In Logical Investigations, Husserl undertook the task of deepening the analysis of intentionality developed by Franz Brentano. In effect, Logical Investigations shows that intentionality, taken in Brentano's sense as the relation of consciousness to its objects, has implicit temporal aspects. The perceived object presupposes its constituting intentionality as anterior ground. The anteriority of ground is not simply a temporal anteriority, it is a constitutive anteriority, in effect a presupposition in Kantian transcendental relation to the perceived object. Yet Husserl very skillfully introduces a relation of fulfillment to temporality. Anticipation, expectation, purpose become modalities of intention in which the relation of constituting ground to fulfillment takes time (Husserl, 1970, p. 578ff., pp. 544-45, 563, esp. p. 695). On the basis of this analysis, it is intentionality itself that makes lived time, as the experience of time, possible. A few years later, in the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, Husserl (1964) analyzes temporal experience (lived time) as an essential dimension of consciousness juxtaposed to all considerations of constitutive intentionality. Husserl points out that the experience of pastness is itself rendered possible through a sinking into the past of what is presently experienced, by virtue of which we remain in the presence of what was present as having been present. The present is thus always thick with its past. On the basis of the analysis in the Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, this temporal dimension of consciousness seems to render intentionality itself possible. For the temporal flow of consciousness renders the experience of fullfillment possible, as the relationship between aim and the object aimed at, which is the reverse of the present seeping into the past. In the experience of fulfillment, the past aim remains present as once present, but in fusion with the object aimed at. Thus, fulfillment, and in turn intentionality, have as foundation a time consciousness which allows what is past to be immanently present as past (see p. 233 and fn 11) and conversely what is future to be immanently present as expectation.