Existence Of Dasein Research Articles

Conceptualization of everyday life in philosophy of M. Heidegger and R. Barthes

The article is devoted to the analysis of the concepts of everyday life in the works of M. Heidegger and R. Barthes. Based on textual and comparative analysis, the author offers her own interpretation of the meaning of the concept of "everyday life" in "Being and Time". In the first section of the study, the author examines Dasein and some structures of its existence, the concept of "das Man" as the basis of inauthentic existence, two modes of Dasein's existence and their connection with the meaning of everyday life. Particular attention is paid to Barthes's work "How to Live Together: Novelistic Simulations of Some Everyday Spaces", which is a collection of his lectures, his concept of "idiorrythmie" in connection with the study of the structure of everyday life. Barthes continues the work begun by Heidegger, but tries to establish and reveal the cultural and ideological influence on human everyday life. To accomplish the tasks, the author uses a methodology that is based on the methods of textual and comparative analysis, as well as the problematization of concepts. The main conclusions of the conducted research are, firstly, the identification of three possible meanings of "everyday life" in the work "Being and Time", secondly, the disclosure of the discourse on everyday life in the framework of R. Barthes's philosophical works, thirdly, an attempt to identify the cultural and ideological influence on the grasp of everyday life by man. Thus, it was established that everyday life itself, as an a priori-ontological condition of human existence, is unchangeable, but only the perception of everyday life by man or his way of grasping everyday life in consciousness changes. In this sense, Barthes continues and brings to a new level the work begun by Heidegger, but he starts not from individual consciousness, but from the life of the "I" with others in everyday life as a space of idiorrhythmes. The discovery of common features of reflections on everyday life in Heidegger and Barthes prompts the author to trace the influence of philosophical texts on changes in the subject of the humanities.

The Great Wall and Time

Abstract Heidegger suggests that the manner of research is neither historiological nor systematic, but instead phenomenological. The phenomenological approach to time is to grasp time from the existence of Dasein. If time is understood from a phenomenological standpoint, the Great Wall has rich and vivid images, thus revealing very different life implications. But phenomenological time cannot be divorced from historical time or systemic time; otherwise, we cannot understand the life of the Other.

Martin Heidegger mengenai Mengada secara Otentik dan Relevansinya bagi Pelayanan Kesehatan

<p>Human existence is perceived by Martin Heidegger as Dasein, that being-in-the-world. The modes of existence of Dasein in the world are Being-with-the-other (<em>Mitsein</em>), Being-alongside-things (<em>Sein-bei</em>), and Being-one’s-self (<em>Selbstein</em>). For Heidegger, the ideal mode of existence of Dasein is Being-one’s-self (<em>Selbstein</em>). Only through this mode of being that Dasein forms its distinctiveness from other entities which are just being-within-the-world. As to the convenience of enjoying the objects of the world, idle talk or gossipping can cause Dasein to forget its authentic being. After describing the thoughts of Heidegger on the fall of Dasein into being unauthentic, this paper highlights the ontological awareness of the existence of Dasein towards death as an authentic mode of existence. At the end of this writing, I propose narration as a ‘tool’ to be used by health care providers in assisting the patient to affirm and accept illness experience as their modes of being.</p>

Merleau-Ponty’s Criticism of Heidegger

It now clear that took seriously the criticism that Being and Time did not adequately address the human body.1 He addresses this criticism in the Zollikon Seminars2 and provides a brief outline of an existential theory of the body, one that bears a striking similarity to Merleau-Ponty's, as both Richard Askay and Kevin Aho have recently claimed.3 Another thing that clear that MerleauPonty was among the most Heideggerian of the French philosophers of his generation, since he adopts Heidegger's etoasis characterization of human existence, i.e., the subject's active transcendence toward the world, and speaks of perception as occurring through the anonymous of the body and not as a personal choice.4 It also true, as some have claimed, that The Visible and Invisible5 Merleau-Ponty 's most Heideggerian text,6 since, in his own words, he attempts to move even further from the of Phenomenology of Perception - by developing an ontology of the Flesh, by developing a theory of perception that nature perceiving itself through one of its own, through the human body. In a Heideggerian spirit, Merleau-Ponty claims that the individual's experience rests upon the body that opens to a world that includes it and other human bodies. The individual's Flesh blends with the greater Flesh of the world. Yet, even though recent commentators have claimed that a similarity between Heidegger's and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body, they have also claimed that Heidegger's Being-in-the-world supersedes the body and remains more primary. Heidegger's position remains more worldly and less attached to the subjectivism that necessarily remains a part of an individual's orientation toward the world, and, apparently, the subjectivism that remains a part of Merleau-Ponty 's theory of the body (Askay 32). Kevin Aho presents Heidegger's analysis of the body in the Zollikon Seminars as similar to Merleau-Ponty's in that each seeks to overcome the body understood merely as an object or merely as a vehicle for a Cartesian subject. For both the body must be understood as Uvedthrough (Aho 15). However, Aho also claims that the Zollikon Seminars remain at the level of the ontic-existetiell, describing the concrete activities and perceptions of a 'factical' individual. This of course means that the comparable analysis provided by MerleauPonty, especially in Phenomenology of Perception, also remains at the level of the ontic, at the level of the individual's body (Aho 16; see Askay 32-33). Aho also points out that Being and Time, on the other hand, more primarily concerned with the ontological structures that determine the of beings ___ These constitute the Da, the disclosure site in which any entity whatsoever can show up as such and such. That why claims that it a mistake to interpret as . . . in a determinate place, 'here and not there' (Aho 16).7 One thing, then, that distinguished from Merleau-Ponty that the latter adheres to the here-there structure of a particular embodied opening upon the world, while Heidegger, at least in Being and Time, focuses on the there in a way that supposedly transcends the here of the situated, embodied subject. As Richard Askay expresses it, referring to and quoting Heidegger, bodily possible because our beingin-the-world always already consists 'of a relatedness in which we perceive-apprehend that which addresses us out of the openness of our world' (Askay 32: see ZS-G 293, ZS-E 232).8 Bodily-being, he continues, is 'founded upon' Dasein's responsiveness to the clearing (Askay 32: see ZS-G 232, ZS-E 186). Moreover, he states that Dasein 's existence the precondition for the possibiUty of being (Askay 32; see ZS-G 113, ZS-E 86-87). Askay thus concludes that Heidegger . . . would no doubt have accepted MerleauPonty's premise that the Uved body and existence 'presuppose each other,' and yet deny his conclusion that neither 'can be regarded as the original of the human being' (Askay 33). …

Aus meiner Erfahrung der japanischen Übersetzung von <i>Sein und Zeit</i>

I have first translated Sein und Zeit in Japanese in 1971 in collaboration with my elder colleague Prof. Hara in Tokyo. But in 1976 both he and Martin Heidegger died, and in 1977 a new edition of Sein und Zeit was published as part of Heidegger's complete works. This new edition included many marginal notes of Heidegger's and many textual revisions made by Heidegger him-self. Therefore, I have published in 2003, based on the old version of my Japanese translation, a totally revised Japanese translation of Sein und Zeit, in which, as translator, I have written a new introduction, many explicatory notes about Heidegger's marginal notes and textual modifications and a chronological detailed record of Heidegger's career. Out of this expericnce, I would like to detail upon two aspects: first, any nowadays reader of this work must study not only the original text itself, but also, by all means, Heidegger's marginal notes, in order to correctly grasp a development of his thought on Being, Secondary, a reader must especially pay attention to the difficult problem of the relationship between authenticity and inauthenticity of the Being-in-the-world, because here is the most basic problem of the existence of Dasein and it is here the place where the turning point in Heidegger's later thought on Being has its origin.

To Think as Mortals

Immortals are mortal, mortals immortal, living the other's death, dead in the other's life. Heraclitus, 22B62 En-owning owns god over to man in that it owns man to god. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Front Enowning) The relation between philosophy and the existence of Dasein is a recurrent theme in Heidegger's writing. Analyses of anxiety, conscience, and resoluteness sit alongside reminders of the demands made by a philosophical life and calls for commitment on the part of his students. It is not just that philosophy is difficult or time consuming. For Heidegger, there is an unbreakable link between philosophy and the existence of Dasein, insofar as the temporal horizon for the disclosure of Being is to be elicited from the existence of Dasein itself, in and through which the ontological difference occurs. Fundamental ontology rests on an ontic foundation.1 Moreover, fundamental ontology depends for its success on the extent to which Heidegger's philosophical analysis can preserve the dimension of the ontological difference, while at the same time affirming the of the relation between the optic and the ontological. The recognition of this necessity, which informs the problematic of Being and Time, amounts to an acknowledgment that philosophy itself is inextricably linked to the finitude of human existence: to its temporality, affectivity, understanding, and above all to its mortality. It is for this reason that in Heidegger's view philosophy cannot be undertaken as a specialism abstracted or otherwise set apart from one's existence as a whole. Even as we read denials that authenticity is ethically privileged, it is plain that Heidegger regards philosophy as making extraordinary demands on the individual. Indeed, the involvement and engagement it demands are such as to require the illusion, as it were, that the given task at hand is the one and only necessary task; to accomplish anything at all one must, says Heidegger, have acquired that art of existing [Existierkunst] by which this illusion of is conjured and sustained from out of the finitude of existence.2 In view of the fact that Heidegger regards philosophy as a distinctive possibility essential to the existence of Dasein as such, two questions present themselves. First, what are the repercussions for philosophy of its optic foundation in the existence of Dasein? Second, does the activity of philosophy represent the accomplishment of the existence of each individual Dasein? To these, a third may also be added: why is the unique necessity of philosophy said by Heidegger to be an illusion? These questions will be approached via an issue central to the critical appropriation of Aristotle that figured so highly in the early period of Heidegger's writing; namely, that of the relation between phronesis and sophia.3 Placing the question of this relation in proximity to that of the optic foundation of ontology, and the accompanying interest in the mutual implication of philosophy and existence, will help to shed light both on Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle and on his understanding of finitude of philosophy. Phronesis and Sophia In the course of making the case for sophia as the crowning accomplishment of a good life, Aristotle exhorts us, in line with the overarching teleology that governs his philosophy, not to be satisfied with the Euripidean advice to think as mortals, but rather to be true to the highest, divine, element within our souls.4 The opposition between phronesis and sophia is thereby aligned with that between the human and the divine, the mortal and the immortal. Their crossing, which is never a reduction or subordination, poses the question of mortality in relation to philosophy. In view of Heidegger's acknowledgment of the implication of philosophy in the finitude of human existence, we are bound to reconsider this inter-relation of the human and the divine, the mortal and the immortal. …

On the Borders of Language and Death

On the penultimate page of the Gesamtausgabe edition of Heidegger's essay "Das Wesen der Sprache" ("The Essence of Language"), we find the following brief and enigmatic passage: Die Sterblichen sind jene, die den Tod als Tod erfahren konnen. Das Tier vermag dies nicht. Das Tier kann aber auch nicht sprechen. Das Wesenverhaltnis zwischen Tod and Sprache blitzt auf, ist aber noch ungedacht. Es kann uns jedoch einen Wink geben in die Weise, wie das Wesen der Sprache uns zu sich belangt and so bei sich verhalt, fur den Fall, dass der Tod mit dem zusammenghort, was uns be-langt. [Mortals are they who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do so. But animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between language and death flashes up before us, but remains still unthought. It can, however, beckon us toward the way in which the nature of language draws us into its concern and so relates us to itself, in case death belongs together with what reaches out for us, touches us.]1 The unthought announced here, the "essential relation between language and death," still remains largely unthought today. In his book, Language and Death,2 Giorgio Agamben attempts to begin to think through this relation between language and death, and to explore the implications that a thinking of this unthought might have for a new and different understanding of the ethico-political. Our task in the present essay is not simply to reconstitute the argument of Agamben's text, but to interrogate his thought concerning the essential relation between language and death from the perspective of the question of the animal. Specifically we wish to inquire about the status and the place of the animal in a thought of community that attempts to understand the relation to language and death otherwise. Man's Ethos Beyond Voice and Negativity The introductory section of Language and Death opens with the quotation from Heidegger's On the Way to Language that we have cited above. Agamben isolates one phrase from this quotation by repeating it in italics: "The essential relation between death and language flashes up before us, but remains still unthought" (LD xi). He then proposes a thematic investigation of this relation between language and death, not only in Heidegger's text, but also in decisive places in the history of western metaphysics, specifically in Hegel, medieval grammatical thought, and modern linguistics. The structure of Agamben's task is fitting since throughout Western metaphysics man's essence has consistently been determined through the possession of one or another distinct abilities or faculties, prominent among them being the capacity for language (e.g., man as noon logon echon in Aristotle) and the capacity for death (e.g., Fahigkeit des Todes in Hegel). Is there any essential connection between these two specific capacities? Anticipating the method and conclusion of Agamben's argument, we can say here at the outset that this question will be investigated through an interrogation of the place of negativity in metaphysical theories of language and death, and that the problem of the Voice will be the clue that leads to the discovery of a common negativity at the core of both of the these capacities. Beginning with an examination of the place of negativity in metaphysics, Agamben looks to Heidegger's discussion of death in paragraphs 50-53 in Sein and Zeit. Here, Heidegger radically reverses the common notion that death is simply an accident that befalls human beings by arguing that death is essential to Dasein's existence. Dasein is not related to death like some chance occurrence that happens to come its way; rather, Heidegger insists, death is Dasein's "ownmost possibility," and as long as Dasein exists it has an essential relation to dying in the form of Being-towards-death. The anticipation of death as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence as such is witnessed or attested to in the call of conscience (Ruf des Gewissens). …

Ricoeur's "Human Time" as a Response to the Problem of Closure in Heideggerian Temporality

In this essay I explicate Heidegger's conception of to show that the account of self understanding and interpretation built upon that conception fails to provide the closure necessary for determinacy self understanding. The flaw lies a discontinuity between the two levels of within Heidegger's concept ofBeing-toward-death. This discontinuity prevents the formation of a requisite temporal unity and a concommitant conceptual unity. I go on to explain how Paul Ricoeur's account of time responds to this problem by drawing on the strategies of poetics (specifically narrative) to articulate both temporal and conceptual unity. Ricoeur identifies the processes by which two levels of interweave to achieve a tentative, unstable closure through the inscription of phenomenological on objective time.1 The strategies which fix meaning by connecting together the diverse aspects of human acting can also disconnect and reconnect those elements ongoing processes of re-interpretation across chronological time. Dasein: The Ontological Temporality of Subjectivity Heidegger attempts to expose the ontological structures of human being through analysis of the implicit structures of self awareness and experience. This analysis reveals that, as a subject, one always already finds oneself encountering a wherein one is aware of one's existence that as self aware, i.e., as having orientation to, and concern for, one's existence. This mode of existence Heidegger calls Dasein.2 As self consciousness, or subjectivity, only can enquire into its own existence as enquirer. This existence as enquiry into its own existence is ontological: it refers to Dasein's being an entity for which, intimately involved its being-in-the world, this very being is at issue.3 is not entity, but is a mode of existence characteristic, indeed, constitutive, of being a human subject. That is to say, to exist as a self is to live this self concernfulness; there is no other essence, no soul or substantiality behind self consciousness, no telos determining what we are to be. The single defining feature of a self is concern with one's existence: one's existence is always issue. For this reason Heidegger says that the essence of is its potentiality: in each case possible ways for it to be.4 Because human being lacks predetermination, it can be characterized only by potentiality-the potentiality to become various kinds of lives. Aware of life's potential, it is up to each subject to carve out existence for himself or herself, to create the meaning of one's own life. This is the task of self determination. Self determination is necessary if one is to acquire identity, i.e., to become some-one. This is why Heidegger says that Dasein has each case mineness, and that Dasein is mine to be one way or another.5 The peculiar feature of human existence is that we are required to, as it were, appropriate our lives from the many possibilities and situations before us. The meaning of one's experiences is not a function of either nature or God, but of our own self activity. Our capacity for self determination is the response to the closure necessary for potentiality to become actuality. As potentiality-to-be, Dasein's being is fundamentally temporal-we are in-the world oriented to what we are to be; that is, we have a basic orientation to our own existence terms of our future.6 If the essence of being a subject is to be self concerned, then it is to be concerned with oneself a fundamentally temporal, and primarily futural, way. Because of the futural orientation of self concern, Dasein's existence is primordially practical. Heidegger argues that my understanding of the is, firstly, terms of tasks rather than objects, and it is the tasks that I find myself amongst that give definition and purpose to objects around me.7 Finding oneself always already among tasks, is said to be thrown. …

JThe Birth of Difference

Although birth marks the entrance of a human being into the world and establishes the very possibility of experience the philosophical implications of this event have been largely ignored in the history of thought. This is particularly troubling in phenomenology in general and in the work of Martin Heidegger in particular. While Heidegger raises the issue of birth he drops it very quickly on the path to defining Dasein's existence as constituted from the standpoint of death, as being-towards-death. In this paper I argue, contra Heidegger, that intentional existence can only be understood from the standpoint of birth. I begin by showing that intentionality inheres in a double difference that is fundamentally dependent on birth insofar as birth is an original differentiating from prenatal existence. I conclude with the argument that only a philosophy that regards Dasein from the standpoint of birth, as being-from-birth, can give an adequate account of humans as beings who live with others and who can initiate sense constitution and action.

THE HEIDEGGERIAN BIAS TOWARD DEATH: A CRITIQUE OF THE ROLE OF BEING‐TOWARDS‐DEATH IN THE DISCLOSURE OF HUMAN FINITUDE

Abstract: In this paper I take issue with Heidegger's use of the concept of death as a means of disclosing human finitude. I argue that Being‐towards‐death is inadequate to the disclosure of Dasein's thrownness which is necessary for the kind of authentic historizing that Heidegger describes and furthermore leads to a reading of authenticity which is preclusive of Being‐with‐Others, I suggest that this difficulty may be alleviated through increased attention to the opposite boundary of Dasein's existence, namely its birth. Although I do not pursue the project here of conducting a phenomenology of birth, I suggest some directions for proceeding with that task, and I illustrate that a greater emphasis on Dasein's beginning will increase the richness of our understanding of our Being‐with‐Others.

Is Heidegger a Nihilist?

IS HEIDEGGER A NIHILIST? T HE shift in accent which occurs in the works posterior to 1930 marks Heidegger's concentration on developing the positive side of the doctrine of finite Being. Viewed thus positively, the Being revealed by the Dasein's existence is historical. Consequently, the sum-total of the historical destiny of mankind composes the immeasurably rich treasury of concrete human possibility, which, in the form of the progressive illumination of the things that are, can be called their Being. But because the Dasein is finite, the negative element, so strongly emphasized by Heidegger in Was ist Metaphysik? cannot be ignored, but joins with the positive to weave a chiaroscuro picture of a revelation of the things that are that is at the same time always a dissimulation. In the Postscript to Was ist Metaphysik?, written in 19M3, some 13 years after the Inaugural Lecture itself, Heidegger seeks to equilibriate the black and the white of what was said in the original discussion of the Nothing. After having admitted that Was ist Metaphysik? is thought" in transition" which has not borne its full positive fruit and which remains too much in reaction against the traditional ontology, Heidegger seeks to show that what was written there is nevertheless basically sound. To put the earlier doctrine into clear perspective , Heidegger proposes to allay three" misgivings" that have arisen concerning the work, with the intention of showing that the lecture may, and indeed should, in each case be interpreted in a way that leads past the forbidding negative assertions to a positive doctrine of Being. These misgivings are of particular interest, for they not only show the points about which the later Heidegger has become sensitive, but in the answers furnished to each problem we are provided with a· vivid demonstration of the advances which the later Heidegger has made in coming into full, positive possession of the ontology he would found in breaking with the past. 302 IS HEIDEGGER A NIHILIST? 303 The three misgivings are these: (1) Having made "nothing " (das Nichts) the subject of metaphysics, the lecture becomes the last word in Nihilism; (2) A philosophy of "Angst " paralyzes the will to act; (3) The anti-logicism of the lecture leads to a philosophy of pure feeling.1 Let us examine the author's answer to each misgiving separately. 1. After reviewing the analysis in Was ist Metaphysik? that led to the affirmation of the Nothing, Heidegger seeks to forestall any possible nihilistic interpretation of his intentions. It would be immature ... to adopt the facile explanation that Nothing is merely the nugatory, equating it with the non-existent (das Wesenlose). We should rather equip ourselves and make ready for one thing only: to experience in Nothing the vastness of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being itself. Without Being, whose unfathomable and unmanifest essence is vouchsafed us by the Nothing in essential dread, everything that "is" would remain in Beinglessness (Sein losigkeit). But this is not a nugatory nothing, assuming that it is the truth of Being that Being never essentializes itself without Seienden, and Seienden cannot be without Being.2 The opening of a transcendental horizon is not, indeed, a nugatory nothing, just as it is not either the work of a " something," -a Seiende in its Seiendheit. But when the philosopher wishes to introduce into history the proper presence of the Presence that opens an horizon, and he wishes to distinguish his conception of " Being " from the traditional metaphysical conception which always begins with things as things, then clearly the first effort at expression is bound to be negative.... Being is NOT Seiendheit. Even when Heidegger affirms that it is Anguish which reveals that the Nothing is at the heart of the transcendence of Being, this is not nihilistic in the visual sense. Indeed, anguish is the grasp of the radical freedom of our finitude, but it is that freedom in and through its finitude which makes possible that presence of the things-that-are which we call "Being." The accent then is positive when Heidegger 1 Was ist Metaphysik? p. 45. ~ Was ist Metaphyaik? p. 46. 804 THOMAS D. LANGAN...