Existential Propositions Research Articles

Husserl on Impersonal Propositions

The young Edmund Husserl stressed that the success of his philosophy hinged upon his ability to determine the subject and the predicate of impersonal propositions and their expressions, such as ‘It is raining’. This essay accordingly investigates the tenability of Husserl’s early thought, by executing the first study of his analysis of impersonal propositions from the late 1890s. This examination reshapes our understanding of the inception of phenomenology in two ways. First, Husserl pinpoints the subject by outlining why impersonal expressions are employed during communication. This contravenes interpretations of the early Husserl as uninterested in intersubjectivity. Second, by studying how Husserl determines the predicate by investigating existential propositions, I show that Husserl , in the late 1890s, came to his final view on the concept of being.

Identité narrative et récit contrefactuel dans The Invention of Solitude et 4321 de Paul Auster

Since The Invention of Solitude, Auster has never stopped exploring the intricacies of identity. 45 years after IS, 4 3 2 1 goes beyond a pseudo double identity, as it contains four different characters who share a name that turns out to be deceptive. These identities all refer to a single name (or idem)―Ferguson. This protean narrative entails a narrative identity containing as many existential propositions as there are parallel worlds in the novel. The narration becomes more complex as new narrative threads emerge, exploring the counterfactual. IS used intertextuality as a means of universalizing the author’s experiences, while 4 3 2 1 deals with characters who could have existed, but also with a narrative source whose narrative is but one of the four threads composing this long counterfactual novel, whose unexpected writing style may express a “new humanism.”

Что говорят негативные суждения о существовании?

How to read negative existential claims? This question has been intensively dis­cussed in philosophy. The problem of these propositions is that under standard reading they say something contradictory, i.e. that something that somehow ex­ists does not exist. If so, then all such propositions must be false or having no truth value. But intuitively many of them are true. In this article different so­lutions to the problem of negative existential propositions are critically observed: for instance, the solution consisting in the acceptance of double existence, exis­tence of abstract entities along with material objects, events, states etc., or the so­lution of W.V.O. Quine who treats names as predicates. The author aligns with situationism, the position based on the idea of relativity of existence. From this point of view any existence is an existence in some situation – spacio-temporal section of some world. Situationism presupposes that entities denoted by names like “Pegasus” belong to reality (or the world in question) like normal objects with spatio-temporal features.

Subject and Predicate in Existential Propositions: A Survey of Frege’s Problem and Its Solutions

Subject and Predicate in Existential Propositions: A Survey of Frege’s Problem and Its Solutions

The Meaning of Being: Husserl on Existential Propositions as Predicative Propositions

This essay examines how Husserl stretches the bounds of his philosophy of meaning, according to which all propositions are categorical, to account for existential propositions, which seem to lack predicates. I examine Husserl’s counterintuitive conclusion that an existential proposition does possess a predicate and I explore his endeavor to pinpoint what that predicate is. This goal is accomplished in three stages. First, I examine Husserl’s standard theory of predication and categorial intuition from his 1901 Logical Investigations. Second, I show how Husserl imposes those 1901 insights to uncover the predicate of the existential proposition in unpublished manuscripts and lectures. He determines that the existential proposition predicates of the subject, that it corresponds to an actual object. This analysis reveals that Husserl’s descriptions of existential propositions from the late 1890s employed both static and genetic methodologies. In those texts, he carefully untangles and clarifies the co-enmeshed passive and active moments of consciousness and shows that the passive givenness of certain circumstances is the condition of possibility for our active verifying of propositions. Finally, I execute a critical assessment of Husserl’s thought to reveal that, while his insights about existential propositions are largely correct, they are augmented by re-construing them within the context of his mature philosophy. Only by renouncing his metaphysical neutrality and by accounting for intersubjectivity, can Husserl properly clarify existential propositions.

Purely Theoretical Explanations

This paper introduces a new kind of explanation that we describe as ‘purely theoretical’. We first present an example, E, of what we take to be a case of purely theoretical explanation. We then show that the explanation we have in mind does not fit neatly into any of the existing categories of explanation. We take this to give us prima facie motivation for thinking that purely theoretical explanation is a distinctive kind of explanation. We then argue that it can earn its keep via application to two existing literatures: the literature on how we explain the truth of true negative existential propositions and the literature on how we explain the truth of true propositions about the past. We reply to some possible concerns regarding the introduction of purely theoretical explanations. We conclude that there is nothing obviously wrong with them and explore the ramifications for particular debates in metaphysics.

MODAL VERBS TO EXPRESS CONFIDENCE / UNCERTAINTY

The article deals with the concepts of modality and the way it influences utterances in a fictional discourse. The confidence / uncertainty of the utterances with epistemic modal verbs (must, have to / have got to, might, may, could, should, ought to, would, will) was analyzed and ranked on the probability scale of Renooij S. and Witteman C. It was found that must, have to, modified with epistemic words will and would and hypothetic will belong to “probable” (85%) part of the scale, should, ought to, and hypothetic would belong to “fifty-fifty” (50%) part of the scale, might, may, could belong to “uncertain” (25%) part of the scale, might not, may not, could not, would not, should not belong to “improbable” (15%) part of the scale, can’t, will not belong to “impossible” (0%) part of the scale.The article also analyzed modality strength and degree of modal verbs and direction of uncertainty of utterances with modal verbs. An important point discovered in the research is that other epistemic words that co-occur with epistemic modal verbs influence their direction of uncertainty, strength and degree of modality. The influence of epistemic words on modal verbs with a strong deontic component and futurality component was studied. The article also studies the structural composition of utterances with different modal verbs. It’s discovered that should, ought to, could are often followed by existential propositions and may, could are followed by contradictory propositions.

Dashtakī (d. 1498) and Dawānī (d. 1502) on the Analysis of Existential Propositions

Abstract The present article is a reconstruction of a logical dispute concerning the analysis of existential propositions between the two rivals from Shiraz, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 1502) and Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 1498), a dispute that continued to echo down to the nineteenth century, especially in Iran and the Indian subcontinent. The controversy was elicited by a passage from a discussion in the commentary by Qūshjī (d. 1474) on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd in which Qūshjī had briefly suggested that perhaps the predicates “existent” (mawjūd) and “nonexistent” (maʿdūm) are unusual in not needing a copula to link them to the subject. Dashtakī thought that a copula is needed in both existential and non-existential predications, but that in existential predications the copula is simply the union of subject and predicate, whereas in non-existential predications there is an additional copula that signifies the existence or nonexistence of the predicate for the subject. Dawānī’s position was that existential and non-existential predications are exactly on a par and should both be analyzed into subject, copula and predicate.

Existential unaccusativity and new discourse referents

It is well-known that new information strongly disprefers subject position in English (Horn 1986; Prince 1981; 1992; Beaver et al., 2005), even though English allows indefinite subjects. English is therefore seen as one of the many languages that adheres to the given-new contract (Clark & Haviland, 1977). This paper argues that a subset of intransitive sentences in English readily establishes new discourse referents in subject position—in an apparent breach of the given-new contract. These sentences, exemplified by A fancy lady waltzed in, are analyzed as syntactically unaccusative and semantically as having an existential proposition. These sentences are termed existential unaccusative: in the proposed VP structure, a verbal root that (typically) denotes manner of motion selects for a headed small clause whose subject is interpreted as a Path to a contextually-determined location. The analysis adapts McCloskey’s (2014) analysis of Irish existentials to English, and I argue that sentences with this structure establish discourse referents by the same means as existential there BE sentences. The analysis is discussed in the context of claims made by Du Bois (1987) that languages organize information such that new discourse referents are established as objects of transitive sentences and subjects of intransitive sentences. This analysis suggests that Du Bois’s generalization holds for a structurally distinct subset of intransitives in English in sharing the discourse function of introducing new discourse referents.

Conceiving existence: on Hume’s argument against the distinctness of the idea of existence

ABSTRACTThere are two questions concerning Hume’s doctrine of existence which have not yet found any persuasive answer: (a) What is his argument in favour of the thesis that there is no distinct idea of existence? (b) What are the semantic and metaphysical consequences of this thesis within his philosophical framework? This paper mainly aims to answer question (a). In order to do that, I will first explain why some reconstructions suggested by interpreters such as Cummins and Bricke are problematic. One of them relies on exegetically dubious presumptions; the other departs too much from Hume’s text. Then, I will offer my own reconstruction that makes maximal use of some principles which are very familiar to Hume’s readers, including the principle stating the similarity between perceptions and their images. After that, I will discuss a potential objection to my reconstruction and make a brief remark on question (b), arguing that, as opposed to numerous interpreters’ concerns, Hume’s thesis that there is no distinct idea of existence does not by itself prevent him from being able to conceive negative existential propositions.

Ibn Sīnā's Solution to Kant's Challenging View of Existence

Jerome Shaffer (1962) claimed that Kant's view on existence leads to two problems—what I call problem of contradiction and problem of insignificance. The former shows that existential propositions are analytic, while Kant asserted that they are synthetic. According to the latter, Kant's view implies that in the act of predicating either, the subjects do not have and cannot capture their exact extensions and/or no predicate could be a real predicate. After formulating the two problems, Ibn-Sīnā's views concerning essence, existence, and their relations are explained. Then, it is shown how the problems can find satisfactory solutions on the basis of Ibn-Sīnā's views.

Methodological Reterritorialization of Journalistic Narratives

This paper presents a methodological proposal for journalistic work in the academy, using the assumptions made by Foucault, Latour, Deleuze and Guattari, among others. It is understood that given the dynamics lived by the current society, the researcher in journalism needs to seek new methodological approaches more appropriate to the particularities that involve his doing, with the final objective to seek satisfactory results for the communication process. In this case, using methods originally formulated by another field of knowledge, with the aim of delineating a new field of continuities and discontinuities in the journalistic narrative practices in vogue. It is up to the researcher to seize the fertility of concepts and work on possibilities of new articulations. The main attempt is to structure in the journalistic method other scientific knowledge handcuffed by Cartography, Network Analysis, existential and material territories and other propositions besides the New Journalism and all the current methods and cognitive presuppositions, which implies a transcendent and Evolution of the methodologies adopted.

Kant and Frege on existence

According to what Jonathan Bennett calls the Kant–Frege view of existence, Frege gave solid logical foundations to Kant’s claim that existence is not a real predicate. In this article I will challenge Bennett’s claim by arguing that although Kant and Frege agree on what existence is not, they agree neither on what it is nor on the importance and justification of existential propositions. I identify three main differences: first, whereas for Frege existence is a (non-relational) property of a concept, for Kant it is a relational property pertaining between the concept and intuition of an object. Second, whereas for Frege truth about individuals presupposes their existence, for Kant truth is in many cases (including judgments about individuals) independent of the (possible) existence of objects. Third, whereas Frege binds logic to existence and removes modalities from logic, for Kant existence is a modal category that is emphatically removed from the domain of (general) logic and set in the core of metaphysics. Due to these differences in Kant’s and Frege’s theories of existence, Frege cannot be seen as giving logical clarity to Kant’s view.

What Can Humans Cognize about the Self from Experience? Comments on Corey Dyck’s “The Development of Kant’s Psychology during the 1770’s”

I agree with Dyck’s basic claim that Kant follows the methodology of Rational Psychology in setting up his critique of it: He starts as it starts, with an existential proposition ‘I think.’ On the other hand, I am not convinced of Dyck’s use of the Dreams essay in establishing a timeline for the development of Kant’s views on inner sense. That essay is evidence that Kant thinks that Schwendenborg’s metaphysics is ungrounded, because he has a crazy sort of inner sense, but it does not show that Kant rejected a more standard internal sense at this time. I also suggest that some of Kant’s vacillation about inner sense depends on an unusual feature of his doctrine of the representations of space and time: They are composed of both sensory and a priori elements. My hypothesis is that the seeming vacillation about inner sense may be a reflection of whether whether he is considering it broadly, as a faculty that provides intuitions with a particular form, or whether he is restricting what it provides to what can be sensed.

存在否定命題の問題について

存在否定命題の問題について

Patterns of variation in existential constructions

The main goal of the present paper is twofold: on the one hand, to highlight the patterns of variation among the existential constructions found in Italo-Romance and Sardinian dialects; on the other, to examine the observed microvariation in a comparative perspective in order to identify common properties and general tendencies. Starting from a description of the variation concerning the primary components of existentials and depending on the copula selected, I show that, irrespective of the superficial morphosyntactic variation attested, all Italo-Romance existential constructions share a fundamental property: their distinguishing features can all be viewed as the reflex of the persistence of formal properties continuing or overlapping with a source construction. This construction is either the locative predication, when be is selected, or the possessive structure, when the existential copula is have. The pivot of the existential construction therefore shows properties typical of arguments, which are however subject to a high degree of instability and variation because it has been semantically reanalysed as the predicate of an abstract contextual domain serving as the argument of the existential proposition. This mismatch between the syntactic and the semantic characteristics of existential structures contributes to the microvariation encountered.

Irish Existentials in Context

AbstractThis paper aims to contribute to the comparative typology of existential constructions by examining Irish existentials in detail. It goes on to engage some of the central theoretical issues raised in that investigation and provides support for the bifurcated analysis of the definiteness restriction proposed by McNally (1992). It identifies what is argued to be a true existential predicate and argues that there is no common syntactic form for existentials crosslinguistically; rather, the observed commonalities among existentials across languages reflect semantic primitives out of which they are constructed. Diversity in the expression of existential propositions principally reflects different patterns of lexicalization.

The Hard Road to Presentism

AbstractIt is a common criticism of presentism – the view according to which only the present exists – that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a ‘no truthmakers’ approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed.

Anomalous experiences, psi and functional neuroimaging

Anomalous experiences, psi and functional neuroimaging

The logico-epistemological nature of ontic and ontological arguments

In the paper I explore van Inwagen?s distinction between ontic and ontological arguments, the latter being a special case of the former. An ontic argument proves the existence of some entity; an ontological one proves the existence of a deity. Both are based on a single premise which specifies a set of properties exemplified by an entity of the sort in question. This set van Inwagen calls an ontic set, and he defines the ontic set of an ontological argument in a way which secures the semantic validity of the argument. I argue that an ontological argument is neither immediate nor semantically valid, but that, contrary to van Inwagen?s contention, it is rational to accept its conclusion. In my argument for this claim I rely on C.I. Lewis? notions of intension and comprehension. Although I disagree with van Inwagen?s formulation of ontic arguments, I do not reject it as a whole - its considerable advantage is, I suggest, in blocking an objection (which allegedly follows from Fregean semantics) that the sentence ?God exists? is not well formed. Consequently, part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of existential propositions. The argument I give in favour of the rationality of believing in the conclusion of an ontological argument is based on identifying and avoiding the step which leads to a generalization resembling the one that generates Kyburg?s lottery paradox.