Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction Research Articles

Cooperative and non-cooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery

The fishery for Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Barents Sea is one of the most valuable fisheries in the North Atlantic. After the introduction of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, cod is a shared stock between Norway and Russia. Overfishing of quotas has been a concern for a number of years. The purpose of this article is to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery. This will be done in a game theoretic context, based on different assumptions regarding important variables such as cost of effort and initial stock size. The game theoretic analysis will be based on an empirical bioeconomic model developed and estimated by Hannesson (Mar Policy 31:698–705, 2007; J Bioecon forthcoming). The case of cooperative management is analysed for different cost parameters and starting values of the stock. An interesting result is that the optimal policy gives rise to pulse fishing. As this involves effort (and harvests) varying from year to year, potentially imposing substantial social costs on the industry in years when the fishery is closed, a policy of constant effort is also considered. Finally, non-cooperative management is analysed.

The Atlantic Canada Resource Management Catastrophe: What Went Wrong and What Can We Learn from It?

The recent closure of the Northwest Atlantic cod and flounder fisheries off the east coast of Canada has prompted calls for a reconsideration of our understanding of fisheries stock dynamics. It is unsettling to recognize that back in 1979, after Canada declared Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction off its shores, the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) of northern cod (2J3KL Cod) was expected to rise to 402,000 tonnes by 1985 (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1981) as the stock was rebuilt from the depleted state to which it had been reduced as a result of the actions of distant-water fleets over the previous two decades. In fact, the TAC for this stock never rose above 266,000 tonnes, and beginning in 1989 it was progressively reduced until the directed fishery was effectively closed in mid-1992. This outcome would have had no credibility, even as a worst-case scenario, when Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction was established, with high expectations. The East Coast fishery was the subject of numerous studies (see, for example, Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 1978; Economic Council of Canada 1980; and Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries 1982), none of which anticipated a problem resulting from a shortage of fish. While stock assessment methods have been the focus of attention as a result of the collapse of the groundfish stocks (see, for example, Northern Cod Review Panel 1990), the enormity of the catastrophe suggests reconsideration as well of aspects of fisheries bioeconomics theory. This paper discusses the origins of the fisheries collapse in Atlantic Canada, and draws out lessons for fisheries economics and management.

Extended fisheries jurisdiction: origins of the current crisis in Atlantic Canada's fisheries

With Canada's Atlantic fisheries in a state of acute crisis because of a severe reduction in groundfish populations, the government is developing strategies to reduce harvesting and processing capacity by 50%. The current difficulties are attributed, at least in part, to excessive overexpansion of the fisheries following the declaration of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction in 1977. On several occasions in the past, the Canadian government has faced the problem of fishing overcapacity, but on each occasion attempts to reduce employment in the fishery have been stymied. The operative forces are discussed; those which halted ‘downsizing’ in the past still exist.

Assessment and Management of the Georges Bank Cod Fishery: An Historical Review and Evaluation

Assessment and Management of the Georges Bank Cod Fishery: An Historical Review and Evaluation

Distant water fishing nations and extended fisheries jurisdiction

Distant water fishing nations and extended fisheries jurisdiction

U.S. Demand for Selected Groundfish Products, 1967–80: Reply

Lin, Johnston, and Rettig (hereafter LJR), as well as Crutchfield, have praised our innovative approach to estimation of market arrangements in a fishery of great importance, and our valuable contribution to the literature. They nonetheless take issue with our conclusion that expected benefits from extended fisheries jurisdiction (EFJ) will not accrue to the fishery current market arrangements are maintained (Tsoa, Schrank, and Roy, p. 489). We arrived at this conclusion on the basis of our analysis of U.S. monthly demand certain narrowly defined groundfish products over the period 1967-80.' We found that U.S. demand these groundfish products was price inelastic and income elastic. LJR have no quarrel with this fundamental result. This was, at least to us, a rather striking finding. It generally had been accepted that groundfish products are very close substitutes one another, and to a lesser degree other food products; and so the demand these products, and even groundfish products generally, should be highly price elastic. This seemed to be confirmed by the available empirical studies, some of which are cited by LJR and Crutchfield.2 A high price elasticity implies that there would be no grounds concern that the benefits of EFJ would be constrained by marketing factors. Only small price adjustments would be required any additional harvest to be absorbed by the market. Unfortunately, these studies were subject to serious specification error, the nature of which is discussed in our earlier paper and will not be considered further here because LJR and Crutchfield do not raise any questions along these lines. We have been able to remove at least some of this error and have reported the results. Among these results was the finding that demand these products is usually price inelastic. On the basis of this evidence, we suggest that if the of fish to the United States increases dramatically because of greater catches by American fleets as well as by fleets of other countries; then, price elasticities are low, extreme reductions in fish prices may be required to enable the American market to absorb the increased supply (Tsoa, Schrank, and Roy, p. 483). LJR have raised the possibility that demand fish products produced domestically may be quite price elastic even though the demand all groundfish products may be price inelastic. Thus, EFJ results in an increase in domestic production, the total revenue to the domestic industry may increase while that of foreign suppliers decreases, or at least remains unchanged. Were LJR's model valid, it would have offered a serious challenge to our conclusions. However, we have serious reservations about the model specified by LJR. Our reservations are centered around the following assumptions which are made in their analysis: (a) that domestic and imported groundfish are perfect substitutes; (b) that there is a well-defined foreign function as postulated in equation (2) of their model; and (c) that domestic will increase while foreign remains constant or even falls as a result of EFJ. First, LJR assume, for convenience, that domestic and imported groundfish products are perfect substitutes. All their analytical results are based on this assumption. In fact, as Crutchfield points out in his comments, most U.S. groundfish landings are marketed fresh, while imported groundfish products are mainly sold in the form of frozen fillets and blocks. Since fresh fish and frozen fillets and blocks are marketed through different channels and to different categories of buyers, there appears to be a segmented market.3 Crutchfield has elsewhere reported cross-price elasticities between domestically produced and imported fish products in the range of 0.09-0.14 (p. 216). This result, which is consistent with ours, suggests that it would be more reasonable to treat imported and domestic fish as unrelated products rather than as close substitutes.

U.S. Demand for Selected Groundfish Products, 1967–80: Comment

In a recent paper in this Journal, Tsoa, Schrank, and Roy (hereafter TSR) present a model of the demand for groundfish in the United States. Their modeling strategy is a departure from other analyses of this in that they estimate the reduced form of a system of inventory-price expectations equations rather than the more traditional system of demand and supply relationships. Using data from 1967 to 1980, they estimate a single equation derived from their simultaneous equations model. They find perverse elasticities; the demands for cod, haddock, and redfish (ocean perch) fillets are all inelastic in the short run, and all product forms (including frozen fish blocks) are income elastic. They thereby concluded that since the demand for various groundfish fillets is price inelastic, a recession in the United States will exert strong downward pressure on prices for these products if they are to be absorbed by the U.S. market (p. 489). They also draw conclusions as to the expected result of extended fisheries jurisdiction (EFJ): If EFJ results in an increase in the supply of fish products in the United States due to both increased do-

Extended fisheries jurisdiction in the USA: An economic appraisal

Extended fisheries jurisdiction in the USA: An economic appraisal

The Management of Shared Fishery Resources Under Extended Jurisdiction

The management of shared fishery resources is one of the prime management issues to have arisen as a consequence of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction. This paper reviews the issue from a bioeconomic perspective. A major conclusion arising from this review is that it should in principle be possible for joint owners of shared resources to develop effective joint management programs, even though they may have significantly different views on optimal management strategy. Avenues of future research on the issue are also discussed.

Potential Economic Benefits from Gear Restrictions and License Limitation in Fisheries Regulation

The economic analysis of various fisheries management tools has been the subject of an enormous economic literature, a large portion of which has been produced since the passage of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction laws in the majority of the countries of the world (Crutchfield 1961; Anderson 1977; Pearse 1979; Rettig and Ginter 1980; Clark 1980; Clark 1981; Anderson 1981; Sturgess and Meany 1982; Beddington and Rettig 1984). The general conclusion of this literature is that traditional management techniques such as closed seasons, closed areas, gear restrictions, and total quotas are economically inefficient in that, directly or indirectly, potential gains are dissipated through increases in costs.

U.S. Demand for Selected Groundfish Products, 1967–80

AbstractThe expansion of national fisheries jurisdiction to the two‐hundred‐mile limit enabled maritime nations to allocate increased shares of the fish catch off their shores to their own fishermen. The Atlantic groundfish catches of Canada and the United States are sold primarily on the American market. A Nerlovian inventory adjustment‐price expectations model is estimated for the American demand for groundfish. Income and price elasticities are perverse. The ability of the American market to absorb the increased anticipated catches are therefore limited, and benefits of extended fisheries jurisdiction will be lost unless marketing arrangements are substantially changed.

The Newfoundland Groundfishery: Some Options for Renewal

The cost-effectiveness (in social terms) of alternative methods used by the Newfoundland fleet to harvest groundfish is examined. The following conclusions are obtained: (1) gear used by particular vessel types is frequently inefficient relative to alternative gear; (2) when efficient gear is used, small boats and medium-sized trawlers are about equally cost-effective, while midshore longliners are highly inefficient; (3) there is little potential for additional employment creation in groundfish harvesting, even with the higher yields expected as a result of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction; (4) both inshore and offshore components of the industry are supported by an enormous degree of subsidization.

The emerging fisheries regime: Implications for india

Abstract Extended fisheries jurisdiction will have a significant impact on the management of marine fisheries of many coastal states. Developing coastal states face special problems because of their deficiency in skilled labor, managerial skills, economic infrastructure, capital and finance, and effective linkages to national and international markets. The article sets forth the objectives of a national marine fisheries program for India which have relevance for many developing coastal states with significant fisheries resources off their coasts. The first section deals with the stocks under the exclusive control of India; it is to be noted that almost ninety percent of India's catch will comprise such stocks. The second section deals with the management of stocks that India shares with its neighbors. The final section considers the highly prized tuna species that swim within and beyond the 200‐mile zone.

Joint ventures with foreigners as a method of exploiting canadian fishery resources under extended fisheries jurisdiction

Abstract Under the extended fisheries jurisdictions created by new 200-mile economic zones, coastal states have an opportunity to capture a larger share in the exploitation of domestic or contiguous resources. In the short-term, the costs of gearing up to the necessary levels of operating and technological capacity are high for such states. A strategic alternative is suggested for the Canadian case (which may also be appropriate for other coastal nations) that significantly reduces the cost to the nation of capturing the resource. The public sector should avoid the temptation to finance such growth directly, but rather encourage private interests in the country to enter into joint fishery ventures with foreigners. Because of the common pattern of changes in such situations of bilateral monopoly, limited amounts of lost short-term benefits would be recompensed by longerterm capture of the major share of benefits from the resource in international markets.

Economic impacts of extended fisheries jurisdiction

Economic impacts of extended fisheries jurisdiction

Distributional Implications of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction: Some Policy and Research Issues and Policy: Discussion

Bromley's paper draws attention to the importance of distributional considerations in fishery management decisions (as in Bromley and Bishop), and he suggests these implications be identified before such decisions are made. Bromley also attempts to demonstrate how distributional considerations can be used to evaluate policy questions arising from extended fisheries jurisdiction in international and domestic settings. While these points are important, he has not clarified these concepts sufficiently for them to be useful in identifying policy and research issues. The general equilibrium analysis of international fisheries is confusing. It is difficult to understand the interdependent production possibility curves presented in his figure 1. The production possibility frontiers of countries A and B without extended jurisdiction are given by PLA and PLB, respectively. His presentation seems to indicate that complete specialization in fisheries by both countries would produce more fish than it is possible to produce (i.e., the width of the box). If it is intended that movements along a frontier (PLA, for instance) shift B's frontier, this would, in turn, shift A's frontier and, thus, PLA becomes meaningless except for point D; that is, if there is interdependency as he indicates, PLA and PLB cannot simultaneously hold.

Economic Impacts of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction.

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Distributional Implications of the Extended Economic Zone: Some Policy and Research Issues in the Fishery

At a recent conference on the economics of extended fisheries jurisdiction, Bishop and I argued that distributional considerations had been largely ignored by economists as they sought to influence public policy. Among the reactions to that paper, the least surprising was that efficiency analysis is scientific and value free, while distributional matters are value laden, mercantilistic, and concern love. Another reaction was that to pay undue attention to distributional concerns would freeze us into total incapacity in attempting to rationalize the The historical justification for this emphasis on efficiency was that it was difficult enough convincing biologists and policy makers (often one and the same) of the relevance of economics and that therefore it was better to get half a loaf rather than nothing. Besides, everyone else is already a specialist in distribution. The premise of this paper is that there are important insights to be gained by a more careful specification of the traditional steadystate/yield-effort models and by viewing the economics of extended jurisdiction in a welfare theoretic framework. Length restrictions preclude a comprehensive treatment, yet it is possible to offer some analysis that is suggestive of directions for research. More importantly, I am hopeful that useful policy recommendations might also result. In the following section I briefly introduce my view of distributional matters as they pertain to the fishery. Then, I present a simple model for assessing the distributional implications of extended jurisdiction in an international setting. Next, I discuss access to the enlarged domestic fishery with the primary motive of reminding economists of the elements hidden in that raw number fishing effort. Finally, I discuss some research and policy implications.