Explanatory Projects Research Articles

Advice as a model for reasons

AbstractSmith (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55, 1995, 109) and Manne (Philosophical Studies, 167, 2014, 89), both following Williams (Making sense of humanity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), have developed advice‐based models of practical reasons. However, advice is not an apt model for reasons. The case for such pessimism is made by examining the positions of Smith and Manne first as attempts to explain the nature of reasons, then as suggestions for reforming our conception of reasons for action. The explanatory projects fail: both views either omit or distort ordinary reasons. The reforming project fails because insufficient reason is provided for thinking that the significant extent of revision offered by these models is worth it. Overall, the advice‐based approach to understanding reasons fails because advising is a social practice to aid with decisions, whereas reasons are considerations that favour action regardless of whether these considerations are inputs to or outputs from such a practice.

A plea for descriptive social ontology

Social phenomena—quite like mental states in the philosophy of mind—are often regarded as potential troublemakers from the start, particularly if they are approached with certain explanatory commitments, such as naturalism or social individualism, already in place. In this paper, we argue that such explanatory constraints should be at least initially bracketed if we are to arrive at an adequate non-biased description of social phenomena. Legitimate explanatory projects, or so we maintain, such as those of making the social world fit within the natural world with the help of, e.g., collective intentionality, social individualism, and the like, should neither exclude nor influence the prior description of social phenomena. Just as we need a description of the mental that is not biased, for example, by (anti)physicalist constraints, we need a description of the social that is not biased, for example, by (anti)individualist or (anti)naturalist commitments. Descriptive social ontology, as we shall conceive of it, is not incompatible with the adoption of explanatory frameworks in social ontology; rather, the descriptive task, according to our conception, ought to be recognized as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. If social phenomena are, for example, to be reduced to nonsocial (e.g., psychological or physical) phenomena, we need first to understand clearly what the social candidates for the reduction in question are. While such descriptive or naïve approaches have been influential in general metaphysics (see Fine 2017), they have so far not been prominent in analytic social ontology (though things are different outside of analytic philosophy, see esp. Reinach (1913). In what follows, we shall outline the contours of a descriptive approach by arguing, first, that description and explanation need to be distinguished as two distinct ways of engaging with social phenomena. Secondly, we defend the claim that the descriptive project ought to be regarded as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. We begin, in Section 2, by considering two different ways of engaging with mental phenomena: a descriptive approach taken by descriptive psychology and an explanatory approach utilized in analytic philosophy of mind. We take these two ways of approaching the study of the mind to be analogous to the distinction we want to draw in social ontology between a descriptive and an explanatory approach to the study of social phenomena. We consider next, in Section 3, how our approach compares to neighboring perspectives that are familiar to us from general metaphysics and philosophy more broadly, such as Aristotle’s emphasis on “saving the appearances”, Strawson’s distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, as well as Fine’s contrast between naïve and foundational metaphysics. In Section 4, we apply the proposed descriptive/explanatory distinction to the domain of social ontology and argue that descriptive social ontology ought to take precedence in the order of inquiry over explanatory social ontology. Finally, in Section 5, we consider and respond to several objections to which our account might seem to be susceptible.

Discrimination and the value of lived experience in Sophia Moreau’s Faces of Inequality

In Faces of Inequality: A Theory of Wrongful Discrimination, Sophia Moreau embarks on a classic philosophical journey. It is what philosophers nowadays call an explanatory project. The goal of explanatory projects is to deepen our understanding of wrongful actions and what they share in common. In this review essay, I argue that Moreau’s book embodies a valuable explanatory project that ought to be on the radar of lawyers, legal theorists, and philosophers. After sketching the book’s arguments, I explain why they are so refreshing. The remainder of the review essay proceeds in a more critical mode. First, I argue that the book’s explanatory aspirations fall short, and I sketch a framework for a more radically pluralistic theory of wrongful discrimination. This framework has the power to embrace Moreau’s compelling view that discrimination wrongs people by failing to treat them as equals while also recognizing a rich array of other discriminatory wrongs found in lived experience. Second, I argue that Faces of Inequality will disappoint readers looking for a truly inclusive account of wrongful discrimination. I end by emphasizing the book’s contribution to political philosophy and its ambition to provide a truly liberatory theory of what we owe to each other as moral and political equals.

Imitation and culture: What gives?

What is the relationship between imitation and culture? This article charts how definitions of imitation have changed in the last century, distinguishes three senses of “culture” used by contemporary evolutionists (Culture1–Culture3), and summarises current disagreement about the relationship between imitation and culture. The disagreement arises from ambiguities in the distinction between imitation and emulation, and confusion between two explanatory projects—the anthropocentric project and the cultural selection project. I argue that imitation gives cultural evolution an inheritance mechanism for communicative and gestural skills (but not technological skills), and cultural selection yields the cognitive mechanisms that make imitation possible.

Two approaches to natural kinds

Philosophical treatments of natural kinds are embedded in two distinct projects. I call these the philosophy of science approach and the philosophy of language approach. Each is characterized by its own set of philosophical questions, concerns, and assumptions. The kinds studied in the philosophy of science approach are projectible categories that can ground inductive inferences and scientific explanation. The kinds studied in the philosophy of language approach are the referential objects of a special linguistic category—natural kind terms—thought to refer directly. Philosophers may hope for a unified account addresses both sets of concerns. This paper argues that this cannot be done successfully. No single account can satisfy both the semantic objectives of the philosophy of language approach and the explanatory projects of the philosophy of science approach. After analyzing where the tensions arise, I make recommendations about assumptions and projects that are best abandoned, those that should be retained, and those that should go their separate ways. I also recommend adopting the disambiguating terminology of “scientific kinds” and “natural kinds” for the different notions of kinds developed in these different approaches.

Davidson’s Wittgenstein

Although the later Wittgenstein appears as one of the most influential figures in Davidson’s later works on meaning, it is not, for the most part, clear how Davidson interprets and employs Wittgenstein’s ideas. In this paper, I will argue that Davidson’s later works on meaning can be seen as mainly a manifestation of his attempt to accommodate the later Wittgenstein’s basic ideas about meaning and understanding, especially the requirement of drawing the seems right/is right distinction and the way this requirement must be met. These ideas, however, are interpreted by Davidson in his own way. I will then argue that Davidson even attempts to respect Wittgenstein’s quietism, provided that we understand this view in the way Davidson does. Having argued for that, I will finally investigate whether, for Davidson at least, his more theoretical and supposedly explanatory projects, such as that of constructing a formal theory of meaning and his use of the notion of triangulation, are in conflict with this Wittgensteinian quietist view.

Scenarios, Probability, and Evidence Scholarship, Old and New.

Scenarios, Probability, and Evidence Scholarship, Old and New.

Replicate after reading: on the extraction and evocation of cultural information

Does cultural evolution happen by a process of copying or replication? And how exactly does cultural transmission compare with that paradigmatic case of replication, the copying of DNA in living cells? Theorists of cultural evolution are divided on these issues. The most important objection to the replication model has been leveled by Dan Sperber and his colleagues. Cultural transmission, they argue, is almost always reconstructive and transformative, while strict ‘replication’ can be seen as a rare limiting case at most. By means of some thought experiments and intuition pumps, I clear up some confusion about what qualifies as ‘replication’. I propose a distinction between evocation and extraction of cultural information, applying these concepts at different levels of resolution. I defend a purely abstract and information-theoretical definition of replication, while rejecting more material conceptions. In the end, even after taking Sperber’s valuable and important points on board, the notion of cultural replication remains a valid and useful one. This is fortunate, because we need it for certain explanatory projects (e.g., understanding cumulative cultural adaptations).

El papel del pensamiento poblacional en la teoría de la doble herencia

Dual inheritance theory is possibly the most promising research programme nowadays available about cultural evolution. However, many misunderstandings still surround its goals and the means to achieve them. In this article, I shall discuss the explicit engagement with population thinking displayed by many supporters of this programme. This, supposedly innocent, engagement actually hides an ambiguity with respect to a set of metaphysical and explanatory commitments. I shall show, by taking into account the two most common interpretations of population thinking – those of Mayr and Sober –, that they lead to two substantially different approaches to many topics, like the causal structure of populations and the best way to model it. The compatibility between both interpretations and dual inheritance theory reveals that there exist, in it, two distinct explanatory projects, whose difference is rarely stressed.

Abstractions, parts, and explanations in cancer sciences

Most often our societies must deal with complex problems that require the look and involvement of multiple scientific and philosophical practice. This is the case of cancer, which is configured as the leading cause of death in the world and as a multifactorial and complex disease. In this paper I recover and use the notion of abstraction worked Levins and Winther who understand it as a necessary moment of science by which parts, wholes and relationships about specific problems are established. Under this view, the plurality of explanations about cancer can be understood as different partition frames, and as the joint and sometimes tension of at least three explanatory projects: the molecular, the epidemiological and the structuralist. In this paper I compare the abstractions that are made from these projects, analyzing his speeches and how they justify their explanatory power. The notion of abstraction allows us to observe how each practice can turn abstractions into concrete realities, and idealizes, that is, reified abstractions that were historically limited, causing detrimental effects on different levels. Thus, this work contributes to a more responsible and pluralistic research about the complex problems such as cancer

The regularity theory of mechanistic constitution and a methodology for constitutive inference

This paper discusses a Boolean method for establishing constitutive regularity statements which, according to the regularity theory of mechanistic constitution, form the core of any mechanistic explanation in neuroscience. After presenting the regularity definition for the constitution relation, the paper develops a set of inference rules allowing one to establish constitutive hypotheses in light of certain kinds of empirical evidence. The general methodology consisting of these rules is characterized as having formed the basis of many successful explanatory projects in neuroscience.

Big Gods, historical explanation, and the value of integrating the history of religion into the broader academy

This article discusses critiques raised by historians of religion concerning Ara Norenzayan's Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), offering some defense of Norenzayan's position, but also discussing in detail the more substantive challenges. It concludes with some reflections on the current position of the history of religion within the Academy, and an argument for why large-scale explanatory projects and interdisciplinary collaboration should be part of the future of our field.

Population thinking and natural selection in dual-inheritance theory.

A deflationary perspective on theories of cultural evolution, in particular dual-inheritance theory, has recently been proposed by Lewens. On this ‘pop-culture’ analysis, dual-inheritance theorists apply population thinking to cultural phenomena, without claiming that cultural items evolve by natural selection. This paper argues against this pop-culture analysis of dual-inheritance theory. First, it focuses on recent dual-inheritance models of specific patterns of cultural change. These models exemplify population thinking without a commitment to natural selection of cultural items. There are grounds, however, for doubting the added explanatory value of the models in their disciplinary context—and thus grounds for engaging in other potentially explanatory projects based on dual-inheritance theory. One such project is suggested by advocates of the theory. Some of the motivational narratives that they offer can be interpreted as setting up an adaptationist project with regard to cumulative change in cultural items. We develop this interpretation here. On it, dual-inheritance theory features two interrelated selection processes, one on the level of genetically inherited learning mechanisms, another on the level of the cultural items transmitted through these mechanisms. This interpretation identifies a need for further modelling efforts, but also offers scope for enhancing the explanatory power of dual-inheritance theory.

Truthmakers: a tale of two explanatory projects

Truthmakers are supposed to explain the truth of propositions, but it is unclear what kind of explanation truthmakers can provide. In this paper, I argue that ‘truthmaker explanations’ conflate two different explanatory projects. The first project is essentially concerned with truth, while the second project is concerned with reductive explanation. It is the latter project, I maintain, which is really central to truthmaking theory. On this basis, a general account of truthmaking can be formulated, which, when combined with a specific theory of reduction (the ‘conceptual entailment approach’), yields a new analysis of truthmaking. This analysis is intuitively appealing and avoids the problem of necessary truths, which poses a serious obstacle for standard accounts.

Part-whole science

A scientific explanatory project, part-whole explanation, and a kind of science, part-whole science are premised on identifying, investigating, and using parts and wholes. In the biological sciences, mechanistic, structuralist, and historical explanations are part-whole explanations. Each expresses different norms, explananda, and aims. Each is associated with a distinct partitioning frame for abstracting kinds of parts. These three explanatory projects can be complemented in order to provide an integrative vision of the whole system, as is shown for a detailed case study: the tetrapod limb. My diagnosis of part-whole explanation in the biological sciences as well as in other domains exploring evolved, complex, and integrated systems (e.g., psychology and cognitive science) cross-cuts standard philosophical categories of explanation: causal explanation and explanation as unification. Part-whole explanation is itself one essential aspect of part-whole science.

On the failure of reductionism in cosmology

I consider several examples of failure of the reductionist approach to explanation in cosmology. I show that they form natural boundaries on this type of explanatory projects. Finally, some speculations regarding possible causes of so uneven success of reductionist explanations are given.

The Victoria Longitudinal Study: From Characterizing Cognitive Aging to Illustrating Changes in Memory Compensation

The article is divided into two sections. First, we describe the key characteristics of the Victoria Longitudinal Study (VLS), including the rationale, design, measures, and research objectives. In general, the VLS may be described as a large-scale, multi-cohort, longitudinal sequential study of human aging. Accordingly, the VLS provides data suitable for multiple descriptive, explanatory, and epidemiological research projects. Second, we present the background, methods and results of three new programmatic studies on intraindividual change and variability in memory compensation. Study 1 reports 6-year change and variability information on five mechanisms of memory compensation. Study 2 describes both personality and health influences on 6-year changes in memory compensation. Study 3 focuses on the influence of initial memory skill on 6-year change and variability in memory compensation.

Critical Realism, Feminist Epistemology, and the Emancipatory Potential of Science: A Comment on Lawson and Harding

In a recent contribution to this Journal , Tony Lawson (1999) claims that the methodological framework of critical realism fits the "explanatory and emancipatory projects" of feminist economics. This essay challenges his claim on the basis that a "naive" notion of science underlies critical realism. It argues that for feminist economists, a rethinking of traditional notions of scientific inquiry is just as important as the rethinking of methodology, and that one cannot be done without the other.

Capitalist schools: explanation and ethics in radical studies of schooling

1. Studying Schools and Assessing Theories 2. Theoretical Debates and Explanatory Claims 3. The Logic and Assessment of Functional Explanations 4. Is there a Selective Tradition? 5. Ethical Values and Marxist Educational Critiques 6. Ethical Values and Marxist Educational Prescriptions 7. Explanatory Projects and Ethical Values.

Libri Ad Mnemosynen Missi

G.B. Kerferd, Aristotle's Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides.?M. Mignucci, Expository Proofs in Aristotle's Syllogistic. ? M. Schofield, Explanatory Projects in Physics 2, 3 and 7.?M. Woods, Universale and Particular Forms in Aristotle's Metaphysics.?J. Ackrill, Change and Aristotle's Theological Argument.?A. Kenny, The Nicomachean Conception of Happiness.?J. Brunschwig, On a Booktitle by Chrysippus: 'On the Fact that the Ancients Admitted Dialectic along with Demonstrations'.?A.A. Long, The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue.?H. Armstrong, Aristotle in Plotinus: The Continuity and Discontinuity of Psyche and Nous.?Pamela Huby, Stages in the Development of Language about Aristotle's Nous.?J. Barnes, Ammonius and Adverbs.?Anne Sheppard, Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of De anima 3,3.?Ilsetraut Hadot, The Role of the Commentaries on Aristotle in the Teaching of Philosophy according to the Prefaces of the Neoplatonic Commentaries on the Categories.??. Blumenthal, Nous pathetikos in Later Greek Philosophy.?H. Robinson, Form and the Immateriality of the Intellect from Aristotle to Aquinas.?R. Sorabji, From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality.?Publications on Ancient Philosophy by A.C. Lloyd.?Indexes.