causal models. Asking people to explain policies in detail both undermined the illusion of explanatory depth and led to attitudes that were more moderate (Experiments 1 and 2). Although these effects occurred when people were asked to generate a mechanistic explanation, they did not occur when people were instead asked to enumerate reasons for their policy preferences (Experiment 2). Finally, generating mechanistic explanations reduced donations to relevant political advocacy groups (Experiment 3). The evidence suggests that people’s mistaken sense that they understand the causal processes underlying policies contributes to political polarization.

A step into the anarchist's mind: examining political attitudes and ideology through event-related brain potentials.

The present study investigates patterns of event-related brain potentials following the presentation of attitudinal stimuli among political moderates (N=12) and anarchists (N=11). We used a modified oddball paradigm to investigate the evaluative inconsistency effect elicited by stimuli embedded in a sequence of contextual stimuli with an opposite valence. Increased late positive potentials (LPPs) of extreme political attitudes were observed. Moreover, this LPP enhancement was larger among anarchists than among moderates, indicating that an extreme political attitude of a moderate differs from an extreme political attitude of an anarchist. The discussion elaborates on the meaning of attitude extremity for moderates and extremists.

Intergroup contact, friendship quality and political attitudes in integrated and segregated schools in Northern Ireland

This study examines the effects of integrated and segregated schooling on Northern Irish children's self-reported contact and friendship with members of the other denominational group in school and community settings. To assess the effects of cross group friendships and cross group contacts in school and outside school on children's political attitudes. A cross-sectional design was employed with 1732 children being assessed at three age levels 11,12 & 14 years in eight-matched integrated, maintained (Catholic) and controlled (Protestant) schools. Lisrel modelling was used to investigate the interrelationships among cross group friendship quality, cross group contacts in school and outside school and children's political attitudes. Intergroup contact within and outside school was reported frequently in integrated schools but only occasionally in segregated schools. Modelling revealed that cross group contacts in school and outside school were both associated with less extreme political attitudes. Friendship quality with cross group members had no significant effects on political attitudes. The results provide support for educating Protestants and Catholics together as a means of moderating attitudes and creating cross-community friendships in a divided society.

A quasi-paranoid feature of students' extreme attitudes againstcolonialism.

Three alternative explanations concerning an apparent paranoid quality of extreme political attitudes were tested: (1) Such attitudes reflect exceptional, if embarrassing, perceptiveness by their proponents; (2) such attitudes reflect a cognitive style similar to that of paranoids without any attendant defensiveness, and (3) such attitudes represent paranoid defensiveness. Results on a selected total sample of 96 “left,” “middle” and “right” college students supported only hypothesis (3) and, furthermore, suggested that paranoid-like functioning was most prevalent in those on the extreme “left.” Paranoid defensiveness was indicated through an interaction with manipulated suspicion-arousal during assessment.