Liberty Of Expression Research Articles

Discipline Body and Digital Panopticism to Woman Instagram Influencer through Hijab Discourse

In contemporary society, the migration of interactions among millennials, particularly Muslim women serving as influencers, to digital platforms has spurred an intriguing shift. However, this transition is fraught with complexities as these women encounter digital media panopticism, constraining their liberty of expression. This study delves into the propagation of hijab discourse within millennial influencer circles via digital channels, aiming to unveil the established truths propagated by authoritative figures. Employing Foucault’s notion of panopticism, discursive practices, and Howe-Strauss’ Millennial generation, this research employs critical constructionism, qualitative methodologies, and in-depth interviews to unravel the pervasive digital panopticism shaping the disciplined digital personas of these influencers. The investigation uncovers how authorities utilize digital panopticism to regulate influencers, aligning with Foucault’s theories. This discreet strategy amplifies influence while perpetuating continuous surveillance through participatory transparency. By penalizing deviations from the hijab discourse, authorities instill fear, prompting self-discipline on social media platforms. Despite influencers’ vigilance, the opaque nature of control fosters ambiguity, highlighting the subtle yet profound impact of power dynamics in digital spaces. This observation echoes Foucault’s discourse on subtle regulatory mechanisms in contemporary society, underscoring the pervasive influence of power dynamics in digital spheres.

“A Paper Agitation”: The All India Newspaper Editors’ Conference, the Indian State, and the Struggle Over the First Amendment

ABSTRACT The addition of the First Amendment to the Indian Constitution is considered a crucial moment in the constitutional history of liberty of speech and expression, and by extension, freedom of the press, in postcolonial India. Aimed at limiting the right to free speech and expression through several caveats, the attempt to pass the amendment roused fierce press protest led by the All-India Newspaper Editors’ Conference (AINEC). Such protest notwithstanding, the Nehru government succeeded in passing the amendment through Parliament. This article seeks to revisit the months of April to July 1951 to understand how the press and, in particular, its primary organization—AINEC—understood the threat to their liberty and organized against it. In particular, the arguments put forth by AINEC and the methods applied by its leaders to unify the press shall be studied through the letters, meetings, and editorials of AINEC and its major functionaries. The reactions these endeavors elicited, in turn, shall be studied to explain why the attempted unity, and the larger protest, ultimately failed, and what this failure can explain about the limits of press unity and the difficulties of opposing a nationalist government in early postcolonial India.

From the Culture of Silence to the Culture of Expression: A Meta- Analysis of the Pedagogies Adopted at Higher Education Institutions

The current study is a meta-analysis of the pedagogies adopted at higher educational institutions. The study focuses on learner-centered instruction, which leads to a culture of expression in contrast to teacher-centered learning, which creates a culture of silence. Students have the opportunity to critically evaluate prevailing educational, social and political structures and put their understandings of the subject matter. Social reality is constructed through active participation in higher education institutions and the presence of teachers. Students have liberty and freedom of expression in the discussion and critique of the issues. In critical pedagogy, students are encouraged to critically evaluate established patterns associated with educational institutions in particular and society in general.

Democratic responsibility in the digital public sphere

Democratic responsibility in the digital public sphere

Mongolian democracy: key challenges and opportunities in modern environment

In the last three decades, views about democracy in Mongolia have transformed from high expectations and hopes to perceived failure in performances in political and economic terms. A national and international researchers concluded that at the initial stage of democratization, Mongolians were guided by the general concepts and values of democracy such as human rights, liberty, and freedom of association and expression. Later, these values shifted to more in-depth notions that can be summarized as “democracy is a process for ensuring accountability and justice based on the active engagement of citizens”. This article explores the factors that contributed to democratic challenges and bottlenecks drawing on experts’ interviews conducted by the author and a review of various public opinion surveys assessing democratic performance in Mongolia. The article uses methodologies and tools designed by International IDEA and assesses the applicability of different democratic models to the Mongolian context. It argues that the evaluation of democracy in Mongolia should use additional criteria reflecting Mongolian characteristics. It concludes by suggesting that the enhancement of the democratic mechanism of accountability of public institutions is a key opportunity to consolidate democracy. The experts participating in the assessment viewed the frameworks of executive, pluralist and protective democracy are more suitable for democracy development in Mongolia, and communitarian democracy.

Freedom of Expression and Speech: An Exploration of Waḥīduddīn Khān’s Views and Approach

In Islam, freedom of expression has a significant value and it is considered a basic human right and obligatory duty of Muslim believers. Therefore, Islam commands all Muslim men and women, rulers and public, inferior and superior to establish and maintain it properly keeping in view certain parameters and boundaries within which it must be practiced. With the rise of the new waves of freedom of expression in the western world, a number of Muslim scholars have attempted to reinterpret these parameters in order to offer a better understanding of the said issue. Employing qualitative research methodology, we analyzed the views of Mawlānā Waḥīduddīn Khān published in his books, papers, interviews and blogs. Providing a critical analysis of the writings of a well-known Islamic scholar, this paper is an attempt to understand his approach towards the subject matter at hand. This study concludes that he evaluated critically the concepts of traditional Islamic scholars and their vantage points towards liberty and freedom of expression and he is more or less near to the western approach towards freedom of expression. One may examine that there are some remarks of Khān contradictory to that of his other views concerning liberty. This study also recommends that we need a deep analysis of his views to understand his opinions regarding freedom of speech and thought.

The Virtues of Everyday Talk: The Enduring Significance of John Milton’s Theory of Expressive Liberties

The system of free expression John Milton defends in Areopagitica, a pamphlet against prior restraint in publishing, is often characterized as merely a proto-liberal, truth-based marketplace of ideas theory. But this represents a misunderstanding of Milton’s views on the freedoms of conscience, speech, and the press. The tendency in political theory, philosophy, and law to reduce the “free speech Milton” to Areopagitica, and the reduction of that essay to several soundbites, has meant sidelining both the significant exceptions to expressive liberties that Milton calls for and also the role of the social in his theory. This incomplete characterization has enabled Milton’s misuse in First Amendment discourse and jurisprudence, where he is made to support hierarchical approaches to free speech that privilege public political speech and are therefore ill-equipped to address the full range of communicative experiences. More comprehensive readings of Milton, however, reveal both certain limits to free expression, and also deep consideration for a wide range of speech acts. By reading Milton’s theory of expressive liberties in light of the justifications he provides for those freedoms—i.e., virtue-building and Truth-seeking—this essay provides a fuller account of his views. What emerges is a distinctly Miltonian, virtue-driven “political theory of everyday talk” that locates value in even the most ordinary communicative acts. This theory—embracing both verbal and nonverbal expression—not only complements existing political theories of the everyday but can also help illuminate contemporary free speech concerns, many of which stem from the libertarian approach to expressive liberties that Milton (inadvertently) helped inspire.

A Classic Book Review of 'Judicial Strictures: Liberty of Judicial Expression and Restraint' by Dr. Tirlok Nath Arora

Dr. Arora starts this book with the question on judicial independence and liberty of judicial expression on the bench and of the bench. Some judges are prone to make carping remarks about individuals and organizations during the hearing or in their judgments which get headlines in the media. The justification for such remarks has been the subject of academic discussion. A measure of aloofness from political controversy has to be an essential part of judges life. Judges are human beings and they cannot be expected from withholding their own opinions – sometimes strong which may or may not be warranted. What is not warranted is the expression of the same in the public. Judges, we should remember, are human beings, not disembodied spirits; they respond to human emotions. The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of mankind, in the words of Cardozo do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges idly by. Yes notwithstanding the human factor the courts operate in a setting that forces responsibility upon them. Judges are bound within the walls, lines, and limits that are often unseen by the laymen – walls, lines and limits built from the heritage of the law; the impact of the cases as they come down through the years; the regard for precedent, the self imposed practice of judicial restraint, in brief, the tradition of the law. It is also an essential requisite for a judge to acquire a certain amount of detachment and the discernment, so that he is not carried away by popular catch words and shibboleths. He must always beware of the danger which underlines the disposition to take the immediate for the eternal, the transitory for the permanent and the ephemeral for the timeless. This necessarily calls for a determined resistance to the hypothecation of the thinking process unwarranted remarks in the course of hearings have to be avoided, nor should a judge be given to over-speaking. If he does so, he lends himself to the charge of ill tuned symbol. (pp. ix-x) The book is very important collection of case law on the subject as it tells that the language to be used by the judge whether positively or negatively must be judicious. It tells judicious means which are required by the judicial function of a judge. It also tells that a judicial function is the due process and due process is a process which promotes dignity of mankind and mankind includes the judge and all actors in the process. This classic book is a primer which must be read, inter alia, by our students, our professors, our judges, our law professionals, and our social scientists. It will create a light within their hearts and will make it easy for them as to how much is useful to remain reasonable, logical, moderate, appropriate, cooperative, coordinating, and proving themselves as guards and security and guaranteeing safety throughout. When the object of all is to establish the truth and reality, no corner should be left to allow falsity in the society whether the level is individual, collective, international or even universal.

Liberty, Enlightenment, and the Polish Brethren

The article presents an overview of the history of the idea of dialogics and liberty of expression. This liberty is strictly tied to the problem of liberty of conscience. Since the 17th century, the development of the dialogics traveled from an apocalyptic – and demonising its opponents – discourse as in John Milton’s approach in Areopagitica, through dialogics of cooperation and obligations and laws (in the Polish Brethren, so-called Socinians, especially Jan Crell), through dialogics of deduction (transcendental deduction in Immanuel Kant), to dialogics of induction and creativity (John Stuart Mill).

Freedom of the Media in Sri Lanka: A Study

Media freedom has never been consistent in Sri Lanka. Different regimes used legal and constitutional means to control the media from public debates and criticisms. The Constitution of Sri Lanka does not specifically mention the freedom of the media. Freedom of the Media is implied from the Article 14(1) (a) of the Constitution. However this right is subject to restrictions under sub-clause, whereby this freedom can be restricted for reasons of sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka, the security of the Country, Parliamentary privileges, public order, Emergency Regulations, relation to contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offense and Official Secrets Acts. As per the Press Council, the freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subjects and to whatever length, the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, but apart from statute this privilege is no other and no higher. The range of his assertions, his criticisms or his comments is as wide as and no wider than that of any other subject. The Preamble of the Sri Lankan Constitution ensures to all its citizens the liberty of expression. Freedom of the media has been included as part of freedom of speech and expression under the Article 14 of the UDHR. The heart of the Article14 says that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. In view of the above, Right of Information Act 2016 is a milestone in the guest for building an informed and prosperous society .As this overview of Sri Lankan media Laws show, their social media enjoy a wide range of legal rights. This study focuses on Judgments of the cases on Joseph Perera v Attorney General, Visuvalingam v Liyanage and Fernando v Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation were delivered under the 1972 Republican Constitution, they continued to remain valid precedents even under the Current Constitution of 1978. It was an Important and far – reaching Judgment. This paper is a critical analysis of the Sri Lankan concept of Freedom of the media and how it is related to the concept of expression in Constitution of Sri Lanka. The judicial view in this context has also been studied.

Western ‘Civic Totalism’, Sovereignty of the People, and the Need for Limited Government

In a fascinating, comparative philosophical article, Sungmoon Kim attempts ‘to revamp Confucian democracy, which is originally presented as the communitarian corrective and cultural alternative to liberal democracy, into a robust democratic political theory and practice that is plausible in the societal context of pluralism’. The same source of inspiration that Kim uses to reconstruct Confucian democracy – William Galston’s notion of liberal pluralism – can be used to critically appraise the current state of Western liberal democracy, to consider, more specifically, the extent to which Western liberal democracy still manages to realize the principle of expressive liberty, defined by Galston as ‘the absence of constraints, imposed by some individuals on others, that make it impossible (or significantly more difficult) for the affected individuals to live their lives in ways that express their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning or value to life’.

The Emperor of All Actualities: S.377 Jurisprudence in Comparative Context

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India revolutionized, contemporized, and revitalized our Equality jurisprudence. In this essay, I argue that Supreme Court’s jurisprudence culminating in Navtej is best understood as one in a long line of cases leading us to an expanded notion of equality (Articles 14 and 15) in the context of a gradual and ongoing judicial acceptance of academic scholarship on a global theory of sexual sovereignty. I address the history behind S. 377 including colonial history, early jurisprudence, attempts at repeal, the High Court decision in Naz Foundation, the reversal in Koushal, and the intermediary steps of NALSA and Puttaswamy leading to redemption in Navtej. I also examine the Indian Supreme Court’s changing attitudes towards comparative constitutionalism with a special emphasis on foreign law, examining the global theory and comparing Navtej with its parallel in Lawrence v. Texas with a focus on Spatial Privacy, Deliberative Autonomy, and Expressive Liberty. I further examine the constitutionality of S. 377 in a neutral manner while considering parallels with Lawrence, noticing how a utopian reading of Lawrence maps perfectly onto the singular approach in Naz and the various approaches in Navtej. I also note the most distinct contributions to our jurisprudence made by the bench in Navtej. In doing so, I examine the changes in our Article 14 and Article 15 jurisprudences, our Right to Privacy jurisprudence emanating from Article 21, and the varying judicial attitudes that lead to such changes. I conclude with a note on the importance of clear rule-making, clarity, consistency, and respect for the separation of powers in judicial analysis.

Walking Raddy: The Baby Dolls of New Orleans ed. by Kim Vaz-Deville

Reviewed by: Walking Raddy: The Baby Dolls of New Orleans ed. by Kim Vaz-Deville Peter Dunbaugh Smith Walking Raddy: The Baby Dolls of New Orleans. Edited by Kim Vaz-Deville. ( Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2018. Pp. xxviii, 349. Paper, $30.00, ISBN 978-1-4968-1740-2; cloth, $90.00, ISBN 978-1-4968-1739-6.) Though long a subject of scholarly analysis, New Orleans's annual Mardi Gras celebration continues to reveal itself as an important cultural index. Kim Vaz-Deville's collection of essays offers scholars in women's studies and African [End Page 721] American cultural history, as well as casual readers who are interested in these subjects, an impressive array of multidisciplinary perspectives on the historical construction and recent reemergence of a Mardi Gras masking tradition known as the Baby Dolls. Women in communities marginalized by Jim Crow segregation embraced opportunities to leverage the expanded expressive liberties afforded them during carnival season. They created new identities through the use of increasingly ritualized cultural practices, providing themselves with a new and transgressive forum to contest, critique, and ironize the same social constraints that had previously disempowered them. Public presentation of women's bodies in motion became a powerful and purposeful assertion of individual and collective black female autonomy that directly challenged the same normative concepts of race, gender, and class that had been imposed on them. Walking Raddy: The Baby Dolls of New Orleans deftly navigates its complex sociocultural terrain in a manner that is both intimate and scholarly. Personal narratives of individual dancers, such as Henrietta Hayes Warrick, an important cultural transmitter of the earliest Claiborne Avenue Baby Doll traditions, and Cinnamon Black, a current practitioner, help structure the book's introductory passages with an informants' framework, creating a thematic unity that informs the eclecticism of the accompanying essays. In particular, Warrick's own longevity embodies this unifying aspect of historical continuity, which helps tie together the wide variety of perspectives on this unique gendered practice. From biographical essays on influential musicians and dancers, including Lionel Batiste and Antoinette K-Doe, to historical chronologies documenting local and national influences that helped shape their communities, this collection embodies a multiplicity of expression that resembles the kaleidoscopic visual culture it reveals among the various Mardi Gras krewes. Essays deeply rooted in the neighborhoods themselves are among the most effective. Local knowledge is leveraged to reveal the nuanced shades of propriety that distinguished later Baby Doll dancers from their earlier antecedents among neighborhood prostitutes. This methodological approach also contributes to a better understanding of the subsequent evolution of some Baby Doll troupes into more traditional community, social, and philanthropic organizations. Less effective are background essays that propose to encompass broader issues of race and gender through more generalized approaches. For example, one essay compares the local use of the term baby with its use in lyrics by Tin Pan Alley songwriters, an argument that would have been enhanced by the introduction of more meaningful connections between these songs and New Orleans itself. The last few chapters—of a book that is already richly illustrated with images and photographs of relevant practitioners and locations—are dedicated to a celebration of the continuing resonance of Baby Doll traditions, as expressed through the work of contemporary visual artists. From figurative paintings and sculptures to folk art quilts and pillows, these pieces embody the exuberance of the participant and the pleasure of the spectator with an immediacy that would have been difficult to express through the written word. Issues surrounding cultural preservation and the transmission of heritage often provoke important subtexts that, in this case, help direct the work of many of Walking Raddy's authors. The scope of their questions concerning continuity of practice and the transformation of meaning among various generations of [End Page 722] Baby Dolls over time seems to overflow traditional disciplinary silos. By providing readers with an insider's insight into the agency of women operating within these small but historically significant neighborhoods in one of America's great cities, the essays reveal a truly neglected ingredient in the recipe of New Orleans's rich gumbo of culture. More important, readers also learn the degree to...

Economy of pain: When to regulate offensive expression

Expression that assaults another’s identity or human dignity, as with hate speech, presents a vexing case for regulatory protection. This article proposes a method of expressive elasticity as a means to balance individual protection with expressive liberty in a rigorous and neutral manner. The method of expressive elasticity treats harm to individual recipients as a function of social utility. To maintain neutrality on the content of ideas, social utility is defined as the optimal number of individual participants in public discourse. Offensive expression should be regulated only when it reasonably lessens the likely amount of future contributors to the marketplace of ideas. The object is to restrict offensive expression that signals a hostile or prejudiced public space that a reasonable recipient would recoil from. Elasticity generally refers to the responsiveness of one variable to a change in another variable. Elasticity, as util ized in this article, is a view to the responsiveness of individual participation to the amount of external harm received. When individuals can absorb the external harm and their potential participation remains unchanged, there should be no government intervention. Elasticity should be recognized as inversely related to the private costs imposed on offensive expression. When a speaker is publicly reviled because of a hateful message, then the private marketplace has appropriately indicated that the targeted person is not the one devalued by society. When the private costs for hateful expression are insufficient, however, public sanction may be necessary to ensure optimal levels of future participation.

VOTING CULTURE, ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TLEMCEN AREA – HENNAYA - MODE

This work is subscribed in the case of the political anthropology reseach; wich si interested on the study of cultural particularities by fucising on the taboo manifested through three dimensions: social; political and cultural.
 It is precisely about the study of the elections plans and their social and cultural impact in instance that has a capital importance as mechanism allowing a certain liberty of expression.
 Thus; our thesis brings a bunch of reflection on the input of elections in terms of anthropologiy

La rupture du tabou sur internet –analyse linguistique des mèmes sur Aleksander Kwaśniewski

Dans le livre Totem et tabou Sigmund Freud remarque que « le fondement du tabou est une action interdite pour laquelle il existe dans l’inconscient une forte inclination ». La politique est un domaine qui, depuis son apparition, met en valeur des hommes qui éveillent en même temps des émotions ambiguës comme l’admiration, la curiosité, voire parfois la jalousie et le mépris. Avec l’émergence des réseaux sociaux (Twitter et Facebook) et grâce à la liberté d’expression sur Internet, on constate que cette forte inclination de notre inconscient peut enfin être assouvie sans limites. Le but de notre communication sera de présenter comment le tabou concernant les penchants vers l’alcool de l’ex-président de la Pologne Aleksander Kwaśniewski demeure sur Internet. A l’aide de supports visuels et à la fois d’outils contemporains de la communication sur Internet - des mèmes, nous allons présenter une campagne de dénigrement relevant du hate dans laquelle l’euphémisme et l’ironie sont responsables de la rupture d’un tabou datant d’il y a près de 25 ans. Notre classement sera effectué sur un corpus d’une centaine de mèmes tirés essentiellement de Facebook et du fanpage « Aleksander Kwaśniewski Memes ». Mis à part l’analyse sociolinguistique de ce phénomène, nous allons procéder à un classement de ces mèmes du point de vue de leur construction en distinguant entre autres les figures, les allusions, les néologismes, les emprunts, les jeux graphiques et phonétiques qui s’y produisent.

Justifying Academic Freedom: Mill and Marcuse Revisited

I argue that the core of genuinely academic freedom ought to be freedom in research and teaching, subject to disciplinary standards of expertise. I discuss the law in the United States, Germany, and England, and express doubts about the American view that distinctively academic freedom ought to encompass extramural speech on matters of public importance (speakers should be protected from employment repercussions for such speech, but not because of their freedom qua academics). I treat freedom of academic expression as a subset of general freedom of expression, focusing on the Millian argument that freedom of expression maximizes discovery of the truth, one regularly invoked by defenders of academic freedom. Marcuse argued against Mill (in 1965) that indiscriminate toleration of expression would not maximize discovery of the truth. I show that Marcuse agreed with Mill that free expression is only truth- and utility-maximizing if certain background conditions obtain: thus Mill argues that the British colony in India would be better off with benevolent despotism than Millian liberty of expression, given that its inhabitants purportedly lacked the maturity and education requisite for expression to be utility-maximizing. Marcuse agrees with Mill that the background conditions are essential, but has an empirical disagreement with him about what those are and when they obtain: Mill finds them wanting in colonial India, Marcuse finds them wanting in capitalist America. Perhaps surprisingly, Marcuse believes that indiscriminate toleration of expression should be the norm governing academic discussions, despite his doubts about the utility-maximizing value of free expression in capitalist America. Why think that? Here is a reason: where disciplinary standards of expertise govern debate, the discovery of truth really is more likely, but only under conditions of indiscriminate freedom of argument, i.e., academic freedom. This freedom is not truly indiscriminate: its boundaries are set by disciplinary competence, which raises an additional question I try to address. In sum, the libertarians (Mill and Popper) and the Marxists (Marcuse) can agree that academic freedom is justified, at least when universities are genuine sites of scientific expertise and open debate.

J.S. Mill's Boundaries of Freedom of Expression: A Critique

AbstractThe essay opens with some background information about the period in which J.S. Mill wrote. The discussion revolves around the concept of blasphemy which Mill considered to be highly problematic. Tagging unpopular views as ‘blasphemous’ amounted to abuse of governmental powers and infringed on the basic liberties of the out-of-favour speakers. The discussion on blasphemy sets the scene to the understanding of Mill's concerns, his priorities and consequently his emphasis on the widest possible liberty of expression. Section 2 presents the Millian principles that are pertinent to his philosophy of free speech: liberty and truth. Section 3 analyzes Mill's very limited boundaries to freedom of expression, asserting that the consequentialist reasoning had led Mill to ignore present tangible harm. It is argued that democracy is required to develop protective mechanisms against harm-facilitating speech.

Legal Aspects of Citizen Journalism in Bangladesh

What follows here is a brief write-up highlighting some key legal issues involving individuals’ freedom of expression in the internet. A citizen journalist is first and foremost, a citizen entitled to the full spectrum of constitutionally guaranteed liberty of speech and expression in all forms. Threats of severe punishment and widening the reach of legal control beyond legitimate limits hurt fundamental democratic values. One conclusion this paper makes is that the laws, if too oppressive, cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, and are liable to be scrapped.

Precedent and Speech

The U.S. Supreme Court has shown a notable willingness to reconsider its First Amendment precedents. In recent years, the Court has departed from its prior statements regarding the constitutional value of false speech. It has revamped its process for identifying categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection. It has changed its positions on corporate electioneering and aggregate campaign contributions. In short, it has revised the ground rules of expressive freedom in ways large and small. The Court generally describes its past decisions as enjoying a presumption of validity through the doctrine of stare decisis. This Article contends that within the context of expressive freedom, there has been no such presumption. When the Court concludes that a precedent reflects a cramped vision of expressive liberty, adherence to the past gives way. Unfettered speech, not legal continuity, is the touchstone. This practice is understandable. After all, free expression is crucial to political and social life. Yet departures from precedent can compromise the notion of constitutional law as enduring and impersonal. Responding to the tension between legal continuity and the undiluted protection of speech, this Article defends precedent as a tool for separating the content of constitutional law from contested matters of interpretive philosophy. The key premise is that a precedent’s perceived harmfulness should generally be irrelevant to whether it is retained or overruled. Perspectives on harmfulness track underlying interpretive commitments that vary from judge to judge, creating a conceptual gulf that the doctrine of precedent is meant to bridge rather than widen. As an alternative, the Article contends that even within the Court’s existing framework, a renewed emphasis on principles of concreteness and content sensitivity would facilitate a more nuanced approach to precedent. Such a development would embrace the reality that not all speech is created equal—and not all limitations on speech are equally bad.