External Lenders Research Articles

ESG performance and trade credit: evidence from OECD countries

ABSTRACT Using a Difference-in-Differences model, this paper investigates the relationship between firm-level ESG performance and trade credit receipt in OECD countries while accounting for a firm’s external finance dependence. The results indicate that firms with better environmental performance secure more trade credit, whereas social and governance practices do not have a statistically significant effect. This outcome is contingent on the firm’s reliance on external finance, underscoring the importance of ESG performance as one of the key factors for external lenders assessing firms through publicly available ESG scores.

Project risk and the bank monitored credit line

AbstractIn this paper we investigate the role a monitored credit line plays in managing a firm's liquidity needs and influencing the firm's project risk. We develop a theoretical model where a firm finances a risky project that is subject to a liquidity shock. External lenders are imperfectly informed about both project risk and the firm's liquidity, which leads to moral hazard. We identify conditions under which it is optimal for the firm to fund the project using a term loan from a less informed lender and manage liquidity using a line of credit from an informed lender.

The Molina Family Latino Gallery: A PEAS Case Study

The Molina Family Latino Gallery: A PEAS Case Study

Financing constraints and growth of private family firms: Evidence from different legal origins

We investigate whether family control informs the extent to which business growth depends on internal finance. Our results are based on a sample of private firms from two regions in which family ownership prevails: Western Europe and East Asia. The countries covered nonetheless differ from each other in their legal origin. We find that the growth of private family firms is less reliant on internal finance. The beneficial effect of family control is especially pronounced in countries where external lenders are more protected. Family control and a protective institutional environment therefore complement each other to facilitate business growth.

A Corporate Financing-Based Asset Pricing Model

I show that an asset pricing model for the equity claims of a value-maximizing firm can be constructed from its optimal financial contracting behavior. I study a dynamic contracting model in which firms trade off the costs and benefits of a given promise to pay external lenders in a specific economic state. Deals between firms and financiers reveal the importance of that state for firm's equity value, namely the stochastic discount factor the firm responds to. I empirically evaluate the model in the cross section of expected equity returns. I find that the financial contracting approach goes a long way in rationalizing observed cross-sectional differences in average returns, also in comparison to leading asset pricing models. In addition, the model discloses that two easily measured variables, the growth rates on net worth and profitability, generate sizeable cross-sectional spreads in returns. Finally, a calibrated version of the model is broadly consistent with observed corporate policies of US listed firms.

Entrepreneurial firms and financial attractiveness for securing debt capital: a Bayesian analysis

Using theoretical arguments grounded in venture financing literature and signaling theory, we examine the impact of both intended and unintended signals on the venture’s financial attractiveness perceived by external lenders. We develop two concepts, the venture’s (i) emergent volatility associated with operations and (ii) deliberate diversity of its financing portfolio, and assess their signaling impact on the firm’s overall financial attractiveness for securing debt. Using Bayesian inference on a large sample of growth-oriented entrepreneurial ventures in the United States, we obtain results that explain the ways in which emergent volatility and deliberate diversity act as unintended versus intended signals, respectively, thus affecting the venture’s financial attractiveness for securing debt capital from external lenders.

Through the Eyes of a Whistle-Blower: How Sherry Hunt Spoke Up About Citibank's Mortgage Fraud

In 2011, Sherry Hunt was a vice president and chief underwriter at CitiMortgage headquarters in the United States. For years she had been witnessing fraud, as the company bought billions of dollars in mortgage loans from external lenders that did not meet Citi credit policy and sold them to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). This resulted in Citi selling to GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pools of loans that were considerably defective and thus likely to default. Citi had also approved hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of defective mortgage files for U.S. Federal Housing Administration insurance. After reporting the mortgage defects in regular reports, notifying and working closely with her direct supervisor (who was subsequently asked to leave Citi after alerting the chairman of the board to these issues) to stop the purchase of defective loans, leaving anonymous tips on the FBI's and the Department of Housing and Urban Development's websites, and receiving threats from two of her superiors who demanded that she change the results of her quality control unit's reports, the shy and conflict-avoidant Hunt had to decide who she should tell about the fraud, and how.The case gives students the opportunity to recommend how Hunt should proceed based on their analysis of the stakeholders involved. To aid instructors, the case includes Kellogg-produced videos of Hunt—the only on-camera interviews she has ever given—explaining what happened after she reported the fraud to Citi HR and, later, the U.S. Department of Justice. Within the case, students are also briefly exposed to legislation and bodies pertinent to whistle-blowing in the United States, including the Dodd-Frank Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the SEC Office of the Whistleblower.This case won the 2014 competition for Outstanding Case on Anti-Corruption, supported by the Principles for Responsible Management Education (PRME), an initiative of the UN Global Compact. Analyze stakeholders' motivations to prepare counter-arguments to the resistance one might encounter when reporting unethical behavior Write a script for who to tell, how, and why Discuss how incentive structures, management, and culture play roles in promoting or hindering ethical behavior in organizations Identify behaviors that help a whistle-blower be effective Gain experience resolving ethical dilemmas in which two values may conflict, such as professional duty and personal ethics

Modernizing government accounting standards in Greece: a case of ‘garbage can’ decision-making

This paper examines the standard-setting process during the recent reform of government accounting standards in Greece. The process is viewed through the lens of the ‘garbage can’ model, informed by interviews, informal discussions and archival data. Findings indicate a lack of effective monitoring of the process by politicians and external lenders (the ‘Troika’), and an outcome that favoured the bureaucrats and consultants involved.

R&D Subsidies and Firms' Cost of Debt

Financing research and development (R&D) through loans is usually a costly endeavor. Information asymmetry, outcome uncertainty and low collateral value tend to increase the cost of debt. Based on a large panel of heterogeneous firms, this study shows that recipients of public R&D grants, on average, face lower costs of debt. The findings also suggest that a process of certification in which the subsidy signals the quality of the firm’s R&D to external lenders rather than a ‘resource effect’, i.e. the direct liquidity impact of the subsidy, explains this observation. The comparison between young and established firms shows that the certification effect for young firms primarily stems from subsidies for basic research, that is, for the stage of R&D in which outcome uncertainty and information asymmetries are typically larger. In addition, young firms seem to benefit from a ‘formation effect’ through learning from the subsidy application process. Application experience may improve young firms’ R&D project plans in a way that reduces information asymmetries between firms and lenders.

Debt and Expropriation

We regress leverage on an index of corporate exposure to expropriation by the controlling shareholder - the ratio of his ownership rights O to his control rights C - and on an index of creditor rights. Amongst corporations that can access related party loans, a lower O/C ratio increases leverage when creditor protection is weak; but reduces leverage where creditor protection is strong. In the first case, higher leverage gives the controlling shareholder control of more resources to expropriate. In the second case, minority shareholders and external lenders constrain the leverage of group affiliates that seemed more vulnerable to expropriation.

Trade Liberalization’s Impact on Agriculture in Low Income Countries: A Comparison of El Salvador and Costa Rica

Due to both deepening economic crises and pressure from external lenders, Costa Rica and El Salvador implemented trade and market liberalization reforms in the 1980s. This study explores whether these policy changes shifted production toward each country’s presumed comparative advantage in agriculture. For Costa Rica, trade and market liberalization strengthened the country’s ability to generate agricultural trade surpluses while liberalization caused a decline in El Salvador’s agricultural sector. Liberalization also affected how prices and exchange rates influence agriculture in both countries. The findings demonstrate that agriculture’s response to liberalization can vary widely among countries. Overall market conditions in the rural sector, including El Salvador’s postconflict challenges, during liberalization’s introduction partly explain the different responses. Other potential factors include the pace that governments implement policy reforms and that liberalization will only stimulate agriculture if the country has a clear comparative advantage in that sector.

Capital structure decisions: research in Estonian non‐financial companies

PurposeTo investigate the relations between company‐specific financial factors and the capital structure decisions of Estonian non‐financial companies and to examine behavioral differences between companies of different sizes.Design/methodology/approachTotally 260 Estonian non‐financial companies are divided into small‐, medium‐ and large‐companies, each sample being analysed by correlation‐regression method in two aspects – impact of financial factors on static capital structure and capital structure dynamics. Companies' financial statements of 2002/2003 or 2003/2004 are used. Finally, capital structure adjustments in extreme boundaries are analyzed.FindingsCapital structure decisions among Estonian non‐financial companies are driven by the pecking order theory, the evidences supporting optimal capital structure choices in long run remain weak. The robustness of the pecking order behavior significantly differs between smaller and bigger companies.Research limitations/implicationsLimited number of companies surveyed due to hard manual work required to adjust financial accounts. Implication of findings is somewhat limited as the study covers a single country.Originality/valueThe paper helps to identify financial drivers and to understand motivations behind capital structure decisions of emerging market companies and it supplements earlier studies. Quasi‐equity debt distorts the observed capital structures. Capital structure is adjusted for operating leases and quasi‐equity debt to identify true amount put at risk and its mix between owners and external lenders.

Poverty, Petroleum & Policy Intervention: Lessons from the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline

The ‘resource curse’ – the tendency of resource wealth to impair natural resource exporting countries on various economic and political dimensions – has shown some of its strongest manifestations in Africa's petro-states. For this reason, the World Bank's recent attempt to engineer an accountable and transparent oil economy in one of Africa's poorest and most corrupt countries – Chad – deserves close scrutiny and critical analysis. Although the World Bank has conducted the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project with the belief that the ‘resource curse’ can be mitigated through sound economic and fiscal policies, the results thus far suggest that Chad is doomed to repeat an all too familiar fate of economic turmoil and political strife. This article draws on the disappointing realities since Chad's first oil exports, and examines three major factors underlying Chad's unsuccessful conversion of oil revenues into poverty reduction: institutional capacity constraints, socio-political incompatibilities, and subversive interactions with external lenders. Although the majority of critics attribute the project's failures to the World Bank's policy choices and management, this analysis suggests that the project has been hindered more by the external nature of the World Bank's policy intervention than by any particular design flaws. Given the shortcomings of the Bank's intervention, this article considers plausible revisions to the project, and draws policy implications for future development endeavours of this nature.